PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE BRITISH ACADEMY

1903–1904

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A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF
THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACADEMY

AT a Meeting of the Representatives of the chief European and American Academies, held at Wiesbaden in October, 1899, a scheme was drawn up for the organization of an International Association of the principal Scientific and Literary Academies of the World.

The scheme provided for the division of the Association into two Sections, viz. a Section of 'Natural Science' and a Section of 'Literary Science,' the term 'Literary' being used to indicate the sciences of language, history, philosophy, and antiquities, and other subjects the study of which is based on scientific principles, but which are not included under the term 'Natural Science.'

While the Royal Society represented at the Association the United Kingdom in the Section of 'Natural Science,' no existing institution was at that date deemed competent to represent the United Kingdom in the section dealing with historical, philosophical, and philological studies.

In consequence of this defect in existing English institutions, these branches of study in the United Kingdom were not represented at the first meeting of the International Association of Academies held in Paris in 1900.

It was urgently demanded by the International Representatives present at the Meetings of the Association that immediate efforts should be made to secure the due corporate representation of these branches of study in the United Kingdom.

On November 21, 1899, the Council of the Royal Society addressed a letter to certain selected persons suggesting the possibility that some body might be formed capable of representing this country in the International Association of Academies in respect of those studies in which the country is not represented by the Royal Society. The persons who received that letter conferred with each other, and at a meeting held on December 14, 1899, drew up a statement of their views, which was communicated to the Royal Society. The main point in the statement was that the idea of an academy formed

by the simple federation of existing societies did not meet the views of those present at the meeting. At the same time a letter from the late Professor Henry Sidgwick was forwarded to the Royal Society, enclosing 'a plan for the institution of a new Academy or Section,' which had been approved by several of the gentlemen taking part in the meeting. According to Professor Sidgwick's 'Plan,' the aid of the Royal Society might be given in one of two ways—(*a*) It might propose to enlarge its scope so as to include the representation of the subjects in question; or (*b*), if it preferred to maintain the restriction of scope, it might support a body external to itself in the attempt to obtain a new Charter.

On January 18, 1900, the Council of the Royal Society considered the matter, and appointed a Committee of Fellows, with power to confer with such persons as they thought desirable, and to report to the Council on the suggestions made in Professor Sidgwick's memorandum. The Committee placed themselves in communication, through Professor Sidgwick, Professor Jebb, and Lord Acton, with a number of representatives of philosophico-historical and philological studies, and on May 29, 1900, a Conference took place between the Committee and the latter representatives of 'literary' science. At the conference views were exchanged as to various methods by which the desired object could be effected. The Committee of Fellows subsequently furnished to the Council of the Royal Society a report of considerable length, stating the reasons which might be urged for and against the several measures suggested. Upon the receipt of that report the President and Council thought it desirable that the subject should be considered by the whole body of Fellows, and it was accordingly decided that the meeting of the Society on May 9, 1901, should be devoted to the consideration of the report in order that the President and Council might have an opportunity of hearing the views of the Fellows on the questions raised therein.

The feeling of the meeting held on May 9 was against the possible enlargement of the scope of the Royal Society, so as to include the representation of the new subjects; and on June 4, 1901, the following decision was arrived at by the President and Council of the Society—'That the President and Council, while sympathizing with the desire to secure corporate organization for the exact literary studies considered in the British Academy Report, are of opinion that it is undesirable that the Royal Society should itself initiate the establishment of a British Academy.'

Soon after the meeting of the Fellows of the Royal Society held on May 9, 1901, certain persons who had received the original letter

from the secretaries of the Royal Society, in association with other persons, took independent action, with a view of supplying what the Royal Society felt itself unable to supply. A meeting was held at the British Museum on June 28, 1901. At that meeting it was unanimously resolved as follows—'That, in the opinion of this meeting, it is desirable that a society representative of Historical, Philosophical, and Philological Studies be formed on conditions which will satisfy the requirements of the International Association of Academies.' The persons present, with power to add to their number, were constituted a Provisional 'General Committee,' and a sub-committee was at the same time appointed for the purpose of considering how the project might be realized. The sub-committee held frequent meetings in the summer and autumn of 1901, and on November 19 reported to the 'General Committee' by which it had been appointed. The 'General Committee' then decided that certain persons should be invited to become the first members of a new body to be called 'The British Academy for the Promotion of Historical, Philosophical, and Philological Studies.'

On December 17, 1901, the new body, as an unincorporated society, met for the first time, and drew up a Petition to His Majesty in Council for the Grant of a Royal Charter for incorporating the society under the title of 'The British Academy for the Promotion of Historical, Philosophical, and Philological Studies,' or under such other title as to His Majesty might seem fit; in accordance with the terms of the Draft Charter submitted, or in such other terms as might seem proper.

The Royal Society cordially welcomed the institution of the new body, and petitioned His Majesty in favour of a Charter being granted.

In reply to a petition presented to the Lords of the Privy Council by a number of men of science and men of letters, to the effect that such incorporation as was sought could be most effectively provided for in some relationship to the Royal Society, it was submitted that the granting of the Charter would not preclude any ultimate combination of the Royal Society and the British Academy.

On August 8, 1902, the eve of His Majesty's Coronation, the Royal Charter was granted, incorporating the new Society as 'the British Academy for the Promotion of Historical, Philosophical, and Philological Studies.'

The Bye-laws, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, were allowed by Order of Council, dated February 5, 1903.

Dated 8th of August 1902

THE BRITISH ACADEMY

FOR THE PROMOTION OF HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHICAL AND PHILOLOGICAL STUDIES

CHARTER OF INCORPORATION

EDWARD—the Seventh—by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, to all to whom these presents shall come greeting:

WHEREAS certain of Our subjects, members of a society called The British Academy for the Promotion of Historical, Philosophical, and Philological Studies, whose names are herein set forth, have petitioned for a charter of incorporation such as is in and by these presents granted:

And whereas We are minded to comply with the prayer of their petition:

Now, therefore, We, of Our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, do hereby for Us, Our heirs and successors, will, grant, direct, appoint, and declare as follows:

1. The Right Honourable Earl of Rosebery, K.G., K.T.; The Right Honourable Viscount Dillon, President of the Society of Antiquaries; The Right Honourable Lord Reay, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., President of the Royal Asiatic Society; The Right Honourable Arthur James Balfour, M.P.; The Right Honourable John Morley, M.P.; The Right Honourable James Bryce, M.P.; The Right Honourable William Edward Hartpole Lecky, M.P.; Sir William Reynell Anson, Baronet, M.P., Warden of All Souls College, Oxford; Sir Frederick Pollock, Baronet, Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford; Sir Edward Maunde Thompson, K.C.B., Director and Principal Librarian, British Museum; Sir Henry Churchill Maxwell-Lyte, K.C.B., Deputy-Keeper of the Public Records; Sir Courtenay Peregrine Ilbert, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.; Sir

Richard Claverhouse Jebb, M.P., Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge; David Binning Monro, Provost of Oriel College and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford; Adolphus William Ward, Master of Peterhouse and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge; Edward Caird, Master of Balliol College, Oxford; Henry Francis Pelham, President of Trinity College and Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford; John Rhys, Principal of Jesus College and Professor of Celtic in the University of Oxford, The Reverend George Salmon, D.D., Provost of Trinity College, Dublin; John Bagnell Bury, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Dublin, Samuel Henry Butcher, Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh; Ingram Bywater, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford, Edward Byles Cowell, Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Cambridge; The Reverend William Cunningham, D.D.; Thomas William Rhys Davids, Professor of Pali in University College, London; Albert Venn Dicey, K.C., Vinerian Professor of English Law in the University of Oxford, The Reverend Canon Samuel Rolles Driver, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford; Robinson Ellis, Corpus Professor of Latin in the University of Oxford; Arthur John Evans, Keeper of the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford; The Reverend Andrew Martin Fairbairn, D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford; The Reverend Robert Flint, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh; James George Frazer; Israel Gollancz, University Lecturer in English in the University of Cambridge; Thomas Hodgkin; Shadworth Hollway Hodgson; Thomas Erskine Holland, K.C., Professor of International Law and Diplomacy in the University of Oxford; Frederick William Maitland, Downing Professor of English Law in the University of Cambridge; Alfred Marshall, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Cambridge, The Reverend John Eyton Bickersteth Mayor, Professor of Latin in the University of Cambridge; James Augustus Henry Murray; William Mitchell Ramsay, Professor of Humanity in the University of Aberdeen; The Reverend Canon William Sanday, D.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford; The Reverend Walter William Skeat, Elrington and Bosworth Professor of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Cambridge; Leslie Stephen, Whitley Stokes, C.S.I., C.I.E., The Reverend Henry Barclay Swete, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge; The Reverend Henry Fanshawe Tozer; Robert Yelverton Tyrrell, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Dublin, James Ward, Professor of Mental Philosophy in the

University of Cambridge, and all such other persons as now are or may hereafter become members of the said society, according to the provisions of these presents, shall for ever hereafter be, by virtue of these presents, one body politic and corporate by the name of 'The British Academy for the Promotion of Historical, Philosophical, and Philological Studies,' and by that name shall have perpetual succession and a common seal, and may take and hold, notwithstanding the Statutes of Mortmain, any lands, tenements, or hereditaments situate within Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, not exceeding in the whole the annual value of two thousand pounds, such annual value to be calculated according to the value at the respective dates of acquisition, and may grant, demise, alien, charge or otherwise dispose of all or any of the lands, tenements, and hereditaments belonging to the Academy.

2. The objects of the Academy are the promotion of the study of the moral and political sciences, including history, philosophy, law, politics and economics, archæology and philology.

3. The members of the Academy shall be called Fellows.

4. The persons herein-before named shall be the first Fellows.

5. There shall be a President and a Council of the Academy. The President and the Council shall be elected by the Fellows from amongst their own number.

6. New Fellows shall be elected at a General Meeting of the Fellows, from among persons who have attained distinction in some one or more of the branches of scientific study which it is the object of the Academy to promote.

7. The Government of the Academy shall be vested in the Council, and in the Fellows assembled in General Meeting.

8. The Academy may elect Honorary and Corresponding Fellows, but an Honorary or Corresponding Fellow shall have no voice in the management of the affairs of the Academy or in the election of new Fellows.

9. The Council may make such bye-laws and regulations as appear to be required for regulating, subject to the provisions of these presents, the constitution of the Academy and the management of the affairs thereof, and may repeal, alter or add to any bye-laws or regulations so made.

Provided always that the said bye-laws shall not be in any manner repugnant to the laws and Statutes of this Realm. And provided also that the said bye-laws and any revocation alteration or amendment thereof shall not be of any force or effect until the same shall have been allowed by the Lords of our Privy Council of which

allowance a certificate under the hand of the Clerk of our Privy Council shall be conclusive evidence.

In Witness whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made patent Witness Ourself at Westminster the Eighth Day of August in the second year of Our reign.

By Warrant under the King's Sign Manual

Muir Mackenzie.

Allowed by Order of Council, the 5th Day of February, 1903.

BYE-LAWS

Number of Fellows

1. The number of Ordinary Fellows shall not exceed one hundred, but it shall not be necessary to complete that number.

The President.

2. The term of office of the President shall be one year

The Council.

3. (1) The Council shall consist of the President and of fifteen Fellows.

(2) The election of members of the Council shall take place at the Ordinary Annual Meeting of the Fellows.

(3) The term of office of each member of the Council, other than the President, shall be three years, and one-third of these members shall retire in each year.

(4) At meetings of the Council the President shall, if present, take the chair. In his absence a Chairman shall be chosen by the members present at the meeting. Questions shall be decided by a majority. The Chairman shall not have a vote, except in the event of the votes being equal, but in that case shall have a casting vote.

(5) At meetings of the Council five shall be a quorum.

(6) The Council may act notwithstanding any vacancy or vacanices in their body.

(7) Casual vacancies in the Council shall be filled by the Council, and the person elected to fill a casual vacancy shall hold office for the remainder of the term of office of the member whose place he fills.

Sectional Committees.

4. (1) There shall be Sectional Committees representing the different branches of study which it is the object of the Academy to promote.

(2) The number of these Sectional Committees and the branches of study they represent shall be determined from time to time by the Council.

(3) The power of appointing the members of each Sectional Committee and of filling any vacancies therein shall vest in the Council.

5. A general meeting of the Fellows, called the Ordinary Annual Meeting, shall be held in the month of June or the month of July in each year, at a time fixed by the Council. General Meetings

6. The election of new Fellows shall take place at the Ordinary Annual Meeting of the Fellows. Election of new Fellows

Before any person is elected an Ordinary Fellow—

(a) There must be a certificate signed by not less than three, nor more than six, Fellows, stating that each of the Fellows signing the certificate is from personal knowledge of opinion that the person proposed for election is a fit and proper person to be a Fellow of the Academy, regard being had to the provisions of Article 6 of the Charter. The personal knowledge may be knowledge either of the person proposed or of his work, or of both;

(b) The person proposed must be recommended by a Sectional Committee of the Academy;

(c) The recommendation of the Sectional Committee or Committees must have been approved by the Council;

(d) The person proposed must have expressed his willingness to be a Fellow and to observe the Regulations of the Academy.

The recommendation of a Sectional Committee shall not be valid unless one-half of the Committee are present at the time when the recommendation is made. The approval of a recommendation of a Sectional Committee shall not be valid unless two-thirds of the members of the Council are present when the recommendation is approved.

7. (1) There shall be payable, by each Ordinary Fellow, an entrance Fee of ten guineas and an annual subscription of three guineas. Entrance fee and annual subscription.

(2) The annual subscription shall be due on the first day of January in each year.

(3) A person shall not be qualified to act as an Ordinary Fellow until he has paid his entrance fee and annual subscription.

(4) If the annual subscription of an Ordinary Fellow is in arrears for more than one year the Council may, in default of a satisfactory reason for non-payment, remove him from the list of Fellows.

8. It shall be the duty of each Ordinary Fellow to attend, except when reasonably prevented, all general meetings of the Council, if a member, and all meetings of any sectional or other Committee of which he is a member, and to satisfy the Council, by Duties of Ordinary Fellow.

the reading or submission of papers or otherwise, that he is actively engaged in work tending to the advancement of some one or more of the branches of study which it is the object of the Academy to promote.

Corresponding Fellows.

9. Corresponding Fellows must be persons not resident in the United Kingdom who have attained distinction in some one or more of the branches of study which it is the object of the Academy to promote, and who can by their knowledge or scientific contributions aid the Academy in the promotion of those branches of study.

Removal of Fellows.

10. The Fellows in meeting may, on the recommendation of the Council, remove a person from the list of Fellows on the ground that he is not a fit and proper person to be a Fellow.

The foregoing provisions shall be subject to the following preliminary arrangements :—

The first President shall be the Right Honourable Lord Reay, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

His term of office shall continue until the expiration of one year from the date of the first Ordinary Annual Meeting of the Fellows.

Of the first members of the Council other than the President, viz., Sir W. R. Anson, Baronet, M.P.; The Right Honourable James Bryce, M.P.; Professor Ingram Bywater; Professor T. W. Rhys Davids; The Rev. Professor S. R. Driver, D.D.; The Rev. Principal A. M. Fairbairn, D.D.; Sir C. P. Ilbert, K.C.S.I.; Sir R. C. Jebb, M.P., The Rev. Professor J. E. B. Mayor; Dr. J. A. H. Murray; Professor H. F. Pelham; The Rev. Professor W. W. Skeat; Sir E. Maunde Thompson, K.C.B.; Dr. A. W. Ward; Professor James Ward; one-third shall retire from office at the expiration of one year from the date of the first Ordinary Annual Meeting of the Fellows; one-third at the expiration of two years from that date; and the remaining third at the expiration of three years from that date. The persons to retire at those respective times shall be determined by agreement, or failing agreement, by lot.

In the year 1903 new Fellows may be elected at a General Meeting of the Fellows other than the Ordinary Annual Meeting.

LIST OF FELLOWS, 1904

Sir W. R. ANSON, Bart., M.P
Right Hon A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.
[1] Professor B. BOSANQUET
[1] Professor E. G. BROWNE.
Right Hon. JAMES BRYCE, M P.
Professor J. B. BURY
Professor S. H BUTCHER.
Professor INGRAM BYWATER
Dr. EDWARD CAIRD.
[2] Rev. Professor T K. CHEYNE, D.D.
[1] Mr ARTHUR COHEN, K.C.
[1] Mr. F C. CONYBEARE.
Rev WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, D.D.
Professor T. W. RHYS DAVIDS
Professor A. V. DICEY, K.C.
Right Hon. Viscount DILLON.
Rev. Professor S R. DRIVER, D D.
[1] Professor F Y. EDGEWORTH.
Professor ROBINSON ELLIS.
Dr. A. J. EVANS.
Rev. Principal A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D D.
[1] Dr. C. H FIRTH.
[1] Professor A. CAMPBELL FRASER.
Dr. J. G. FRAZER.
[1] Right Hon. Sir EDWARD FRY.
[1] Dr. F. J. FURNIVALL.
[1] Professor P. GARDNER.
[2] Professor I. GOLLANCZ.
[2] Mr. F J. HAVERFIELD.
Dr. THOMAS HODGKIN.
Dr. S. H. HODGSON.
Professor T E HOLLAND, K.C.
Sir C. P. ILBERT, K.C.S.I.
[1] Dr HENRY JACKSON.
[1] Dr. M. R. JAMES.
Sir R. C. JEBB, M.P.
[2] Professor HENRY JONES.
[1] Dr. F. G. KENYON.
[1] Professor W. P. KER.
[1] Right Hon. Lord LINDLEY
[1] Right Hon Sir A. LYALL, K.C B, G.C I.E.
Professor F. W MAITLAND.
Professor ALFRED MARSHALL.
Sir H. C. MAXWELL-LYTE, K C.B
Rev. Professor J. E. B MAYOR.
Mr. D. B. MONRO
[1] Professor W. R. MORFILL
Right Hon. JOHN MORLEY, M.P.
Dr. J. A. H. MURRAY.
[2] Professor A. S. NAPIER.
[1] Professor J. S. NICHOLSON.
[2] Professor A. SETH PRINGLE PATTISON.
[2] Dr. JOHN PEILE.
Professor H. F. PELHAM.
[2] Professor W M. FLINDERS PETRIE.
Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bart.
[2] Dr. R. L. POOLE.
[1] Dr G. W. PROTHERO.
Professor W. M RAMSAY.
Right Hon. Lord REAY, G C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
Professor JOHN RHYS.
[2] Professor W RIDGEWAY
[1] Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D D.
Right Hon. Earl of ROSEBERY, K.G., K.T.
Rev. Professor WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D.
Rev. Professor W. W. SKEAT.
Dr. WHITLEY STOKES, C.S.I., C.I.E.
[1] Professor G. F STOUT
Rev. Professor H. B SWETE, D D.
Sir E. MAUNDE THOMPSON, K.C.B.
Rev. H. F TOZER.
[2] Right Hon. Sir G O TREVELYAN, Bart.
Professor R. Y. TYRRELL
[2] Sir SPENCER WALPOLE, K.C.B.
Dr. A W. WARD.
Professor JAMES WARD.
[2] Professor JOSEPH WRIGHT.

[1] Elected March, 1903. [2] Elected June, 1904.

CORRESPONDING FELLOWS

Elected June 29th, 1904

Count UGO BALZANI (Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Rome).

Professor H. DIELS (Secretary, Royal Prussian Academy, Berlin)

M. le Comte de FRANQUEVILLE (Membre de l'Institut; Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Paris)

Professor M. J de GOEJE (Royal Academy of Sciences, Amsterdam).

Professor I. GOLDZIHER (Hungarian Academy, Budapest).

Professor T. GOMPERZ (Imperial Academy of Sciences, Vienna).

Professor J. L. HEIBERG (Royal Danish Academy, Copenhagen).

Professor K. KRUMBACHER (Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences, Munich).

Professor F LEO (Secretary, Royal Academy of Sciences, Gottingen).

M PAUL MEYER (Membre de l'Institut; Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Paris).

M. GEORGES PERROT (Membre de l'Institut, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Paris).

M. GEORGES PICOT (Membre de l'Institut, Sec. Per., Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques).

Professor C. H. SALEMANN (Imperial Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg).

DECEASED FELLOWS

Professor E. B COWELL.

Right Hon. W. E. H. LECKY

Rev. Provost GEORGE SALMON.

[1] Dr. A. S MURRAY.

Sir LESLIE STEPHEN.

[1] Elected March 1903.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

1903

PRESIDENT

THE RIGHT HON. LORD REAY.

COUNCIL:

SIR W. R. ANSON, BART, M.P.
THE RIGHT HON. J. BRYCE, M.P.
PROFESSOR I. BYWATER.
PROFESSOR T. W RHYS DAVIDS.
REV. PROFESSOR S R DRIVER.
REV. PRINCIPAL A. M FAIRBAIRN, D.D
SIR C. P ILBERT, K.C S I.
SIR R. C. JEBB, M P.
REV. PROFESSOR J. E B MAYOR.
DR. J. A. H MURRAY.
PROFESSOR H. F PELHAM.
REV. PROFESSOR W. W SKEAT.
SIR E. MAUNDE THOMPSON, K.C.B.
DR. A. W. WARD.
PROFESSOR J WARD.

SECRETARY.

PROFESSOR I. GOLLANCZ.

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

1904

PRESIDENT:

THE RIGHT HON. LORD REAY.

COUNCIL

SIR W. R. ANSON, BART., M.P.
THE RIGHT HON. J. BRYCE, M.P.
PROFESSOR S. H. BUTCHER.
PROFESSOR I BYWATER.
PROFESSOR T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
REV. PRINCIPAL A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D.
SIR C. P. ILBERT, K.C.S.I.
SIR R. C. JEBB, M.P.
REV. PROFESSOR J. E. B. M[illegible]
DR. J. A. H. MURRAY.
PROFESSOR H F. PELHAM.
THE VERY REV. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON.
REV. PROFESSOR W. W. SKEAT.
SIR E. MAUNDE THOMPSON, K.C.B.
PROFESSOR J. WARD.

SECRETARY·

PROFESSOR I. GOLLANCZ.

FIRST ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

June 26, 1903

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT, LORD REAY

INCORPORATED by Royal Charter, bearing date of the Eve of His Majesty's Coronation, the Academy celebrates its first anniversary on the day of the public celebration of His Majesty's Birthday. And the first duty of the Academy is to express its loyal sentiments to the Throne.

Those who have watched over the birth of the Academy are naturally filled with hopes and fears on this occasion. Well nurtured and wisely directed, the youngest of the Academies will assuredly take its due place among its elder and more favoured sisters, learning by their experience, and profiting by their example. Its existence will, we hope, prove to be a blessing; it will not be content merely 'to be,' but will also strive to carry out the work which may be expected of it, and for which it has been called into being. At present it is in the happy condition of having no past. Perhaps the words of the poet Cowley addressed to the Royal Society in its sixth year may be adapted (with the necessary modifications) to our one-year-old Academy —

> 'With Courage and Success you the bold work begin;
> Your Cradle has not idle bin:
> *Not even Hercules could* be
> At *one* year's age worthy a History.'

The British Academy may be regarded as embodying the recognition on the part of England, that she, too, at last recognizes that History, Philosophy, Philology, and kindred studies, call for the exercise of scientific acumen, and must take their place by the sister-sciences, the interpreters of nature's mysteries. But though England is the last of the countries of Europe thus to embody this recognition of literary studies, our country may claim to have

contributed marvellously to what might well be termed the Academic Learning and the Academic Spirit of the modern world, from the far-off days when the Monasteries of Northumbria were little 'academes,' shedding light not only over the land but far across the Continent. Is it not a matter of just pride for us to look back, on this occasion, to the venerable figure of Bede, whose almost encyclopaedic learning and whose enthusiasm for knowledge made him the very glory of our Island? It is significant that a movement is at last on foot to raise a monument to his memory, in sight of Monkwearmouth where his boyhood was spent.

And one is reminded that, if Bede himself did not actually found an Academy of Learning, another Englishman born in the year of his death, the illustrious Alcuin, carried out Charlemagne's famous Educational Reform, perhaps the first attempt of the modern world at the corporate organization of literary studies. 'Charlemagne's Academy,' as it is called, has not without some justification been placed among the very earliest of Academic Institutions, though it belongs rather to the History of Universities than to that of Academies in the narrower sense of the term. But from those distant days, right through the centuries, to the time of 'the large browed Verulam, the first of those who know,' there was never wanting in England the race of intellectual giants who attempted to cope with the forces of knowledge. By his efforts to systematize all knowledge, Bacon, the great representative of the New Thought, exercised a truly commanding influence on the whole course of learning in modern times; as Macaulay aptly put it, 'He moved the intellects which have moved the world'; and it was his influence which, directly or indirectly, helped the corporate organization of scientific learning in the seventeenth century, and led to the ultimate foundation of our own great 'Royal Society' established for the promotion of Natural Knowledge. But Bacon's plan for the advancement of learning was not limited to Natural Science, it included all learning, divine and human. Again, certain lines from Cowley's *Ode to the Royal Society* may fittingly be quoted in respect of Bacon's attitude towards those special subjects of study outside the scope of Natural Science, and which he would certainly have desired to subject to like scientific inquiry—the subjects which are to be our own special care:—

> 'Bacon at last, a mighty Man, arose,
> Whom a wise King and Nature chose
> Lord Chancellor of both their Laws,
> And boldly undertook the injur'd Pupils' cause.

> Bacon, like Moses, led us forth at last,
> The barren Wilderness he past,
> Did on the very Border stand
> Of the blest promis'd Land,
> And from the Mountain's top of his exalted Wit,
> Saw it himself, and show'd us it.'

For our own studies, perhaps, some such survey is now needed as Bacon attempted in his *Advancement of Learning* and his *De Augmentis*; and it is to be hoped that the Sectional Committees will place in the forefront of their programme systematic reports as to the work to be done, and the general condition of the several branches of learning represented by them. The Academy in its corporate capacity will not be unmindful of Bacon's dictum 'that all works are overcomen by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction, and by the conjunction of labours'; though as regards 'the amplitude of reward,' that must rather stand for the encouragement and the fostering care which it is hoped the Academy will, in course of time, be enabled to bestow on *others*. Even as Bacon elsewhere aptly quotes from the poet:—

> 'Quae vobis, quae digna, viri, pro laudibus istis
> Praemia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
> Dii *moresque* dabunt vestri.'

In many ways it would appear that the time had arrived for the foundation of an Academy of Learning in England—an Academy of 'Historico-Philosophical' Science in contradistinction to Natural and Applied Science. In this age of the practical, it is well to remind our countrymen, and to show other countries, that England, too, is not unmindful of the claim of the less utilitarian studies, and that we, too, recognize the necessity of corporate organization in the varied departments of Philosophy, Philology, and History.

It was something more than mere sentiment that made the modern world take a pride in connecting itself, in aspiration as well as in name, with the famous Academies which played so great a part in the history of Humanism, and which stretched back in direct line to the very groves where the great Humanist himself 'taught the truth.' Though, indeed, it might facetiously be said that for the time being we ourselves are rather *Peripatetics* than Academics.

It is noteworthy how great a part Academies played in Italy in awakening and keeping alive the new-born spirit of Humanism. According to Tiraboschi there were no less than 170 Academies of Belles-Lettres in the sixteenth century scattered throughout that land, doing signal service to learning, in spite of their fantastic titles, assumed perhaps, at times, to hide seriousness of purpose.

Like the early 'Accademia Lincei,' many of the Academies showed by name, symbol, or motto, that they were prepared 'to do battle with error and falsehood' As in other matters of Humanism, the rest of Europe followed the example of Italy. Richelieu, in 1635, founded the 'Académie Française', Mazarin, in 1648, the 'Académie des Beaux-Arts.' But before the foundation, in 1666, of the 'Académie des Sciences'; before the foundation, in 1706, of the 'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres'; and before the foundation, in 1700, of the famous Academy of Berlin, 'die Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften'—England had already established its 'Royal Society of London,' incorporated by Royal Charter in the year 1662. From the first, the Society was more particularly devoted to physical, mathematical, and astronomical knowledge, and more and more in process of time it limited its work to these and kindred departments of Science. Its Roll of Honour during the two and a half centuries of its existence includes the names of many of the most illustrious Englishmen, and its record, starting from modest beginnings, is a source of pride to all, and of encouragement to us.

It was almost by a mere accident that an English Academy had not been called into being some years before Richelieu's 'Académie Française.' As early as 1617, Edmund Bolton had proposed to King James a design for a Royal Academy or College on a truly regal plan. In 1624 the project was nearing completion. The list of names of the proposed original members is still extant, and includes those of George Chapman, Sir Robert Cotton, Michael Drayton, Ben Jonson, John Selden, Sir Henry Spelman, Sir Kenelm Digby, Sir Henry Wotton: assuredly this was to be no mean Academy of Learning. The death of King James delayed the accomplishment of the scheme, and it ultimately collapsed. But its ambitious programme is not without interest. "It was to consist of three classes of persons, who were to be called Tutelaries, Auxiliaries, and Essentials. The Tutelaries were to be Knights of the Garter, with the Lord Chancellor, and the Chancellors of the two Universities; the Auxiliaries were to be Lords, and others selected out of the flower of the Nobility, and Councils of War, and of the new Plantations; and the Essentials, upon whom the weight of the work was to lie, were to be 'persons called from out of the most able and most famous lay gentlemen of England, masters of families, or being men of themselves, and either living in the light of things or without any title of profession, or art of life for lucre, such persons being already of other bodies.' The members of the Academy

were to have extraordinary privileges, and among others were to have the superintendence of the review, or the review itself, of all English translations of secular learning, to authorize all books which did not handle theological arguments, and to give to the vulgar people indexes expurgatory and expunctory upon all books of secular learning printed in English. The members were to wear a riband and a jewel, and Bolton even speculated upon the possibility that Windsor Castle might be converted into an English Olympus, and assigned to the members as the place in which to hold their Chapters [1]."

Bolton was also generally interested in historical work, and had some ambitious projects of research. But so far as the study of History and Antiquity is concerned, the learned Society whose hospitality we enjoy, though only incorporated in 1751, may legitimately trace its history to the 'spacious days of Queen Elizabeth,' when Englishmen's joy in England made them cherish and study its ancient records, its monuments, and such relics of the past as might help to give a better understanding of the History of their land. The Elizabethan Age was a great age for antiquarian zeal. It produced Archbishop Parker, the preserver of Anglo-Saxon Manuscripts, Camden, the 'nourice of Antiquity,' Stowe, Speed, Holinshed, Sir Robert Cotton, Spelman. This great age had its 'Antiquaries' College,' which was on the point of being incorporated as 'the Academy for the Study of History and Antiquity founded by Queen Elizabeth,' with a Library, to be called 'The Library of Queen Elizabeth,' to preserve the scattered treasures of the Monasteries. The death of the Queen delayed the Incorporation, and King James, 'having a little mislike of our Society,' as Spelman put it, the project of Incorporation was lost sight of, until at last the Society, which had practically been suppressed, rose again as 'The Society of Antiquaries of London.' Its work in the departments of Antiquity and Archaeology has been well maintained, and its prestige, always deservedly high, is as great now as ever.

But the existence of Academies of the type of the 'Académie Française' was not without influence on those Englishmen who dealt with the corporate organization of Studies, and Bishop Spratt, in his *History of The Royal Society*, has some interesting observations on a proposal for establishing an English Academy, which was to deal not only with the English Language, but also with greater works which might be found for it, more especially in the department of National History; there follow at the end of his digression some

[1] See *Dict. Nat. Biog. sub voce.*

noteworthy passages with special reference to a history of the Civil Wars to be undertaken by such an Academy —

"There are only therefore wanting, for the finishing of so brave an undertaking, the united endeavours of some public minds, who are conversant both in letters and business; and if it were appointed to be the labor of one or two men to compose it, and of such an Assembly, to revise and correct it, it might certainly challenge all the writings of past, or present times. But I see, I have already transgressed; for I know it will be thought unadvisably done, while I was enforcing a weightier design, to start, and to follow another of less moment. I shall therefore let it pass as an extravagant conceit; only I shall affirm, that the Royal Society is so far from being like to put a stop to such a business, that I know many of its Members, who are as able as any others, to assist in the bringing it into practice."

'The Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom,' founded in 1820, and incorporated in 1825, represented an interesting effort, but possibly its range was altogether too wide.

It is not necessary here to recapitulate the successive stages in the history of the movement which terminated in the establishment of the British Academy. The anomalous state of affairs in England, as regards the corporate organization of learning, was brought into special prominence at the first meeting of the International Association of Academies, and the attention of the Royal Society was directed to the anomaly. The whole problem was carefully investigated by a special Committee of the Society. Scholars, representative of the departments to be organized, took part in the deliberations, but eventually it was decided by the Council that while sympathetic with the proposal to deal with the corporate organization of the studies in question, the feeling of the Society was against dealing practically with the problem within the Society itself, or itself initiating the establishment of a British Academy. Meanwhile, before the Council's final decision had been communicated, certain of those who had taken part in the deliberations, and others, met together to consider the situation, and at a Meeting held at the British Museum on Friday, June 28, 1901, it was resolved :—

"That a Society representative of Philosophical, Philological, and Historical Studies be formed, on conditions which will satisfy the requirements of the International Association of Academies."

From June to December of that year, those who were entrusted with the work laboured anxiously, and eventually on the 17th December, 1901, it was decided that the Petition and proposed Charter should be presented to His Majesty in Council. The public discussion

that ensued, the Petitions presented against and for, were the almost natural accompaniments of our Petition of Incorporation. But it is our duty to record our grateful obligation to the President and Council of the Royal Society for their generous help, and for the weighty Petition presented by them to the Lords of the Privy Council in support of the grant of a Charter. The Charter of Incorporation was ultimately granted, and bears the date of the eighth day of August, 1902—the eve of His Majesty's Coronation Day—a date singularly appropriate and of good omen. Those who received the Charter had to deplore the loss of three of their fellow Petitioners, namely, Professor Davidson, Dr. Gardiner, and Lord Acton ; one distinguished scholar passed away just before he was to have been invited to join the Petitioners, namely, Bishop Westcott. One other member of our body has been lost to us this year—the eminent Orientalist, Professor Cowell. To one more name it is my duty to allude; it is a source of greatest sorrow to us and to me personally that my friend the late Professor Henry Sidgwick, who had taken so deep an interest in the problem when first considered by the Royal Society, has not lived to see the establishment of the Academy. He, with Lord Acton and Sir Richard Jebb, gave his ripe wisdom to the idea when first mooted. Happily one of these three great scholars is still with us, to help us, let us hope, for long years to come, with his knowledge and discretion.

You are all familiar with the terms of the Charter under which we work. One clause has not yet been put into effect—the power to elect Honorary and Corresponding Fellows. Later on, no doubt, we shall join to us many a foreign scholar of distinction, and thus link ourselves with the great Republic of Learning. One such scholar, whom we had hoped to reckon among the first of our Corresponding Fellows, is now, alas! mourned by France, and the Academy has shown its sympathy with the *Institut* and the *Académie Française* by offering them the homage of its condolence on the death of M. Gaston Paris, and has received a touching acknowledgement, showing how deeply these international courtesies are appreciated. Indeed, I may say that the foundation of the Academy has been enthusiastically welcomed by the other Academies of Europe, and it has at once been admitted a constituent Academy of the International Association of Academies.

The first work of the Council of the Academy was the drafting of the Bye-Laws, in accordance with the terms of the Charter. The question of the number of Fellows was fraught with many grave problems, and the Council has reason to believe that the right course

has been followed in fixing the maximum number of Ordinary Fellows at one hundred. On the fifth day of February of the present year, the Bye-Laws were allowed by order of Council, and empowered by a special provisional clause, appertaining to the present year, the Fellows of the Academy have already, before this Annual Meeting, elected twenty-two new Fellows, thus raising the number from forty-eight to seventy. In accordance with the Bye-Laws, Sectional Committees have been formed, each Fellow of the Academy being assigned to one or more Sections. At present there are four main Sections:—

I. History and Archaeology;
II. Philology in its various Departments;
III. Philosophy;
IV. Jurisprudence and Economics;

with Mr Bryce, Sir R. C. Jebb, Dr. Caird, and Sir C P. Ilbert as Chairmen of the respective Sections. Much of the good work of the Academy depends on the organization and efforts of these Sectional Committees, to each of which will be referred the various questions coming within its scope

The preliminary tasks of this first year of our existence have been so many, that it would be unreasonable to expect much as regards Papers and Publications. The question of the latter must remain in abeyance until we know what means are at our disposal. As regards the former, five valued contributions have been made, two Papers being read by special invitation. Mr Sadler communicated a Paper on 'The Ferment in Education in Europe and America.' You have had the pleasure to-day of hearing His Excellency the Swedish and Norwegian Minister; further, Papers were read by the following Fellows of the Academy—by Professor Rhys on 'The Origin of Irish History,' by Dr. Caird on 'Idealism as a Theory of Knowledge,' and Professor W. M. Ramsay on 'Excavation in Asia Minor.'

The Academy was duly represented at the recent Congress of Historical Sciences held at Rome, and the Academy is generally becoming the recognized representative Body of Literary Science in the United Kingdom. Let us hope it will soon be representative of the Literary Learning of the Empire generally. Perhaps at some distant time, some future Imperial Academy of all the Arts and Sciences may satisfy the fondest dreams of those who believe in the strength and dignity and prestige of so imposing and all-comprehensive a foundation.

Meanwhile, the Academy has its work to do, if adequately financed and domiciled.

It will be one of our first important duties, with the Royal Society, to prepare a fitting welcome for the International Association of Academies when it meets in London next year at Whitsuntide, and to make that Meeting a success. We shall occupy the position of the youngest of the Academies, and I trust we shall display the charm of youth, and enjoy the happy position of being without history, but full of hope and vitality.

We are well aware that a British Academy does not represent a caste, does not presume to impose its authority on others. There has always been in English society an instinctive suspicion of learned monopolies. I think I am entitled to assert that whatever mistakes may have been made in the very difficult duty we had to discharge, we have not been guilty of placing this Academy on the narrow basis of any school of thought. We have sought and obtained the support of men who represent very divergent opinions, and we intend to guard ourselves against the appearance even of exclusiveness. Our desire is to obtain the confidence of our countrymen, and we have no reason to complain of the way in which this Academy has been received. I believe it has been fully understood that the mandate we indirectly received from the International Association of Academies through the Royal Society was of an imperative character, and that we should have been wanting in patriotism if we had not accepted it. We do not pretend that the studies we represent would not have flourished without an institution of this kind. But we think that the Corporate Organization which this Academy offers to the individual workers may give them the solidarity which they need, may stimulate younger men, and may elicit dormant activity. For the purpose of comparison of different periods of time, of different ideas in various countries, in the several branches of learning we represent, a most careful collection of facts is required. This collection can only be carried out by the Agency of a learned body and of an Association of Academies, working together with a view both to specialization and to generalization. The survey of a field of knowledge indicates gaps, co-ordinates inquiry, and prevents waste of energy. It is here especially that an Academy can be of practical use. Even as the Royal Society has been the incentive to discoveries in the scientific world, so the British Academy may look forward to the exercise of similar functions with regard to the branches of learning which it represents. Much less recognition by the State is given in Britain to original work than in foreign countries. All the greater is the need for the energetic impulse of private associations. There is no lack of latent intellectual vigour in the

younger generation throughout the Empire. It only requires encouragement to kindle the flame, and that encouragement we may do much to supply.

To a certain extent an Academy competes in the field of research with the Universities; but an Academy can give all its energy to research, whereas Universities are primarily teaching institutions, and their multiplication is due to this object in the first instance. We are as yet unable to judge of the consequences of this increase in the number of our Universities. No one could deny that there is a risk in the possible competition for students between rival institutions. I do not think I claim more than I ought for the influence to be exercised by us, if I say that we will directly and indirectly co-operate with the Universities in keeping up a high standard of teaching and research, and that the best results of the work done at the Universities will receive the recognition of the Academy. The Universities will be largely represented in the Academy, and naturally a mutual connexion will be established between them. I am inclined to think that this connexion will become more and more intimate, although it certainly will be to the advantage of the Academy to be in touch with the outer world.

You will perhaps allow me briefly to indicate the main lines of our activity in the various sections.

In our Philological Section many diverse branches of Study are represented. The national esteem for them has hitherto scarcely been so high in England as in some other countries where they have been organized by Academies of high standing. When international co-operation is required for the collection of inscriptions, of editions of great books, or for the compilation of great Lexicons, England has hitherto had no organ for such co-operation. We fully recognize the excellent work of Philological Societies, and the relation of a central Institution such as the British Academy to the existing societies will ultimately be adjusted for their mutual advantage. The Academy will have ample work to do in the various departments of Ancient and Modern Philology, and Comparative Philology generally. Only to-day we have been considering an invitation from the Berlin Academy to co-operate with it on a Corpus of Greek and Latin Medical Writers. But while active in all branches of Philology we shall not, I hope, neglect our primary duty to enterprises of a more national kind, though the monumental labours of Dr. Murray and his coadjutors, and the signal generosity of Oxford University, have happily relieved us of the serious task, well worthy of the energies of a British Academy, of engaging in the production of a great thesaurus

of our noble English language; while Professor Joseph Wright is gathering in from the nooks and corners of the Kingdom the rapidly changing folk-speech of England, ultimately destined to throw so much light on many vexed problems in the history of English speech —his results will, I hope, find an honoured place among the Publications of the Academy: but much still remains to be done, and at some distant day many a troublesome problem—possibly even the practical question of spelling reform—may require attention. Meanwhile the work of editing English texts should be encouraged by us, —more especially the remains of the oldest English Literature; we should supplement and aid the excellent work of the Early English Text Society, due to the whole-hearted devotion of our zealous colleague, Dr. Furnivall.

Also there remains our duty to that old Celtic Literature, of which many a treasure-trove still remains unclaimed. I feel sure that nothing but good will result, if the British Academy takes its full share in the work of Celtic research which is engaging the attention of great scholars both at home and abroad, but has so far been scantily aided by official recognition.

Oriental studies must be taken up by the Government with more seriousness than has been shown hitherto. A great Oriental Empire cannot discharge its duties towards its Oriental subjects without giving the fullest opportunity for higher research, and encouragement to those who are engaged in it. No one is satisfied with the present condition of things. Countries which have not the same direct interest in Oriental affairs which we have are much more alive to the importance of such studies from a purely scientific point of view. To us they are essential even from a utilitarian point of view. It will be our duty to see that justice is done, and fostering care substituted for long and undeserved neglect. Meanwhile we owe a debt of gratitude to that small band of eminent scholars who without any due reward have rescued us from the reproach which this neglect might otherwise have brought upon us. The Philological and Philosophical Sections of the Academy will have full scope for the development of their energies in this great field.

The International Association of Academies has determined to publish an Encyclopaedia of Islam, and a Committee has been appointed to give effect to this decision. The Academy will be represented on that Committee by our colleague, Professor Browne. It is not necessary for me to dwell on the vast importance of such a publication to this country; Englishmen count the greatest number of Mahommedans among their fellow subjects, and it would

be nothing less than a scandal if we shirked our share of this great scholarly undertaking. Another matter of great importance will come before the next meeting of the International Association. Scarcely any two of the manuscripts of the great epic of India, the Maha-Bharata, give the same text. A proper edition is urgently required. The only English translation (Roy's) fills fourteen large volumes. The co-operation of scholars will be essential, and also the collection of funds, as no publisher would undertake the risk. Our co-operation will be cordially given, and I trust we may obtain material assistance from the Government of India. I am quite sure that in India both these publications will be enthusiastically welcomed. We cannot but regret that the foundation of our Academy after these proposals were first entertained, does not permit us to claim the initiative which this country ought to have taken with regard to subjects in which it is more directly interested than any other. We shall now, however, be able to prove that we are keenly sensible of our responsibility.

In History we have to deal with the mutual interaction of different civilizations and to compare these civilizations. The task of the Historian is very similar to that of the explorer of Nature's laws. Our colleague, Professor Bury, in his interesting Inaugural Lecture, has eloquently emphasized the application of strict scientific methods to the study of History, as the study of 'all the manifestations of human activity.' Historical research with a view to obtain facts will be entitled to claim our most cordial support, and if a proposal is made to us for a Corpus of Inscriptions of the British Isles (which I believe to be the intention of Professor Bury), we shall I have no doubt welcome it. He has told us very emphatically that 'History is not a branch of Literature,' but, while this strict scientific attitude voices the very aims of our Academy, I need hardly state that, if the facts of History are placed on record in an artistic literary form, we shall not fail to appreciate such presentment, as long as historical truth is not sacrificed.

In the department of archaeological exploration, an understanding might be obtained through the International Association with regard to the spheres of scientific exploration which should be allotted to various nations, so as to arrive at a systematic distribution of archaeological research in the vast domain open to the explorers of different nationalities. We must avoid chaos of areas, chaos of unconnected research in the same sphere, chaos of financial contributions from various sources culminating in waste of means.

Economic and legal studies will receive from the International

Association of Academies the precise facts which they require. Economic tendencies in other countries, as well as legal enactments, affect our relations with those countries. The International Council of Academies will be in a position to influence those relations by the opportunity it affords of approaching international problems on the scientific side, before they enter on a more controversial phase in which diverging national interests come into collision. Economic problems are daily increasing in complexity, and so much depends on their right solution that no Academy can remain indifferent. Economic Science has to take into account all the facts which may cause a disturbance of prosperity, not only in one quarter but in many directions. Careful analyses of all accessible data over a wide area will be undertaken by the inquiries of the various Academies, and a comparison of results will be less difficult. Such questions as the housing of the poor, old age pensions, employment of children, hours of labour, are engaging the attention of all legislatures, and if the experience thus gained is collected and sifted by the Association of Academies a valuable contribution will be made to Economic Science.

In the domain of law I would point to the conferences which have been held at the Hague to promote the codification of private International law, at which I regret this Empire was not represented, although it will still be open to us at any time to secure to His Majesty's subjects the benefits of the conventions which have been concluded by the Powers interested. As regards public International law, it is not necessary to point out that its authority depends on the sanction which may be given to it by the various Governments on the advice they obtain from experts, whose presence in the International Association of Academies will be of great value in securing to International law an international sanction.

The growing tendency to assimilation in law, particularly in regard to matters of Commerce, is a significant fact. No fewer than one hundred legislatures of English-speaking races deal with legal problems. To compare their legal enactments transcends the power of any individual. The Academy will be able to co-ordinate individual efforts. A comparison of the Criminal law of various countries will deal with the measures, methods, and objects of punishment. The scientific treatment of law has been too long neglected in England, and it will be our privilege to give encouragement to those who are striving to place the scientific study of law on a footing worthy of the great traditions of English jurisprudence.

We shall approach the problems connected with education in

a philosophical and historical spirit. We are fortunate in having in the Academy many who are engaged in the actual work of higher education. They will bring to the discussion of educational problems the results of their own practical experience. The experience of other countries will be similarly brought to bear on the discussion of this great subject in the various Academies, and the International Association will enable us to reap the benefit of a comparison of results. Meanwhile, it will be our duty to consider how we can take part in the endeavour to improve our system of Education in order that it may be constantly adapted to the ever-growing intellectual needs of all classes of the community. There is no doubt, I think, that in this department waste of energy should be prevented and counteracted by concentration of effort.

There is another aspect of our activity; our Charter imposes on us the duty of dealing with questions which embrace the whole range of the moral sciences. We have to deal with the problems of the mind. The complex agencies which constitute the motives of our actions are subjects of our investigation. The forces which influence individual energy are open to our analysis. To discover the principles which regulate the progress of human society, which eliminate the causes of friction, which facilitate the attainment of high ideals—all these inquiries come legitimately within the sphere of our operations.

The keen and subtle intellect of the Hindu Philosophers can render great service to our Academy. The contact of the Western and of the Eastern mind lends to philosophical inquiry a peculiar charm. The influence of English thought and literature on Indian thought has not met with the attention of English students which it so richly deserves; I believe that in this Academy we can foster the intercourse of the leaders of Indian and of British thought. A vigorous impulse can be given to the better understanding of the tendencies towards ethical reform, and of the search for some methods of reconciling Vedic theology with the standard of morality which has been created by the aspirations of Indian reformers in recent times.

The science of religions, the historical development of religions, the mutual interaction of different religions, will be included in our programme. Philosophical and historical inquiries could not be properly conducted unless these subjects were dealt with in accordance with scientific methods which exclude all possibility of trenching on forbidden ground.

The unbiased attitude of the mind towards ethical and meta-

physical problems is one of the conditions of our existence as a scientific body. And I make bold to say that if at any time a shrewd observer of contemporary history were to detect anything likely to prove a menace to the free development of the human intellect, this Academy of Learning could not render a greater service to the cause of humanity than by supporting with its best strength all efforts to check the peril.

The acquisition of truth can alone satisfy the human mind, and slowly and surely each succeeding generation comes nearer to the object of its quest.

Bacon's eloquent warning against the idols of the tribe, of individuals, of the forum, and of the platform, may well be taken to heart by the present generation.

The tendency of all scientific study is to become international and cosmopolitan. A new discovery like radium flashes through the civilized world, and the newly discovered code of Khammurabi, as well as Mr. Evans's Cretan discoveries, enlarge our horizon. We may compare our Academy to a National Clearing-house, and the International Association of Academies to an International Clearing-house of ideas on these subjects.

The State is directly interested in these results of scientific discoveries, and in its relation to other States, the due representation of its own scientific development cannot be a matter of indifference. Our country will, through the Academy, secure its proper representation in this field of international activity.

The State gives encouragement to scientific studies. It may require advice as to what form of expenditure will lead to efficiency of research. In the Academy it will find men competent to give advice which may prevent the waste of public money by concentration and combination.

When the State desires to obtain information, the Academy will be able to collect such information or to indicate the channels through which it should be obtained.

The Academy may also stimulate private benefactors, on whose munificence we depend to a large extent in this country for the advancement of scientific knowledge, and protect them against indiscreet attempts to divert their benevolence to objects which are not calculated to promote the strict scientific development contemplated by the generous donors.

I trust I am not too sanguine if I give expression to the hope that this Academy may become a bond of union between the various parts of the Empire. If we can establish closer relations between the

intellectual activity of the various parts of the Empire, we may realize an intellectual federation which may prove more permanent than a federation based on more material considerations.

The claim of the leaders of thought in India and in the Colonies to be represented in this Academy will be readily admitted. I think that we may expect to reap from this exchange of opinions an invigorating result. If we can inspire our fellow workers in the Colonies and in India with the sense that their efforts meet with due recognition in the centre of the Empire, we shall have strengthened the feelings of true kinship.

By this combined intellectual effort throughout its scattered parts, the British Empire cannot fail to be even materially consolidated.

By this combined effort of representatives of every part of the Empire linked together in one common aim, perchance the British Academy may contribute to a fuller significance of what should be our watchword, *Civis Britannicus sum*, and of the great truth underlying Bacon's noble utterance, which might well be our motto, '*Human knowledge and human power meet in one.*'

SECOND ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

June 29, 1904

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT, LORD REAY

I do not propose on this occasion to deliver anything in the nature of a lengthy address, such as I had the pleasure of delivering to the Academy at our First Annual General Meeting, held on June 26 of last year. On this, the Second Annual General Meeting, I think it will suffice if I very briefly epitomize the chief events in the second year of our corporate existence.

The Session which is now drawing to a close has called forth our energies and tested our strength to a degree that might have caused anxiety even to an institution of longer standing. I need hardly say I allude to the duties which fell upon the Academy in connexion with the historic first meeting in London of the International Association of Academies. It is not for us to dwell upon the part played by the Academy, more especially towards the Section of Letters, which, had not the Academy been called into existence, would have fared as a stranger in a strange land, with none to show it hospitality, and no congenial welcome; though be it remembered that we, in common with our guests, owe a deep debt of gratitude to the distinguished directing Society, that great Academy of Natural Sciences, the Royal Society of London, to whose generosity we desire to pay our due tribute of thanks. Our guests have testified, with that real sincerity which is so encouraging, to the services rendered by the Academy, and to the manner in which it has discharged its duty, in the full consciousness of its responsibility, as the national and imperial representative in England of humane learning. I think, without any exaggeration, the Academy may claim that before its third anniversary it has justified its being.

It will, I know, be a source of gratification to our friends abroad to learn that we have this day, for the first time, put into force the power granted us by Charter and enrolled, as the first Corresponding Fellows of the Academy, representatives of the constituent Academies of the Association, thus fittingly commemorating the first meeting in London of the International Association of Academies.

The Report of the Section of Letters is at present being prepared by the Secretary, and will no doubt in due course be in your hands, but I may refer to the proposals initiated by the Academy. Sir Richard Jebb's proposition for a new Greek Thesaurus evoked much interest, and resulted in the appointment of an international Committee, from whose deliberations there can be no doubt much good will result. Professor Rhys Davids carried his resolution anent the new Pali Dictionary, and won the enthusiastic gratitude of the Section for his services in the matter.

It is to be hoped that the Academy will be able to do its duty in promoting some of the great international enterprises in which the Empire is eminently interested, as, for example, the projected Encyclopaedia of Islam, and the critical edition of the Mahābhārata, to mention merely two of the projects in hand.

The three years which will intervene between now and the next Meeting of the Association, to be held in Vienna, must be years of strenuous endeavour for us. Let us hope that by that date we shall be more fully equipped than we are now to meet our responsibilities. May I also express the hope that by that date that other great branch of the English-speaking Race—the great American people—may be represented among the Academies of the world by a constituent Academy in the Section of Letters. We send this message to our kinsfolk across the Ocean, and nothing would give greater satisfaction to the British Academy than to help to bring about the much-to-be-desired consummation.

To come now to the internal history of the Academy during the last twelve months. There have been Meetings of the Council, of the Sections, of Special Committees, and of the General Body, and much good work has been done in the various departments. Perhaps the most important Meeting was that held on December 9, to discuss the specific mode or modes by which it is proposed to attain the general objects of the Academy. The valuable statements submitted on that occasion, and the spirit which prevailed in the Meeting, strengthened the conviction that great work could be carried through by the Academy when adequately financed. A digest of the Statements submitted would, I venture to think, dispel any doubt which might exist in any one's mind as to the need of corporate endeavour in the department of Literary Science. A Special Meeting was held on February 12, being the Centenary of the Death of Emanuel Kant, on which occasion an Address was delivered by Dr. S. H. Hodgson (Fellow of the Academy). In accordance with the suggestion of Professor Campbell Fraser, it

was appropriately decided at that Meeting to celebrate the Bi-Centenary of the Death of Locke in October next, when Professor Campbell Fraser, whose *Biographia Philosophica* has brought him nearer to us than his more abstruse speculations, will contribute a Paper on some aspects of Locke's Philosophy. Papers have also been read by Dr. A. J. Evans (Fellow of the Academy) on 'The Pictographic and Linear Scripts of Minôan Crete and their relations'; by Dr. F. G. Kenyon (Fellow of the Academy) on 'The Evidence of Greek Papyri with regard to textual Criticism', by Professor Rhys Davids (Fellow of the Academy) on 'Oriental Studies in England and Abroad'; and by Professor I Gollancz (Secretary of the Academy) on 'Shakespeariana, 1598–1602.' These Papers will in due course appear in the first Volume of our *Proceedings* now printing at the Oxford Press. The Volume will be brought down to the end of the present year. The *Proceedings* will contain notices of those whose loss we have so much cause to deplore, those whom we have been privileged to number in our brotherhood. Though they have stayed but a little time with us, their memory is endeared to us all, and it is some comfort to know that they were included in our Roll of Honour. Since our last Annual Meeting we have lost from our band of workers the conscientious and sympathetic Historian, Mr. Lecky; the modest and ever-helpful Archaeologist, Dr. A S. Murray; the versatile Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, Dr. George Salmon; and the great critic and richly endowed man of letters, Sir Leslie Stephen. May their example be an incentive for us all! As we look back and think of those we have lost, we are saddened by our sense of loss, but the future is full of bright promise, for the faith is with us that England will ever continue to give to the world truly gifted workers in all the branches of human knowledge; the long line of those who hand on the torch of Learning from generation to generation will not fail!

I need say no more to-day, lest I stand too long between you and our distinguished colleague, whose words I feel sure you are anxious to hear. I have much pleasure in calling on Sir Richard Jebb to address us on the subject of 'Bacchylides.'

STUDIES IN EARLY IRISH HISTORY

BY PROFESSOR JOHN RHYS

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read March 25, 1903.

WHEN this paper was begun it was only intended to be an account of the Irish Druid Stone, together with a brief discussion of the more immediate questions to which the inscriptions give rise. But I have been allured further and further afield to survey a wider range of subjects. One of the inscriptions, however, is of importance to my speculation, so I leave my notes on the stone standing, and they may be regarded as a sort of introduction to what I have to say further.

I.

Late in September, 1902, I prevailed on my friend Professor Bury to accompany me to Colbinstown in order to visit Killeen Cormac, in the county of Kildare. I was all the more anxious that he should come as he had assured me that my reading of the Druid Stone was partly impossible. It is only a short walk from the railway station to the Killeen, and when we reached there we found awaiting us Lord Walter FitzGerald, who had bicycled across from Kilkea Castle. We were fortunate in having his lordship as our guide, for nobody knows the place better. Not long ago he published, among other things, an elaborate paper on the Killeen inscriptions, together with valuable illustrations, in the third volume of the *Journal of the County Kildare Archaeological Society*. With his permission one of them, a photograph of a good rubbing of the Latin side of the Druid Stone, is here reprinted for the purposes of these notes.

After reading a great deal written by the late Father Shearman in his *Loca Patriciana* and elsewhere concerning Killeen Cormac, I paid a visit to the spot in 1883, but the weather was against my making a good study of the inscriptions that day I find, however, that my reading of the Ogam scores was correct, though I added some unnecessary queries. One was as to the *i* of *Ivacattos*: why was it not *Evacattos?* Then I had a query as to the initial vowel of *Ovanos*, whether it did not consist of three notches, for there is a kind of hollow there in the edge, but it is too shallow and too far away to be reckoned a part of the Ogam. Next I queried *an* at the end instead of *os*, for I have it in

my notes of that time that a kind of irregular hollow seemed to connect itself with the second notch of the *o* at the end, in a way to suggest one vowel notch and five scores instead of two notches and four scores; but when looking at the stone the other day I had forgotten this, and the appearance of the two Ogams in question failed to recall to me my former alternative reading *an*. The Ogam reads up the first edge and runs towards the right along the top edge and down the next perpendicular edge, so that the whole consists of the following three bits:—

All the consonant scores on edge No. 1 incline backwards, but those of the *v* at the top slope in the contrary direction, probably because, beginning as it does at the very corner, it would otherwise come too near the vowel ending No. 1. The *c* and *tt* all slope forward like consonants of the M group, but the final *s* has its scores nearly perpendicular to the edge. The edges No. 1 and No. 3 are fairly regular, especially the latter, but the top edge is very much the contrary, and after the *v* comes a chink taking up a space where one might have to admit that there was originally a fourth score, that is, if anybody discovered reasons for supposing the second name to have been *Isacattos* rather than *Ivacattos*: none such have occurred to me. The *c* is rather imperfect, but I thought on both occasions that I could trace all the four scores of it. Professor Bury, however, could feel certain only as to the first and the last; but that practically comes to the same thing.

The whole inscription *Ovanos avi Ivacattos* would mean 'the monument or place of Ovanus, descendant of Ivacattus,' but with the first of these names I have hardly found anything to compare. I gather from the genitive *avi* that *Ovanos* was also genitive, postulating a nominative *Ovanus* of the *U* declension. The name of a successor of St. Donnan of Eigg, which is given under the year 724 in the *Annals of Ulster* as *Oan*, would equate exactly so far as one can see with our *Ovanus*, and possibly we have the same name in *Ouan* borne by a son of Kaw in the Welsh story of Kulhwch and Olwen: see the Oxford *Mabinogion*, p. 107. But the name would

seem to have been rare, and it is easy enough to suggest a reason for its dying out: the moment *Ovanus* in the course of a process of phonetic decay usual in Irish lost the *v*, it could not remain *Oan*, but had almost inevitably to become *Uan* and coincide with *uan* 'lamb' (for an early *ognas* cognate with Latin *agnus*). It is needless to say that a name which ran the risk of being interpreted to mean a 'lamb,' had no chance of popularity among a people who were nothing if not brave and valiant and generally unlamblike.

The other name *Ivacattos* is peculiar in having an initial *i* where one would have expected *e*. The stone does not suggest *e*, but the first element in the compound is doubtless to be equated with that of *Evalengi* on a Pembrokeshire stone inscribed in Latin: see the *Archaeologia Cambrensis* for 1897, pp. 328–30. Otherwise this genitive is found in Latin as *Evolengi* and *Evolenggi*, which occurs in Medieval Irish as *Eolang*, genitive *Eulaing*. Nay, we have the very genitive *Ivacattos* on the Ogam inscribed stone found in the cesspit of a Roman house at Silchester, in Hampshire: there it is written *Ebicatos* (*Archaeologia*, liv. pp. 35–9), with *b* used (after the late Latin fashion) for the sound of *v* and *i* instead of *a* as the thematic vowel of the first element: the Gallo-Brythonic vowel was *o* as in the Gaulish *Evotalis*, Irish *Eothail*, genitive *Eothaile*, while in Welsh we possibly have the equivalent in *Eital*, *Eidal*. What *eva-* or *iva-* meant is not certain, but Medieval Irish had a word *eo* which seems to have meant a tree or timber: see Stokes's edition of the *Calendar of Oengus*, March 10, where he renders *eo ainglech* by 'an angelical shaft.' So I presume that 'shaft' or 'spear' is the meaning of this vocable in the compounds here in question, and that *Iva-catt-* meant one who fought with a spear of some kind: for in the second element *catt* we have the word which appears in Old Irish as *cath*, 'battle, war,' genitive *catha*, but in the unaccented part of a compound *cad*, as in *Dunchad*, genitive *Dunchada*. So here our *Ivacattos* equates with *Eochada* in the *Book of Leinster*, fo. 332[a4], 334[b], 335[b], 339[a1]. The nominative should be *Eochad*, but I have no recollection of ever meeting with it, as the name is confounded with *Eochaid*, genitive *Echdach* (also *Echach*), somewhat after the analogy of *Lugaid*, genitive *Lugdach* (*Lugach*) or *Lugdech* (*Lugech*), written in Ogam *Lugudeccas*. To this may be added the nominative forms *Eochu*, *Eocho*, or *Eocha*, for which the genitive was also *Echdach* (and *Echach*). There was likewise a genitive *Eochaide*, as in the name *Mæl-Eochaide*, genitive *Mæili-Eochaide* (*Book of Leinster*, fo. 317[c1]): the corresponding nominative after the analogy of *Eothaile* should be *Eochaid*, which, being the common form, explains how the influence of *Lugaid* found

admission. Thus the group of names, more or less confounded with one another, seems to be made up of at least three distinct forms: (1) Nominative *Eochu* (*Eocho*, *Eocha*), of obscure origin, but possibly hypocoristic and indeclinable like such names as *Cunnu* (*Book of Leinster*, fo. 372[a]), *Dinnu* 327[f], *Dátu* 361[c], *Mo-Segu* 353[e], *Mo-Sinu* 368[f]. (2) Nominative *Eochaid*, genitives (*a*) *Eochaide* like *Eothaile*, and (*b*) *Ech*(d)*ach* after the analogy of *Lugaid*, gen. *Lugdech*; and here such a sporadic spelling of the genitive as *Eochthech* (ib., fo. 364[d]) is worth mentioning. (3) Nominative *Eochad* unrecorded, gen. *Eochada* = *Ivacattos*.

Before leaving this face of the stone, I may call attention to a point of orthography: in certain inscriptions *tt* stands for *th*, and *cc* for *ch*; but how is it that we have *Ivacattos* and not *Ivaccattos*, which is not the reading? At first it would seem as if the inscriber had been inconsistent, but that cannot be proved from our data. They suggest rather that the *c* here was sounded *ch*, but that the dental had gone through the stage of *th* as in 'thin' to the soft *th* as in 'this,' which was in fact the sound also meant by the *d* of *Eochada*, that is to say, before it passed from $d = dh$ into that of $g = gh$, which is the value of *dh* in Modern Irish.

Now I come to the Latin inscription: it is on that face of the stone which is to the left of the Ogam, and reads upwards parallel to *Ovanos avi*. Hurriedly and under very difficult circumstances in 1883 I read it IVVENE DRVVIDES. The fifth letter was imperfect, but I read it as *N* conjoint with the *E* that follows. Since then Prof. Bury took an opportunity of examining the legend, with the result that he felt certain that the consonant was *R* and not *N*. So I was glad to look at it in his presence.

Now with regard to the doubtful letter I may say at once that Professor Bury is right, and that close inspection convinced me that my former reading was wrong: the letter is *R*. To go a little more into detail I have to remark first, that the tail is not a straight line like that of the other *R*, but a gentle curve, which makes it all the less like the diagonal of an *N*; and in the next place it does not touch the following letter, which is *E*, so the conjecture as to a conjoint *NE* proves to have had a loose foundation. The top of the *R* is damaged by a little flake of the surface having gone off, but that flake did not cover the whole semicircle at the top of the *R*: the direction of the perpendicular and the tail of the *R* show that the letter must have extended above the deepest part of the flake, and I thought I could trace it now as a very shallow curve partly outside the flake. This means that the *R* before being damaged was a little

THE LATIN INSCRIPTION ON THE DRUID STONE AT KILLEEN CORMAC

taller than the IVVE preceding it—that it was, in fact, as tall as the other *R*, which is also taller than most of the other letters The drawings I have hitherto seen of this stone do not very accurately represent this feature of the inscription, as will be seen on comparing them with Lord Walter FitzGerald's rubbing. There is nothing else to call for remark in the form of the letters except that the *S* is inverted so as to face the wrong way. Altogether the Roman letters are more regularly cut than the average of corresponding inscriptions in Wales, Devon, or Cornwall.

The reading of the Latin may now be treated as IVVERE DRVVIDES, and the next question is what its relation is to the Ogam. In the first place it is to be noticed that the relative position of legends in Ogam and Roman letters in the case of bilingual stones in Wales would require the Latin to have been on that face of the stone which is bounded by the edges on which the Ogam has been cut, and also that the Ogam should begin by reading upwards, and the Roman letters downwards Sometimes the latter read across the face as in Roman inscriptions, as in the case, for instance, of the first Ogam discovered in North Wales. Neither of these conditions is met in the case of the Killeen stone. In the next place the spelling with *vv*, which comes twice in the Latin, is avoided in the Ogam, though there occurred no less than three opportunities for it. The conclusion to which these two considerations would seem to point is that the two inscriptions have nothing to do with one another; but I cannot say that I attach much importance to that · I should say none, if I could only feel certain that *druvides* is to be construed as a genitive singular. For I must confess that I see no satisfactory way of combining a nominative plural in the Roman letters with a genitive singular in the Ogam. The question, therefore, is whether we may not regard *es* as standing for *is* in *druvides*. Plenty of instances of some kind of interchange of *e* and *i* may be found in late Latin, but it is desirable to restrict the search to the ending *is*, and I find the following · (1) a late inscription at Llantwit, in South Wales, has *Res patres* in the genitive for *Ris patris* (Hübner's *Inscriptiones Britanniae Christianae*, 63). (2) Stokes, in his *Goidelica*, p. 5, finds in the Turin Glosses of the ninth century *os turtores* for *os turturis*. (3) In an early inscription at Penmachno, in Carnarvonshire, we have *cive* (for *cives*) standing for the classical nominative *civis* (Hubner, 135). (4) In the volumes most in point of the Berlin *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* I find the following: in vol. vii (Britain) *cives* for *civis* nominative singular, Nos. 52, 66, in other inscriptions *civis*, together with some instances of *i* for *e*, as *equis* for

eques, No. 353, and *superstis* for *superstes*, No. 640. (5) Vol. xii (Gallia Narbonensis) has a good number of instances of *e* for *i*: see more especially Nos. 935, 936, 937, 1,693, 2,179, 2,187, 2,188, 3,899, 5,750, with such genitives singular as *cruces*, *consoles*, *fontes*, *iuniores*, *resurrectiones*, and *urbes*. Most of the inscriptions in question are decidedly Christian, and of the sixth century[1]. There is no need to give the other instances of *e* for *i*, or those of the converse change, for what has just been indicated will suffice to show that there is no obstacle to our construing IVVERE DRVVIDES to mean *Iverne Druidis*, that is to say, 'of the Druid of Ireland,' and to regard it as a description of the man whose name and patronymic we have in the Ogam. Probably also one would be right in regarding the whole as belonging to the sixth century. What may have been exactly meant by calling a man a Druid who was at that time presumably a Christian I cannot say: it may have been official and hereditary. In any case one does not gather that there was any wholesale objection to the word: witness the ancient hymn ascribed to St. Columba, from which Reeves, in his Adamnan's Life of that Saint, p. 74, cites the line—

Is é mo drái Crist mac Dé
My druid is Christ the Son of God.

This leads me to mention again the late Father Shearman's *Loca Patriciana*, a book full of learning, in which Killeen Cormac and its inscriptions occupy a considerable place. Among the author's conclusions may be mentioned that he regarded it as probable, that St. Abbán maccu Cormaic (pp. 6, 12), who, as his name suggests, seems to have been of the Dál Cormaic, was buried at Killeen Cormac. This place-name he regarded as standing for *Cell Fine Cormaic*, 'the church of the tribe of Cormac' (pp. 11, 22), and *Fine Cormaic* he treated as another name of *Dál Cormaic*, 'the clan or sept of Cormac.' He found that the Fine Cormaic had a subtribe called Ui Lugair or Hy Lugair (pp. 18, 22), and that the branch of the Ui Lugair to which belonged Dubthach maccu Lugair, chief bard or poet of Erin in the time of St. Patrick, was identified with the immediate neighbourhood of the Killeen (p. 23), also that documents of the twelfth century placed in the district a church called Killinulugair, that is to say, *Cell Fine Ui Lugair* (p. 23), which he would identify with *Cell Fine Cormaic*. Then as he interpreted the Latin inscription to mean IV VERE DRUVIDES, 'the four true Druids' (pp. 2, 43), he endeavoured to identify them as Dubthach maccu Lugair and three of his sons (p. 46); but nothing hardly is known of the

[1] Vol. xiii for the rest of Gaul is incomplete, and of course without an index.

three sons, while there is a lack of evidence that the father was a druid. He is usually called chief bard or chief poet of Erin, and he was converted to Christianity by St. Patrick. Further, Father Shearman came across a passage in the *Lebar Brecc*, or Speckled Book, stating that Dubthach and his three sons together with other persons were buried at a place described as *Dinlatha Ceneoil Lugair*[1] (p 46), which he interpreted as 'the marshes or muddy places of the Cinel Lugair' (p. 48), to be identified with Killeen Cormac; but that identification is unfortunately based on a mistranslation. *Dinlatha Ceneoil Lugair* means the *dinn* or place of the ruling family of Lugar's race. That description is not so likely perhaps to have referred to any kind of church as to some one of the fortified sites on the eminences in the neighbourhood of the Killeen. On the whole Father Shearman cannot be said to have succeeded in identifying his four men; but, all the same, it is by no means impossible that our druid was of the race of Dubthach maccu Lugair.

[1] The passage occurs in the *L Brecc*, fo 22[b], eleven lines from the bottom, and the corresponding one in the *Book of Leinster*, 353[c], reads as follows: '*Muninne* ⁊ *Lonan* ⁊ Molasse *tri mac* Dubthaig ⁊ *ingine cainnig* ⁊ mochom*moc* m*accu* Lugair *in* di*n*d flatha genel*aig* lugair ⁊ ci*um*thir noeb de munter *Patraic* i*m*malle f*ri* dubtach' That is, 'Muninne and Lonan and Molasse three sons of Dubthach and of Cainech's daughter, and Mochommoc macu Lugair in the *dinn* of the ruling family of the race of Lugar Also a holy priest of the familia of Patrick together with Dubthach.' In the *L Brecc* we have *ceneóil*, genitive of *cenél* 'race,' while in the *Book of Leinster* the word used is *genelach*, which is *genealogia*, borrowed in its late Latin sense of 'gens, genus, familia.' The older word which was here replaced by *cenél* and *genelach* was, doubtless, *maccu* or *moccu*, for which *ua* 'descendant' has sometimes been substituted, as happens in column 372[a] of the Leinster Book, where we have Dubthach h*ua* Lugair twice. The scribes took into their heads that *maccu*, older *mocu*, genitive *mucoi*, *mocui* meant *mac-hui* 'filius nepotis' No objection was taken by them to this word as applicable to one man, and the chief bard is mostly called Dubthach maccu Lugair, but they could not understand *maccu* as applied to more than one man, say to a whole clan or tribe So they substituted other words such as *cenél* and the unexpected *genelach* of the *Book of Leinster*. Their difficulty was partly the same as that of the modern scholars who render it by some such a word as descendant; but it means 'race' or 'tribe,' and Adamnan treats it as equivalent to *genus* in his Latinity The race of Lugar would be called Maccu Lugair, and there is no syntactic difficulty, so Dubthach maccu Lugair ought to be translated in the same way 'Dubthach race of Lugar', but perhaps the most neutral word in English is kin, and the rendering would be accordingly 'Dubthach kin of Lugar'=*Dubtacus genus Lugeri*, so to say. Some such a formula is forced on one by the Ogmic inscriptions, which end frequently enough like the following. Lugudeccas maqui maqui mucoi Neta-Segamonas. Converted into Latin it would run thus, all in the genitive case: *Lugudecis filii filii generis Neta-Segamonis.* One is reminded at once of group marriages of a more primitive kind than even those described by Caesar in a well-known passage in Bk. v. 14 of his *Bellum Gallicum*

II

Taking the Roman legend as my text I proceed to make some further remarks on it. I begin with DRVVIDES, which I treat as standing for *Druuides* or *Druvides* and meaning *Druidis*, the spelling as regards the *vv* differs in the same way from the normal orthography of Caesar's nominative plural *Druides* as PVVERI on the bilingual stone at Glanusk Park in Brecknock does from *pueri*; see Hübner, 34, where the whole reads TVRPILLI IC IACIT PVVERI TRILVNI dVNOCATI. The old Irish nominative singular *drui*, genitive *druad*, and the more usual Latin forms, together with the genitive *Droata* (for *Droatta*, pronounced probably *Droađa*, with the same soft spirant as was suggested in the case of *Ivacattos*), in ancient Ogam in the Isle of Man, prove that the second *v* of *Druvides* is not original but introduced to avoid a hiatus between *u* and *i*. This rules out the conjecture that *drui* comes from *dru-vid-s*, which is countenanced in Holder's *Altceltischer Sprachschatz*. Add to this that Stokes in Fick's *Urkeltischer Sprachschatz*, p. 157, is constrained to declare the etymology of the word 'ganz unsicher.' This agrees, so far as it goes, with an old surmise of mine, that Druidism was not of Celtic origin. I would now go further and suggest that the word for 'druid' was not Celtic but adopted by the Celts from some earlier population of the countries conquered by them The Welsh for druid, namely, *derwyđ*, though appearing to come from *derw* 'oak' or *derw* 'true,' is probably only a phonetic modification of the *druid*, which we have in the Gaulish plural *druides*[1].

Let us now take the other word IVVERE, where I am disposed to regard the final *e* as representing the standard *æ* of the genitive feminine, as it does in many of the Roman inscriptions of Britain

[1] Just as I was writing this I received the following note from my friend Dr. Henry Bradley, who has kindly placed it at my disposal :—'According to Fick-Stokes, there is a difficulty in referring the Welsh *derwyđ* to the same stem as the synonymous Gaulish *druid-*, Irish *draoi* Yet the equivalence of meaning is a strong argument for the formal identity of the two words The British places called *Derventio* are both situated on rivers now called Derwent, and the river-name occurs in several other districts, while the place-name as such might be satisfactorily interpreted as "oak-wood," this is an unlikely meaning for a river-name. The frequent occurrence of Derwent as a river-name suggests that the towns were named from the river. It would be satisfactory if we could identify Derwent formally with the Gaulish *Druentia*, which Stokes reasonably refers to the Idg root *dru* 'to run.' Can we assume that *dru* before a vowel, while in Gaulish and Irish retaining that form with hiatus, was in primitive British treated as *drų-*, and that this in historic British is represented by *derw-*? This would allow us to identify formally *derwyđ* with *druid-*, and *Derwent* with *Druentia*.'

and other portions of the Roman Empire. It would follow probably that the author of this inscription regarded the Latin nominative feminine as being *Ivvera*; and in this *Ivvera* we have at last actually a name, the existence of which has been virtually proved by M. Gaidoz in the second volume of the *Revue Celtique*, pp 352-361, in an article characterized by the writer's usual learning and critical acumen. It is entitled 'Du pretendu nom d'*Ile Sacrée* anciennement donné à l'Irlande,' and his reference is to Avienus in the fourth century: the passage will be found in the latter's *Ora Maritima*, v. 108-12 —

> Ast hinc duobus in Sacram (sic insulam
> Dixere prisci) solibus cursus rati est
> Haec inter undas multa caespitem iacet,
> Eamque late gens Hibernorum colit
> Propinqua rursus insula Albionum patet.

As to the word *Sacram*, M Gaidoz asks the following question 'Quoi de plus naturel qu'un écrivain grec, croyant deviner le séjour des bienheureux dans cette Ile océanide dont on ne connaissait que le nom, ait de 'Ἰέρνη ou de 'Ἰερνὶς νῆσος fait ἱερὰ νῆσος ?' If I may do so without appearing to be flippant, I should answer that there was something even more natural than this, namely, that IVVERA should become 'Ἱέρα and then ἱερά, just as IVVERNA has corresponding to it in Greek 'Ἰέρνη. For the existence of IVVERNA is demonstrated by Mela and Juvenal's *Iuuerna*, though the latter in his verse may have treated the word as *Jūverna*, ii. 159, et seq.:—

> Arma quidem ultra
> Litora Iuuernae promouimus, et modo captas
> Orcadas, ac minima contentos nocte Britannos.

As to the *vv* I shall here only point out that the doubling occurs in some of the old Ogam inscriptions in such a word as *avvi*, otherwise written *avi*, the genitive of *ave* 'a descendant.' In the case of a Carmarthenshire bilingual inscription (*Archaeologia Cambrensis*, 1893, p. 288), we have *vv* in Ogam twice, but in the accompanying Latin a single *v* twice, that is to say the converse of what we have on the Druid Stone. They combine to teach us that at the time of the inscriptions in point no difference of sound attached to the doubling of the *v*. In any case this is carried somewhat further back perhaps by an ancient graffito in Rome giving apparently the names of three slaves: it has been read 'Bassus Cherronesiia et Tertius Hadrumetinus et Concessus Iverna': see Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, pp. 268, 305. We have a similar spelling but with the late Latin *b* for *v* in a Roman inscription with *Iuli*]A IBERNA at Caerleon in Monmouthshire: see the Britannia volume of the

Berlin *C. I. L.*, 130. *Iverna* and *Iberna* with one or two more instances given by Holder are the oldest authentic forms one can quote as bearing on this question.

The sound of intervocalic *vv* or *v* was in the fifth and sixth centuries probably that of the Welsh *w* in *Iwerdon* 'Ireland,' a sound which I cannot distinguish from that of the English *w* in such words as 'bewitch' and 'beware'; but whatever it exactly was, suffice it to say that when *Ivvera* and *Iverna* dropped the labial sound and became 'Ιέρα and 'Ιέρνη, it was because that labial was identified by Greek pronunciation with the Greek digamma, whose fate of extinction it therefore suffered, either when the digamma generally went, or else, more probably, at some later time and under the influence of the analogy of native Greek words. On this question of date Professor Bury kindly informs me that he thinks an intelligent Greek (like Pytheas) might have used the digamma graphically to denote the sound, although it had already disappeared from Greek speech; and that, if he did not, his only alternative was to leave it unrepresented. So Professor Bury thinks that here *ie* for *ive* does not necessarily imply a very early date. In any case the Greeks seem to claim priority in this matter over the Romans; and one naturally looks to Massilia, whose merchants had ready access to the countries inhabited by the Celts.

With regard to the Latin form *Hibernia* we have it in the *Grammatica Celtica*, p. 57, that the *h* is due to the Romans having accommodated the name of the island as 'Ιουερνία to their own adjective *hibernus*, i. e. *hiemalis*. Pedersen in his *Aspirationen i Irsk*, p. 143, disapproves of that view, but without making out a clear case against it. Then as to 'Ιουερνία, M. Gaidoz, in the article already cited, is of opinion that this is merely a Greek adaptation of the Latin spelling *Hibernia* with *ou* for the late Latin *b*, which one is helped to understand by the spellings *Iverna* and *Iberna* already cited; not to mention manuscript variants such as *Hivernia* and *Ivernia*. Here let us for a moment compare the forms in Ptolemy's Geography, where we have, according to Dr. Carl Müller's text, the genitive of the name of the island 'Ιουερνίας four times, the adjective 'Ιουερνικός twice, the ethnic name 'Ιούερνοι once, and the name of a town 'Ιουερνίς once, but the river of kindred name Muller calls (in the genitive) 'Ιέρνου [1], as he would seem to have found

[1] This has sometimes been supposed to be the sea-water known as Kenmare River, but Dr. Henry Bradley in his map to his 'Remarks on Ptolemy's Geography of the British Isles' (*Archaeologia*, vol. xlviii), and Mr. Goddard H. Orpen in his 'Ptolemy's Map of Ireland' (*Journal of the R. Soc. of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 1894), pp 115, 118, are probably nearer the mark in placing

no adequate manuscript authority for adopting *'Ιουέρνου*. This favours M Gaidoz's view, as it seems to mean that the river-name had only escaped the influence of the Latin spelling by reason of its obscurity. Then there is MS. X, which appears to read *'Ιούβερνοι* instead of *'Ιούερνοι* and once *'Ιουβερνίας*, namely in ii. 2. 10, while some of the other MSS. have *'Ιουβέρνιος* for *'Ιουερνικός* in ii. 3. 2 In the two cases from MS. X, Holder adopts the reading with *ουβ*, and rightly no doubt. They are chiefly interesting because they also seem to presuppose a Latin spelling with *uu* or *ub* as in Juvenal's *Iuverna* or *Iuberna*.

One of the things which must strike anybody who glances at the names of ancient Ireland is the number of the forms implied: we seem to have the following:—

1. *Iveriịō* or *Iveriịū*: with this goes the ablative form *Hiverione* or *Iverione* which occurs in the *Antonine Itinerary*, also the *Hiberione* and *Hyberione* [1], which Stokes prints in the *Confession of St. Patrick*, where we have also the genitive plural of the name of the people of Ireland as *Hyberionacum*. *Hiberione* comes also more than once in Stokes's edition of the *Epistle to the subjects of Coroticus* see his *Patrick*, pp. 357, 364, 375–7. These forms with *Hiverion-* or *Hiberion-* are probably derived from the early Brythonic declension of the name, nominative *Iveriịō*, genitive *Iveriọn-os*, represented in Welsh by *Iweryd*, a woman's name, and *Iwerdon*, the name of Ireland. On the other hand the Medieval Irish forms were *Hériu* or *Ériu*, 'Ireland, also a personal name feminine,' genitive *Hérenn* or *Érenn*, representing some such early forms as nominative *Iveriịō*, genitive *Iverịen-as*.

As to the aspirate in this group I regard (*a*) the other Latin forms as owing the *h* to *Hibernia*, a spelling produced under the influence of popular etymology, as Zeuss thought. But (*b*) as to the Irish forms, the *h* is entitled to be there wherever the first syllable has *ēr*: the aspirate represents an initial *ị* or *y* consonant which was

the "Ιερνος further west. Ptolemy's next rivers as you follow the west coast northwards are Δούρ and Σῆνος. This last has commonly been supposed to be the Shannon, and there seems to be no sufficient reason for rejecting that conjecture; so that the Δούρ falls into its proper place as the tidal river on the southern side of the town of Tralee, where Miss Hickson (the same Journal, 1894, pp. 256–63; 1896, pp 173–5) thought that she discovered traces of the name Δούρ. Its ἐκβολαί may be said to be between Killelton and Fenit. To the south-west of Tralee there is no river worth mentioning, so the 'Ιέρνου ποταμοῦ ἐκβολαί would be the top of Dingle Bay, called Castlemaine Harbour, into which flow the Maine and the Laune, the latter draining the Lakes of Killarney and the other a district in all probability belonging to the 'Ιουέρνιοι, from whom the river is, by reason of its name, not to be severed. Ptolemy, be it observed, does not extend their territory to the western coast

[1] Professor Bury kindly informs me that this is also *Hiberione* in the MS.

strengthened into *h*, somewhat in the same way as initial *w* or *v* has systematically become *f* in Irish. The stages may be roughly represented thus *iver*, *ier*, *i̯ēr*, *yēr*, *hēr*; and etymologically *Hériu*[1], *Hérenn*, are to be preferred to *Ériu*, *Érenn*, except when preceded by a word requiring the soft mutation, perversely called 'Aspiration' by Irish grammarians.

2. Ἰέρνη, Ἰερνίς (for Ἰϝέρνη, Ἰϝερνίς), the former of which seems to have determined the ending in *a* of the Latin *Iuverna* or *Iuberna*, in fact Claudian's *Hiberne*, *Hyberne*, accusative *Ivernen*, according to Holder's instances, retain the Greek final *ē*. On the other hand, Ἰουέρνη, Ἰουερνίς, together with the tribal name Ἰούερνοι, Ἰούβερνοι, owe their ου, ουβ to Latin influence, as already indicated. It is to be noticed, however, that the *uu*, *ub* of the Latin *Iuverna*, *Iuberna* await further explanation.

3 *Iverna*, *Hivernia*, *Ibernia*, *Hibernia* (with the adjective *Iberniensis*, *Hiberniensis*), represent a Latin formation after the analogy of names of countries in *ia* like *Britannia* and *Gallia*, neither of which had any existence probably in any Celtic language. The Greek Ἰουερνία looks like a spelling of the Latin *Iverniа*, but the cognate Ἰουέρνιοι nevertheless represents a native Irish adjective, as will be seen presently. Ἰουβερνία (with Ἰουβέρνιος) betrays in like manner the influence of the Latin *Iuverna*, *Iuberna*. Lastly, the oldest manuscript of Adamnan's *Life of St. Columba* shows a preference for an initial *e*, and makes the name of the island into *Evernia* or *Ebernia*, with the adjectives *Everniensis* and even *Evernilis*.

4. IVVERA with the plural of the people's name *Iberi*, which occurs for *Goidels* in two of the letters of the celebrated Irish monk Columbanus, published by the editors of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* in the third volume of their *Epistolae*, pp. 164, 171. They ascribe the letters in point to the years 603 or 604 and 612-5 respectively. Columbanus was abbot of Luxeuil in the Vosges and afterwards of Bobbio in North Italy, but he was a native of Leinster

[1] Here some regard the *h* as representing an Indo-European *p*, and I must plead guilty to having proposed, so far back as the second volume of the *Revue Celtique*, p. 196, to derive the name from the same origin as the Greek Πι(ϝ)ερία and Sanskrit **pîvar*, 'fat, swelling.' That unfortunate swelling has since been partly removed in a very drastic way in Fick's *Urkeltischer Sprachschatz*, p 45, where *Hériu* is derived, it is true, from the same origin as Πιερία, Sanskrit *pîvan*, &c , but it is added that Ptolemy's Ἰουερνία, Ἰούερνοι, and Ἰουερνίς are 'andern Ursprungs,' and that *Evernilis* and Welsh *Ewyrdonic* 'Irish' point to *Ever-* = Sanskrit *ávara* as the leading element in them. But I cannot help regarding the Celtic words as inseparable, whatever their origin may prove to be.

and educated at Bangor in Down, in the time when St. Comgall, the founder of Bangor, was still its head. It is not clear on what principle exactly the name *Ivvera* was formed, but it is pretty evident that if it had been originated under Latin influence it would have been *Ivveria*, not *Ivvera*. So one naturally looks elsewhere, which one is encouraged to do by the Ἰέρα underlying the Ἱερὰ Νῆσος of Avienus's original. By the side of this must also be placed Diodorus's accusative Ἶριν (v. 32, 3), which would seem to postulate a modification of *iver* into *ivir*. The Greek forms would accordingly be Ἴϝιρις = Ἶρις, accusative Ἴϝιριν = Ἶριν; but the more probable explanation is that a scribe either accidentally or purposely assimilated the name to that of the Greek Ἶρις, Ἶριν, and that we should restore Ἴεριν to Diodorus's text. This would mean that the Greeks of Massilia had the two forms Ἰέρα and Ἰερίς, just as they may have had Ἰέρνη and Ἰερνίς, and that the former were in use at least as early as the time of Diodorus Siculus.

From these details one arrives at the general conclusion that the basis of the names of the country was usually some form or other of the ethnic name. Suppose a Greek or Roman to meet natives of Ireland, and suppose them, when asked as to their origin, to have described themselves as Iverni from the land of Iverijō, or whatever the name happened to be, it is quite natural that he should have called them Ἴϝερνοι or *Iverni* in his own language, and that he should prefer to give their country a correlated name fashioned in his own way, Ἰϝέρνη or *Ivernia*; and so with regard to *Iveri* or *Iberi* and *Ivvera*. We know that similarly, when he heard of some of the inhabitants being *Scotti*, he called the island *Scottia*.

I would now append some notes relative to the ethnic names and the adjectives connected with them in so far as they may be traced in their later forms in Irish and Welsh literature. Beginning with the Goidelic crude stem *Iverna-* (Brythonic *Iverno-*), I would point out that the form it should take in later Irish could hardly be any other than *hiarn* or *iarn*. That is unfortunately also a form of the word for 'iron,' worn down from *iserna-*, as both intervocalic *v* and *s* underwent the same sort of fate of extinction. This opened a door for confusion, but it is still possible, I think, to trace in Medieval Irish an *iarn* which did not mean 'iron,' but stood for *Iverna-* and referred to the Iverni. In the *Revue Celtique*, iii. 267–74, Dr. Thurneysen published a paper headed 'Le terme *Iarmbérla* dans la grammaire irlandaise,' in which he distinguishes two Irish terms which have been sometimes confounded: (1) *Iarmberla*, which is applied to certain unaccented adverbs and other particles of little

account in Irish verse The compound is made up of *berla* (written in Medieval Irish *beurla* and in Old Irish *béhe*) with the eclipsing preposition *iar*, 'after,' prefixed to it. (2) The other was *iarnberla* to which the following article is devoted in Cormac's *Glossary* '*Iarnbelra* is de asberar friss for a dhuibe in belra ⁊ for a dhorchacht ⁊ for a dlúthi conach urusa taiscélad tritsin (no ind).' Thurneysen translates thus. 'Iarn-belra (le langage de fer) est ainsi nommé à cause de la noirceur du langage et à cause de son obscurité et de sa densité, de sorte qu'il n'est pas aisé à pénétrer.' Thurneysen quotes some further texts to show that the word meant the use of a kind of obscure and unusual language which found no little favour with the Irish poets Cormac's explanation of the compound as meaning 'the iron language' is too fanciful to need serious discussion and instead of 'iron' I should simply substitute 'Iverman.' The better known instances given of the *Iarn-belra* in Cormac's *Glossary* are *hond*, 'a stone,' and *fern*, 'good'· Thurneysen cites one or two more. But as the term had got to mean 'obscure language,' it does not follow that any one of the instances given was really derived from ancient Iverman, whatever the origin or characteristics of that language may have been. Lastly, *Iarn-berla* is composed just in the same way as *Saxan-berla*, *Sacs-bhéurla*, 'Saxon language,' a compound which, by the way, has dropped its distinctive element and yielded *Béurla* as the ordinary Irish word for the 'English language' at the present day.

Immediately formed from the stem *Iverna-* there was another *Invernia-*, from which is derived the name of the Érna or Érnai of Munster, a people figuring a good deal in early Irish history. The name was identical, as we shall see, with Ptolemy's Ἰουέρνιοι or Ἰούερνοι: somewhat in the same way as *tigernia-s*, 'lord or master,' became *tigerne* and later *tigerna*, *Iverniạ-s* made *Érne*[1], which afterwards became *Érna*, as also the plural *Iverniịi* became successively *Érne* (Todd's Irish version of *Nennius*, p. 262) and *Érna* or *Érnai*, genitive *Érna* (O'Grady's *Silva Gadelica*, p 101; *The Topographical Poems*, edited by Dr. O'Donovan, p. 112). The forms like *Érna* with *a* helped apparently to distinguish the Érna of Munster from a tribe called by a name which it is supposed to have left to Loch *Erne*, in Irish, Loch *Éirne*, genitive Locha *Éirne* This latter *Érne* or *Éirne* points back doubtless to Ptolemy's more northern tribe of Ἐρδῖνοι[2],

[1] The *Book of Leinster*, 17ᵃ, has it *deg erne*, 'a brave Ernean,' which is glossed 'McGuill', but the *Four Masters*, A.M. 3656, have it as a man's name 'Dagairne, son of Goll.'

[2] If Greek palaeography admitted of our supposing Ἐρδῖνοι to stand for an original Ἔρδνιοι or Ἐρδίνιοι, one would arrive at Éirne with phonological regularity; but there are probably several possibilities.

as suggested by Mr Orpen, loc. cit., p. 118, where he rightly insists that the town of 'Ιουερνίς cannot be dissociated from the 'Ιούερνοι, and infers that it was situated at or near the site of the present city of Cork He regards the territory of the 'Ιούερνοι as extending along the south coast from Waterford as far, perhaps, as Kinsale.

Lastly, besides *Érna* or *Érnai*, genitive *Érna*, this people had another and a kindred name which consisted of a nominative plural *Éraind*, genitive *Érand*, better *Hérainn*, genitive *Hérann* see the *Book of Leinster*, fo. $22^{a,b}$, 318^{b}, 318^{c}, $324^{d,f}$, and compare 'Brinna Ferchertne,' edited by Professor Kuno Meyer in his *Zeitschrift*, iii. 41. Their commonest designation, however, is *Érna* or *Érnai*, genitive *Érann* or *Érand*, accusative *Érnu*, dative *Érnaib* Here the *nd* is later spelling for *nn*, but neither is *nn* to be found often in Ogam inscriptions, where we have instead a single *n*, as, for example, in *Maqui Cairatini*, genitive of the name which appears later as *Macc Cairthinn* or *Mac Cairthind*, 'Son of the Rowan.' This question of the *nn* has been studied very hard by Pedersen in his *Aspirationen i Irsk*, where one should consult more especially pp. 122–4. For my immediate purpose it is more to the point to mention that Adamnan's *Mocu Dalon* appears later as *Maccu Dalann* and *Macu Daland*; so we have *on* as the antecedent of the later *ann* or *and*. Bearing this in mind, one is enabled to see through the ethnic plural *Éraind*, genitive *Érand*. These vocables stand for some such early name as *Iveri̯on-es*, 'Iverni,' and *Iveri̯on-am*, 'Ivernorum,' which are formally the plural of *Iveri̯ō*, to which the genitive singular *Iveri̯en-as* has been ascribed already, but it could also probably have a genitive *Iveri̯on-as*. At any rate, we have here to do with a declension in which there was a struggle, as it were, between the vowel *o* of the strong cases and the vowel *e* of the weaker ones. Brythonic favoured the former, so *Iveri̯ō* made *Iweryd* and the genitive *Iveri̯on-os* yielded *Iwerdon*; but in Goidelic we have an instance in Ogam of the double genitive in the case of *Broinien-as* and *Broinion-as*, as to which one may consult the *Journal of the R. Soc. of Antiquaries of Ireland*, 1902, p. 5. These variant genitives should yield in Medieval Irish *Broenenn* and *Broenann* respectively, corresponding to nominatives *Broeniu* and *Broenu* or *Broena*[1], derived from another personal name *Bróen*, genitive *Bróin*,

[1] The two declensions seem to range themselves on the following lines, (*a*) with *e* retained, and (*b*) with *e* eliminated :—

(*a*) With *e* retained :—

Nom	**Brōini̯ō*.	Later	**Bróeniu*.
Gen	*Brōini̯en-as*	,,	**Bróenenn*.

written later *Bracin* and *Braoin*, as in *Ua Bracin* or *Ua Braoin*, anglicized *O'Breen*, common enough in the Irish annals of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The relation in which our *Érainn* or *Iverịon-es* stand to the ancestral name *Iverịō* (*Ériu*) is closely paralleled by Albion and the name of its people Albiones, as well as that, according to Pliny, of a people in the north of Spain. It is needless to say that Albion was originally perhaps as little geographical as Iverịō.

We now come to the shorter form *Iber-i*; the early Goidelic singular corresponding would be *Ivera-s*, Brythonic *Ivero-s*, with the

(*b*) With *e* eliminated —

Nom. **Brōnịō* Later **Broenu, -a*
Gen. *Brōnịon-as.* ,, **Broenann*

To facilitate reference I append what should be the early declension of *Ériu* :—

(*a*) Sing Nom *Iverịō*, later *Hériu*, *Ériu* (Welsh *Iweryd*)
,, Gen *Iverịen-as*, ,, *Herenn*, *Érend*
(*b*) Sing Gen. *Iverịon-os*, ,, (Welsh *Iwerdon*).
Plu. Nom. *Iverịon-es*, ,, *Hérainn*, *Éraind*
,, Gen *Iverịon-am*, ,, *Hérann*, *Érand*.

The early Goidelic declension of Albion 'Britain' seems to have been as follows.—

(*b*) Nom *Albịō*. Later *Albu*, *Alba*, *Alpa*
Gen *Albịon-as*. ,, *Alban*, *Alpan*.

We seem to have the Welsh form in *elfyd*, which however is attested only as meaning *terra firma* generally and not that of Britain in particular, a provection of meaning on the same lines as that of *Merweryd* to be mentioned presently. Should this etymology prove well-founded, the word would have to be explained as standing not for *Albịō* but, as might in the case of Brythonic be expected, for *Albịō*. For the convenience of comparison I proceed to add the forms of the name of the god whom I have usually called *Nodens*, but there is no warrant for that form, I find. The inscriptions relating to him are those of Nos 137–40 of C I. L., and the case attested is the dative which occurs as *Nodonti*, *Nodenti*, and *Nudente*, doubtless for *Nudenti*. The Welsh is *Nūd* and the O. Irish was *Nuadu*, while intermediate we have on an old inscribed stone at Cynwyl Gaeo in Carmarthenshire a Latin genitive *NV . . INTI* which is doubtless to be completed *NVDINTI*: compare the Breton name *Nodent* attested several times in De Courson's *Cartulaire de Redon*. Lastly the Yarrow Stone, Selkirkshire, has a genitive *NVDI* The following scheme will show at a glance how these forms are related to one another: needless to say, the case termination *is* here is Latin, and the first vowel of the name was *ō* (or *ū*), making *ū* in Welsh and *ua* in Irish :—

Nominative: (*b*) **Nōdont-s*.
**Nōdons*, Irish *Nuadu*, later *Nuadha*
**Nōdos*, (Welsh *Nūd* indeclinable), with the genitive *Nudi*: compare *Brigomagli* corresponding to a nominative *Brigomaglo-s*, on a stone at Chesters in the North.

Genitive: (*a*) **Nōdent-is*, whence *Nudint-i*, and Breton *Nodent* (indeclinable).
(*b*) **Nōdont-is*, O. Irish *Nuadat*, later *Nuadhad*

Dative: (*a*) *Nōdent-i*.
(*b*) *Nōdont-i*, O. Irish *Nuadait*, later *Nuadhaid*.

genitive *Iveri* common to both languages. The system of early Irish genealogy such as is given in the *Book of Leinster* presents two ancestral names which seem to challenge equation with *Ivera-s*, and they are *Eber* and *Iar*. Let us take *Eber* first: there is little to say concerning it, and that little is mostly negative. In my opinion it is not genuine, but a modification of the name *Emer* with the *b* of *Iberi* and *Hibernia* substituted for the *m*: the change was phonetically a small one, as both *m* and *b* in such a position sounded some sort of *v*. It is, however, to the name *Emer* we probably owe the initial *e* of such Latin forms as *Evernia* and *Evernilis* already mentioned. In return Emer has to submit to have a *b* in his bonnet, as you have seen, in order to become Eber in the *Book of Leinster*, and then he has to be dubbed Eber Find or the fair, to distinguish him from another Eber called Eber Donn or the dark, who is called also Eber mc Hír. The most ancient reference to Emer is to be found in a well-known line of Fiacc's hymn, where all the Irish are described comprehensively by the words *meicc Emir meicc Erimon*[1], 'the sons of Emer (and) the sons of Erem.' The name of *Erem* or *Airem* (genitive *Erimon*, *Eremon*, or *Airemon*) seems to have meant a ploughman, and he is represented as son of Mílid of Spain. The coming of his sons to Ireland is generally treated as the advent of the Goidil, and his line embraces the names of the great Celtic heroes of early Irish history, such as Tigernmas, Ugaine Mór, Labraid Longsech, Eochaid Feidlech, Tuathal Techtmar, Conn the Hundred-fighter, Cormac mc Airt, Cairpre Lifechair, Muredach Tirech, the Three Collas, Eochaid Mugmedoin, Niall of the Nine Hostages, and others too numerous to mention. They were the leaders of the great families who ruled in Lagin or Leinster, in Meath and Connaught, and held, by the beginning of the Christian era, strong positions in three of the most fertile regions in Ireland, namely, at Tara of the Kings, at Alend 'Knockaulin,' near Old Kilcullen in the county of Kildare, and at Cruachan 'Rathcroghan' in that of Roscommon (*Book of Leinster*, fo. 311ᶜ). But as to Alend, it is right to say that it had from remote times a rival in Nas (now written Naas) in the same county and the same sort of country. Those families were, doubtless, the descendants of the Celtic conquerors of the country, and the fact is duly emphasized by the military rank they enjoyed and the precious metals, gold and silver,

[1] This seems to be the reading of the MSS both of Trinity College and the Franciscan Convent, but Stokes and Strachan in their *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus* (Cambridge, 1903), ii. 316, have preferred *maicc Ebir maicc Erimon* for their text.

in which their honour price had to be paid: ibid., 312^{a}. On the other hand, Irish tradition has it that the race of Emer in the south of the island and under the lead of Mog Nuadat, otherwise called Eogan Mór, proved strong enough to force Conn the Hundred-fighter to agree to confine himself to the northern half of Ireland, called in consequence Leth Cuinn, 'Conn's Half,' while the southern half came to be similarly known as Leth Moga, or 'Mog's Half,' identified in the *Book of Rights* (p. 54) with the name of Emer. At one time, accordingly, it was natural and intelligible to speak, as in Fiacc's hymn, of the chief populations of Ireland as being collectively the sons of Emer and the sons of Airem. The name *Emer*, genitive masculine *Emir*, genitive feminine *Emire*—for it was also a woman's name—is of obscure origin; but being, as it would seem, genuine, it enables one to explain away as factitious the name *Eber*. This last should probably be corrected everywhere into *Emer*, later *Emher*.

We now come to the other name *Iar*, which must be regarded as genuine, as it appears here and there in various pedigrees, and was borne by individuals of no conspicuous importance or distinction. Thus, among the posterity of Emer we find a sept called Húi Mc Ier, 'the descendants of Mc Ier.' The form Ier is in the heading (*Book of Leinster*, fo. 326^{e}), but on reading the pedigree to the end, one finds the ancestor called in the genitive *Iair* mc Cuirc—in fact, this genitive occurs twice as *Iair* in the column; it occurs also twice in a reference to this pedigree at fo. 319^{c}. The forms are of importance, so I add a few more references: a certain Fiacc Mc *Ier* is mentioned at 316^{b}, and as Fiacc mc *Ieir* at 337^{b}, 347$^{a\text{-}d}$ note, and another man of the same name is Fiacc mc *Ieir*, 312^{a}. At 313^{a} one reads 'Mc *Ier* a quo teoir ingena (three daughters of) mc *Ier*,' and at 319^{b} we have Eogan mc *Iair*; also Mc Ier, son of Tál, 327^{d}; Crimthaind Móir mc *Iair* mc Setnai, 337^{b}, 351^{b}, and mc Mc Ieir vel Mc Crimthaind mc *Ieir*, 339^{a2}. Similarly, the ancestor of Eterscél is in the genitive *Iair* at fo. 22^{b} and 23^{a}. In these instances the prévailing genitive is spelt *Iair*. The nominative occurs less frequently: we have *Iar* mc Dedad at 324^{f}, but at 319^{a2} his name is *Iair* in the nominative, and we have a deacon's name *Ieir* in a list mostly of nominatives at 366^{d}. Some instances of the name occur in the Martyrölogies, such as one printed by Stokes *Mac Cier* in his *Mart. of Gorman*, September 29, Mac *Ieir* in the *Mart. of Donegal*, and Meic *Ier* in the *Mart. of Tamlaght*, which Stokes quotes On October 26, Gorman has the genitive Meic *Iair* with a dissyllabic *Iair*, for which the *Mart. of Donegal* seems to have the unusual

spelling Mic *Iaair.* But Stokes hesitates, as to the nominative, between *Íar* and *Íer*. So we may put the simple name down as *Íar* or *Íer*, genitive *Iair* (or *Ier*) and *Icir*.

This is, however, not all, for we find an Iar occupying a prominent position at the remote end of the genealogy of Conaire Mór and the Érna. A passage in the *Book of the Dun Cow*, fo. 99[a], is in point: it purports to be a bit from the *Book of Druim Snechta* concerning the death of Conaire Mór at Bruden ui Derge —'Conaire mc Etarscéli mc mc Ier di Ernaib Muman is é ro hort isin Brudin seo'. that is to say, 'Conaire son of Ederscél son's son of Iar of the Érna of Munster was he who was killed in this hostel.' But the intervening generations in the *Book of Leinster*, 324[a], are too many for this to be literally true, so I suppose that the word for son has been taken in an indefinite sense when Ederscél is represented as son's son of Iar, a view which is countenanced by his being called *h. Iair* on fo. 22[b], and *mc. h. Iair* on 23[a]. Also by a statement in the *Book of Fenagh*, edited by the late Celtic scholar Mr. Hennessy from O'Mulconry's copy made in 1516 at p 32 we have 'Etirscel mor mac. h. Iair, di Ernuib'; that is, 'Ederscél the Great, kin of Iar of the Érna,' or less literally 'E. the Great of the race of Iar of the Érna.' It is needless to mention that *mc. h.* stands for *mac hui*, the substitution of which for *maccu* has already been touched upon: see p 27 above. Now *maccu*, or rather its genitive in an early form, occurs in Ogam inscriptions as *mucoi* or *mocoi*, and it is of all others the vocable wont to stand immediately before the name of the remotest ancestor mentioned in such inscriptions. To return to the *Book of Leinster*, 324[a], there we have a tribe belonging to the north-west of the present county of Cork, the Muscraige Mittine traced back through Conaire Mór to Glass mc Roglais nitha mc Ier mc Itha mc Bregoin. A few lines lower the name which is *Ier* in the genitive becomes *Hir* in the nominative, and at the top of 324[b] we have the nominative *Hír* and the dative *Ír*, while 19[a] has genitive *Ír*. On fo 329[c] both *Hír* and *Ír* will be found used in the nominative and the genitive At first sight this may appear to be confusion worse confounded; but that is hardly the case, as *Hír* supplies the key, as will be seen by comparing what has been indicated already at p. 32 above. We set out from *Ivera-s*, genitive *Iveri*, and what has happened is this *Iveri* became *Iviri* and successively *Iir*, *Įir*, *Yir*, *Hir*, *Īr*, while the nominative *Ivera-s* became *Ier* and yielded to the analogy of words in which *ē* became successively *ie* and *ia* with the accent on the *i*, which could not on that account pass into a consonant of any kind. Thus we obtain according to

ascertained analogy a nominative *Iar* (for an older *Ier*) and the genitive *Hír*, liable to be reduced to *Ír*. The natural result of the disparity of forms was the dissociating of the nominative and the genitive; and the next step was to provide *Iar* with a new genitive *Iair* or *Ier*, but as the genitive *Hír* suggested no new nominative it was used both as genitive and nominative, that is, it became indeclinable.

This bifurcation of the name derived from *Ivera-s* had an influence on the arrangement of the pedigrees, which it is necessary briefly to discuss before proceeding further, and let me mention first a note on the words 'meicc Emir meicc Eremon' in the text of Fiacc's hymn, to which reference was made at p. 37. The original, supposed by Stokes and Strachan to date about the end of the eleventh century, will be found in their *Thesaurus*, ii. 316, and it is to the effect that the six sons of Mílid came to Ireland at the same time as did the six sons of Bile son of Bregon, but that the sons of Mílid[1] proved more illustrious than those of Bregon, who are mentioned no more. Then the sons of Mílid are treated in the usual way, except that it is implied that Mílid himself is not descended from Bile or Bregon. The arrangement in the *Book of Leinster* is different and may be represented as follows:—

[1] This name is the Latin word *miles, militis*, borrowed and shortened in Irish into *míl*, genitive *mílid*, 'a soldier,' but this was contrary to analogy; so the word has been treated in two ways:—(*a*) *Míl* has had its genitive *mílid* modified into *míled*, which will be found in its proper place in the *Gram Celtica* (pp. 255-8). We have it also in poems in the *Book of Leinster* as *Míled* assonating with *ler*, fo. 16^{a}, and as *Míleth* with *meth* 14^{b}, with *leth* 22^{a}, and *drech* 19^{a} (*b*) The other treatment was the same as that of *Hír*, namely, to use *Mílid* in all the cases, so we have not only the compound *Echmílid* in the genitive 332^{a3}, but also *Mílid* as a nominative on fo. 4^{a}, 12^{a}, 14^{a}, 14^{a3} The reduction of the *t* of *militis* into *th* and *d*=*đ*, shows that the word belongs to the earliest list of Irish loan-words from Latin, a fact in harmony with its occurrence in the Welsh compound *milwr*, 'a soldier' At the foot of fo 12^{a} we are told that the real name of *Milid Espáine*, 'the Soldier of Spain,' was *Galam*, which appears to have likewise meant a soldier or man of valour: needless to say, this was a word of native origin.

Most of the notes I have to make on the pedigrees will fall into their natural places as follows, in the order here indicated —

1. *Síl Lugdach mc Itha* or the race of Lugaid son of Ith. Lugaid's descendant Lugaid Laigde left his name to his posterity the Corco Láigde, who were also called the Darine, and another of his descendants Ederscél—not Ederscél father of Conaire Mór—gave his name to his descendants, the Ui Ederesceoil, whose name is in English cut down to O'Driscoll. The territory of Lugaid's race consisted of the baronies of Carbery, Bantry, and Beare, in other words, the whole of the diocese of Ross in the south-west of the present county of Cork, or Desmond proper: see O'Donovan's notes to his edition of the *Topographical Poems of O'Dubhagain and O'Huidhrin* (Dublin, 1862), p. 104, notes 563–6, his edition of the *Book of Rights* (Dublin, 1847), pp. 46, 64, and Todd's edition of *The Irish version of Nennius* (Dublin, 1848), p. 261 One of the pedigrees, *Book of Leinster*, 325 [f], is remarkable as ending with 'Lug mc Ethlend mc Lugdach mc Itha,' where the Lug famous in Irish story is brought in and his mother is tacitly transformed into a *son* of Lugaid, an example of the treatment sometimes dealt out to the ancestresses in these genealogies.

2. *Síl Hír mc Itha* or the race of Iar of the Érna of Munster. (1) The great name in this genealogy is Conaire Mór, who had two sons, Cairpri Musc and Cairpri Bascind. From the former descended a people called Dál Musca (*Book of Leinster*, 324 [b]) or Muscraige, divided into six or more branches:—(*a*) Muscraige Mittine or the Muscraige of O'Floinn, whose name is perpetuated in Musgrylin, embracing some fifteen parishes in the north-west of the county of Cork. (*b*) Muscraige Luachra about the source of the Blackwater in the same county. But the district called Sliab Luachra and Luachair Dedad was originally very extensive and took in portions of the counties of Kerry and Limerick; Loch Léin, that is the Lakes of Killarney, was in it, and so must have been the head-quarters of those of the Érna, who were known as Érna Dedad: it was called Temair Luachra or Temair Érand, and according to O'Donovan it was situated near Castle-Island in Kerry. See the *Four Masters* (Dublin, 1856), vol v. p. 1731, note c; *Book of Rights*, p. 254, *Revue Celtique*, xv. 445: and compare O'Curry's *Battle of Magh Leana*, p. 22, and his *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, iii. 132. This, to say the least of it, harmonizes with the surmise that the Maine flowing into Castlemaine Harbour was Ptolemy's river Ἴερνος, and that it must have flowed through the territory of the Ἰουέρνιοι or Érna. (*c*) Muscraige Tri Maige in the barony of Orrery

and Kilmore and parts of the baronies of Fermoy and Duhallow. With these Muscraige one of the *Top. Poems*, p 110 (notes 605–6), associates a river Iaram, which looks like another Ἴερνος or Iverman stream. (*d*) Muscraige Tréthirne, also called M. Breogain and M. Chuirc, in the barony of Clanwilliam in the county of Tipperary. (*e*) Muscraige of the west (east in the *Book of Leinster*, 324[d]) of Feimen in the same barony in the south-west of Tipperary. (*f*) Muscraige Thire in the present barony of Lower Ormond and a part of Upper Ormond in the same county. See the *Top. Poems*, pp. 108–11, notes 600–13; *Book of Rights*, pp. 42–5; *Book of Leinster*, 323[f]–324[d].

(2) Cairpri Bascind gave his name to the Corco Bascind who had the land which is now comprised in the baronies of Clonderlaw, Moyarta, and Ibrickan in the west of the county of Clare. See the *Top. Poems*, p. 110, n. 616, *Book of Rights*, pp. 48, 75, 85.

(3) Cairpri Musc had a son called Corc Duibne after his mother Dubin, and his descendants were the Corco Duibne, a name modified into that of the barony of Corcaguiny. This, however, represents only a part of their original territory, which included the two great peninsulas between Tralee and Kenmare. They had also what is now the barony of Magunihy, in which Killarney is situated and near which they fought against the Eremonians under Tigernmas. In fact, O'Donovan has expressed himself to the effect that the territory of Conaire's race extended to the river Suir in the county of Tipperary. (*Book of Leinster*, fo. 16[b]; *Top. Poems*, p. 109, n. 594, *Book of Rights*, p. 47.) That means that besides most of Kerry this people, under its wider name of the Éraind or Érna of Munster, had the whole of the county of Cork except the south-west, which was occupied by the race of Lugaid, and that their territory extended beyond the eastern boundary of the county of Cork and became conterminous with that ruled by the kings of Cashel. As regards at least the southern and central portions of the county of Cork, O'Donovan's view is established beyond reasonable doubt by the fact that no other early people has those districts assigned to it.

(4) A son of the second Conaire, Cairpri Riata, became king of Dál Riada, the part of the county of Antrim north of Sliab Mis, 'Slemish,' in the barony of Lower Antrim (*Four Masters*, A.M. 2859, note *a*), and of his progeny came Echaid Munremair, ancestor of the Dálriad kings of Scotland (*Book of Rights*, p. 160, note).

3. *Síl Heremoin* or the race of Eremon has already been noticed, p. 37 above, as that of the conquering Celts. It is perhaps worth

the while to notice that one of the chief figures in the pedigrees, namely, Ugaine the Great son of Eochaid the Victorious, is represented dividing his territory between his children, numbering twenty-five: see *Book of Leinster*, 21[b], 22[a], *The Four Masters*, A. M. 4566, 4606, and O'Donovan's note z. Their names practically represent so many plains or districts, mostly in Leinster and Connaught, and the story relates that Ugaine exacted oaths from the people of Erin that they would never contend with his seed for the sovereignty for ever. Now the mother of his twenty-five children is said to have been Cessair, whom a wilder story describes landing in the south-west of Ireland before the Flood. She may probably be regarded as an eponymous[1] ancestress or goddess of the non-Goidelic peoples of Ireland, and the whole suggests that to a certain extent amalgamation had been proceeding between the Goidels and the other inhabitants, especially in the central region comprising Leinster and Connaught.

4. *Síl Ebir* or the race of Emer. The greatest figure in this genealogy was Ailill Ólum, who left three sons, Eogan Mór, Cian, and Cormac Cas, who all had numerous progeny. (1) Those of Eogan were known as Eoganacht, of whom a number of clans occupied various portions of the present counties of Limerick and Tipperary, including the part of Mag Femin which extended to the neighbourhood of the important site of Cashel. There were also outlying Eoganacht occupying, for instance, what is now the barony of Glanworth, in the county of Cork, and others on the Bandon in Kinelmeaky, whence they encroached on the race of Lugaid; not to mention that some of the Eoganacht of Cashel settled in the eleventh century under the name of Ui Donchada, 'O'Donoghue,' in the barony of Magunihy and the neighbourhood of Killarney. There appear also to have been Eoganacht in Aran in the Bay of Galway. See the *Top Poems*, pp. 102, 120, n 523, 548, 684, 686, 688; *Book of Rights*, pp 47, 59; *Ir Nennius*, p. 258, O'Curry's *MS. Materials of Ancient Irish History*, pp. 485, 486.

(2) Cian's descendants were called Dál Céin or Cianacht, of whom some gave their name to the barony of Keenaght in the county of Londonderry; and there were Cianacht also in Mag Breg between the Liffey and Druim Inesclainn, now called Drumiskin, in the neigh-

[1] This brings nearer to the lines of probability the conjecture, that a population of the same race occupying southern Britain, which is also represented as subject to Ugaine's rule, once owned the same eponymous heroine Cessair (for an earlier *Cassitari-s*, *Čestari-s*), that the name is echoed by that of the *Cassiterides* for our islands, and that through the latter it supplied the Greek language with its word κασσίτερος for tin; see *The Welsh People*, p. 61.

bourhood of Castle Bellingham in county Louth. This was territory given to Tadg son of Cian by Cormac mc Airt for assisting him against the men of Ulster (*Top Poems*, p 21, n. 69; *Four Masters*, A.D. 226, n.) The Gailenga were a branch of the Cianacht descended from Cormac Gaileng son of Tadg son of Cian, and they comprised families in Meath and Connaught. Of the same origin were the Luigne, who have left their name to the barony of Leyney in the county of Sligo and to that of Lune in Meath, but their original territory there appears to have been much more extensive than the modern barony. See *Top Poems*, p. 133, n 761, *Book of Rights*, pp. 103 n, 186 n., *Ir. Nennius*, p. 260.

(3) Cormac Cas was the reputed ancestor of the Dál Cais: they belonged to Thomond and occupied most of the county of Clare, but they had a considerable extent of territory also south of the Shannon in the county of Limerick. Nearly related to them were the Delmna or Delbna, anglicized Delvins, who occupied districts in the following counties—Meath, Westmeath, King's, Roscommon, and Galway. See the *Top. Poems*, p. 122, n. 698, 708; O'Donovan's *Tribes and Customs of Hy-Many* (Dublin, 1843), p. 83 n.; *Book of Rights*, pp. 105, 183; *Ir. Nennius*, p. 260.

5. *Síl Hír* being the race of Emer son of Hír. The most remarkable ancestor of this race was Ollam Fodla, with whom Irish legend associates the prehistoric antiquities of Lough Crew and Slieve na Calliagh in the vicinity of Oldcastle in the north-west of Meath. His burial place and that of his family was at Tailte, now Teltown on the Blackwater between Navan and Kells. His great descendant was Rudraige Mór, from whom the whole race is sometimes termed Rudrician, and to whom are traced the *Fír Ulaid* (B. Lein. 22[b], 346[c]), 'the True Ultonians or Ulidians' (the Cruithnians or Picts of Ulster) around Emain Macha or the 'Navan Fort,' in the neighbourhood of Armagh. Here belong the heroes of the Ulster Cycle, such as Conchobar mc Nessa, Conall Cernach, Celtchair mc Uthechair, the Sons of Usnech, and many more, excepting always Cúchulainn, who is treated with his father as Eremonian rather than with his mother as Ulidian. Some of Conchobar's sons left their names to clans derived from them, but in that respect Conall Cernach is of greater interest. From him were descended (1) the Conaille of Murthemne in the present county of Louth and all the other Connaille in Ireland. (2) The Laegse, 'Leix,' occupying the southern and eastern baronies of Queen's County, where they obtained land in the time of Fedlimid Rechtmár for assisting the king of Leinster against the men of Munster: see the *Book of Rights*, p. 215 n. (3) Also the Dál nAraide or the

Dalaradians, who derived their name from Conall's descendant Fiacha Araide, and occupied an area consisting of a large tract of the county of Down, extending northwards as far as Slemish. (4) From the same Fiacha were derived through an ancestor named Eochaid Coba, a tribe called Ui Eochach Coba or Ui Eochach Ulad, who left their name to the baronies of Upper and Lower Iveagh (Uib Eathach) to the west of their kindred the Dalaradians in Down. (5) Fiacha had a son Sogan Salbuide, whose descendants were called Sogain; some of them were in Meath and the others in the country of the Hy-Many between the Shannon and Loch Corrib. See the *Top. Poems*, pp 63, 84, n. 346, 421; *Hy-Many*, pp 72, 159; *Book of Rights*, pp. 22, 23, 159, 165, 166, 214; *Bk. of Leinster*, 331[e]. See also the tract on the Picts published by Skene in his *Chronicles*, pp. lxviii, 318–21, from the Bodleian MS. Rawlinson B. 506, and referred by him to the fourteenth century. For the tribes here in question were all Cruthni or Picts ruled by kings whose authority is said to have been exercised at one time both in Erin and Alban.

6. Here may perhaps be added a sixth ancestor variously called Érech mc Milid, Hérech Febria mc Milid, and Herech mc Febria mc Mílid, in the *Book of Ballymote*, fo. 154[b 1], Airich Februaid (genitive) mc Milead. This Érech is introduced for the sake of Fergus mc Roig, who was found troublesome: in fact, Fergus has more than once in the *Book of Leinster* no less than three pedigrees drawn up for him: see fo. 331[c], 336[f], and compare 327[d]. In some of them Roig or Roich his mother is treated as of the other sex, a kind of error to which attention has already been called, p. 41. When, in the present instances, this is corrected, we find that we have to do with one pedigree tracing Fergus mc Roig through his father back to Rudraige Mór, and two tracing him through his mother, the one to Lugaid mc Itha and the other to Érech mc Mílid. The difference between the latter two is probably due to the introduction of another ancestress, though I cannot detect her for certain. The most usual assumption is that Fergus was a Rudrician, that is, an Ulidian descended from Eber mc Ír. Some of the most important of his numerous progeny were his sons by Queen Medb, known as Ciar, Corc, and Conmac. (1) Ciar left his name to the Ciarraige, who occupied the north of Kerry from Tralee to the mouth of the Shannon: they have left their name to the whole of the modern county. There were outlying branches of the Ciarraige who settled eventually in the counties of Mayo and Roscommon: see the *Top. Poems*, p. 112, n. 627–30, *Book of Rights*, pp. 48 n., 100–3; *Ir. Nennius*, p. 264. (2) Corc's descendants were called

Corcomruad[1], whose territory was what is now the baronies of Corcomroe and Burren, or the diocese of Kilfenora, in the north of Clare see the *Top. Poems*, p. 114, n. 639; *Book of Rights*, p. 65. (3) Conmac was reckoned the ancestor of all the Conmaicne, some of whom possessed Moy Rein in the counties of Longford and Leitrim, and the Conmaicne of Connaught, including the Conmaicne Mara, who have left a portion of their name to Connemara see the *Top. Poems*, pp. 64, 112, n. 317, 318, 320, 627, *Book of Rights*, pp. 100, 247, 248; *Ir. Nennius*, pp 262-4 (4) Through Mug Ruith the druid, another descendant of Fergus[2], were derived the Fir Maige Féne, who have left their name to Fermoy, which originally comprised, besides the modern barony of Fermoy, that of Condons and Clangibbon. This territory is supposed to have been given Mug Ruith by the men of Munster for assisting them to defeat Cormac mc Airt. See the *Top Poems*, pp 102, n. 544; *Book of Rights*, pp. 78, 82; *Ir. Nennius*, pp. 264, 265; O'Curry's *Manners and Customs*, ii. 212-6. (5) The Orbraige are traced to Fer Céchech, 331[b], and some of them have left their name to the barony of Orrery in the north-west of the county of Cork see the *Book of Rights*, p. 64. (6) Other clans descended from Fergus are mentioned in the *Book of Leinster*, 331[b], such as Dál Conlaid, Dál Cethirn, Dál nAulum, Corcu Dáland, Dál Conrach, Dál mBuinni, and Mediaige. Fergus and his progeny may be said to diversify the map of ancient Ireland, but they can hardly be said to have belonged to the most ancient edition which Irish legendary history enables one to project of it.

The sons of Míled were six or more, for their number does not appear fixed. they were all wanted either for place-names or for the pedigrees, but I have not found any genealogical use for more than three or four of them. The Milesian expedition as a whole is made

[1] Corcomruad is supposed to mean *Corco m'Druad*, that is, the descendants of one who was reverentially called *Mo Drui* (genitive *Mo Druad*), 'My Druid'; and whether Corc was the proper name of the ancestor seems uncertain: in the pedigree of the Corcomruad, fo. 336[g,h], Fergus's son in question is called *Corc Doth*, while in 331[c5] his name is *Fer Deoda*, with the second vocable of which we may compare perhaps the genitive *Defatha, Deatha* 327[d], 331[c], 336[f], 346[c1].

[2] In the pedigree of the Dál Moga Ruith, 331[c3], one misses the name of Fergus in its proper place, while in that of the Fir Maige Féne he is duly represented as an ancestor of Mug Ruith and his progeny, 326[e]. The *Four Masters* have a Mug Ruith belonging to the Fir Bolg, but they date him A. M. 3579. In fact, he is mentioned in the *Book of Leinster*, fo 16[b], as a contemporary of Tigernmas, and as belonging to the Fir Bolg Probably the later Mug Ruith was called after him, or rather was regarded as a rebirth of him. The names are remarkable, such as *Fer Dechet, Fer Loga, Fer Tlachtga*, and the like, put together after the model, as it were, of *Fer Bolg*: see more especially the *Book of Leinster*, fo 331[c].

to include not only the sons of Mílid and certain representatives of Milid's uncle Ith, but a number of followers whose names are in a good many obvious instances those of places in Ireland. Presumably there is not a name in the list which was not required to account for that of a tribe or of a place. Thus there are two plains of Ith, genitive Itha, in the *Book of Leinster* (12 [a], 349 [g], 374 [a]), and the *Four Masters* (A. M. 2530, 2550, A. D. 663, 728, 843), who write it variously Ithe or Itha (Iotha). The better known of the two localities was in Ulster, in the barony of Raphoe, near the Finn and the Foyle, while the other was in the south-east, namely, in the barony of Forth. The case of Bregon is not quite so obvious, but a *raison d'être* of this ancestor is to be found perhaps in the description of a branch of the Muscraige as the Muscraige of *Breogan*, whose territory was, according to O'Donovan, in the present barony of Clanwilliam in the south-west of the county of Tipperary (*Four Masters*, A. D 899, note *n*). Probably the name was above all intended to recall that of the town of *Brigantium Flavium* in Spanish Gallicia. Sometimes a similar personal name was invented to account probably for Mag *Breg*, the plain forming the eastern portion of ancient Meath *Breg* is perpetuated in the name of the mountain Slieve Bregh. This will serve to illustrate the way in which the remoter stages of the pedigrees have been sometimes constructed.

The arrangement of the above-mentioned ancestors seems to suggest a time when the Celtic chiefs of the Eremonian group held in check the tribes of the race of Emer mc Mílid and of Emer mc Hír, while the race of Conaire, that is, of Hír or Íar of the Érna, retained a fuller independence: that of Lugaid son of Ith need hardly be taken into account, as its geographical position must have made it more or less of an adjunct to the power of the Érna. Nevertheless the independent position of the Eremonians and the Érna as regards one another is not what the pedigrees themselves seem to suggest so much as some kind of a union, and that of a somewhat close nature. Thus the genealogy traced back to Iar son of Ith is usually forgotten, and the Érna are simply treated as being of the race of Eremon [1]. How this is to be accounted for I cannot

[1] While, for example, the chief families of the Muscraige Mittine are traced, *Book of Leinster*, 324 [a], back through the later Conaire, Mug Lama, Conaire Mor, and Ederscel to Iar mc Itha mc Bregoin, those of the Érna are traced, 324 [e], back to Oengus Turbech or Tuirmech, who is traced later, 346 [c 2], to Eremon This Oengus is also the ancestor in a pedigree of Ríg Ulad 'Kings of the Ulidians,' 335 [h]. Here may be mentioned a note by Dr. Todd in his edition of the *Ir. Nennius*, p 262 'The Ernai, Arbhraighe [Orbhraigh or Orrery, Co. Cork],

tell, but I suspect it is partly due to intermarriage between the Eremonians and the Érna, as when, for example, the younger Conaire took to wife the blue-eyed Saraid, daughter of Conn, and partly to the changes made in the pedigrees when the non-Celtic descent through the mothers came to be converted into one through the fathers after the Celtic and the Christian fashion. What those changes can have precisely been I fear it is impossible to ascertain, but one of them has already been suggested, namely, the tacit transformation of mothers into fathers at the hands of the genealogists. Another probably was based on the grouping of families round a great name of man or woman in the tribe's history with the help of the word *muco* or *mocu*, later *macu*, 'kin or *genus*': here I suspect that *mac* 'son' was sometimes substituted, and that it took its place even in cases where the non-Celtic system supplied no assignable father's name at all.

These surmises are only made in regard to the difficulties presented by the pedigrees; but the close connexion between the Érna and the Eremonians is a different matter, a matter doubtless of historical and political relations. The key to the situation seems to be the rivalry which appears to have existed between the Érna and the race of Emer with its head-quarters at Cashel to the east of the Suir. This may be presumed to have disposed the Érna to cultivate the friendship of the Eremonians, and to have made the race of Emer welcome all the more readily within its territories the Eremonian Déssies expelled from Meath by Cormac mc Airt and his sons. As regards the Érna and the Eremonians, the advantages of an alliance need not have been by any means confined to the former. Irish story has it that Mug Nuadat, the head of the race of Emer mc Mílid, was only able to force Conn to yield him half the island, when he, Mug Nuadat, had contrived to compel Conaire and Mc Niad to help him against Conn and his Eremonians. When these heads of the race of Iar and Lugaid favour Conn it is the turn of Mug Nuadat and his Emerians to be beaten [1].

Musca (Muscraighe), and Bascan, are tribes of the race of Heremon, according to the common account. But the *Book of Lecan* states that by some they are deduced from Ir, son of Ith, fo 112 b' The text which suggested this note makes all those clans into descendants of Lugaid, who tends in the *Ir. Nennius* to stand for both Lugaid and Iar in one The Orbraige, however, are usually represented as of the race of Fergus mc Roig.

[1] That is the teaching, for example, of the story of 'the Battle of Magh Leana,' published by Curry in 1855. There seems, it is true, to be no ancient manuscript extant of that story any more than there is of the kindred one entitled 'Tochmarc Momera' which the editor has included in his volume; but

To return to the name of *Iar* or *Hír* son of Ith, we are told, 324 a, b, that, while Lugaid his brother remained in the south with Emer (Eber), Iar was in the north with Eremon, and that he was the ancestor of Dál Musca, Dál mBascind, and Dál nDubne, whom the note goes on to represent as coming into Munster under the lead of Mug Lama or his sons in the time of the sons of Ailill Ólum, the great Munster representative of Emer. This practically identifies Iar or Hír son of Ith of the south with Hír or Ír mc Mílid, ancestor of the Cruithnian *Fír Ulaid* in the north. The identity of name has already been sufficiently indicated, but the statement that the descendants of Iar or Hír came to the south from the north was probably suggested by the identity of names. At any rate it cannot have had much foundation in fact, for it has already been shown (1) that the name of the Érna is a rule-right modification of that of the 'Ιϝέρνιοι, and (2) that they inhabited the very district where Ptolemy locates the latter. (3) It has also been suggested that their town of 'Ιουερνίς was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Cork Harbour. It was in that district that they may probably be said to have had their centre of gravity, from which they pushed into Kerry and wiped out the individuality of the people of the Οὐελλάβοροι, whom Ptolemy locates in the south-west. This event would seem to date later than the information which enabled Orosius early in the fifth century to use (i. 2, 81) the words 'ab eo praecipue promunturio, ubi Scenae fluminis ostium est et Velabri Lucenique consistunt.' We have it in the Rennes Dinnšenchas (*Revue Celtique*, xvi. 83) that *ostium Scenae fluminis* or Inver Scéne had the territory of the Corco-Láigdi identified with it. So it was probably the Kenmare River, on the one side of which was the race of Lugaid and on the other Ptolemy's Οὐελλάβοροι[1]. I am not sure that *Velabri Lucenique* require any further emendation than to make them read *Velabori Lugadenique*.

The identity of the name of *Iar*, *Hír*, or *Ír* of the Erna with that of the ancestor Hír or Ír of the True Ultonians, viewed in the light of the foregoing facts, warrants us in placing the importance of both to the credit of the common and undivided ancestor whose name we may now treat as *Iar*, genitive *Hír* or *Ír*, as representing

there appears to have once been a copy of respectable antiquity of the latter, as we meet in the *Book of Leinster*, 319b, with the words '*amal roscríbsamar i tochmarc momera ingine rig espaine*,' 'as we have written in the Courtship of Momera, Daughter of the King of Spain.'

[1] We have the singular of this noun in the Irish personal name Falbhar mentioned in O'Curry's *Manners and Customs*, iii. 158. In the feminine it occurs as *Velvor* at Llandyssul in Cardiganshire, Hübner, No 112.

Ivera-s, genitive *Iveri*. Thus are brought together the scattered representatives of the Ivernian race: they are found to have continued in their greatest mass in West Munster; but before the northward expansion of the Goidels from Meath under the Three Collas and other Eremonian leaders they were probably as numerous, if not more so, in the country from the Boyne to the northern coasts of Ireland. The turning-point in their history is described thus by Tigernach, as translated by Stokes in the *Revue Celtique*, xvii. 29, 30:—'The battle of Achad Lethdeirg in Fernmag, wherein fell, by the three Collas, Fergus Foga, son of Fraechar Fortrén, the last prince of Ulaid in Emain Macha, and in that battle Colla Menn fell. Then the three Collas razed Emain Macha, and the Ulaid thenceforward did not dwell therein, and their kingdom was taken away from Loch Neagh westwards' This is entered by the Four Masters as having taken place in the year 331, and it may be inferred that it led up in some way to the appearance of the Scotti by name for the first time in Roman Britain, namely, in the year 360 (Holder, s. v. *Scotti*). In other words, the Ulidians, having had most of their territory wrested from them by the Goidels of Meath, were crowded[1] into the corner of Ulster to the east of Loch Neagh, whence some of them crossed the sea to join their kinsmen the Picts of Britain in a formidable attack on the Roman province; and those of them who crossed over were called Scotti by themselves or by the Brythons or by both, so that Scotti became the word in Latin generally for invaders from Ireland: it ended by being regarded as simply the Latin equivalent for the Irish *Goidil*, singular *Goidel*, 'a Gael.' But even after the Eremonians had made 'swordland' of extensive tracts of the north in the earlier half of the fourth century, the Ulidian descendants of Hír retained some sort of tribal individuality far and wide in the country for some time afterwards. This may be gathered from their localities already mentioned. They embrace on a modern map portions of Queen's County and those of Galway and Roscommon, of the counties of Meath and Louth, of those of Armagh, Down, and Antrim. In fact, there is no ancestral name of the pre-Celtic populations of Ireland, with the possible exception of *Emer*, to compare in importance with that of *Iar* or *Hír*. *Emer*, in case one may correct *Eber mc Ír* into *Emer mc Hír*, assumes the same form as the name of the ancestor of Ailill Ólum's people of east Munster, a fact which would seem, especially when placed by the side of that of the wide

[1] Except, perhaps, such as Sogan's people, some of whom settled west of the Shannon: see p. 45 above

range of the name *Iar-Hír*, to have a bearing on the question, how far the pre-Celts of Ireland were of one and the same race. Provisionally, I should not only treat as closely related the descendants of Lugaid and Iar, as indicated by the genealogists who made brothers of those two ancestors, the sons of Ith, but I should go further, and suggest that there seems to be no reason of language for severing from that Ithian group the race of Emer mac Mílid. The possession of a rich territory with such a position of vantage as the Rock of Cashel suffices, with the help of the Déisi, to account for the ethnic individuality of the people of east Munster. In other words, the race of Emer was a branch of the Érna, and a time when they had not as yet been dissociated from the body of the Érna seems to be implied by the division of Ireland in the Senchus Mór between three free tribes, the Ulidians, the Goidels of Tara, and the Érna—there is no allusion to the race of Emer. The relatively late growth of that power is indicated by the comparatively late date of the building of Cashel, namely, by Corc mc Lugdach about the time of St. Patrick, and by its being given the Latin names of Macerıa and Cashel, which is the Latin word *castellum* adapted. In Irish it is distinguished as *Caisel na Rig*, 'the stone fort of the kings,' and the work was probably of a kind which was considered new at the time in Ireland. O'Curry even mentions the story of the discovery of the site by swineherds moving about in the midst of a forest: see his *Manuscript Materials*, pp. 485, 623, 654, and plate 7. It is needless to say that Ptolemy has nothing to show corresponding for certain to Cashel. The forest with which the district was covered is a sufficient explanation why Cashel appears so late in the history of Ireland. What good to the owner of herds of cattle would a natural stronghold be if the country around could not support the herds on which he depended? The difficulties and tediousness of converting a forest into pasture land are always serious, but they must have been vastly more so for the primitive farmer with such wretched tools as he had at his command.

To leave Emer, I may say that incidental proofs will probably suggest themselves that formerly the Hír of the north was regarded as the same ancestor as the Iar of the Érna. One such has just occurred to me in reading the pedigrees in the *Book of Leinster*, fo. 329 e: two men called Cermna and Sobairche are introduced as sons of Ebric (329 e, 346 c, 349 c), son of Eber mc Hír. They leave no known progeny, in other words, there was no excuse for alluding to them except to mention that they were *dá chétrí herend ahultaib*, or 'the two first kings of Erin, who were Ultonians,' and to account

for two place-names, that of Dún Cermna, supposed to be represented by the remains of a stronghold on a famous promontory in the south of the county of Cork, called the Old Head of Kinsale, and that of Dún Sobairche, now Dunseverick, the ruins of a castle on a rock a few miles east of the Giants' Causeway. That an Ultonian should have had his *dún* built on one of the remotest points of Munster and ruled Ireland from there looks highly unhistorical. The explanation is, that he, as well as Sobairche, was regarded as a macHír see O'Donovan's notes to the *Four Masters*, A M 3501, 3668. The latter's text avoids the blunder made in the *Book of Leinster*, for what they say is, that those men were the first two kings of Erin, *do shlocht Ir*, 'of the race of Ír,' where Ír must be the common ancestor of the Ivernians both of the south and the north. It is to be noticed that the association of Cermna with Dún Cermna on the Old Head of Kinsale, becomes, thus treated, evidence that the Old Head was within the territory of the Érna. It emerges more clearly still from the pedigree of the Érna, which gives a different account of Dún Cermna; for it makes the statement that it was built by Cacher son of Ederscél. He was probably a much later man and he figures as the head of the ruling family of the Érna in his time (*Book of Leinster*, 324 d). Now the real or historical reason for the race of Iar-Hír being severed into two groups is the fact already suggested, that while those of Munster remained more or less independent, the rest became isolated fragments of it, so to say, in the central and northern portions of the island in consequence of the conquests of the Celtic warriors of the Eremonian stock. This separation of the Ivernians into two groups found its linguistic expression in their being made the descendants of Iar and Hír respectively. But it may be remarked, by the way, that the reduction of these two names into one supplies no adequate measure of the original importance of the Ivernian element. One would have to take into account the other names inseparable from them, *Ivera*, *Iverna*, *Ivernia*, *Ériu*, and the Welsh *Iwerdon*. These are some of the exponents of the great fact, that the Ivernian race succeeded in impressing its own name so deeply on Ireland that the Goidels were never able to efface it and substitute their own: no such a geographical name as Goidelia has ever been called into existence.

To return to *Iveras* = *Iar*, genitive *Iviri* = *Hír*, *Ír*, there is another kind of proof of the former existence of that name, and I wish now to devote a little space to that proof. It is supplied by an adjective derived from it, which would be in early Goidelic *Iverija-s*, Brythonic *Iverijo-s*: this last enters into an old Welsh name for the

Irish Sea. At one time this was *Merweryđ* or *Myrweryđ*—both forms occur—for an early *Mori-Iveri̯o-n,* with the chief stress on the second *i* of the second element so the whole came to be treated as *Mori-veri̯o-n,* which, when the terminations were discarded, resulted in *Merweryđ*[1] or *Myrweryđ.* Compare *Myrđin* in Caer-Fyrđin, 'the town of Carmarthen,' from *Mori-dúnon.* The present name of the Irish Sea, *Mor Iwerđon,* literally 'Ireland's Sea,' is as old probably as the thirteenth century, but the Welsh poets continued the use also of *Merweryđ*; and, as the Irish Sea was the only sea with which the Welsh had directly to do, they were inclined to treat the name as meaning the sea generally and the roar of its billows. The original meaning, however, continued to be known late enough for etymological spellers to reintroduce the 'sea' in the more intelligible form of *mor* by making the word into *Morweryđ* and *Mor Weryđ.* Dr. Davies, in his Welsh Latin Dictionary, 1632, gives *Merweryđ* as meaning, according to Thomas Williams, whose MSS. he used, *fremitus maris*; but he indicates his doubt by a reference to *Morweryđ,* which he interprets on the authority of another Welsh scholar as 'Mare Hibernicum.' In a map drawn by Humphrey Llwyd for the Dutch geographer Ortelius's *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum,* prefaced 'Antverpiæ M.D.LXX,' and published also in English in 1606, H. Llwyd describes the Irish Sea in the following terms.—

> Vergivium sive Hibernicum Mare
> Mor Weridh, *Britannis*
> The Yrishe Oceane, *Anglis.*

This mistaken identification of the 'Vergivian' Ocean with *Mor Weridh* was accepted in Gibson's Camden's *Britannia* (1722), col. 1309; compare, however, col. 1184. The modification of *Merweryđ* into *Mor Weryđ* could hardly stop there, as it suggested a masculine *gweryđ* where an apparent feminine *weryđ* seemed inadmissible; so we find Richards, in his *Welsh and English Dictionary,* 1815, explaining *Morweryđ* as standing for *Mor Gweryđ,* 'the Irish Sea.' Others had got over the difficulty, but hardly before the eighteenth century, by making it into *Mor y Weryđ,* 'the Sea of *the* Gweryđ' as it were, with an invented *Gweryđ,* which a modern writer has used for the manufacture of *Y Gweryđ For,* 'the Gweryđ Sea.' Next may be mentioned that for Richards in 1815 *Morweryđ* meant the Irish Sea, but by the sixties it had got to be used to render

[1] I am indebted to Professor Anwyl for valuable suggestions, and especially for the following references to passages where the word *Merweryđ* occurs in *The Myvyrian Arch of Wales,* I pp 191[a], 195[b], 271[b], 310[a], 415[a], 495[a].

the English 'Atlantic Ocean,' which continues to be its application[1]. This will serve to explain the term *Mor y Weryd*, but there is a spelling *Mor Yweryd* to be occasionally met with which has no foundation in usage. It can be readily brought to the test by placing before *Ywerydd* a preposition which requires the form *yr* of the definite article, and you have to say *i'r Weryd*, 'to the Atlantic,' *o'r Weryd*, 'from the Atlantic,' *a'r Weryd*, 'and or with the Atlantic.' Neither is there in Welsh, except in the case of an orthography which leaves the sounds of *i* and *y* undistinguished, any such a word as *Ywerdon* for *Ireland*: it is *Iwerdon*, but the accent being on the penult the *i* is apt to be obscurely pronounced or even elided. This has allowed the definite article to enter in its form of *y*, so that the name becomes colloquially *y Werdon*, less frequently, *Werdon*. Submitted to the test of the preposition one would say *i'r Werdon*, as it were 'to the Ireland,' and similarly in other cases. We have become in fact so used to this treatment of the name, that we have got to regard the article as being in its place here; and I should, to avoid the hiatus in *i Iwerdon*, always write *i'r Iwerdon*, but never, either *i Ywerdon* or *i'r Ywerdon*, as nobody, so far as I know, indulges in that pronunciation. The form *Ywerdon* has only been made by and for comparative philologists who have difficulties as to the limited extent of the change of which the vowel *i* admits. They find the Welsh vowel *y* more tractable and more ready to interchange, for instance, with *e*, so as to enable them to account easily for the Medieval Welsh adjective, *ewyrdonic* 'relating to Ireland, Irish.' But so long as Welsh is a spoken language, they cannot choose between *i* and *y*: they should rather compare such names as *Tegid* from *Tacitus*.

III.

One or two points of difficulty have been passed over, to which I wish. [illegible] is as to *Ivverna* with intervocalic *vv*, how did it reach Mela and Juvenal? I can discover no reason to suppose that the racial name *Iverni* and its congeners as pronounced by the Goidels themselves or by their neighbours the Brythons could have suggested the *vv* to a Roman, or to suppose a Roman to have invented that spelling. Whether it was sounded *w* or *v*, or sometimes the one and sometimes the other, makes no difference: in both cases it would be represented in Latin by *v*, with the choice in late Latin of writing *b* for *v*. The only remaining

[1] For the reference to H. Llwyd's map and several others I am indebted to Professor J. Morris Jones; and above all have I to thank him for suggesting the above analysis of *Merweryd*, which had not occurred to me

possibility is that the intervocalic *vv* came from a native source, and that not merely as the casual invention of any educated Goidel in converse with a Roman or a Greek or a Gaul, but as the spelling which he had been taught and for which the pronunciation of his language supplied the reason then or at some previous time. At all events that is countenanced by the existence of the graffito (p. 29) and the occurrence of some ten ancient Ogam inscriptions which establish the fact that this peculiarity of orthography, the use of *vv*, once prevailed among the Goidels in Ireland and in Wales. This presupposes that the Goidels practised writing of some kind or other as early at any rate as the time of Mela and Juvenal in the first century.

It means also probably that there was more intercourse between the Goidelic portions of the British Isles and the Continent than is usually supposed; and in this context the word *Britanni* (Βρεττανοί) inevitably suggests itself. Did it reach the Romans and the Greeks from Goidels settled on the Continent or from Goidels in the British Isles? The Irish plural *Bretain*, genitive *Bretan*, proves that it was a Goidelic form, as contrasted with the *Britto*, plural *Brittones*, Welsh *Brython*, to which the race of that ilk appears to have itself given the preference. It would be interesting to know what answer would be made to this question by those who think that there were no Goidels in Britain or on the Continent either, if I understand them rightly, till such came over from Ireland in the second century of our era and later. In any case, to distinguish in these matters between the Goidels of Britain, wherever they came from, and the Goidels of Ireland is hardly possible; but at all events the latter are not to be left out of the reckoning. In fact, I cannot help suspecting that Caesar, when he wrote that most of the Gauls desirous of studying druidism thoroughly, came to Britain to do so, was as badly informed as when he penned the words (v. 12) 'Nascitur ibi plumbum album in mediterraneis regionibus.' In other terms he should, when speaking of the seat of druidic learning, not have named Britain alone, but Erin likewise, or rather, perhaps, Erin first and foremost His exact words are (vi. 13): 'Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur, et nunc qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur.' Here the word 'plerumque' seems to suggest that he was conscious of speaking somewhat loosely, and of the difficulty of getting trustworthy information. At any rate, there is no proof that the Brythons, or Britanni proper, had druids at any time; and we have only one special mention of druids in southern Britain, and that was in the then non-Brythonic Mona or Isle of Anglesey. I allude to Tacitus's

well-known account of Suetonius Paulinus and his soldiers landing there: see the *Annals*, xiv 29, 30.

It has been pointed out that we have no evidence of any early attempt to give the Goidelic *Iverijū*, later *Hériu*, *Ériu*, a Latin or Greek form, but though no reason was suggested, it is easy to see that there probably was one, and easy even to guess what it was. I infer that it was this at the time when the ethnic name suggested *Iverna* or *Ivernia* it is not unlikely that *Iverijū*, originally a feminine personal name, had not as yet acquired a frankly geographical force. It was presumably on the way to do so, and it may have, as an ancestral name, even then had a racial or tribal sense. Its passing into the geographical sense would be a matter of time At any rate, to shorten such a term, for example, as *Tó Hérenn*, 'Eriu's Land,' Welsh *Tir Iwerdon*, into *Ériu* and *Iwerdon* implied no difficult step. But as to the latter, the history of Welsh accidence permitted the Welsh nominative *Iweryd* (p. 36) to escape being similarly treated, as will be shown presently. As a personal name in *iu*, Ériu is only one among many which occur in Medieval Irish. Take for example the feminine *Diebriu*, gen. *Drebrenn*, *Ráiriu*, gen. *Ráirend*, and the masculines *Bricriu*, gen. *Bricrend*, *Goibniu*, gen. *Goibnenn* (in Medieval Welsh *Gofynyon* and *Gofannon*) The Four Masters' entry under A. M. 3500 will do to illustrate how Ériu was treated as a person: she appears as one of the three queens of the Tuatha Dé Danann when the Sons of Mílid invade Ireland, the other two were Fotla or Fodla, and Banba, and their respective husbands were McGréine ('Son of the Sun'), McCecht ('Son of the Plough'), and McCuill ('Son of the Hazel'). This suggests some kind of a triple division of the country, but Irish poets have been in the habit of using Ériu, Fodla, and Banba loosely as ancient names of all Ireland. Nevertheless, we should probably be right in associating Ériu more closely with the Érna or Ivernians of Munster, especially if the derivation of their name Éraind, genitive Éiand (p. 36), is borne in mind. *Fodla* would seem to associate itself naturally with the Ulaid or Ulidians, especially as Ollam Fodla (p. 44) was their most remarkable ancestor. The intermediate tract of country, that is between ancient Ulster and Munster, remains for Banba, and that seems to work out all right, as follows:—*Banba* should mean 'the Boar Lady' or 'Boar Goddess,' from *banb*, 'a young pig,' Welsh *banw*, 'a young boar.' It looks, in fact, as if one might regard Banba as representing one of the names of the goddess of certain inhabitants of an amber coast, which I follow the late Mr. Elton in regarding as the fens and islands between the

Rhine and the Elbe. see his *Origins of English History*, pp. 49, 50, 62, 63, 65, 66, where he calls them Estians or Ostians. The classical passage concerning them is Tacitus's *Germania*, c. 45:—

Ergo iam dextro Suebici maris litore Aestiorum gentes adluuntur, quibus ritus habitusque Sueborum, lingua Britannicae propior. Matrem deum venerantur Insigne superstitionis formas aprorum gestant ' id pro armis hominumque tutela securum deae cultorem etiam inter hostes praestat: rarus ferri, frequens fustium usus. Frumenta ceterosque fructus patientius quam pro solita Germanorum inertia laborant Sed et mare scrutantur, ac soli omnium sucinum, quod ipsi glesum vocant, inter vada atque in ipso litore legunt

That Tacitus was referring to a Celtic-speaking people is certain from his reference to their language as approaching the Lingua Britannica. no more correct definition of the linguistic position could have been given of any people who spoke Goidelic, than that they came somewhat near in speech to the speakers of the Lingua Britannica rather than to those of the Teutonic language of the Suebi. They were the remnants probably of a tribe of which a portion had migrated to Britain and thence in time invaded Ireland, while the other portion remained on the Continent to be overshadowed by the Suevi. In the British Isles one could, with the aid of a Welsh story, locate the immigrants in a congenial atmosphere, so to say, alongside of the descendants of the Wolf of Ossory, concerning whom we read in the Irish version of *Nennius*, p 204, and in the *Topographia Hibernica* of Gerald the Welshman, ii. 19. The Welsh story I mean is that of Kulhwch and Olwen, which locates the Boars first (Oxford *Mabinogion*, p. 135, Guest's *Mabinogion*, ii. 307) at a place in the east of Ireland called in the Welsh text Esgeir Oervel, which has been identified by Prof. Kuno Meyer with Sescenn Uairbeóil, 'the Marsh of Uarbél,' a locality described as being in Leinster and frequently mentioned in Irish story as the abode of famous heroes. see *The Transactions of the Cymmrodorion Society*, 1895-6, p. 73. The Boars had been devastating Ireland, and in spite of Arthur's attack on them they continued to do so until they resolved to visit his own country. So from Esgeir Oervel they crossed to Porth Clais, near St. David's, and engaged Arthur's men in various localities in South Wales, where also they seem to have been thoroughly at home in fact, it is thence probably they had invaded Ireland. Twrch Trwyth, or 'the Boar Triath,' and the other Boars associated with him, suggest to me the chiefs of a tribe whose totem was the wild boar. The Irish for Twrch Trwyth has usually been treated as *Orc Treith*, where *Orc* is the etymological equivalent of Latin *porcus*; but the etymological equivalent of Welsh *Twrch* is Irish *torc*,

'a boar'; and *Twrch Trwyth* comes in the *Book of Leinster*, fo. 9[b], as *Torcthriath rí Torcraide diátá mag trethirne*, that is, 'Torc Triath, the Torcraige's king, after whom is called the Plain of Treithirne.' This comes in an enumeration of the remarkable men and women of the Tuatha Dé Danann. Keating (Comyn's edition), i. 218, has the name somewhat more briefly as Triath-rí-Thorc, 'Triath, king of Boars,' after whom is called Tréithirne, which has been mentioned already (p. 42) as a district in the present county of Tipperary: see also the *Book of Leinster*, 21[b], 22[a], where Triath is reckoned one of the many sons of Ugaine Mór by his wife Cessair. There is no suggestion that Torctriath and the Torcraige were boars rather than human beings, whereas the Welsh story treats them as wild boars, or rather as men who had for their sins been converted into boars. The etymology of *Tréithirne* is misleading, as the plain of Tréithirne is less likely to have been so called from *Triath* than from some such a name of a person as Tréithirne, Tréithern, or Tréither, so I would rely rather on the above-named locality of the Boars in the east of Ireland and within easy reach of the coast of Dyfed: this makes for the association of Banba with Leinster. But one is tempted to give Leinster, or rather the Irish plural *Lagin*, genitive *Lagen*, a wide meaning, especially when one finds the *Book of Leinster*, 311[a], treating *Galion* and *Domnand* simply as other names for Lagin. For the people of Domnu appear to have invaded Ireland in the west, where they left their name to Irrus Domnand, 'the peninsula of Domnu,' now Erris in Mayo, and in the east, where they left it to Inver Domnand, 'the River mouth of Domnu,' now Malahide Bay to the north of Dublin. The Rennes Dinnsenchas (*Revue Celtique*, xv. 300) mentions also Fothairt Domnann, 'the Fothairt of Domnu.' The Fothairts have left their name to a barony of Forth in county Carlow, and another in the south-east of Wexford: the latter was possibly Fothairt Domnann. The distance between these places need cause no surprise, seeing that their name identifies the people of Domnu with the Dumnonii of Britain. Some of the latter were in a position to set sail from the coast of Ayrshire or the mouth of the Clyde and to invade Ireland either in front or from behind; not to mention that there were Dumnonii also south of the Severn Sea, who may possibly have contributed to the volume of the invasions on the east coast. This seems to suggest a Goidelic area which comprised most of the modern Leinster and the whole of Connaught as roughly representing the conquests of the Celts landing on the opposite coasts of the island. But the region seized upon by Mílid's Goidels was

probably Meath, which is sometimes called 'Mide mac Míled,' the Meath or central district of Mílid's sons (*Book of Leinster*, 22[a]); and it may be worth while mentioning that the realm of Ugaine Mór and of his ancestor Tigernmas is called Banba (*Book of Leinster*, 16[b], 22[a]).

What has already been said as to the ancestral names Iar and Hír and the wide distribution of the Ivernian race in Ireland make it easy to understand that Ériu might, however, beat Banba and Fodla in the competition for the eponymity of the whole island. In the process the ancestral idea was eventually forgotten, doubtless in favour of the purely geographical meaning. On Welsh and Brythonic ground the case was very different, for the nominative *Iweryđ* and the genitive *Iwerđon* were dissociated and treated independently, the latter becoming the regular name for Ireland, while the former was probably restricted for a long time to the supposed ancestress, but used eventually as an ordinary name of a woman: any great ancestor's name appears to have been eligible for this later vogue, as we have seen in the case of Iar (p. 38), to which one might perhaps add even that of such a dubious ancestor as the one called *Ler*. In Welsh, as soon as that language ceased to distinguish case relations by inflexion, there was nothing to prevent the use of *Iweryđ* as a personal name, and *Iwerđon* as the name of Ireland. The same dissociation of cognate words may be illustrated by the treatment of such a Latin loan-word as *civitas*, genitive *civitat-is*, accusative *civitat-em*, &c. From the nominative, Welsh has made *ciwed*, 'a rabble or mob,' and from the longer stem *ciwdawt*, *ciwdod*, 'a city or tribe.' The same thing is also seen to have happened in such native words as allowed an opening for the dissociation of their forms: take for example names compounded with *ci*, 'a hound' (Irish *cú*, genitive *con*), such as Gurci and Gurcon, which are found in the *Liber Landavensis* as separate and independent names of men. In Irish any such dissociation between *Ériu* and its genitive *Érenn* could not take place, and I know of no instance of the name occurring as that of an ordinary woman: there may be some, but they must be rare. The contrary is the case with *Iweryđ* in Medieval Welsh: its distribution tends to show that it was once fairly popular, as the following instances, taken at random, would seem to indicate:—Brut y Tywysogion has *Iweryđ* as the name of a half-sister of Bleđyn, prince of Powys, in the eleventh century (see Rhys and Evans's *Bruts*, p. 303, and Williams ab Ithel's *Brut*, p. 140). See also the *Record of Carnarvon*, pp. 4, 22, where the name occurs twice, written *Ewerith* and *Eweryth*. Lastly it occurs spelled Yweryth as the name of a woman who is mentioned in the *Black Book of St. David's*, a Latin

MS. supposed to be a sixteenth-century copy of an original some two centuries older. Therein Yweryth appears as one of the Bishop of St David's tenants in the Vale of Teifi in Cardiganshire see the *Cymmrodorion Record Series*, No. 5, edited by Mr. Willis-Bund, p. 215. Here it may be remarked that the use of *Iweryđ* in Medieval Wales as the ordinary name of a woman is best accounted for on the supposition that the race to which it belonged had materially contributed in flesh and blood to the population of the Principality.

It remains to say something about *Iweryđ* as an ancestral name. Two instances occur in the *Black Book of Carmarthen*, a MS. of the twelfth century, and they are of great interest here. I may cite first a passage on folio 50ª (of Evans's autotype Facsimile) from a dialogue between the two legendary characters Gwyđno Garanhir and Gwyn ab Nuđ. There Gwyn, enumerating the great scenes in which he boasts having played a part, speaks as follows —

> Mi awum inlle llas bran.
> mab ẏwerit clod lẏdan.
> ban ryerint brein garthan[1].
>
> *I have been where Brân was slain,*
> *Iweryđ's son of widespread fame,*
> *When ravens hurried to the field.*

This reference to Brân's disastrous expedition to Ireland represents him as killed there and then, but the story in prose in the Mabinogi of Branwen is marvellously different In the carnage at the Meal-bag Pavilion he was wounded in the foot with a poisoned spear, whereupon he ordered his men to cut off his head. His seven chief followers were to take it to Wales and they would find the society of that Venerable Head (*Urđawl Ben*) as agreeable as when it was on its owner's shoulders. It would be the central figure at banquets of incredible duration which they were to enjoy around it at Harlech and elsewhere. Another of Brân's men who took a leading part in the fighting just mentioned and fell in it, is given the name Morđwyd Tyllion; and we have a reference to him in the *Book of*

[1] I am not sure how *garthan* is to be construed or interpreted, but as to *ryerint* the word occurs four times in the poem, as *ryerhint*, *ryerint*, *ryreint*, and *ryreeint*. It occurs also eight times in poem XXII in the same MS 36ª–37ª, and there it is written once *rerent* which is faulty, and seven times *rereint* which is right, and to be pronounced *rereint* in three syllables. The best spelling in the present poem is *ryreint* and next *ryreeint*, where *ee* fixes the accent. The root is *reg* (with the prefix *ro*, later *ry*, *rhy*, *re*) of the same origin as Irish *rega*, 'I shall come': we have another compound of this verb in the Welsh imperative *dere* or *dyre*, 'come.'

Taliessin. The poet pretends to have been present · see poem XIV in Skene's *Four Ancient Books of Wales*, ii. 154:—

> Bum y gan vran yn iwerdon.
> Gweleis pan ladwyt ymordwyt tyllon.
>
> *I was with Brân in Ireland,*
> *I saw when Morđwyd Tyllon was slain*

Coming back to the *Black Book* I would now mention its other instance of *Iweryđ*, namely, on fo. 46[b]. The passage refers to an earlier incident in the Mabinogi of Branwen, where it is related (Oxford *Mab.* p. 36, Guest's *Mab.* iii. 118, 119) how Brân and his army came to an impassable river in Ireland, how he laid his gigantic body across the stream, and how his men placed hurdles on him and used him as a bridge over that dangerous water —

> Can ethiv ruiw in rodwit
> iwerit a teulu na fouch
> guydi.met meuil na vynuch

Discarding the punctuation one might translate as follows .—

> *Since a king became the ford*
> *Of Iweryđ, you host flee not:*
> *After mead seek not shame*

The first clause, however, is somewhat ambiguous and may be also rendered simply:—

> *Since a king went into the ford*
> *Of Iweryđ.*

The poem is a very mixed and obscure one, but these lines were meant to encourage the *teulu* or house-troops of a prince to be brave, and this was attempted by reminding them of a great leader who had on a famous occasion allowed himself to be trampled upon to enable his army to cross a river in pursuit of a hostile force. It is very possibly a sample of the sort of thing which the bards used to sing to the Welsh princes' troops, when, after having enjoyed a cup of mead, they were on the point of engaging in battle. The word *ruiw*, later spelling *rhwyf*, meant a king, or one who is first and foremost; it challenges comparison with Latin *princeps* and German *furst*; we have the plural in the name of the Gaulish Remi, Ῥῆμοι, who prided themselves on being the first and foremost of the Belgic Gauls in Caesar's time. The word *rodwit*, later spelling *rhodwyđ*, has been explained to mean a ford, by M. Loth in the *Revue Celtique*, xv. 97. Why the poet should be here more primitive than the prose story and speak of a ford where the latter has *pont*, 'a bridge,' I cannot exactly say; but I have no doubt that he meant to refer

to the same incident and in a manner which would be intelligible to the troops to be influenced by his words.

Now Brân is commonly known in Welsh literature as Brân fab Llyr or Bendigeidfran fab Llyr, that is, 'Bran or Blessed-Bran, son of Llyr,' and his brother was Manawyđan, son of Llyr. On Goidelic ground the latter plays the chief rôle, to wit, that of a great magician and master mariner, Manannán mac Lir, that is, M. son of Ler (*Filius Maris*), while Brân—there called *Bron*—is seldom mentioned at all. An instance, however, occurs in the Dinnsenchas or Place-name Stories, where Bron and Manannán are mentioned together as brothers, sons not of Ler but of Allot: see the *Revue Celtique*, xvi. 142, where the name to be explained was *Mag mBroin*, 'Bron's Plain.' It is hard to say whether such a patronymic as *mab Llyr* or *Mac Lir*, 'son of Ler,' that is, son of the Sea (*ler*, genitive *lir*), was meant to give the father's name or not. In case it was, one would naturally have treated Iweryđ as Llyr's wife and the mother of his sons; but bearing in mind this parentage from Allot, and the fact that Manxmen say *Manannan mac y Lear*, 'M. son of the Sea,' always with the definite article, I am inclined to the other view, and to interpret *Mab Iweryđ* loosely as meaning son of Iweryđ in the sense of a descendant of hers. For the statement in the opening of the Mabinogi of Branwen makes Brân's mother not Iweryđ but Penardim, daughter—more correctly sister—of Beli, fabled to have been king of Britain in its golden age before the advent of the Romans. This name *Beli* is to be identified with that of the Bile treated as father of Mílid and brother of Ith in the Pedigree (p. 40). But when Brân was styled Mab Iweryđ it was probably intended to say further that he was her offspring and representative *par excellence*, the chief and head of the race of which Iweryđ was regarded as ancestress [1]. In other words he is thus indirectly identified with the race of the Iverni or Érna. Similarly I should interpret Iweryđ's ford to mean a ford for Iweryđ, for the men descended from her, the name of the supposed ancestress being employed to denote her offspring forming the hosts of her great descendant Brân.

Mention may be now briefly made of the localities in the west

[1] This may be illustrated from Irish annals thus: the men of the ruling family of the Corco Achlann were Mac Branans, but only one could be simply Mac Branan. O'Donovan's translation of the following entry by the *Four Masters*, A.D. 1489, may be here cited:—'The title of Mac Branan was conferred on John Mac Branan by O'Conor and Mac Dermot; and on that day he remitted to the O'Mulconrys the half mark which his predecessors had from them for a long period, for Baile-an-bhealaigh.'

of Britain associated in Welsh story with the fortunes of the Llyr heroes :—

1. Harlech and North-west Wales. The Mabinogi of Branwen begins by locating the Sons of Llyr at Harlech, and later it takes them to Aberffraw in Anglesey. The Seven Men forming the escort of the Venerable Head of Brân on their return from Ireland accompanied by Branwen land at Aberalaw, also in Anglesey: at Aberalaw Branwen dies and has her tomb made there. The Seven Men proceed then to Harlech and there enjoy a seven years' dinner around the Head, with the Birds of Rhiannon singing to them from afar. Intermediate between Aberffraw and Harlech we read of Brân holding his court on one occasion at Kaer Seint yn Arvon, more briefly called in English Carnarvon. Away east a place in Edeirnion called Seith Marchawg, now known as Bryn y Saith Marchog, 'the Seven Knights' Hill,' in the upper part of the Denbighshire section of the Vale of Clwyd, comes into the earlier portion of the story as one of the Llyr head-quarters. Perhaps one might also associate with Brân the ruins of an old castle near Llangollen in the valley of the Dee, on the strength of its being called Castell Dinas Brân, 'the Castle of Brân's Fort,' and Gorsed Brân, 'Brân's Seat,' one of the Hiraethog Mountains.

2. Dyfed or South-west Wales. Pryderi, king of Dyfed and son of Pwyll who was previously king of that country, was one of the Seven Men in charge of the Head of Brân, and together with the others, of whom Brân's brother Manawydan was one, proceeded from Harlech to the Isle of Gwales, now called Grassholm, on the coast of Pembroke. There they had a fair and royal place provided with a spacious hall in which they banqueted for eighty years without observing by one another's faces that they had aged in that space of time[1]. But disregard for a taboo brought that state of felicity at last to an end, and they had to hurry to London to bury the Venerable Head. When that was over Manawydan came back with Pryderi to the latter's kingdom of Dyfed and married the king's mother Rhiannon, the widow of his father Pwyll.

3. The Severn Region. Pwyll king of Dyfed had something to do with Gwent is Coed, 'Netherwent,' near the Severn Sea in the present county of Monmouth, as Teyrnon the prince of that Gwent is represented in the Mabinogi of Pwyll as feudally connected with the

[1] The passage is corrupt in the text (Oxford *Mabinogion*, p. 42): in line 8 the words *yn hyn* 'older' have dropped out before *yn hynny*, and in line 7, the words *Nyt oed annesmwythach* should be cancelled they belong only to line 9

latter. Pryderi, his son, seems to have gone in the same direction to find a wife, the daughter of Gwyn, son of Gloyw, after whom Caer Loyw, 'Gloucester,' is sometimes supposed to have been called. The lady's name was the very un-Brythonic one of Cigfa, and written Ciocbha it belongs to the legendary history of Ireland: see Rhys's *Celtic Folklore*, p. 546, and compare Cichmann in the *Book of Llan Dâv*, p. 242. Further, when Pryderi and Manawydan son of Llyr were driven out of Dyfed for a time they retreated eastwards and remained a while at Hereford, this was when the fairy chief Llwyd, son of Kil Coed (a Welsh variant of Liath mc Celtchair), had contrived to place the country under spells of magic, which in the romances became the Enchantment of Britain. As I have referred to the *Liber Landavensis*, or the *Book of Llan Dâv*, I may mention that nothing in it is more remarkable than the number of non-Brythonic names in the diocese of Llandaff. One of them is in point: in the country between Chepstow and Hereford the river Ἴερνος of West Munster has its namesakes in Frut Iguern and Rivulus Iguern, which, if one allows for the intervocalic *gu* of Old Welsh, is literally either Rivulus Ivernus or Rivulus Iverni (pp. 170, 221). Here I cannot help recalling the Caerleon inscription to the memory of the young lady called Julia Iberna (p. 29), daughter of a mother named Fla. Flavina. Perhaps it is not an accident that these instances converge near the Severn. Then there is the name of the Severn itself: it is not a little remarkable that we find it practically reproduced in the most Ivernian part of Ireland, namely, as Sabrann, which used to be formerly the name of the River Lee in the county of Cork: see the *Top. Poems*, p. 82, n. 402. It looks as if immigrants from the banks of the estuary of the Severn gave her name to the great harbour which they navigated on their way to the site of their Ἰουερνίς, somewhere near where the city of Cork now stands[1]; or shall we suppose the migration to have taken just the contrary direction?

4. CORNWALL. In poem XIV in the *Book of Taliessin* (Skene, ii. 153), to which reference has already been made, the poet pretends to have been with the sons of Llyr at Ebyr Henvelen, 'the river-mouths of Henvelen,' and to have sung to them over their cups in the course of an expedition the story of which has not reached us. It appears to have been a disastrous one, and the taboo on the perpetual feast in the Isle of Gwales was to the effect, that the door

[1] Mr. Orpen, loc. cit. p. 121, suggests that the reading Δαβρώνα of Ptolemy's MSS. should be corrected into Σαβρώνα as being probably the name of the water here in question.

of the banqueting hall, which looked towards Aber Henvelen, 'the Henvelen River-mouth,' in Cornwall, should not be opened, as if to avoid recalling unpleasant memories.

To these notes I must add a passage from Mr. Alfred Nutt's abstract of the *Petit Saint Graal*, premising that Brân's name, in Irish *Bron*, appears in the French also as *Bron*, nominative *Brons*. See Nutt's *Studies on the Legend of the Holy Grail*, p. 28, where we read as follows:—'The son of Alein le Gros is a child named Percevaux, and as Alein is dying he hears the voice of the Holy Ghost saying, Know thou art near thy end, and wilt soon come into the fellowship of Jesus Christ. Brons, thy father, dwells in these isles of Ireland, and with him is the Grail. And he may not die until thy son finds him, to whom he shall commend the grace of the vessel, and teach the secret words Joseph taught him, then shall he be cured of his infirmities.' That this Bron was Brân ab Llyr I have tried to show in my *Arthurian Legend*, pp. 253, 309. The story of the endless feasting in the society of Brân's Venerable Head was more than anything else the origin of the legend of the Holy Grail; but on the other hand it is to associating with Brân the Grail in its Christian developments, that we seem to owe the strange prefixing of the adjective *bendigaid*, 'blessed, *benedictus*,' to his name in the Mabinogi of Branwen. That would be worth remembering in any attempt to fix the date of the Mabinogion as we have them, just as the occurrence of Brân's name in its Goidelic form of Bron in the Grail romances is of importance as showing that the Goidels of Wales helped to supply the stuff which went to make *la matière de Bretagne.* Then as to Percevaux, his name should be Peredur in Welsh. No Peredur, however, appears in the Mabinogion, but a Pryderi very much, as already mentioned more than once: he was present at the Meal-bag Pavilion when Brân was wounded, and he was one of the escort of seven who brought the Head back to Wales and feasted in its society for nearly a century. He continued the friend of Manawyđan ab Llyr in the Mabinogi called after that hero, and he lived to figure in the Mabinogi of Math, where is given the story of his death at the hands of Gwydion, son of Dôn. On the whole I cannot help thinking that the names *Peredur* and *Pryderi*—liable to be also spelt *Prederi*—have been confounded, a conjecture which would rid us of several difficulties and allow us to regard Peredur as belonging to a comparatively late date, as being in fact brother of Gwrgi, together with whom he is represented in the *Annales Cambriae* as dying A.D. 580, otherwise they have been supposed to have fallen side by side in the battle of Arderyđ. Here,

however, I am directly interested only in the statement that Bron was living 'in these isles of Ireland,' that is, in the original, *en ces îles d'Illande* see Hucher's *Saint Graal*, i. 420 The words are so remarkable from the point of view of one on the Welsh side of the Irish Sea that they challenge explanation; and, after what has been already said, that is not far to seek. The name immediately translated into *îles d'Illande* was doubtless some such as *Ynysed Iwerdon*, 'Islands of Ireland,' which had superseded, as I suppose, an older *Ynysed Iweryd*. Practically, however, it rendered the latter name wrongly, as it had been forgotten that *Iweryd* was not Ireland so much as the race of the Ivernians, wherever they might be, the race being described briefly by employing the name of their ancestress in a comprehensive sense, as was found probable in the case of *rhodwyd Iweryd*. Now, to help us to form an idea which these *îles d'Illande* were, we have the express statement in the Mabinogi, that Gwales off the coast of Pembroke was the one where the eighty years' banquet went on around the Venerable Head of Brân. The only other explanation would be, that Iwerdon meant not only Ireland but also the portion of the west of Britain occupied by the Ivernian race. In either case there is no mistake as to the Ivernians being treated as in possession at one time of a part of Britain, a fact of importance for any speculation concerning the early population of these islands. From these details one thing emerges very clearly, namely, that the Llyr group of Ivernians had no forbidding dread of the mariner's life · they figure on the coasts, in the islands, and on sea. Among the islands Goidelic stories lay special stress on the Isle of Man as being Manannán's own the Manx call him *Mannanan Beg mac y Lear*, 'Little Manannán, son of the Sea,' and legend treats him as the first king of the island, while Cormac in his *Glossary* speaks of him to the following effect, as translated in Stokes's edition of O'Donovan's Translation, p. 114:—

> Manannan Mac Lir, a celebrated merchant who was in the Isle of Mann. He was the best pilot that was in the west of Europe. He used to know by studying the heavens (i e using the sky), the period which would be the fine weather and the bad weather, and when each of these two times would change. *Inde Scoti et Brittones eum deum vocaverunt maris. et inde filium maris esse dixerunt i e. mac lir* 'son of sea.'

In old Irish the Isle of Man was called *Manonn*, or *Manann* in the genitive, but there was a Manann country called by Nennius *Manau Guotodin* on both sides of the river Forth in the North. That area is vaguely indicated by such names as Clack*mannan*, Sla*mannan* and Dun *Manann*, later *Dumanyn*, now written Dalmeny If Mana-

wydan or any other of the Llyr heroes had ever anything to do with the banks of the Forth, the story of any such association seems to have been lost.

Some such a state of familiarity with the sea as the Mabinogion and other stories seem to establish would appear a natural and necessary prelude to migration on any considerable scale from either of the larger of these islands to the other. This raises the question as to the direction in which such a movement set was it from Britain to Ireland or the other way about? Or was it to both direct from some common starting-point on the Continent? Whatever form the answer takes, it need not trespass on the later question, Whence came the people who formerly spoke Goidelic in Wales, and continued to do so as late probably as the seventh century? Irish legend may be said to represent the Tuatha Dé Danann and the Ivernians, including the Cruthni or Picts, as being in possession of Ireland when the Milesian invaders arrived, an event which probably means the first landing of Celts in the country, but if that should not be accepted as evidence, we have the fact that the Ivernians gave their name to the country, and that is not likely to have been effected subsequently to the advent of the Goidels. This all goes to prove the essential elements of the stories that have been touched upon in these notes to be of great antiquity, which is in keeping with the very ancient order of ideas to which they give expression. But to come down to a comparatively late period, the Spaniard Orosius, who flourished in the beginning of the fifth century, mentions (i. 2, 71) the pharos of Brigantia, supposed to be Corunna or Betanzos in Spanish Gallicia, as built 'ad speculam Britanniae,' as a point from which to keep watch on Britain. That seems to betray the danger which was apprehended from pirates from Britain; and those pirates can hardly have been Brythons, who, if they were ever fond of the sea, had only too much to occupy them on land in those days. They must have been rather the Scots and Picts who infested the western and southern coasts of this country, and it is in some reminiscence of a time when reavers from the British Isles made expeditions as far as the north of Spain, that one must look for the reason why Irish legendary history has dubbed the chief ancestor of the Goidelic settlers in Ireland *Mílid Espáine*, or 'Soldier of Spain.' Certain peoples of Ireland and their kinsmen in Scotland continued their fondness for maritime adventure conspicuously in the time of St. Columba, the missionaries of whose church reached Iceland long before the Norsemen. What other race could have dreamt the legend of St. Brendan?

It will have been seen that among the ethnic names serving as a text for these remarks there is one which in point of form, at least, appears to be the key to the rest of the group, and that is the one underlying the *Iberi* which has been cited from the letters of Columbanus, p. 32 In Goidelic this, as has been already said, would be *Iveria-s* and in Brythonic *Iverio-s*, with the plural *Iveri* common at an early date to both. Its etymological meaning eludes us, as the word is probably not of Celtic origin. I append the following notes on it, mostly recapitulations of remarks already made:—

1. On the one hand it suggested the geographical name *Ivveria* or *Iveria* which yielded the Ἰέρα underlying the Insula Sacra of Avienus, and we may carry it still further back as the foundation of the Ἶριν of Diodorus.

2. On the other hand, it yielded a derivative adjective *Iveria-s*, the Brythonic form of which *Iveriio-s*, *Iveriio-n* has been detected in the composition of the Welsh *Meirweryd*, 'Mare Hibernicum.'

3. It served as the base for adjectives with *n*, to wit (*a*) *Iver-na-s*, and (*b*) *Iver-nia-s*, attested in Irish (*a*) by the *Iarn* of *Iarn-belra*, and (*b*) by *Érna*, one of the later names of the Iverni. In the MSS. of Ptolemy's *Geography* we have them (*a*) in the river-name Ἴερνος, and Old Welsh *Iguern*, together with the ethnic plural Ἰούερνοι; and (*b*) in Ἰουέρνιος, with the plural Ἰουέρνιοι, both with ου due to the influence of Latin spelling.

4. Lastly it served as the base for the derivative *Iverniō*, later *Ériu*, gen. *Érenn*, Welsh *Iweryd*, *Iwerdon*.

There are other forms, both Goidelic and Greek or Latin, which it is needless to enumerate here, but these details carry the stem *Iver-* back to the time of Avienus, in the fourth century, or even to that of Diodorus, in the reign of Augustus. How then does it happen that it only emerges into publicity in the beginning of the seventh century? I can only suggest that it is a matter of accident, or partly so and partly due to the liability of the word to be confounded with *Iberus*, meaning 'Iberian or Spanish.' Thus there is nothing but the context to show that Columbanus's *Iberi* referred to a people in the British Isles rather than to Iberians in Spain. So most writers of Latin acquainted with the names of well-known nations on the Continent may, perhaps, be credited with reluctance to use the term when they could find another free from the risk of being misunderstood. This answer cannot be considered satisfactory in the absence of data for ascertaining when and whence *Goidel*, Welsh *Gwydel*, gained the upper hand over all others. At all events the name *Goidel* triumphed probably hand in hand with Goidelic

speech. In spite of this question of defective record the stem *Iver* is, so to say, the greatest common measure of the kindred forms. We cannot get beyond it, and it is but logical to regard it as the oldest of the group, relatively far older, for example, than *Iveriō* or any cognate name of Ireland, and it is not clear that it was narrowed down to the area of the application of the other forms. For it is possible that it denoted a widely spread race, while names like *Iverni* may have applied simply to a branch of it. Now, supposing this stem to have been pronounced *Iwer-* and the Spanish name to have been *Ibēr* or *Ibērus* (in spite of the river *Ebro*), one may say, considering the distance separating the Iberians of history from the Iverni of the British Isles, that the two names are sufficiently similar in sound to admit of being regarded as possibly of a common origin. For evidence, however, to prove this or the contrary we should have to look elsewhere: one thing seems probable, namely, that the Ivernians were as little Aryan as the Iberians of the Peninsula.

The tripartite division of ancient Ireland has been touched upon, but it deserves to be discussed more in detail in connexion with the *Senchus Mór*. The text, i. 78, speaks of the three noble tribes (*tri cenela saera*), between whom the island was divided, and the Commentary, i. 80, names the three noble clans (*saerchlanna*) twice, and calls them the first time Ulaid, 'Ulidians,' Feni Temrach, 'the Féine of Tara,' and Erna Dedad, 'the Érna of Dedad mc Sin.' An alternative statement gives them somewhat differently as Ulaid, Galeoin, and Erna[1]. *Ulaid* meant the Fír-Ulaid, 'Ulidians or True Ultonians,' the Cruithnian or Pictish race of Ollam Fodla. They appear in Ptolemy's *Geography* as Οὐολούντιοι or Οὐσλούντιοι—the alternative reading comes nearest to the native *Ulaid*, accusative *Ultu*—and to them he seems to give a town which he calls Ῥηγία; and this may have been the Navan Fort, near Armagh, in Irish *Emain Macha*, the head-quarters of the heroes of the Red Branch who figure in the stories of the Ultonian Cycle. The Érna represent here the Ivernians of Munster without any reference to the Emer tribes or any distinction suggested between the descendants of Lugaid and Iar. There remain the Goidelic conquerors of the central region comprising Lagin and Connaught; and they appear under the two names of Galeoin or Galian and Féine. Let us take them in this order:—

The name of the Galeoin seems to be of the same origin as Γαλάται and Galli, which according to Gaulish phonology stands for an

[1] An earlier passage in the Commentary, i. 70, calls the three principal races (*tri prim cinela*) in Ireland, Feini, Ulaid, and Galeoin, where the first or the third should probably be corrected into Érna.

earlier Galį-i [1] and derives from a stem *gal* which meant, among other things, bravery, valour, so that all three forms seem to have conveyed to the bearers of them the flattering signification of brave men and valiant fighters. The Galeoin are represented as introduced into Ireland by Labraid Longsech on his return from exile, and as having given him efficient help in the slaughtering of his enemies. An unidentified fortress called Dún nGalion after them is mentioned in the *Book of Leinster*, 311ª, which places it in the territory of Dál Mesin-Corb, that is to say, near the coast somewhere on the borders of the counties of Wicklow and Wexford: see Reeves's *Adamnan*, p. 22, and the *Four Masters*, A.D. 952 n. In the epic story of Táin Bó Cuailnge we read of Queen Medb's husband Ailill, having brought 3,000 Galeoin with him from Leinster to Connaught to Medb's head-quarters at Cruachan Ai, when he consented to marry her subject to the Pictish conditions on which she is supposed to have insisted. Now Ailill's Galeoin were such smart warriors and so superior to Medb's troops that she wanted to do away with them. Ailill consented only to their being dispersed among the other troops composing the Connaught army, so that no five Galeoin should be together in any part of it. O'Curry in his *Manners and Customs*, ii. 261, mentions a story that the druids of Ireland were induced to pronounce such withering satires and incantations against the Galeoin, that the race became nearly extinct in the land. This seems to mean that for some reason their name fell into disuse like those of the Fir Bolg and Fir Domnann, with whom they are frequently associated as in the Irish interpretations of Nennius's *Historia Brittonum*: see Mommsen's *Chronica Minora*, iii. 154, 155, and Todd's *Irish Nennius*, p. 44. That the Galeoin should have been execrated by the Goidels in whose lands they were quartered, cannot be regarded as by any means surprising. They were probably of Gallo-Brythonic origin, and the strange explanation offered of their disappearance means that they had not brought their own women with them. The same kind of remark would seem to apply to some of the Fir Bolg, Viri Bulgarum, or Builc, names which would seem to have been originally nick-

[1] *Galeóin* with *ó* is probably due to false analogy: for *Galeoin* seems based on an early Brythonic *Galion-i*. Compare Welsh *hael*, 'generous,' *haelion*, and *dyn*, 'homo,' plural *dynion*, for early *dunio-s*, *dunion-i*. Other forms occur, such as nom. *in Galin* and, perhaps, acc. plural *Gallnai* (*Book of the Dun Cow*, 57ª, 66ª), not to mention Welsh *Galedin* (*Iolo MSS.*, pp. 86, 477) for an early *Galatīn*, pointing to the Galli of the Belgic settlements between Kent and Devon. *Galli* itself as a loan-word in Goidelic probably began at an early date to take the sense of Irish *gaill*, 'strangers': see Meyer's note in point in the *Revue Celtique*, xi. 488.

names for *Belgae*. As their language and individuality became lost in Ireland, they would also seem to have been to some extent mercenaries, which is strongly suggested in the case, for instance, of those of them called Clann Umóir: see O'Curry's *Manners and Customs*, ii. 122. The same people under the name of Builc took possession of Man, Islay, Rathlin, and other isles: see Mommsen, *ibid*., p. 156. We may probably treat as nearly related to them the tribe whose town is by Ptolemy called Manapia, somewhere in the neighbourhood, perhaps, of Arklow in Co. Wicklow. This points back to the mother country of the Menapii on the lower Rhine, which is corroborated by the next tribe to them being called Cauci, a name hard to be severed from that of the Germanic Chauci of the Continent also. In the south-east of Ireland there was a tribe of Brigantes from the same mother country probably as the Brigantes of Britain. To the Brigantes in Ireland belonged doubtless the Tuath Fidga associated with poisoned iron and with the Fothairta in Co Wexford, and said to derive its origin from Britain: see the *Book of Leinster*, 15ª, the Rennes Place-name Stories in the *Revue Celtique*, xv. 427, 428, and Todd's *Irish Nennius*, pp. lxviii, 122-4. Not one of the tribes of the south-east of Ireland, or even the aggregate of them, proved equal to perpetuating its own Gallo-Brythonic language in the country. To come back to our earlier Dermot, that is to say, Labraid the Exile, the armed men whom he brought back with him numbering among them not only Galeoin, but also Fir Domnann or Dumnonii from Britain, whose language was probably Goidelic, and others named Lagin (genitive Lagen), so called from the broad spears or lances, *lagin*, which were carried by them, gave its best known name to *Lein*-ster. It is also to be found in the *Lleyn* and *Llaen* of west Carnarvonshire (Rhys's *Celtic Folklore*, p. 226), and if it was there Labraid found them, the probability is that the language of them also was Goidelic. Thus they and the Fir Domnann would all the more readily lose their tribal individuality in Ireland. It is of importance to notice that Labraid is supposed to have come soon after Ugaine the Great (p. 37), and to have lived in the sixth century before the Christian era, so that his introduction of Galeoin, Fir Bolg, Lagin, and Fir Domnann, and probably the settlement of the cluster of small tribes in the south-east of Ireland, belong to a group of later invasions[1], those of the original Goidels of the Eremonian stock,

[1] In adopting this view I depart from the order of the early invasions accepted by Keating and others, not to mention that the *Book of Leinster*, 15ª, takes for granted the presence of Fir Domnann in Ireland as early as the time of Eremon son of Milid. In the exiled Labraid we seem to have an early historical Dermot,

having, according to the guessings of the synchronizers, taken place more than a millennium previously (see the *Four Masters*, A.M. 3500 and 4658). Such chronology may be extravagant, but the Goidelic element must have been so long and so well established in the country, that the Gallo-Brythonic populations participating in the later invasions underwent the fate of being absorbed into it without being able to perpetuate their own language.

We now come to a different kind of name, that of the Féine of Tara; the word is usually explained as meaning farmers or yeomen, an interpretation quoted, for instance, by O'Donovan in a note to the *Four Masters*, A.D. 733. This is in agreement with its probable derivation from *fén*, 'a cart or waggon.' So one may perhaps translate the term *Féine* as meaning waggon-folk as distinguished from horsemen, for horsemanship, we are told in the *Senchus Mór*, ii. 160, was not taught the Féine. The recently published volume of Glossary to the Ancient Laws of Ireland, by Professor Atkinson, has an important article on *Féine*, which is relevant to these conjectures. He points out that though the Féine were distinguished from the chieftain grades, they were not a *plebs*, but a *populus*. One of the chief uses of the word in the Irish laws is in the phrase *la Féine*, which means *apud Fēnios*, and is said of anything that had the force of law or custom:—it is so *la Féine* or not so *la Féine*, as the case may be. It is Goidelic law and Goidelic speech: there is no question of a Gallo-Brythonic dialect, or of the vernacular of the Cruithnian Pict. On this point Professor Atkinson remarks, 'This gives special significance to the theory that the customs that had the force of law, had been formulated among the Feine, and were set forth in the language of that tribe, community, or race, the language known as the *berla Feine*.' The laws distinguish the man who is *sui berla Feine*, or doctor in the lore of the Féine or the Féinechus, as it is briefly called, from two other learned men, the one skilled in the Latinity of the Church, and the other the poet who sang the deeds of the heroes of the race. This the poet did, according to Professor Atkinson, in Gaelic understood by the people, while as to the Féine customs which constituted the Féinechus, the knowledge of that 'was confined to a limited body, and needed special interpretation.' He concludes that Féine must be a term applicable to the whole people among whom these customs prevailed, and he sums up his impressions as follows:—'Thus it seems difficult to avoid the inference that it means

while the allusions which would introduce the Galeoin and the Fir Bolg before his time await further examination. Meanwhile it is to be noticed that they and the Fir Domnann are remarkable as having no regular place in the stock genealogies.

the conquering race, among whom analogous customs were in vogue, and whose language was different from that of the native poets and historians. In that case we are shut up to the conclusion that it was a Teutonic invasion, for the regulations in force have strong resemblances to the *Lex Salica* and other codes of Germanic origin.' Here I take exception to the Germanic conclusion, which does not seem to me necessarily to follow. I must, however, candidly confess my incompetence to compare Germanic codes with the customs and laws of the Féine, that is to say, of what I take to have been the conquering Goidels. Now the Goidel cannot be considered a variety of Brython or Gaul, nor can the Goidelic language be regarded as a variety of Brythonic or Gaulish; so there seems to be no reason to expect his laws to have been a variety of those of Brythons or Gauls, and no reason why they should not also resemble those of Teutonic nations. It becomes a question of degree is the similarity so great as practically to spell identity? I cannot answer, but there is evidence of a certain amount of contact, social and political, between Celts and Teutons on the Continent: it is to be found in a certain category of words on which M. d'Arbois de Jubainville has written in his *Premiers Habitants de l'Europe*, ii. 335–73[1]. He treats words such as Gothic *reiks*, 'a chief or prince,' Mod. Ger. *geissel*, 'a hostage,' and a good many others, as borrowed from the Celts before they came to these islands. But even supposing the borrowing in some of the instances to have been by Celts from Teutons, the words in point remain evidence all the same of early contact between Celts and Teutons on the Continent. The ancestors of the Goidel would seem on the whole to have come to Britain from the Netherlands and North Germany rather than from the direction of Spain.

Here I should like to recall the passage in the *Germania* of Tacitus, where he speaks of certain *Aestiorum Gentes*, whom Stephanus of Byzantium calls 'Ωστίωνες, quoting, among other things, a statement that Pytheas called them 'Ωστιαῖοι. see p. 57 above. They came nearer in language to the Celts who spoke the *lingua Britannica*, but their religion and dress (*ritus habitusque*) were those rather of the Suebi. Whence Tacitus got his information I cannot tell, but it seems more minute than usual. Without laying any stress on the *frequens fustium usus* as reminding one of the shilellaigh, which takes its name from a district in the county of Wicklow, we come to his statement, that

[1] He reasserts his position in his book entitled *Les Celtes* (Paris, 1904). see, for instance, pp. 169–72, also pp. 10–12, where he calls special attention to the Cotini, whom Tacitus in his *Germania*, c. 43, mentions as speaking a *Gallica lingua*, though they appear to have been living in the southern portion of Silesia.

they cultivated corn and other fruits of the earth with more patience than usually belonged to the idle Germans. If we assume that these people were Celtic-speaking, as I think we may, and that some of the race eventually reached Ireland, we could corroborate the statement of the Roman historian by an appeal to the character and importance of the farming population of the Féine and to the significant fact that the Celtic conquerors of Ireland traced their origin to an ancestor called *Airem* or *Erem*, whose name meant a ploughman. Perhaps one might even add an allusion to the well-known tenacity with which the modern Irish tenant sticks to his holding. As to the idle Germans, the words mean of course that the ancient Germans devoted themselves to war and depended on their thralls to till the ground for them to the limited extent to which it was done at all. But I cannot suppose the ancient Celt to have been a whit fonder of manual labour than his German brother; so we have the conclusion forced upon us, that the Celtic-speaking Aestians were already a composite people consisting of ruling Celts and some other race that had adopted the language of its conquerors and that cultivated their land for them, while retaining to a greater or less extent its own habits and customs: possibly the consciousness of the distinction of race had died out, which would perhaps make them still more completely like the Féine.

As to the language of the Féinechus which Professor Atkinson contrasts with the Gaelic of the poets, his words seem to suggest that he possibly regards the former as some kind of Teutonic. Apart from the questions which that would raise, especially as to how that language came to disappear so completely, it seems to me hardly necessary to suppose any such a difference of speech as that between Celtic and Teutonic. The case would be met by our supposing the language of the Féinechus to have been the archaic Celtic cultivated by a body of conservative specialists, while in the mouths of the people the same language had become greatly modified in the course of time. This process in Ireland would be presumably accelerated, not to say aggravated, by masses of Ivernians adopting Goidelic and inevitably introducing habits of pronunciation and possibly of syntax foreign to an Aryan tongue. The transition from the old Irish of the Glosses into what I call Medieval Irish teaches us something on this point. The widespread dislocation caused by the inroads of the Norsemen created a break of continuity, and when the smoke of their devastations clears away, so to say, this is roughly speaking the state of things:—the old hereditary scribes and professional men belonging to the households of the great chieftains

had been murdered or forced into exile: their place began to be filled by men who could not keep up the traditional Celtic of the older school. For example, when in reading or copying a manuscript they came across a respectable reduplicated form of the verb, they liked to have it glossed and explained by means of a commonplace form of the same verb, a form in fact with which their own vernacular dialect had made them familiar. Some of the old features of the language disappeared, and what seems even more serious was the change effected in the pronunciation. Thus, with the exception of *l, n, r*, all the intervocalic consonants were, so to say, cast into the melting-pot, where they were sometimes forced to evaporate into a mere aspirate or even zero. There are indications that this had been going on for a long time previously. So I can see no difficulty in understanding the possibility of a wide difference in an earlier period between the written language of the conservative scribes of the Goidelic chieftains and the looser speech of their people.

In bringing these notes on the two names to a point, I find no reason to try to identify the Galeoin and the Féine with one another one can do better. For with the help of the Senchus Mór and certain indications to which attention has already been drawn we can bring them together as two elements in the composition of an ancient people, its warriors, and its farmers. Further, as the farmers are called the Féine of Tara we have Tara fixed upon as the centre of gravity of that nation, and this supplies us with an important key to the understanding of ancient Irish history. For any chieftain ambitious of being king of Ireland had to secure possession of Tara, and vice versa the king of Tara was supposed to be *ardrí* or high king of Ireland. With Tara of course went a certain area of the surrounding country, called *Mide* or 'Meath,' which meant the *regio media Hiberniae*, or, perhaps better, the central region of the Sons of Míl d (p. 58). That area is said to have been enlarged by Tuathal Techtmar, monarch of Ireland in the second century, into what was thenceforth known as the kingdom of Meath and treated as the mensal lands of the *Ardrí* see the *Four Masters*, A.D. 106, n., and the *Annals of Clonmacnoise* (Dublin, 1896), p. 51, also Stokes's *Urkeltischer Sprachschatz*, p. 207. This monarchy continued to prove rather Irish in the uncomplimentary sense which is sometimes given the word, and Tara's Halls remind one a little of the Arician Grove:—

> Those trees in whose dim shadow
> The ghastly priest doth reign,
> The priest who slew the slayer,
> And shall himself be slain.

The position of any *airdrí* who did not wish exactly to offer himself *opportunum insidiantibus* naturally made him settle tribes friendly to him and his family here and there where it best suited his interests and least those of his foes. In this respect Cormac mc Airt, grandson of Conn the Hundred Fighter, was directly or indirectly answerable for a good deal. Cormac is supposed to have reigned from A.D. 227 to 265, and he is credited with having been converted to Christianity or some form of religion of which his druid Maelchenn could not approve. So the story goes that the druid incited demons to give him a painful death, which they did by causing the bone of a salmon to stick in the king's throat: see the *Four Masters*, A.D. 266. At the beginning of his reign he gave to Tadg son of Cian as a reward for help in war the best portion of Mag Breg, called from Cian's descendants the Cianacht of Mag Breg. In the south the men of Munster gave the district of Fermoy and more to Mug Ruith and his descendants for helping them to defeat Cormac. Lastly, a family quarrel happening between Cormac and the Eremonian people of the Déisi who were settled in Meath, the king had one of his eyes put out by one of the Déisi champions in the act of killing a son of Cormac's, who had been the immediate cause of the trouble. The blemish to Cormac made it impossible for him to continue king, but he and his sons expelled the bulk of the Déisi from Meath, and most of them were welcomed at last by the men of Munster to settle in what is now the county of Waterford and the adjacent districts of the county of Tipperary. Eventually some of the Déisi crossed the sea to Dyfed or south-west Wales, and we have the pedigree of their kings of Dyfed given in that of Elen, wife of Howel the Good, for she was of that race; and very possibly it is to the Déisi belonged a far earlier and more remarkable figure in the legendary history of this country, I mean Vortigern. At all events that name, which was at home in Ireland, occurs in an old inscription in the Déisi country, while, on this side of the Irish Sea, it is confined, so far as I know, to the Hengist legend, though it was not quite unknown in Brittany.

I have probably said enough to show what a source of weakness Tara could prove to be for Ireland, and the question suggests itself, how it came to be the Goidelic capital? Was it a stronghold of the Goidels' own selection, or had they found it a strong place already occupied by the Ivernians? The latter is the legend and the more probable supposition, especially as it was situated in the midst of a most fertile district, a fact which in the case, for example, of another great Goidelic centre, namely Cruachan or Rathcroghan, in

the present county of Roscommon, would seem to have formed the principal attraction for them. The site of the stronghold on Knockaulin (p. 37) is not known to me nor is that of its rival at Naas, but if you look at the ruins of Cruachan you are much more struck by the goodness of the soil of the surrounding country than by any salient facilities offered by nature for the defence of the place. Tara was easier to fortify and the land was perhaps even more fruitful than around Cruachan; so one is not surprised to find Tara represented as existing before the distant time of Ollam Fodla, who is said to have added to its buildings and to have been the first to hold the Feast of Tara, as an opportunity probably for discussing the affairs of his kingdom and for receiving the allegiance of princes subject to him: see the *Book of Leinster*, fo. 19[a], 329[c], *Four Masters*, A.M. 3922, *Annals of Clonmacnoise*, pp. 34, 35. This would probably mean that Tara was then the capital of the Ulidians, the Cruithnian race of Hír; but at what time they were driven northwards and forced to make Emain Macha their head-quarters it is impossible to say: that was an isolated hill easy to fortify and situated near Armagh, also in a fertile district. Once, however, the Eremonian Goidels had acquired possession of Tara one would have expected them to hold uncontested command of it, but the fact is, that, every now and then, they proved unequal to that task. In other words, the force and volume of the Celtic conquest of Ireland, so far from overwhelming the whole of the island, did not suffice to place the power of the Goidels in a position to escape attacks—sometimes successful attacks—even where that power was presumably strongest, to wit, in the central zone embracing Leinster and Connaught. If you bear in mind this very incomplete conquest of Ireland by the Celts, you can form a notion what to expect as having happened in the domain of language and folklore: you will at any rate not expect everything in them to prove purely Celtic, purely Aryan.

The early history of Ireland is grievously complicated by the repeated shifting and dislocation to which its tribes were always liable; and in saying this I am not thinking so much of foreign invasions like those of the Norsemen or Anglo-Normans, as of movements due to the exigencies of the Ardrí himself, which the case of Cormac mc Airt may be treated as illustrating. Looking over and past these obstacles one can discern the tripartite division of Ireland outlined in the story of the three Queens of the Tuatha Dé Danann and in the three free or noble tribes of the Senchus Mór. With these the pedigrees in the *Book of Leinster* seem on the whole to harmonize, and the division into three leads easily up into that

into five, which we find recognized in the *Book of the Dun Cow*, fo. 46[a], to wit, in the story called the *Sick-bed of Cúchulainn*, where we have (1) the Ulidians under Conchobar mac Nessa standing aloof, while the other four provinces are preparing a bullfeast in order to choose a king of Tara. These are represented (2) by Medb and Ailill of Cruachan in Connaught, while (3) the other Goidelic province, that of Leinster, has in attendance its king, Finn mac Rossa, whose head-quarters were at Naas in the present county of Kildare. Then the great group of the south was represented (4) by Cú-rói (better Cú-rí) mc Daire of the Érna, who had one of his strongholds, like an eagle's nest[1], on the mountain-top called after him 'Cathair Con-Rí or Cú-rí's Citadel,' in the west of Kerry; and (5) by Tigernach Tetbannach, king of the Munster men of the race of Emer. We find the same fivefold division in the story of the Courtship of Étáin in the same manuscript, fo. 129[b], and we have it also in the *Annals of Tigernach*. see the *Revue Celtique*, xvi. 405.

The earliest complete picture of Ireland which Irish literature suggests is that of the whole island divided into three parts between Ivernians and Celts, but every now and then we have a glimpse of the real aborigines looming in the background in the twilight of fairy story. The Fairies are heterogeneous, consisting partly of the divinities of wells and streams and lakes, of those of glens and forests and mountains, and partly of an early race of men more or less caricatured and equipped by fable with impossible attributes. In so far as the Fairies are of the latter origin they form a race of mound-dwellers and a proper subject not only of natural history but of historical inquiry in the higher sense of the word. An exhaustive list of the allusions to the Fairies in Irish legendary

[1] This description possibly applies only as you look up from Camp, on the northern side of the isthmus; for the old stronghold may be more accessible from the south, and as I was travelling by rail one day towards Killorglin I seemed to detect a winding road leading up towards the summit At all events Cathair Con-rí must have practically looked south and east for its supplies from the low-lying country containing Killorglin, Milltown, Castlemaine, and Fairanfore. In any case it contrasts sharply with such Goidelic head-quarters as Tara or Rathcroghan: it may have resembled Greenan-Ely more That is described by O'Donovan as a ruined cyclopean fort on the summit of a hill near Burt, in the barony of Inishowen in the north see his note to the *Four Masters*, A.D. 1101, under which it is recorded that Greenan-Ely was destroyed No mention of Cathair Con-rí occurs in their *Annals*: it is almost as completely lost to history as Tre'r Ceiri in Carnarvonshire. It is to be wished that somebody examined the sites of the more important strongholds of ancient Ireland from the two points of view of natural defence and of the food supply.

history would be very useful, and would probably lead the way to some interesting conclusions. I will only indicate one remarkable instance which occurs in the pedigrees in the *Book of Leinster*, fo. 330 c, where mention is made of Fiatach Finn, ancestor of the Dál Fiatach and of a line of Ulidian kings, said to be of the Érna of Munster. After saying that Fiatach had two sons, it adds abruptly the words: *Is leis arrobad for sídib*, that is, 'It is his to warn the Fairy stations,' and it mentions four of those stations or hills, as follows:—

1. Síd mBresse, to the position of which I have found no clue.

2. Síd Nenta, a Fairy mound, of which a certain Sigmall is mentioned as lord a century or so before the Christian era. The place is now known as Fairymount in the barony of South Ballintober in the county of Roscommon: see O'Donovan's *Tribes and Customs of Hy-Many*, p. 6, O'Curry's *Manuscript Materials*, pp. 286, 591, *Revue Celtique*, xv. 459.

3. Síd Femin, also called Síd Ban bFinn according to O'Curry, who places it in Slievenaman in the present county of Tipperary: see his *Manners and Customs*, ii. 383; iii. 324.

4. Síd Culind, also called in the *Book of Leinster*, loc. cit., Tech Cermnai i Sleib Chulind, 'Cermna's House in Slieve Gullion,' in the county of Armagh.

The number of Fairy hills to which Irish literature alludes is much larger, and they are frequently mentioned in a series of stories published in O'Grady's *Silva Gadelica* under the title of 'Colloquy with the Ancients'; the index to his volumes brings the aggregate up to rather more than a score. It is to be noticed that of the four in question here, three were situated far from one another, and the four were possibly meant to represent all the others. I may mention also that several of them were in the mountains, and altogether their position, politically speaking, suggests to me a comparison with the reservations made for the aborigines by the white man in the United States of America. Add to this the habitual secretiveness of the Fairies, as to which Irish and Welsh stories are agreed. Of the latter a good instance occurs in the Mabinogi of Manawyđan son of Llyr, where Llwyd son of Kil Coed figures as the Welsh namesake of the Irish Fairy chief, Liath mc Celtchair of Cualu, in the present county of Wicklow. Now Llwyd had taken sides with Gwawl son of Clud against Pwyll and his family, and in the time of Pwyll's son, Pryderi, and his ally, Manawyđan, he laid the land of Dyfed under spells of magic (p. 64 above). So when Manawyđan settled with him in Dyfed, he had his crops ruined and his friends stealthily taken captive he knew not whither: in fact,

before he met a single human being outside his own small circle he had been fully seven years in the country, when at last he contrived to force Llwyd to meet him face to face and to acknowledge himself checkmated [1].

It is unfortunate that we have no clue to the nature of the warning which the Moundsmen might expect or might consider themselves entitled to have: all that is taken for granted by the compiler of the Irish pedigrees. But it is not to be overlooked that Fiatach Finn reigning at Emain over the True Ulidians—whether he was also monarch of Erin is not certain (*Four Masters*, A. D. 39 n.)—was of the Cruithnian race of the Érna or ancient Ivernians, and that it is he who is pointed out as the medium of communication with the Moundsmen. This seems to suggest as between the latter and the Ivernians the recognition of a *modus vivendi*, dating possibly from before the era of the invasions of Ireland by the Celts [2].

I cannot close these conjectures more appositely than by borrowing from the brilliant address with which our fellow academician began his work as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge last January. I offer his words as my apology for having selected this subject, and they are these: 'And for the purpose of prosecuting that most difficult of all inquiries, the ethnical problem, the part played by race in the development of peoples and the effects of race blendings, it must be remembered that the Celtic world commands one of the chief portals of ingress into that mysterious prae-Aryan foreworld, from which it may well be that we modern Europeans have inherited far more than we dream.'

[1] The original of the story will be found in the Oxford *Mabinogion*, pp. 46-58, translated in Lady Ch. Guest's *Mabinogion*, iii 165-84, and in Loth's, i. 101-16. For Liath see the Rennes Place-name Stories, edited by Stokes in the *Revue Celtique*, xvi 78, 79; also Rhys's *Celtic Folklore*, p. 546, to which may be added a reference in the Tomb Englyns in the *Black Book* (Evans, 35[a], Skene, ii. 34). the sixty-sixth of them places Llwyd's grave in *Kemeis Tir* or Cemesland, the corner of Pembrokeshire in the angle made by the Teifi with the coast, and looking as it were across to the home of the Irish Liath. In the englyn the Fairy is called *Llwid lledneis*, which one might perhaps render 'Llwyd the dandy' Lastly, an interesting correspondence respecting Llwyd's house at Porth Kerdin, mentioned in the Story of Kulhwch and Olwen, took place not long since between the Rev. A W Wade-Evans, John Griffith, and others in the columns of the *Pembroke County Guardian*, and is now reprinted in the *Archaeologia Cambrensis* for 1904, pp. 33-48.

[2] Compare the Semang dwarfs living in the jungles of the Malay peninsula, who are usually invisible to strangers of importance, but can be readily summoned by their Malay lords or their herdsmen, as they are termed · see Annandale and Robinson's 'Contributions to the Ethnography of the Malay Peninsula' in the April number of *Anthropology*, 1903.

THE FERMENT IN EDUCATION ON THE CONTINENT AND IN AMERICA

BY MICHAEL ERNEST SADLER

Read March 25, 1903.

I.

For some years past, in Western Europe and in the United States of America, not to speak of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and Japan, there has been a marked growth of interest in the question of National Education. The bearing of education on industrial and commercial efficiency is now, in some countries at any rate, amply recognized. More thought is now given than heretofore to a much deeper and more difficult question, namely, the influence of different types of school-training on social structure and on civic ideals Educational aims are now somewhat more accurately distinguished from one another than was once the case, while at the same time there is a greater readiness to admit that the true and lasting welfare of each grade of education is intimately connected with the welfare of the rest. The number of books devoted to the discussion of educational problems seems to have considerably increased. Central and local authorities have been occupied with the growing complexity of educational administration. In several countries much of the time of the Legislature has been devoted to educational questions. In nearly all, it would appear, though comparative educational statistics (like naval and military) are incomplete, the claims of primary, secondary, technological, and university education exact ever-growing subsidies from public funds. So general, indeed, is this movement for increased expenditure on national education that one who surveyed the present state of public opinion, especially in Germany and the United States of America, might be tempted to say that power on the sea and power through the school are becoming two of the main objects of national desire.

Yet this growing and even feverish zeal for educational progress has been dogged by doubts as to the particular kind of education which a given nation will find it prudent to provide in view of its temperament, economic situation, and political responsibilities. Without overstatement it might be said, that never before has there been such apparent unity of conviction as to the need for national educa-

tion or so much inner hesitation as to educational aims. In this paper I propose, with your permission, very briefly to review the chief tendencies which are now showing themselves in the educational movement in France, Germany, and the United States of America, and to consider the points at which different currents of educational opinion are coming into sharp conflict.

The comparative study of educational movements (if checked by due regard to differences in national history, in national temperament, and in social conditions) is not unpractical, seeing that the intellectual and economic interests of the great nations are closely interwoven, and that therefore a serious change to the educational equipment of any one of them is certain, sooner or later, to concern the rest. Nor is it the less advantageous to us, who are as it were the link between Western Europe and America, and yet, as a nation, are apt to lag behind both in our conscious recognition of a new intellectual situation and therefore in the readjustment of our educational aims, to note betimes changes in the weather which in due course will reach our shores. France, Germany, and America, on the other hand, are in return beginning to realize that, by reason of our insular position, we have retained and developed certain types of education which they sincerely admire and from which they admit that they have much to learn.

II.

There is a French system of education in a much truer sense of the word than there is a German or an American. There is no Imperial Minister of Education in Berlin. There is no Federal Minister of Education at Washington. But the Napoleonic tradition still invests the Minister of Public Instruction in Paris with a prestige of centralized authority beyond his own wish or the present spirit of the law. For historical reasons, Paris has for educational France an attractive power which is quite unlike anything in the educational system of Germany or America. In matters of educational government, and happily still even in educational aim, the different States of the German Empire retain large freedom and preserve fruitful varieties of organization. Thuringen, Baden, Bavaria, are still in their different ways a counterpoise to the educational influence of Prussia. In the United States of America there are striking differences in the educational organization, and not less significant differences in the educational temper, of different States and even of different cities. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Illinois, Minnesota, represent, as well from historical as from economic causes,

somewhat different ideals in education and correspondent differences in administrative tradition Nor can the student who is permitted to watch the work of one of the schools in the City of New York ever imagine that he is in Boston, or when he is in a classroom in Atlanta, Georgia, think for a moment that he is in Minneapolis. In France, however, in spite of profound regional differences, and in spite of the almost eager decentralization which it has been the endeavour of French educational reformers to bring about in recent years, there still persists the habit of centripetence, a looking to Paris for a lead, a sense of awkwardness in the use of provincial freedom.

Nevertheless there is in a very true sense a German tradition in education, as there is a French and (within certain limits) an American, which is marked by a distinct tone and tendency, and which can therefore be contrasted, both from the administrative and intellectual point of view, with those of France and the United States. The three nations, for example, lay stress on different outcomes of a course of secondary education. The German generally asks about a young man what he knows. The Frenchman what examinations he has passed. The American what he can do Not that the German pays regard to intellectual attainment alone, but he is aware that in his country a certain grade of general culture is connoted by the completed course of a given type of school training. Nor does the Frenchman take the fact of having passed certain examinations as being of ultimate value in itself, but rather as furnishing a compendious summary of a number of usually connected qualifications. The American, however, concerns himself directly with the individual vigour and practical ability of the man, and expects the school to have equipped him for strenuous effort in actual business rather than to have furnished him with some prescribed average of intellectual attainment.

In Germany, the masses of the people have very little to do with the determination of educational policy; in America, by far the greater part of education is subject to popular control; in France, educational affairs are under administrative order, which is somewhat held in check by academic resistance and tempered by Parliamentary debate.

In Germany, the educational standard is maintained by the labours of a specially trained, learned, and very dutiful body of schoolmasters, servants of the State, deeply versed in the methods of instruction, and devoted to the intellectual side of their professional duties. In France, the brilliancy and stimulus of the best teaching is due partly to the living force of a great literary and scientific

tradition, partly to the presence in many of the secondary schools, especially in those of Paris, of distinguished men of letters, whose work in the classroom does not entail any pastoral care of their pupils out of school. In America, educational influences are much less exclusively masculine, are more social than disciplinary, diffusory rather than intensive, attractive rather than severe, and where most stable and invigorating, the outcome of comradeship rather than of control.

Such in briefest outline are some of the characteristic marks of education respectively in Germany, France, and the United States of America Each system has its own remarkable excellence, and each also the defects of its qualities. Each of the three countries is rightly proud of its educational achievements, though America far surpasses the other two in the intensity of popular enthusiasm for the public schools. France somewhat conceals her sense of educational power in her present mood of self-criticism, while Germany, to whom the whole world of educational thought owes so much, appears to be in danger of taking her own educational supremacy a little too much for granted.

One might perhaps thus attempt to summarize the strong points of the three contrasted educational systems, to which I have referred:—

French education excels in the great tradition of literary style which it is the special glory and mission of her classical secondary schools to cultivate and to transmit: and in the stimulus to clear thinking and to intellectual curiosity which clever boys receive in the higher forms of her metropolitan secondary schools. A third great distinction of French education at the present time is the missionary fervour which inspires so large a proportion of the staff of teachers and inspectors now serving the Republic in connexion with the primary schools in town and country.

The German system excels in the grade of academic and of higher technological instruction. It also excels in the provision of cheap, standardized, well-staffed and easily accessible secondary day-schools for boys, where much is taught (perhaps a little too much taught) that equips a man to take a well-informed and intelligent part in modern trade and professional life, and prepares him to submit to the further discipline of special technical training. A third, but not the least important, excellence of German education is to be found in the combination of well-informed municipal initiative with expert supervision on the part of the State. At the present time this is perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the whole system, and evidence of its success may be seen in the widespread appreciation,

among parents of all classes, of the importance of well-chosen curricula, of sound rather than showy teaching, and of prolonged courses of intellectual discipline.

The American system especially excels in developing the individuality of young children and in stimulating them to many-sided self-expression. It excels in the ample provision which it makes, in all grades of instruction, for the education of girls and women but its strongest claim on the admiration of the world lies in that strong faith in the power and possibilities of education which, in all progressive districts and throughout all ranks of the community, has almost the force of religious conviction, impelling the poor to self-denial on behalf of their children's schooling and the rich to unexampled munificence in educational endowment, and making it possible for the vigorous and far-seeing leaders of American education to make bold and varied experiments in curricula, with what has been happily called 'a calculating adventurousness,' and with a characteristically businesslike idealism.

III.

But in all the countries which I have named, the voices which question the wisdom of many prevailing educational tendencies grow louder year by year. There is a ferment in educational opinion everywhere. And the more one probes beneath the surface, the deeper are the difficulties which reveal themselves and account for this educational unrest.

In Germany, for example, there are many observers who hold that the tight grip of the State on the entrance to the professions, with its consequent control on the range, quality, and pace of secondary school studies, has produced a somewhat over-instructed generation, prone to catch some prevailing intellectual malady, too little trained to vigorous initiative or to the bearing of unexpected responsibilities. Prince Bismarck held that 'Germany would be ruined by State examinations; that the majority of those who pass them are so mentally run down that they are incapable of initiation ever afterwards; and that they take up a negative attitude towards everything that is submitted to them and, what is worst of all, have a great opinion of their capabilities because they once passed all their examinations with credit[1].' On another occasion (in 1890) he said that the German higher schools educate people wrongly, and that the results were particularly noticeable in the majority of the

[1] Von Poschinge, p. 290.

officials. 'Our old Landrate,' he said, 'who lived in their districts all their lives and who were practical farmers, knowing everything and everybody there, were quite different men. To-day the country is governed by unpractical theoreticians and inexperienced office-hunters, whose submissiveness is the only gauge by which the ruling bureaucracy measures their thoroughness and ability [1].'

A very eminent German professor has recently written much in the same strain. 'In no sphere is the deadening influence of bureaucracy so perilous as in education; unless indeed we do not care at all whether our schools are permeated with the bracing spirit of sturdy independence. What will become of a nation, when the intellectual vigour of those who are destined to be its leaders is reduced betimes to respectable mediocrity, and when the rising generation is led to think, by the importance attached to certificates, that a man's real dignity depends on the number of examinations which he has managed to pass [2]?'

A German classical schoolmaster of long experience, Herr Lehmann, has uttered a warning note in his book *Erziehung und Erzieher*. He remarks on the artificial importance which has come to be attached to mere knowledge through the solid prestige and military privileges which are bound up with the successful completion of certain prescribed courses of study. He notes that German parents dare not educate their boys off the authorized line, and that they are apt to dread for their sons the risk of an independent calling. He maintains that the German nation has more common-feeling than ever before, but that it has lost moral enthusiasm and individuality of character, and that these changes are connected. He complains of the defective will-power in so many of the youths who have passed through his hands, and says that one young man, to whom he spoke on the subject, replied, 'How can you expect us to get will-power? We are everywhere kept in leading-strings.'

Some would connect this change in part with the tendency to overvalue oral teaching, and to give too much prominence in early education to the evolutionary aspect of things, thus failing to give children a basis of certainty and conviction, and prematurely laying stress on the relativity of truth. Professor Munch, of the University of Berlin, who speaks with almost unrivalled knowledge of the inner working of the German secondary schools, deplores the tendency to make school teaching too abstract and philosophical in its presentation of subjects. He regrets, too, the effect upon the imagination and on the individual will, of the theory that Government is the

[1] Von Poschinge, p. 130. [2] Dr. Paulsen.

brain of the social organism, instead of a mediator in the general interest between the conflicting tendencies and aims which spontaneously show themselves in the masses of the people.

The late Dr. Goetze of Leipzig, himself a Gymnasiallehrer, felt so strongly the danger of the predominantly linguistic training given in the German higher schools that he devoted himself to the maintenance of a Training College for manual instructors, in order to bring more hand-work into the curricula of the secondary schools. But the prevailing tendency was too strong for him, and during his lifetime his direct influence was almost entirely confined to the elementary schools.

The anonymous author of that strange book *Rembrandt als Erzieher*[1], which has passed through forty-five editions, maintains that 'the root-evils of public instruction in Germany at the present day lie in the fact that the teacher cannot make any selection of his pupils he must take all who come, if qualified for entrance that there is hardly even a possibility of any intimate personal relationship between the teacher and any of his pupils and that the teacher, though he should practise the art of education in the spirit of an artist, is in effect a shopkeeper retailing knowledge to all comers.'

Over-organization, excessive supervision from above, State control over the entrance to the professions, over-development of the civil service (governmental and municipal), the too linguistic character of the instruction, and a lack of variety of individual initiative are the evils from which German education is felt by many to be suffering at the present time. There is a great desire on the part of German educational authorities to develop in their schools more of the love of games and a stronger sense of corporate responsibility among the boys, and of *esprit de corps*. Increasing admiration is felt for what is best in the life of the English public schools. Though many of our methods of instruction are not highly esteemed, our freedom from official uniformity is envied. It seems that it rarely happens for a German boy to be sorry to leave his school.

Almost exactly the same feelings are expressed in much that is now written by French schoolmasters and others about the French secondary schools. The Parliamentary Commission on secondary education, over which M. Ribot presided, completed its labours two years ago, and its voluminous report is a storehouse of brilliant testimony on the aims and methods of French secondary education.

M. Boutmy maintains that, in the French secondary schools at the present time, too much thought is given to the imparting of knowledge,

[1] Leipzig · Hirschfeld, p. 312.

and too little to the inducing of reflection. M. Gréard deplores the tendency to sacrifice activity of mind to mere attainment. M. Émile Bourgeois pleads for greater variety and greater liberty in education, but on the condition that the schools are linked together by a strong feeling of unity in national service. M. de Coubertin protests against the splintering of interest among too many subjects and against the tendency to teach too much and to leave the boys too little strength and leisure for self-development. M. Duhamel points out that the French secondary schoolmaster ought to live more with the boys, as the English public schoolmasters do. The French, like the German, schoolmaster has little idea of the way in which a devoted English public schoolmaster thinks of the *pastoral* side of his work. Throughout the volumes of the French report one comes across expressions of admiration for the best sides of English public school life—not for the methods of teaching, which are perhaps too contemptuously dismissed, but for the *esprit de corps*, for the training in self-government, for the school games, and for the strong power of school tradition.

The new regulations for secondary schools in France are inspired by an earnest attempt to secure the improvements to the need of which French public opinion is now thoroughly aroused. But it is still too soon to predict the consequences of the change.

Turning to America, we find a remarkable growth during the last two or three years of a tendency to criticize some of the results of elementary and of secondary education.

The most disturbing criticisms are those of Professor John Dewey of Chicago, whose writings (especially *The School and Society*) cut at the root of many of the assumptions underlying public elementary instruction in the United States. 'Our social life,' he writes [1], 'has undergone a thorough and radical change. If our education is to have any meaning for life, it must pass through an equally complete transformation. This transformation is already in progress. . . . The introduction of active occupations, of nature study, of elementary science, of art, of history; the change in the normal school atmosphere, in the relation of pupils and teachers, and in discipline; the introduction of more active, expressive, and self-directing factors—all these are not mere accidents; they are the necessities of the social evolution. . . . We must make each one of our schools an embryonic community life, active in the type of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society outside.'

[1] p. 44.

This, from the educational standpoint, and permeated with a belief in educational methods, is the counterpart of M. Pobyedonostseff's criticism of the modern elementary school. M. Pobyedonostseff writes that 'It is an unhappy day when education tears the child from those exercises of his early years through which he acquires, almost unconsciously, the taste and capacity for work. The vast majority of children must learn to live with their hands. For such work training is needed from the earliest age.'

But between M. Pobyedonostseff's view and Dr. Dewey's there is this profound difference. The Russian statesman takes no account of the need for educationally grading this early initiation into handicraft; he lays stress on the purely economic and, as it were, repressive side of the problem; he makes no allowance for the development of the child's individuality, for his training to freedom of thought and of self-expression, for his acquisition of the knowledge essential to free citizenship in the modern state. The American teacher views the whole problem educationally, and with desire not for repression but for the fullest realization of individual ability and character. But though Dr. Dewey lays his finger on the weak spot in much modern elementary education, he cannot define the social order for which he would have the school prepare, nor can he escape the difficulty that for the discharge in adult life of the more mechanical tasks of the modern factory, the free development of artistic faculty in early childhood is pathetically unnecessary.

Miss Jane Addams, the head of Hull House in Chicago, in her recent work *Democracy and Social Ethics*, calls attention[1] to the over-literary character of the instruction in the American elementary school. 'The training of the children of the workers,' she writes, 'so far as it has been vocational at all, has been in the direction of clerical work. No sufficient study has been made of the child who enters into industrial life early and stays there permanently—to give him some offset to its monotony and dullness. We have either failed to realize that cities have become great centres of production and manufacture, in which a large population is engaged, or we have lacked sufficient presence of mind to adjust ourselves to the change. We admire much more the men who accumulate riches, and who gather to themselves the results of industry, than the men who actually carry forward industrial processes; and our schools still prepare children almost exclusively for commercial and professional life.'

Mr. Hanford Henderson, in his *Education and the Larger Life*[2],

[1] Macmillan: p 190. [2] Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.

presses the criticism further. 'Our current education,' he writes, 'is not succeeding in proportion to the money and efforts which are being put into it [1]. . . . It seems to me a greater social service to hold back from much of our present educational method, the machine of official education, than to lend it a hand [2]. . . The nearest approach to the carrying out of the programme of organic education is to be found in our kindergarten, manual training schools, art schools, music schools, and gymnasiums [3]. . . . Large elementary and high schools, with their vast numbers and exact classification, have largely been brought about by administration rather than by human consideration. They offer certain mechanical advantages, but from an administrative point of view they are not unqualifiedly successful [4]. . . . Education has become a machine, just as politics have become a machine, and it is a serious matter to get out of line [5]. . . . We are producing sentimentalists in place of people of power [6].'

The last note is touched in a recent paper by Dr. Hadley, of Yale, on the *Meaning and Purpose of Secondary Education*. 'I believe,' he writes, 'that in education *exactitude* is a more important ethical factor than most of the men of the present day are ready to admit. . . The important thing to be insisted upon now is the teaching of accuracy of thought [7].'

IV.

The points at which, in all the countries named, conflict of educational tendencies seems most likely to become acute may perhaps be summarized as follows:—

1. What shall be the aims of secondary education for boys under present conditions? What its course, or courses, of study? This raises the question of classical education. What shall be the conditions of admission to such a course? What social or other privileges should be attached to the completion of it? Should it be gratuitously provided by the State?

2. Similarly, for girls. What should be the aims, studies and standards of girls' secondary education? Are we (except for girls with a special bent towards letters or a literary calling) now working on too scholastic lines and with too much regard for examinations?

3. Should girls and boys be educated together? If so, within what ages, on what plan of study, and under what discipline?

4. On psychological and physiological grounds, apart altogether from technical or economic considerations, should educationally graded

[1] Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, p. 136. [2] p. 138. [3] p. 139
[4] p. 191. [5] p. 210. [6] p. 220. [7] *School Review*, Dec. 1902.

hand-work of different kinds, practical and artistic, be made an important part as well of secondary as of elementary education?

5. What should be the place of private enterprise in modern education?

6. How far should great varieties of school and of curricula be encouraged in the modern state? How far can such varieties be really encouraged if due regard is had to the need of audit of efficiency through examination, and to the difficulty of equating very disparate kinds of excellence when we come to select by examination, on the results of school and academic training, officials for the service of the nation?

7. In what relation should the individual teacher stand to the State? As a civil servant who must say 'mihi iussa capessere fas est'? Or as an entirely independent person, with the freedom of an artist? Or in an anomalous position, partly under the supervision of the State, but partly free to make experiments and discoveries in the science of education? And should any one be allowed to teach? Or only those whom the State may license? If so, on what conditions should that licence be granted?

8. What is the best course of education for the different backward or subject races—so that their character may be developed at the same time that their economic value is improved? This problem is one of pressing urgency because of those phenomena of race-contact which Mr. Bryce has described as marking a crisis in our time. A related problem faces us in dealing with the pathological aspects of public elementary education among white people. The moral, intellectual, and social influence of the Reformatory and Industrial Schools is a fact of great educational significance.

The conflicts of educational ideals to which I have referred may, I think, be reduced by analysis to two, which in turn are not unconnected with each other. The first is a conflict in social aims, a struggle between discordant, though often only half-articulate, theories of social organization. The growing importance of this side of the question is shown by the appearance of such works as Dr. Natorp's *Sozialpadagogik*[1], and Dr. Bergemann's *Soziale Pädagogik auf erfahrungswissenschaftlicher Grundlage*[2], M. Vial's *L'Enseignement secondaire et la démocratie*[3]; and the books of Dr. Dewey and Mr. Henderson, to which I have already referred. A symptom of the same movement of thought may be seen in the revival of interest in the work of Pestalozzi. All true education

[1] Stuttgart, 1899. [2] Gera, 1900. [3] Armand Colin, 1901.

must prepare for life. National education is a home problem, and a work problem, even more than a school problem. Implicit in educational theory, therefore, is a theory of social order And the fundamental difficulty at the present time seems to be the impossibility of forecasting with confidence the future lines of social organization.

The second is a conflict between different conceptions of human nature. It has been remarked that the theory 'which underlay the education given in the schools of Port Royal, like all other practical expression of Jansenism, had its root in the doctrine of the Fall of Man[1].' Over against this view is the optimism which maintains that in the training of all children the promptings of a child's natural disposition will be our best guide, and 'joy its own security' In one form or other, these conflicting theories can be traced in the living educational literature of the day; and perhaps it is the chief distinction of the best English training that it is based, often unconsciously, on a combination of the two views and on the belief that nearly all children need discipline and oversight, but that they respond to confidence and deteriorate under suspicion. Each extreme, however, tends to develop its opposite. In revolt against the over-repression of the old-fashioned home came excessive encouragement of individuality in children; while the reaction against the results of such treatment already begins to show itself in a reversion to authority.

The student of educational literature at the present day cannot fail to be impressed by the number of momentous issues which are being raised by writer after writer in France, Germany, and America. It is as if the world were being pressed forward, by some inner necessity, to a struggle between conflicting ideals. Many causes combine to increase the urgency of the problem which these writers bring under review. Applied science has profoundly changed the basis of modern life. Commercial development and ambitions urge nations forward into new enterprises. Psychology has directed our thoughts to differences in intellectual development, and therefore in need for discipline, among masses of people who formerly were spoken of as practically alike. The contact between the races in different stages of development gives rise to the same difficulty on an even larger scale. And in the meantime historical criticism and physical studies have compelled a reconsideration of some forms of expression which at one time seemed more adequate to the intellectual and spiritual needs of men and women. Nor does it seem practicable to provide

[1] Dr. Beard, *P. R.*, vol ii, p 138.

as much effective variety of educational choice and atmosphere as most men would be anxious to furnish for the avoidance of all unnecessary friction in this difficult time of intellectual change, because education under modern conditions is extremely expensive, and there must be some limit to the claims upon the income of poorer parents or upon the resources of the State.

V.

The movement, of which I have ventured to speak in this paper, is affecting, or is likely to affect, all civilized countries. Each can learn something from the others: each educational system has its own characteristic excellence and its characteristic defects. But no single educational system can combine the advantages of all. Something must be left out in each. Nor can any escape the double claim which is felt by all at the present time—the claim which is national and the claim which is international. Yet there is danger in the casual borrowing of educational methods and aims. Every national system of education ought to provide a counterpoise to the weakness of the national temperament. The strongest systems of national education do provide this counterpoise, though often unconsciously. Too great readiness to make changes in the inner life of a system of education may proceed from a lack of realization of the national need for some particular form of discipline.

Yet so closely are nations interlocked, that there is growing need for the comparative study of educational systems, a study which must be based on scientific principles and conducted with insight and care. Each nation may in this way learn wisely from the others, and avoid both precipitate imitation and too great insularity of thought. Nor under present conditions is the study lacking in usefulness from the point of view of international intercourse and mutual understanding. But it is submitted that in order to be sound, scholarly, and profitable, such comparative study of educational systems should be based (1) on careful historical and economic investigations in order that light may be thrown on the difference in the conditions of the problem in different countries; (2) that it should be conducted in the light of the researches of modern psychology; and (3) that it should, as far as possible, seek to test its hypotheses by a carefully-ordered series and variety of practical experiments in selected schools.

The results of such an organized investigation would be at once intellectually suggestive, educationally profitable, and financially advantageous, seeing how much money has been wasted in education for lack of preliminary experiment. It may be suggested, moreover,

that such a study would gain much by international co-operation, and that there is much to be said in favour of its being conducted independently of the necessary reserves and occasional exigencies of departmental organization.

Great Britain would seem to be in a position to derive special benefit from such a study and, in turn, materially to further it. In the United Kingdom we possess a singular variety of educational developments. Again, we need guidance, because we have an exceptional number of types of school to keep in efficiency for ever-changing tasks. Our schools have to face the task of fitting men to play their part either in the free democracies of our self-governing colonies or as the rulers of some backward or subject race, or in the complex circumstances of English life. Much that appears at first sight to be irresolution or lack of clear aim in our higher schools is really due to the complexity of our national task. Again, our geographical and political position in the world is such that we can do much to mediate between conflicting ideals in education and to point the way to a synthesis which may include much which is best in both. And finally, may it not be the special task of Great Britain to show in practice that the true ideal of national education is not a mechanically-adjusted system of schools rigorously controlled and standardized by the State, but a free union of self-governing institutions, diverse in their methods and traditions, but all inspired by the spirit of national service? And is not this view confirmed by the nature of true education itself, which is an ever-varying combination of opposites and, in Burke's words, 'a reconciliation of contraries'? It values tradition, and yet has a vivid sense of present needs. It teaches us to inquire and to question, but also to obey and to believe. It fails unless it strengthens character as well as sharpens intelligence. It has regard to the training of the body and to the training of the mind; to personal responsibility and freedom, but also to the claims of the community on each of the individual members of which the community is composed. It combines stimulus and discipline. It admits the need for many-sided intellectual interests, but also for a 'wise passiveness' of mind. While greatly valuing oral teaching and linguistic study, it does not fail to pay regard to those subtler influences which seem to pass into character below the threshold of consciousness, and which affect conduct, though their operation may be too deep for words. It is an artistic and a spiritual work, full of diverse and apparently conflicting influences, and yet itself a whole.

IDEALISM AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

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Since the publication of Kant's great work, almost all discussion of the theory of knowledge has turned upon the relation of the object to the subject or of the content of our experience to the formal character of our thinking. In some sense, therefore, we may call all modern theories of knowledge idealistic, and most of them have been so called by their authors. But this does not carry us very far: for the word idealism has been used with so many shades of meaning that it is loaded with misleading associations. It has even, it may be feared, led to the confusion with each other of philosophies which have almost nothing in common. It becomes, therefore, a matter of some importance to disentangle the various senses in which the term has been employed, and the attempt to do so may perhaps furnish the best starting-point for a consideration of the real issues involved in the question.

Now with Plato, who first brought the word into philosophical use, an idea meant something that was primarily and emphatically objective. The idea of a thing was, as he constantly puts it, the thing itself. 'The good itself,' 'the beautiful itself,' 'the one itself,' are the permanent objective realities to which all our conceptions of goodness, beauty and unity point, as distinguished from their phenomenal appearance; and the thought that they are present to our minds, or accessible to our consciousness, though never absent, is secondary and derivative. But with Locke an idea is primarily a state of mind, and Berkeley's doctrine that the *esse* of things is their *percipi* has so deeply affected our philosophical language that in common usage the name idealism is most often applied to the theory which regards the modifications of our consciousness as the objects, or at least as the primary and immediate objects, of knowledge, and which treats the existence of the external world only as an

inference. This usage would not in itself be a matter for regret, but, as I have already suggested, it has not seldom led to a misconception of the meaning of philosophical writers who employ the word with something of its old Platonic significance.

Such a misconception is partly favoured by the way in which the so-called idealism of Germany has developed. Kant emphasized the relativity of objects to the unity of the self, but he still maintained the reservation that the objects so related are not in an ultimate sense real, apart from the subjectivity to which they are revealed. While, therefore, he contended that the world of experience cannot be regarded as independent of consciousness in general, and, indeed, of the consciousness of man, he still held to the distinction of the objects of experience from things in themselves. He thus, after all, seemed to seclude man in a world of his own consciousness, and to sever him entirely from reality. Hence when Kant was attacked as a Berkeleian, it gave him no little trouble to separate his own doctrine from that of Berkeley, and his attempts to work out this distinction are perhaps the obscurest parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In fact, he was unable to achieve this result except by an argument which—if carried to all its consequences—would have been fatal to the distinction of phenomena from things in themselves, and would thus have transformed the most fundamental conceptions of the *Critique*. For the point of that argument is that we can be conscious of the subject only in distinction from, and in relation to, the object, and that, therefore, our consciousness of the external world is as *immediate* as our consciousness of the self, and our consciousness of the self as *mediate* as our consciousness of the external world. But if this argument be valid, the subjective point of view of Berkeley can once for all be set aside. To suppose that we are first conscious of our ideas, as our ideas, and then that secondly we proceed to infer from them the existence of objects, is to invert the order of our intellectual life, and to tear asunder its constituent elements. It is to invert its order: for, though the unity of the self may be implied in all consciousness of objects, yet it is to the object in the first instance that our attention is directed, and we observe the outward world and construe its meaning long before we turn the eye of reflexion upon the inner life. And it is to tear the elements of it asunder: for the outer and the inner life are at every point in close correlation, and there is no experience of ours, theoretical or practical, in which we have not to do with both. The growth of our inner life is just the development of our knowledge of the outer world and of our interests in it, and the attempt to retire

into ourselves and in a literal sense to make our mind a 'kingdom' to itself is suicidal. It would be like the attempt of the abstract pleasure-seeker to get pleasure apart from all interest in anything but pleasure itself.

Berkeleianism, if we neglect the somewhat artificial expedients by means of which Berkeley tried to find his way back to an objective world or at least to an objective deity, may easily be pushed into the abyss of Solipsism. And, perhaps, there may still be some one who, taking the doctrine in this sense, would repeat the paradoxical assertion of Hume that Berkeley's argument 'cannot be refuted,' though it 'carries no conviction.' In truth, it is so far from being incapable of refutation, that in its very statement it refutes itself, by setting up an '*ipse*' or self with no not-self as its correlate, and indeed, by assuming the possibility of the existence of a finite individual, who is conscious of himself in his individuality, and yet is not, *ipso facto*, aware of his relation to any greater whole in which he is a part. In like manner, in the similar but more developed doctrine of Leibniz the monads 'have no windows,' or, perhaps we might say irreverently, no front-windows, through which they may come into real relations with objects, but the result is that they have to be conceived as under continual illumination by a God, who gives them the apparent experience of a world of which directly they could know nothing. They are isolated from reality in a phantom universe of their own, a sort of spiritual theatre set up in their own souls; but care is taken that the great drama of existence shall be re-enacted on this private stage. Berkeley, in the end, had accepted nearly the same modified form of Subjectivism, dismissing, what on this theory was superfluous[1], the reality of any world but a world of spirits and their conscious states. And in this shape, which is supposed to derive some support from Kant, the doctrine seems still to be accepted by some writers, as the genuine result of idealism, and it has been both attacked and defended on this basis. For, while there are those who find in such a doctrine a *reductio ad absurdum* of all idealism, there are others to whom, as to Berkeley, it seems a valuable safeguard against materialism, and a fundamental element in any spiritualistic theory of the world. Fearing the abyss of *Solipsism*, and reading in a onesided way the truth that all objects as such are relative to the subject, such writers would compromise with the enemy, and abandon to him all parts of the universe in which they cannot find thought and will, or at least some form of consciousness, and they would

[1] Leibniz also conceives all the monads as in a sense spiritual unities each having a perception of the whole.

declare in this sense that 'all reality is spirit,' that is, that reality consists solely of conscious beings and their states of consciousness. But I am afraid that the enemy will not be propitiated even by this sacrifice, and that the denial of the reality of the material world will inevitably lead to the denial of the reality of any world at all.

With such subjectivism the German idealism had no necessary connexion, at least after Fichte had removed the last fragment of it from his philosophy. The result of Kant's teaching, when it was freed from the contradictory notion of the 'thing in itself'—that Irish Bull in philosophy, as Heine calls it—was not to cast any, even the slightest, doubt on the reality of the external world, but only to show that a new element must be added to all that we know of it as an external world, namely, its relation to the subject. No doubt, this new element brings important modifications into our previous views of objectivity. For, on the one hand, it absolutely precludes the attempt to explain the spiritual by the material, and, indeed, compels us to conclude that there is no material world which is not also spiritual. And, on the other hand, as the correlation between the self and the not-self is not onesided, it brings with it also the conviction that there is no spiritual world which is not also material, or does not presuppose a material world Thus the reality of that which is other than the self-conscious intelligence is seen to rest on the same basis with that of the self-conscious intelligence itself, and the one cannot be denied without the other [1].

But at this point a new difficulty has arisen. So soon as it is understood that the assertion that all objects are relative to the subject, involves the counter-assertion that the subject as such is relative to the object, we seem to be involved in an antinomy between two forms of consciousness, which can neither be reconciled nor separated. We seem, in fact, to be forced alternately to make the subject an adjective or property of the object, and the object an adjective or property of the subject; in other words, to set up two opposite theories, materialism and subjective idealism, each of which has its own independent value, and neither of which can be put aside in favour of the other. This balancing or dualistic view is substantially the theory adopted by Clifford and Huxley, and it has been fully worked out by Mr. Spencer. These writers, in short, use the double relativity of consciousness and self-consciousness, or

[1] There is, indeed, a sense in which all that is apprehended by the intelligence must have something of the nature of the intelligence in it. On this subject I may refer to what I have said elsewhere (*Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. i, p. 193 seq.).

of matter and mind, as the means of escaping both from the objections to materialism, and from the objections to subjective idealism: but what they set up in place of each of these theories is simply the assertion that, from a phenomenal point of view, they are both true, while from the point of view of reality, we cannot establish either of them. Thus there are two independent ways of looking at the world, each of which claims the whole field of existence for itself and is, therefore, absolutely opposed to the other. Each of them, indeed, has its usefulness for certain purposes of science, the one as a principle of physics, and the other as a principle of psychology, but neither can finally vindicate itself as the truth to the exclusion of the other. We are, therefore, in the presence of an immoveable difference which defies reconciliation; and the absolute reality which lies beyond these opposites, must for ever baffle our understanding, though, as Mr. Spencer holds, it is presupposed in the very nature of consciousness. Hence we may regard the world *either* as a connected system of motions in matter, *or* as a connected system of modes of consciousness, and from either of these hypotheses important scientific results may be derived but we can neither decide for one of the alternatives to the exclusion of the other, nor can we rise to any higher point of view which would embrace them both. 'See then our predicament,' says Mr. Spencer, 'we can explain matter only in terms of mind. we can think of mind only in terms of matter. When we have pushed our explanation of the first to the farthest limit, we are referred back to the second for a final answer, and when we have got the final answer of the second, we are referred back to the first[1].'

There is a superficial plausibility in this view, but it is difficult to conceive one which is fundamentally more incoherent It 'splits the world in two with a hatchet.' It breaks up consciousness into 'two consciousnesses,' which are somehow united, though there is no logical way from the one to the other and it fails altogether to explain the actual combination of the two in our daily experience. For, just because Mr. Spencer makes the difference of mind and matter absolute, he can admit the unity only in the form of an abstract 'One' in which all difference is lost. At the beginning of his *First Principles*, he lays down the logical doctrine, that thought is essentially the limitation of an infinite or unconditioned being, a being of which we have only a 'dim consciousness,' as that which is presupposed in all definite apprehension either of the object or of the subject. But the unity thus presupposed is unknowable,

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, i, p. 627, § 272.

and that which we know is confined to the phenomenal. Thus each of Mr. Spencer's two conceptions, his conception of the phenomenal world with its insoluble difference, and his conception of the unknowable being which alone is real, seems to require the other as its compliment. The abstraction of the unity leaves the duality of matter and mind without any connecting link, and the equally abstract duality of mind and matter cannot be reduced to unity except by the suppression of their distinctive characters. Hence the unity and the difference cannot be regarded as both real, and if, as with Mr. Spencer, the unity is treated as real, the duality must be regarded as merely phenomenal. All our science, therefore, deals merely with appearances, which we cannot bring into relation with reality The impulse of reason to seek for unity cannot be set aside, but, under the conditions of Mr. Spencer's theory, it can be attained only by the sacrifice of knowledge itself. The result is instructive as pointing to the fate of all theories that set the 'one' against the 'many.' Abstract Monism and abstract Pluralism are not, strictly speaking, two philosophies but different aspects of the same philosophy. Polytheism always ends in setting up a fate beyond the gods.

The Spencerian philosophy, however, is valuable as a protest against its opposite, against any 'too easy monism.' It is a legitimate criticism both upon subjective idealism and upon materialism, though it only puts one one-sided theory against another, and maintains that both have equal rights. If we could not do better, it might be well to compromise upon the Spinozistic idea of the parallelism of the two unrelated attributes of extension and thought, or, upon Schelling's conception of the balanced equality of the real and ideal factors of the universe, even though the result, as with Mr. Spencer, were to leave us without any unity which was more than a name.

We are not however, shut up to such a desperate course, for the main result of modern philosophy and especially of modern idealism has been to put a concrete, in place of an abstract unity, or, in other words, to vindicate the essential correlation of the self and the not-self. Idealism in this sense has nothing to object to the strongest assertion of the reality of the distinctions of matter and mind, or of any of the distinctions and oppositions that enter into the theoretical and practical consciousness of man. But it maintains that there are no *absolute* differences or antagonisms in the intelligible world, no distinctions which do not imply relations, and, therefore also, an ultimate unity between the things distinguished. and, of

course, it must refuse to admit that there is an unintelligible world, a world that cannot be brought in relation to the intelligence.

Here, however we must stop to meet a possible misunderstanding. There are many at present who are justly jealous of an easy monism, and some, perhaps, who, less justly, carry their jealousy to the point of practically refusing to admit any ultimate unity at all. Hence, when it is stated to be an essential result of idealism that there is a unity beyond all difference and through all difference, they are apt to think that this involves the denial of the reality of the differences. Thus they seem to hold, as Spencer seems to hold, that we can distinguish without relating, or relate without admitting any unity within which the difference is embraced. And in this they get much support from the ordinary consciousness. for the 'plain man,' as he is called, prior to reflexion, is apt to alternate between unity and difference without bringing them together he is ready, therefore, to take any distinction which he recognizes as absolute. and, on the other hand, if any doubt is thrown on the absoluteness of such a distinction, he is inclined to infer that it ought to be dismissed as altogether unreal. No one who has got beyond this naive state of consciousness, will allow himself to be impaled on either horn of its unreal dilemma. But, if we have once renounced such abstract ways of thinking, I do not see how we can stop short of the result that the one and the many, so far from being opposed, are factors of thought which cannot be separated without contradiction. An absolute difference would be no difference at all; for it would annihilate all relation between the things distinguished, and, in doing so, it would annihilate itself. This is a principle of logic often illustrated by the fate of dualistic systems of thought, which in seeking to emphasize the reciprocal exclusiveness of two opposite principles, have ended by depriving them both of the very character in virtue of which they were opposed. Thus Manichaeism, when it took evil as absolute, as a reality quite separate from good, inevitably made it lose its character as evil; for it thus turned evil into an independent substance, which in itself had no opposition, because no relation, to good. We can have opposition only within a unity, and, if we try to stretch it farther, we overreach our object, and end by making the opposition itself impossible or meaningless. Any one, therefore, who thinks that a refusal to admit pure abstract contradiction between two terms—say, between truth and falsehood, or good and evil—involves the denial of all validity or reality to the distinction in question, must be reminded that relative opposition is the only real or conceivable opposition, and that distinctions are in effect

denied whenever they are made absolute. Thus those who carry any difference to the point of dualism do away with that very difference by over-emphasizing it, just as surely as those who disregard or abstract from difference in the interest of unity. The parts of the intelligible world mean nothing except in the whole, and the whole means nothing except as distributing itself to the parts, and constituting their spiritual bond [1].

If there is any truth in these views, the only reasonable controversy between philosophers must be, on the one hand, as to the nature of the all-embracing unity on which every intelligible experience must rest, and, on the other hand, as to the nature of the differences which it equally involves. To ask whether there *is* any such real unity, or whether it embraces real differences, is to attempt to leap off one's own shadow: it is to try to think, while attacking the only basis on which we can think. We cannot play the game of thought, if one might use such an expression, without taking our stand upon the idea that the world is a self-consistent and intelligible whole: though of course, this does not mean that any actual attempt to systematize our knowledge can be more than a step towards the attainment of the ideal of a perfect analysis and re-synthesis of the manifold content of experience. The problem of knowledge is to find out how the real unity of the world manifests itself through all its equally real differences, and we can show that any abstract view, such as those of Berkeley or Spencer, which would deprive us of any element in it, would make the progressive solution of it by science and philosophy impossible. But we cannot prove these presuppositions of all knowledge directly, or by making the system based upon them complete, if for no other reason, because with our increasing experience the problem itself is always enlarging. In this sense, the work of science, and still more the work of philosophy, must always be a work of faith, meaning by faith, not believing anything merely upon authority, but proceeding upon a principle the complete vindication or realization of which is for us impossible, for, obviously, nothing short of omniscience could grasp the world as a complete system. It is involved in the very idea of a developing consciousness such as ours, that while, as an intelligence, it presupposes the idea of the whole, and, both in thought and action, must continually strive to realize that idea, yet what it deals with is necessarily a partial and limited experience, and its actual attainments can never, either in

[1] Dr. Ward, in his able Lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism, admits frequently the correlation of subject and object, but he seems to me in effect to withdraw this admission, when he speaks of each individual consciousness as having a subject and object of its own.

theory or practice, be more than provisional. Aristotle[1] has expressed both sides of this ideal in one of his most comprehensive sayings, when he declares that 'as, in practice, it is our highest aim, starting with what *seems* good to us individually, to make what is absolutely good our individual aim, so in theory, we have to start with what seems true to us individually, but the object we seek is to make what is really and naturally intelligible or true, true or intelligible for ourselves.' In other words, we have to learn to look at the world, *in ordine ad universum* and not *in ordine ad individuum*, from its real centre and not from the centre of our own individual existence: and the task is not one which is forced upon us externally, but one which is laid upon us by the nature of the reason which is within us. Aristotle, therefore, holds that it is possible for us to make the universal point of view our own, as it is also possible for us to make the absolute good the end of our lives. But we have to add to what Aristotle says that this end is one which is ever *being* realized, and never is finally realized by us. It is a faith which is continually passing into knowledge, but never becomes complete knowledge.

If however in one sense we must call this idea a faith, we must remember that it is in no sense an arbitrary assumption: rather it is the essential faith of reason, the presupposition and basis of all that reason has achieved or can achieve. We may admit that, as Tennyson says, in this aspect of it our 'deepest faith' is also our 'ghastliest doubt'—the doubt whether the whole system of things to which we belong is not illusive and meaningless. But, apart from this inevitable shadow of our finitude, the real difficulties of knowledge and practice lie not in the idea or ideal of our intelligence, but rather in the application of it to the particulars of thought and life, in carrying out the effort to co-ordinate or affiliate the different appearances as elements of one reality, or, as Mr. Bradley would express it, to determine what is the 'degree of reality' that belongs to each of them, when brought in relation to all the rest, and to give it in our practical life the importance which really belongs to it. But to question whether the whole is an intelligible system, is as vain as to question whether any part of our experience, even the most transient and illusive of appearances, has a place in that system.

There is, indeed, a way of escaping from this view of reality as a systematic whole which has often been tried. This is to take our stand upon some particular principle or principles, or upon some particular fact or facts, as self-evidencing or immediately 'given' truth, on the fixed certitude of which we can build our further know-

[1] Met. 1029 b, 5 seq.

ledge. Mr. Andrew Lang in his book upon Myth and Ritual, tells us of a theological child, who described the creation of the world in the following terms. 'God first made a little place to stand upon, and then he made the rest.' So philosophers have often sought for some special criterion of truth, for some basal principle, like the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes, or for some *datum* or *data* of sense, as a foundation on which they might build their system. But the search is a vain one. For, when we examine any such principle we discover that it is only one aspect of things, which has no claim to be taken as prior to the other aspects of them, and which proves the others only in the same sense in which it is proved by them, and also that in being brought in relation to those other aspects, it is subject to re-interpretation. And, in like manner, when we examine any supposed *datum* of sense, we find that it is merely one appearance, which helps us to explain other appearances only as it is explained by them, and that its ultimate interpretation depends on the way in which it combines with all our previous consciousness of things. All that is certain about any such *datum*, in the first instance, is that it has an indubitable claim to be recognized as an element in the intelligible world; but how much truth there is in the first presentment of it we cannot tell, till we are able to think it together with the other elements of our experience. In other words, it must be interpreted so as to cohere with them, and they must be interpreted so as to cohere with it. But whether this will lead to its being explained, or to its being explained away, or, as is more likely, partly to the one and partly to the other, we cannot tell *a priori*. We cannot, therefore, take our stand on any one *datum* or principle taken by itself; for, taken by itself, it cannot be known for what it really is. We can only take our stand on the unity of the whole system, in which everything that claims to be a fact or a truth must find a place. Thus the idea that there are certain intuitions or perceptions which we can take for granted as *prior* to, and above all criticism, and which remain, in all the discourse of reason, as the fixed and immoveable basis of the whole edifice of science, involves a fundamental mistake. Indeed, the activities of the intuitive and the discursive reason can never be separated without making the former 'blind,' and the latter 'empty.' We always presuppose the unity of the whole in every determination of the parts in distinction from, and in relation to each other: and no element of the whole can be presented apart from the process whereby we distinguish and relate it within that whole. We are thus, throughout all our intellectual life, advancing from a confused, imperfectly differentiated, and there-

fore imperfectly integrated, experience, towards an organic system of knowledge, in which justice shall be done to all the differences and oppositions of appearances, without sacrifice of their essential unity. And it casts confusion upon the whole process, when we treat it as if it were confined to the work of building upon fixed foundations, which are given either in sensation or in thought, apart from any process at all. On the contrary, it cannot be adequately represented except as an evolution, in which it is only the last product that shows distinctly the meaning of the germ out of which it sprang.

The view that has just been stated contains, I think, the essentials of that conception of knowledge which has been maintained by the greatest representatives of modern idealism; and it is obvious that it has no special kindred with the philosophy of Berkeley, and, from that point of view, is no less realistic than it is idealistic. At the same time, it may be acknowledged that in the process of working towards this result and, especially, in seeking to reply to those who treated knowledge as something given to the mind from without, idealists have sometimes dwelt too exclusively on the subjective aspect of knowledge. This was the case, as we have seen, with Kant, and it is apt to be the case with those who go back to Kant and take their start from him. We may add that it is apt to *seem* to be the case with such writers, even when it is not really so. Thus the views of T. H. Green are often misunderstood by those who do not recognize how much his language is coloured by opposition to authors like John Stuart Mill, whose philosophy was in the ascendant when Green began to write, but whose views are no longer so prominent in the mind of this generation of philosophers as they were then. Hence difficulty is apt to be caused by Green's constant insistence on the constructive activity of the mind in knowledge, carried, as it necessarily is, to the point of denying that any element of truth can be given to the mind apart from such activity. Such a doctrine seems to many to involve a denial of the objectivity of knowledge, and it has even provoked in some a reaction against all idealism, and a tendency to fall back upon 'the given' in the sense of naive realism, i. e. upon the idea that at least the basis of experience is presented to consciousness without any activity of its own. And even the most conclusive demonstrations that it is impossible to detect any such *pure datum* have failed of their effect, because of a lurking suspicion that the reality of the objects of consciousness was being undermined. When Disraeli on one occasion was questioned as to the political platform on which he stood for election to a seat in parliament, he answered that he 'stood

upon his head.' But if that is a sufficient basis in politics, it can hardly be admitted to be so in the theory of knowledge. And when an idealist speaks of 'the judgement by which we sustain the world,' however adequate may be his explanation of such language, it is apt to excite a suspicion that his theories, if they were completely carried out, would lead to the individual being regarded as his own universe and his own God. This suspicion, perhaps as much as any other reason, is what drives many to accept some *via media*, in which the subject and the object are represented as in some way acting and reacting on each other—some such view as is implied in the metaphor of 'impression by,' or 'contact with' reality, and to substitute it for an organic conception of the relations between the mind and its object. Such a suspicion the idealist is bound to remove, if he expects his theories to be accepted; yet he must do so, of course, without compromising his fundamental conception of the relativity of the intelligible world to the intelligence.

Now, so far as this difficulty arises out of the Berkeleian theory that the mind has primarily to do only with its own ideas, it may be met by the considerations already suggested. As the consciousness of the self is correlative with the consciousness of the not-self, no conception of either can be satisfactory which does not recognize a principle of unity, which manifests itself in both, which underlies all their difference and opposition, and which must, therefore, be regarded as capable of reconciling them. When, therefore, we speak of the object as manifesting itself in, and to the subject, determining his perceptions, thoughts and desires, and when, on the other hand, we speak of the subject as constructing his world in knowledge, and making it in action the means of his own self-realization, we are using language that represents two aspects of the truth, which are apparently opposed, but each of which has a relative validity, and it is important that we should not allow either of these forms of expression to exclude the other. To say that the mind goes beyond itself to become conscious of the world, or to say that the object goes beyond itself to awake consciousness of itself in us, are two extreme ways of putting the fact of knowledge, which have opposite merits and opposite defects. And, in like manner, in regard to our practical life, to say that we are always determined by objects, or to say we are always determined by ourselves, is to utter half-truths. Neither of these statements is quite adequate; nor can we reach the whole truth merely by putting them together, and saying that we are partly determined from without and partly from within. For, if we accepted this reciprocal determination of

subject and object as our final account of the matter, we should be left with a mechanical conception of action and reaction between two things which are external to each other, and we should be driven to deny that there is any unity which transcends the difference and manifests itself in it. Yet that, as I have attempted to show, is just the idea we have to admit, so soon as we realize that we can have no consciousness of the difference and relation of the two terms except on the basis of such a unity. We always presuppose the unity of consciousness in all our experience, inner and outer, but dualism seems natural to us because in our ordinary modes of thought we only *presuppose* it, and do not specially attend to it or reflect upon it. Our eyes are directed from the unity we tacitly assume to the differences we openly assert. Yet the whole problem of our lives, the problem of practice no less than the problem of the theory, is made insoluble if we begin by assuming the absoluteness of the difference between the self and the not-self, and only then ask how are we to mediate between them. If this were really the question, it could not be answered, but neither could it ever have arisen for us as a question at all. If, therefore, any one bases his theory on a presupposed dualism of subject and object, we may fairly ask how he comes to believe in it. and this is a question which he cannot answer at all without treating the difference as a relative one. But if it be so, the common notion that the Absolute, the ultimate reality, the Divine, or by whatever name we choose to name it, is a far-off something, a *Jenseits* or transcendental 'thing in itself,' involves a fundamental mistake. And it is no less a mistake to suppose, with Mr. Spencer, that it is a mere indeterminate basis of consciousness, of which we can say nothing except that it is. It must be regarded as a principle of unity which is present in all things and beings, and from which they, in their utmost possible independence, cannot be separated. It must be conceived, in short, as that in which they 'live and move and have their being.' And in the case of conscious and self-conscious beings such as we are, this unity must show itself as the underlying principle of all their conscious life. It is, therefore, no metaphor or overstatement of religious feeling, when we say that the consciousness of it is the presupposition both of the consciousness of objects and of the consciousness of self, if only it be remembered that, just because it is πρῶτον φύσει, it is ὕστατον ἡμῖν, i. e. that it is the last thing which we make an object of our thought. On the other hand, though it be last in thought, yet it may be maintained that neither the consciousness of the objective world nor the consciousness of the inner life of the self can attain its highest and

truest form until this presupposition is distinctly realized, as it is in religion, and also, we may add, until it is made the direct object of reflexion, as it is in philosophy. The greatest task of philosophy, indeed, is just to consider how the constant presence of this unity modifies the contents both of the subjective and of the objective consciousness. How far and how this task can be achieved, I cannot at present consider, but in any case it seems clear that neither the subject nor the object can be known for what it really is, until their reciprocal correlation is taken into account, and until this correlation is itself seen in the light of the unity which it presupposes.

SUMMARY

EXCAVATION IN ASIA MINOR

By W. M. RAMSAY

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read May 14, 1903.

Remarkable activity has been shown in Asia Minor during recent years by the leading nations of Europe. Formerly, exploration in the inner country on the great plateau was almost exclusively due to English enterprise; but during the last fifteen years or so there have been many great schemes of exploration carried out by the Austrians, Germans, and French in the inner country, while in the coast-lands their excavations have been conducted on a magnificent scale at Pergamos, Miletus, Magnesia, Ephesus, Troy, and other places, as well as at Sindjerli and elsewhere on the eastern frontiers. The Austrians have established a permanent branch of the Archaeological Institute at Smyrna (a scheme advocated by Mr. Ramsay so long ago as 1881 in London). The Russians have a School of Research in Constantinople. The French have planned a Corpus of the Christian Inscriptions of Asia Minor. The Austrians have published the first volume of their projected collection of all the ancient inscriptions of the country. The Germans had for many years in Dr. Humann a special consul at Smyrna, whose sole duties were archaeological; it was chiefly due to his explorations and discoveries that their interest in the country was first aroused, the appointment was a recognition of the powers and services of the man, and no successor was appointed after his death. The Americans have planned a large scheme of combined exploration and excavation for the coming year. The money for these great enterprises came from various sources. The Austrians had depended greatly on a private society of noblemen and gentlemen interested in the exploration of Asia Minor, some of whom supplied liberal funds for the great explorations of Benndorf and others (like Prince Liechtenstein), while some personally engaged in research and travel (like Count Lanckoronski). The last Austrian expedition in 1902 was granted a sum of £750 by the Society for the Promotion of German Science and Art in Bohemia in order to make a three months' exploration in Lycaonia and Isauria. The Germans and French had depended on government aid, given on a great scale, and supplemented by the German Emperor from his private purse. The

American proposed double expedition is to be equipped on a great scale by the Carnegie Institute in Washington. The number and magnitude of these enterprises are due to the general perception that the key to many important problems of ancient history must be sought in Asia Minor.

In England extremely little is now being done in this department, in which up till 1892 we had been easily first, thanks to the undertakings conducted by the Dilettante Society, and to Hamilton and other travellers. While at the present time every one must feel that the continuance of excavation in Crete is a first duty for us, the small expenditure required makes it also a duty to try to recover our old place in Anatolian exploration. There was no idea of rivalry with other European undertakings, nor even of friendly competition with them, but only of co-operation with their efforts.

The most promising method of work lay in the establishing of a centre during the summer months in some of the larger cities of the inner country, and the conducting of careful explorations around that centre. The time for extensive journeys had now passed by. Intensive study of a small district was now much more important. A new centre would be chosen in each year, so far as possible; but it was extremely important in practice to choose a centre in one of the seats of provincial government. An enterprise which seemed to be eluding the observation of officials by seeking a centre distant from the governing city of the province or Vilayet would be much more liable to surveillance and interruption. The exploration should not be merely archaeological, but ought to follow out many lines of study, botanical, zoological, geographical, &c. For purposes of health the establishment of a centre would be as beneficial as for purposes of study: exploration by continuous travel was much more trying to the health, and far less productive of good and reliable results in observation. Mr. Ramsay was convinced that if such a scheme were fairly started with a reasonable prospect of continuance, a succession of scholars from the universities would be attracted to it. Questioned as to the probable cost, he named £300 per annum as the irreducible minimum on which such a scheme could be worked. Scholars would have there a centre where they could live in comfort during the intervals between expeditions, putting their observations in order and preparing for the next excursion. They would have to pay the expenses of their own excursions (which could be made on a greater or a more economical scale according to taste), as well as the cost of travelling out and home.

THE CONCLAVE OF CLEMENT X (1670)

By HIS EXCELLENCY BARON DE BILDT

Swedish and Norwegian Minister

Read June 26, 1903.

The Conclave of Clement X is not a great historical event in itsel
It has had no important political consequences, nor has it brought t
the front any great characters or remarkable personages. If, neve
theless, I have thought the subject worthy of your attention, it
because its history lays bare—more perhaps than that of any othe
Conclave—the network of personal and diplomatic intrigues which i
those days surrounded the election of the Pope Perhaps it will n
be without a sense of gratification that we shall perceive that a goo
deal of what took place two centuries ago could not be repeated no

The materials for our study are singularly complete, and I doul
whether it would be possible to collect for any other Conclave a set
documents of greater authority than those a fortunate combinatio
of events has preserved in the case of Clement X. For we have n
only the official acts of the Conclave itself, and the reports of t
various ambassadors, but also a private correspondence of the highe
value. This consists of the letters exchanged between Cardin
Decio Azzolino (the younger), head and leader of the independe
party of the Holy College, and his intimate friend, Queen Christi
of Sweden. In a volume which I published in 1899 I have tried
give the outlines of the character of this celebrated daughter
Gustavus Adolphus. With all her faults and eccentricities, t
outcome of hereditary disposition and of irrational education, wit
all her errors, shortcomings, and failures, there is one great redeemi
feature in her career. She was capable of one strong affection in h
life, and of one only. From the moment when, at the age of twent
nine, she met Azzolino on her first coming to Rome, she felt herse
a woman more than a queen, and the affection which she laid at h
feet never varied for a moment until the day when, thirty-fo
years later, she died with her eyes still resting on his.

Do not let us sneer at this affection, friendship, or love, call it by whatever name you like, between a queen who had already her youth behind her, and a man who was not only in holy orders, but was also a prince of the Church. It may have been what the world is pleased to call a forbidden attachment, but it remains, nevertheless, the one feature in the life of these two personages which makes them anything else than ordinary self-seekers, and endows them with that touch of human nature which calls forth sympathy even after the lapse of centuries.

No stronger proof of the all-absorbing devotion of Christina to Azzolino can be found than the notes which she daily sends him during the four months of the Conclave. She seems to live for no other purpose than to second his interests and further his aims. She informs him of everything that takes place outside, she solicits his instructions and obeys his orders, gives hints and advice, often most usefully, and neglects not the smallest detail which she thinks may be of use to him. She has frequent interviews with the French Ambassador, the Duke de Chaulnes, and with Mgr. Zetina, the confidential agent of the Spanish Ambassador, the Marquess d'Astorga. She has numerous spies around Rome, intent on picking up every particle of news to be had in any quarter, particularly in what we would now call the *salon* of the famous Contestabilessa Colonna, the beautiful Maria Mancini, up till now her friend, but during the Conclave the representative of the influence opposed to Azzolino's, that of the Chigi party. On all these matters, exact and minute information is written down, ciphered, and at least once a day, often twice or thrice, forwarded through trusted messengers to the secluded cell of the Cardinal. And, in order to carry on this correspondence more safely, she transfers her head quarters from her palace in the Lungara to the palace inhabited by Azzolino himself in the Borgo Nuovo, now Palazzo Torlonia-Giraud, then the property of Don Lorenzo Colonna, but still generally known under the name of Palazzo d'Inghilterra. This house was situated within the quarter over which the Marshal of the Conclave established his sway, and messengers could therefore be sent from there without being obliged to show the medal-countersign required from those who approached the sacred precincts from the outside.

Then we have the notes sent from Azzolino to the queen, and the correspondence exchanged between Azzolino and his candidate for the tiara, Cardinal Vidoni, as well as the letters exchanged between him and the aforenamed Mgr. Zetina. These documents amount altogether to more than three hundred. Still, they are not complete. Had

all been preserved, the number would have been more than doubled. The Conclave lasted four months and ten days, and it was a pretty considerable amount of writing Cardinal Azzolino and his *conclavista* had to do in their cold and narrow little cells.

To complete this correspondence, we have the dispatches exchanged between the French Ambassador and his Court, the weekly reports of the Venetian Ambassador, Antonio Grimani, and a number of Spanish and Austrian documents.

Speaking before an audience like this, I need not go into any details about the general state of European politics at the time. Be it enough to remember that Louis XIV was then at the most successful period of his duel for supremacy with the House of Austria, which was to be the lifelong struggle of his reign. He had just concluded peace with Spain after the fortunate campaign in the Flanders, and was now seeking to undermine his great rival in Italy. We shall find that he misses no opportunity to try to convert the smaller Italian States of Savoy-Piedmont, Mantua, Parma, and Modena into as many French outposts, destined to counteract and combat the Austro-Spanish power in Milan and Naples, and its paramount influence in Tuscany. To this end he would also like to be able to look upon the sovereign of the Pontifical State as an ally, but above all he wants the moral victory of showing to the world that the making of the Pope lies with him, and that the coming successor of St. Peter must be content to receive the holy keys from his hand, as Sylvester did from Constantine and Adrian from Charlemagne. The authority of the Papacy over the French Church is an everlastingly pricking thorn in the sensitive flesh of the despotic monarch. He is the State, but within the State there is the Church —a Church which dares to acknowledge another power besides him, sometimes above him. What sweeter vengeance can there be than to lay it bare to every one that after all it is from him that power is derived! A Pope that will not prop up the already shaken power of the House of Austria, that will allow Parma and Modena to become valuable allies of the French King, should it even be at the expense of Peter's patrimony, a Pope that will dispense bulls and privileges and confer bishoprics and red hats at the King's behest —such is the dream of Louis XIV.

Far more modest and reasonable are the wishes of the House of Hapsburg, now represented by the infant King of Spain, Charles II, and by his mother, the Regent Queen Maria Anne of Austria. Spain holds the Hapsburg possessions in Italy, and tradition ordains that the Emperor should content himself with supporting Spain in its

relations with the Holy See, especially in regard to the Papal Election. True to this unwritten family compact the Emperor Leopold only demands a Pope strong and active enough to assist him in the ever threatening struggle with the young and aggressive Ottoman power. A strong Pope is also what Spain prays for It is seventeenth-century Spain, the Spain of which the intuition of genius allowed Victor Hugo to roughly sketch the outlines in 'Ruy Blas,' Spain tired after the superhuman exertion of its heroic age, struggling under the crushing weight of its own conquests, Spain hungry in the midst of treasure, poor in all her wealth, needing rest and peace and quiet, and looking to the Pope to resume once more his old position of the world's peacemaker and mediator. Spain does not pretend to make the Pope, nor does the Emperor, but they want a friendly Pope, and above all one that is not a puppet in the hands of France. Show is of less account to Spain than substance. Let Louis XIV have the glory, as he calls it, of making the Pope, it is enough for Spain that the Pope, once made, should be as friendly to the Catholic King as to the most Christian monarch

Venice follows the lead of Spain, and also prays for a Pope able to unite Christianity against the Turks, who have just taken Candia and are already threatening the last remaining bulwarks of Venetian dominion in the East. The other Catholic Powers hardly have any interests in the pontifical election beyond that of seeing a good, just, and wise man in the chair of St Peter. Portugal, intent on regularizing the position of King Pedro, follows in the wake of France, which took the initiative in bringing about his marriage. Poland is just recovering from the troubles of the election of Michael Koributt Wiecnowiecki, and Tuscany is in fact nothing but a feudal province of the Holy Roman Empire.

Of the rules of the Conclave it may be enough to remind you that its organic disposition had been settled by the Bull, *Aeterni Patris*, of Gregory XV (of November 15, 1621), and the ceremonial part by the Bull of the same Pope, *Decet Romanum Pontificem* (of March 12, 1622), both confirmed January 25, 1625, by Urban VIII's Bull, *Ad Romani Pontificis*. Two-thirds majority is required for the election, in which all cardinals duly nominated have the right to vote, even if they have not been formally installed by the ceremony known as *apertio oris*. There are no less than eight cardinals appointed only ten days before the death of Clement IX, and still wearing the insignia of their former lower rank. One of them, Emilio Altieri, is never to wear the red robes at all. It is he who is destined to receive the fisher's ring and confer the coveted hat on his colleagues.

At the election of Clement IX each party had got what it wanted, —show as well as substance. Clement—Giulio Rospigliosi as the world had called him—had in fact been the favourite candidate of Spain and France at one and the same time. Before the Conclave, Azzolino, alluding to his election, had assured the Spanish Ambassador that 'this time the Holy Ghost would wear the *golilla*[1],' and after the election the French Ambassador felt justified in writing to his sovereign—'Your Majesty makes the Pope in Rome as easily as the Provost of the merchants in Paris.' Clement desired in fact nothing better than to act with perfect justice towards both Spain and France, and he had a large part in establishing the peace between them. His great aim was to gather, like Pius II, all the forces of Christianity against the Turks. The relief of Candia and the stopping of the Moslem power on its westward march, these were the ideals he fought and lived for. And we may well say which he died for, as it was the news of the fall of Candia which gave the final blow to his already broken health. He died, after two and a half years' reign, on December 9, 1669, leaving the memory of one of the best Popes that ever adorned the Chair of St. Peter, of a good and just sovereign, of a far-seeing statesman, of a highly-cultured poet, musician, and scholar, and, above all, of a kind and unselfish man, whose life had amply realized his motto :—

'Alteris, non sibi, Clemens.'

The Conclave opened on December 20, after the completion of the *novendiali*, or nine days' funeral ceremonies, prescribed by the etiquette of the Roman Church. It had been foreseen for some time that it would be a long and difficult one, owing to the division between the chiefs of the parties or 'factions,' and to the want of great personalities amongst the candidates. Still, no one would have believed that the Conclave was going to last over four months.

To understand how this came about, a short review of the factions and of the candidates is necessary. The factions or batches of cardinals created by the same Pope were four. An unwritten law demanded that in the Conclave each faction should blindly and unconditionally follow the lead of the cardinal-nephew of the Pope who had created them, he becoming for the time their absolute ruler. Thus Cardinal Francesco Barberino was at the head of eight cardinals created by Urban VIII, Cardinal Flavio Chigi disposed of the votes of no less than twenty-four 'creatures' of Alexander VII, while Cardinal Giacomo Rospigliosi headed eight nominees of the late Pope Clement IX. The Cardinals appointed by Innocent X

[1] The characteristic Spanish collar

enjoyed greater liberty, this Pope not having left any cardinal-nephew, but they had found it in their interest to form a union, which was generally known as the Flying Squadron, because they followed the tactics of transferring their forces now to one, now to another side, as the interest of the Church—or their own—seemed to demand. The leader of this Squadron was Cardinal Azzolino, but he did not exercise the same despotic sway over his followers as did Barberino, Chigi, or Rospigliosi, and he was in fact only the executor of the decisions taken in the common council-room of the Squadronists. Besides, out of the twelve 'creatures' of Innocent X, only six [1] had bound themselves strictly to the organization of the Squadron. Of the remaining six, Ludovisi was a very lazy man, who objected so strongly to the physical discomforts of the Conclave, that it was only possible to get him into the Vatican for a few days. Cibo and Odescalchi (the future Innocent XI) were duty-loving, hard-working men, but of a rather independent turn of mind, and disposed to set religion before politics. The same was the case with Santa Croce and Spada, whose failing health also contributed to hold them aloof from the daily drudgery of the Conclave. As for Albizzi, the most eccentric and plain-spoken of the Holy College, he was in reality nothing but a pensioned informant of the French Court. The forces of the Squadron consisted thus of a minimum of six votes, which might sometimes attain to twelve.

Besides these so-called Papal factions, there were the French and the Spanish groups composed of the cardinals whom birth or interest had attached permanently to either Crown The French, of which d'Este was the nominal chief, numbered eight members; the Spanish, led by Cardinal Leopoldo de' Medici, ten. Of the French only five, and of the Spaniards seven, resided in Italy.

As soon as the news of the death of Clement IX reached the French Court—it took seven days—the King ordered his Ambassador, the Duke de Chaulnes, who had recently returned from Rome, to go back to his embassy. Chaulnes had already been there during the Conclave of Clement IX, and knew his business better than any man in Europe. The three cardinals residing in France received orders to join him. Cardinal Grimaldi, Archbishop of Aix, asked to be excused on account of his great age and the exceptional severity of the winter, but the two others promptly joined the Duke de Chaulnes. One was the already famous Cardinal de Retz, the other, Bouillon, a young man of twenty-five, as yet only known as the nephew of the great Turenne.

[1] Azzolino, Ottoboni, Imperiali, Gualtieri, Homodei, and Borromeo.

The tidings reached Madrid ten days later than Versailles, but there the Regency took things much easier. None of the three cardinals in Madrid, Aragona, Moncada or Porto Carrero, decided to move. No new instructions even were dispatched to the Marquess d'Astorga in Rome, simply an order to abide by the instructions given him for the previous Conclave in 1667.

These instructions were at first sight very simple. Spain professed no decided leanings against or for any particular candidate. Spain, in the language of the time, neither 'included' nor 'excluded.'

Some explanation of these terms may be necessary. To 'include' a candidate meant to vote for him and try to get him votes enough to reach the necessary majority of two-thirds—in short, to try to make him Pope.

To 'exclude' meant to refuse to vote for a candidate, and to work against him generally so as to render it impossible for him to get his two-thirds.

But besides this way of excluding, which is generally called the 'secret exclusion,' because it is not openly proclaimed, there is the 'formal exclusion.' This is a privilege claimed by the three great Catholic Powers, the Emperor, Spain, and France, to notify to the Holy College by means of their Ambassadors that the election of a particular candidate would not be agreeable. It is not a right recognized by any law of the Church, and a Pope elected against the veto of the Powers would still be canonically elected, but it is a privilege based on the brute fact of force. It is a warning given to the Holy College that the cardinals who persist in voting for a candidate who is objected to by any one of the above-named Powers would thereby incur the displeasure of a powerful monarch, and must be prepared to bear the consequences. This meant a good deal in former days: how much it would mean now I will leave you to judge.

To this general rule, neither to include nor to exclude, there were, however, exceptions. Spain could not accept any too decidedly French candidate, nor any one excluded by Spain during former Conclaves, and from whom therefore reprisals might be feared. This latter rule was pointed against Cardinal Brancaccio, one of the worthiest members of the Holy College, but who in his young days, when Bishop of Capaccio, had had trouble with the Viceroy of Naples, and therefore been excluded in the Conclaves of 1655 and 1667. It was, besides, a general rule of Spanish policy not to further the election of any cardinal belonging to the great families of its Italian dominions, in order not to have too powerful vassals to contend with in the person of the Pope's relations. This rule excluded the

Archbishop of Milan, Litta, and the Archbishop of Palermo, Visconti. So much for the exclusion. As to the inclusion, Cardinal d'Elci, who came of a family long devoted to Spanish interests, and Cardinal Vidoni, a personal friend of Cardinal d'Aragona, were especially agreeable to the Spanish Court

The French instructions were more explicit. France maintained the exclusion which she had already in the preceding Conclaves applied to Cardinal Barberino and Cardinal d'Elci, because they were considered too Spanish in their sympathies. These instructions mentioned three candidates as acceptable to France. Albizzi, Bonvisi, and Vidoni. Albizzi's name, however, only stood on the list for show. Mazarin, who had been his friend, had written his name there in 1655, and there it was left, although Louis XIV and his Ambassador well knew that Albizzi had not the slightest chance. In reality, it was not even intended to test his chances at the urns. Bonvisi and Vidoni were the real candidates. As second favourites Louis XIV mentioned Brancaccio, the very man objected to by Spain, and Cardinals Celsi, Carpegna, and Litta. Finally, the King ordered his Ambassador, as a proof of his veneration for the memory of the late Pope, to take care that the choice of the new Pontiff should be one agreeable to the nephew of Clement IX, Cardinal Rospigliosi.

And now let us take a look at the Papables, as those cardinals were called whose election was considered possible. What qualities did the cardinals desire to find in the new Pope? First of all, every one wished that the successful man should stand under some obligation to him, for which a reward might be claimed. Everybody wanted a share in what was called 'the glory of having made the Pope.' The ideal Pope for each head of a party was the man he individually could claim to have forced to the front. Should the same man be easily accepted by the other members of the Holy College, or even carried through by these, he became less desirable, as the glory and the profit of electing him would be divided. Next to a candidate of one's own make, if I may so call it, it was desirable to have an old man whose reign would not be long, or one of a weak and easily influenced disposition.

There were at present no such conspicuous figures in the Holy College as to limit the choice to a few only. It was in fact everybody's race, and any cardinal might aspire who was old enough—that is to say, at least sixty, though seventy was considered better still—and who had not received grave offences at the hands of any of his colleagues, for nothing could excite more fear and dread than the election of a candidate suspected of having personal offences to revenge.

To have offended others was not so very dangerous. That might be forgiven. But to have been offended—that was quite another matter. Those Cardinals who were willing to forget and forgive could not trust anybody else to do the same.

The pamphlets of the time name no less than twenty Papables. In the Barberino faction all the eight cardinals considered themselves on the list They were on an average the oldest in years, and, with the exception of Francesco Barberino himself, whom France objected to ever since the days of Mazarin, who had had cause to dislike him, and of Brancaccio, whom Spain would not have, there was nothing special against any of them. On the other hand, there was nothing special to recommend them. The candidates of this party who had to be seriously under consideration were Barberino's trusted friend Facchinetti, Carpegna, and Ginetti—the last one simply because he was over eighty, a fact which gave hopes of a short reign.

Of the Flying Squadron only one could be regarded as a candidate in full earnest—Odescalchi. He was a most pious, upright, true, and good man, but his austerity frightened many—and then, he was only fifty-eight. The other creatures of Innocent X were perhaps the ablest and brightest men of the Holy College, but just on that account they excited a good deal of envy, an eminently clerical passion, and having held office early in life they had had time to make strong enemies as well as strong friends. Azzolino himself was only forty-seven, and he was also the outgoing Secretary of State of the late Pope. One of these two qualities was already quite enough to exclude him.

The Chigi party with its twenty-four votes was the most powerful party, and its candidates in consequence the strongest. It was around them the great battles had to be fought. Its Papable candidates were four · d'Elci, Celsi, Bonvisi, and Vidoni.

D'Elci, of a noble Siennese family, was related to the Chigi's, and particularly agreeable to Cardinal Flavio He was also agreeable to Cardinal de' Medici, being a subject of the Grand Duke, whom his family had loyally served. He was seventy, and weak in health—two good points more in his favour.

Celsi was the best legal head in the College, but there had been a good deal to say about his morals, and there still was, in spite of his seventy years.

Bonvisi was one of the best loved men in the Church, somewhat younger than the other two, a very strong candidate, against whom it could, however, be urged that he had a nephew, Mgr. Francesco, who excited much distrust.

Cardinal Pietro Vidoni had perhaps the broadest experience and

capacity of all, having held high dignities, both abroad and at home. He was a man of high ambition and strong will, sixty years old. There was a good deal of talk about his morals, and he was unpopular with the Romans on account of his avarice and coarse language, but the chief objection against him was the antipathy of Cardinal de' Medici

In the Rospigliosi faction Bona, Nerli, and Altieri were considered eligible. Bona, however, was a monk, whose life had mostly been spent in the cloister, and monks have never been very popular with the Holy College. Nerli was a poor invalid, who had but few days left to live. Altieri was eighty, very deaf, and of rapidly failing memory. And yet he was to be the winner

The cardinals of the French and Spanish factions, the factions of the rival Crowns, were by common consent excluded from the election.

Summing up the chances, it would appear that Vidoni, who was the only cardinal who was at the same time put up by the strongest faction, the Chigi one, and accepted by both France and Spain, would have the best chance, and that the next best would be for Celsi or for Bonvisi, who were also put up by the same faction, favoured by France, and at least not opposed by Spain. But in the case of all three the old proverb about the Conclave was once more to come out true: 'Any one who enters it as Pope, goes out of it as cardinal.'

And now I must trouble you with some figures. Out of seventy cardinals sixty-five were present in Rome, but six were on an average absent on account of illness. The real voting strength of the Holy College could thus be put down at fifty-nine, requiring forty votes for inclusion and twenty for exclusion.

The Chigi party, which could command twenty-three votes, disposed completely of the *exclusion*, and no Pope could be elected against its solid vote. But to *include*, it needed an addition of seventeen votes.

The three other Papal factions could only muster: Barberino, seven; Innocent's nominees, ten; and Rospigliosi, eight; representing a total of twenty-five, if united. They also disposed of the exclusion, but to include they needed fifteen additional votes.

Now the factions of the two Crowns—France with five, Spain with six, in all, eleven—could not furnish to either side all the votes required. Supposing the two Crowns agreed to go with the Chigi party, this would still be short of six votes. If they went with the other three united, this would still lack four votes. To win the battle the Chigi party must have both Spain and France on its side, and besides win over six men from the other factions.

The three other factions must first unite themselves into one, then

win France and Spain, and finally get four men over from the Chigi faction—quite a difficult and puzzling task for the leader, in fact it did prove a hard nut to crack.

Cardinal Flavio Chigi was a pleasure-loving man, fond of society, of horses and dogs, sometimes even of books, but not much inclined to business. But in time of a Conclave his interest was forcibly aroused, and he exercised fully his privileges as hereditary chief of a powerful faction. He wanted a Pope out of his own set, the creatures of his uncle, Alexander VII, a Pope who would be obliged to him for the tiara, and one under whose reign he might safely enjoy the possession of his enormous wealth, and the sweetness of *dolce far niente*. His relative, old d'Elci, would suit him perfectly; Celsi, whom he regarded as a personal friend, also. They were his favourites, but he felt his followers would not be satisfied should he only present two out of twenty-three as Papables. He had therefore added two names more to his list: Bonvisi and Vidoni, the two generally acknowledged as the ablest men of his following. First, however, he meant to try d'Elci, and set out to secure for him the support of the two Crowns. He well knew that d'Elci had been opposed by France in the last Conclave as being too Spanish in his sympathies, but that did not discourage Chigi. To Paris he wrote, strongly urging Louis XIV and Lionne to drop their objections to d'Elci, and begging for the votes of the French cardinals and the assistance of the Ambassador. The negotiations with Spain were conducted verbally. He met Cardinal de' Medici, the chief of the Spanish faction, in Florence, and proposed an alliance, which Medici made no difficulty in accepting. To him the election of d'Elci, a Siennese, a born subject of the Grand Duke, could not but be agreeable. He shared Chigi's hopes that France would accept him, in which case there ought to be no difficulty in gaining over the few missing votes, and, in his eagerness to play a leading part in a Conclave, particularly tempting to him as a cardinal of very recent date, he accepted Chigi's whole list. He did not like Vidoni's name on it, but after all, Vidoni was only fourth choice, and he thought he held in his hands sufficient power, if necessary, to eliminate him from the contest.

The alliance established at Florence between Chigi and Medici was ratified in Rome by the Spanish Ambassador, Astorga, influenced by the head of the Spanish section of the Roman aristocracy, Don Lorenzo Colonna. Between the houses of Colonna and Chigi strong friendship subsisted—the ladies had much to do with it—and the centre of elegance formed around their beautiful princesses strongly

sympathized with good, kind d'Elci, or indulgent, jolly, old Celsi, both supposed to be more likely than anybody else to let Rome have a good time.

Chigi and Medici thought they had easy work before themselves. Together their factions numbered at least twenty-nine They hoped for the French votes, which would bring them up to thirty-four. A couple more ought not to be difficult to get hold of. It was only necessary to await the arrival of the French cardinals, which would be easy enough to obtain by a little dilatory practice, and in the meanwhile to look out for the necessary deserters. So sure did they feel of victory that they rather arrogantly proclaimed that they did not even want to consult the other chiefs of factions.

This statement of course gave bitter umbrage to the factions in question. It was gall and wormwood to Francesco Barberino, the venerable Dean of the Holy College, who hated Chigi as the man who three years before had thwarted his own election. And now this Chigi—a youngster of thirty-seven—simply wanted to ignore him! Rospigliosi also deeply resented the slight passed upon him, as, after all, he was the late Pope's nephew. At least his advice ought to have been asked. Azzolino and his Squadronists saw their opportunity. They assembled the malcontents, represented that isolated they could do nothing against Chigi and Medici—why not join forces? The advantage was obvious, and a league of their three factions was formed.

The conditions were the following. The three factions agreed to stand solid together against any Chigi or Medici candidate put up without their agreement In Conclave language they united themselves to exclude. But as to the *inclusion*, that is voting *for* any candidate with a view of putting the tiara on his head, they each reserved their liberty. The league was a mutual insurance society against Chigi, Medici & Co.—nothing else.

Now Azzolino and his friends of the Squadron had already during the lifetime of Clement IX favoured Cardinal Pietro Vidoni. What agreement had been passed between them has not been quite ascertained, but it seems probable that Vidoni had promised to maintain in power the outgoing ministers of the late Pope—Azzolino as Secretary of State and Ottoboni as Datary—and not to appoint any cardinal nephew over their heads. Something had already leaked out about this. In fact some cardinals of the Squadron, who were paying a visit to the Princess of Rossano at Frascati in October, had presented Vidoni to her as the future Pope, much to the disgust of Azzolino who did not like to show his hand prematurely. His

motto was in fact *Arcanum taciturnitatis est anima Conclavis*, and he earnestly requested his friend the Queen never to mention Vidoni at all, or, if she did, at least to belittle his chances. This Christina conscientiously tried to do, and when on the day of the opening of the Conclave she visited the cells of the cardinals, she took good care to enter the cell destined for Vidoni and to say loudly, 'This one is not Papable.' For this Vidoni expressed his thanks, but the stratagem deceived but few.

When Azzolino learned that Vidoni had been proposed by Chigi, he determined to try to force through his election. It would be to him Vidoni would be obliged for the tiara much more than to Chigi, who had only given him fourth place on his list. To carry him through it would be necessary to ruin the chances of the three who preceded Vidoni on that list, and that he could do by using against them the twenty-five excluding votes of the Triple League. Afterwards he would have to persuade his colleagues of the League, Barberino and Rospigliosi, to vote for Vidoni. That would perhaps not be so easy, as they would prefer some of their own set. Therefore he wished them to lose every hope of seeing one of their own men victorious before he asked them to vote for Vidoni. His tactics were to use the Triple League to exclude all the Chigi candidates except Vidoni, and the Chigi party to exclude the candidates of his own confederates in the League. When the field had been cleared of them, he would bring forward Vidoni as the only remaining man and the saviour out of all trouble.

The effects of the conclusion of the Triple League showed themselves at once. Chigi and Medici having sent out their henchmen, Corsini and Pio, to sound the minds of their colleagues as to d'Elci and Celsi—that was called *fare la pratica*—they met with a decided refusal to accept them. They perceived that they risked to have the twenty-five votes of the Triple League against them, and they did not even try to bring their candidates to a vote for fear they would be left in a minority that would show them up as hopeless. In fact the lists of the *scrutinii* showed a perfect mosaic of names. D'Elci once, but once only, received twelve votes, and Celsi never even reached two figures. Old Francesco Barberino generally headed the lists with fifteen to twenty votes, and once he reached twenty-five, but it was clear to every one that these votes did not mean to make him Pope, but were intended simply as a warning that no Pope could be made without his consent.

Chigi and Medici soon understood that against this Triple League their twenty-nine votes could do nothing, but they hoped and

declared that the advent of the French, which was daily expected, would change the situation. Not only would the French bring them five or six votes, but they might also, so Chigi hoped, use their influence to detach Cardinal Rospigliosi, who was under obligations to Louis XIV, and his followers from the Triple League. Then victory would be assured.

But now came a difficulty from an unexpected quarter. It dawned upon the Spanish Ambassador that these tactics were nothing but a public proclamation that the making of the Pope lay with France Here was Medici, the head of the Spanish cardinals, openly allied to the strongest faction in the Conclave, the Chigi's, and yet compelled to await the arrival and the good will of the French. And why? Simply because they had put up two men, d'Elci and Celsi, in a manner offensive to the rest of the Holy College. Astorga now remembered that he had received valuable assistance from Azzolino and the Flying Squadron during the Conclave of 1667. If they would assist him again, they could unite with Chigi and Medici on some other suitable candidate. He did not care about d'Elci or Celsi. Let them take anybody else out of the Chigi candidates—Bonvisi or Vidoni for instance—and they could snap their fingers at the French. The glory of the election would be Spain's.

Astorga, for reasons of etiquette, did not like to visit Queen Christina, but he well knew that she was in constant communication with Azzolino, and, as he could not reach the latter, he sent the Spanish *Uditore di Ruota*, Mgr. Zetina, to the Queen to propose an alliance. This was in the first days of January, 1670, the 5th I think.

And here may I open a parenthesis? The weather had been very cold and damp. Many cardinals had suffered from influenza in their unheated cells, and Azzolino himself had been quite unwell for some days. But on the 5th he wrote to the Queen to say he was getting better. Quite a commonplace letter at first sight, but on the top stood the letters S.M. I confess that at first sight I did not pay much attention to these initials, which I supposed meant Sua Maestà, nor to the fact that they were missing on the preceding notes.

But hear what effect they had on the Queen. She answers :—

'Je crois, sans m'efforcer beaucoup à vous exprimer ma joie, que vous serez persuadé de celle que j'ai ressentie en vous sentant guéri. Cette heureuse nouvelle m'a rendu la vie, mais pour la conserver il faut qu'elle continue de m'apprendre demain votre entier rétablissement.

'Mais par quelle heureuse influence m'avez vous rendu les glorieuses marques de ma félicité passée? Est-ce que je me trompe et les lettres de "S.M." ne signifient-elles plus ce qu'elles signifiaient autre-

fois? Si je pouvais vous faire imaginer la joie que leur vue m'a donnée, vous me jugeriez en quelque façon digne de ce titre, que je préfère à celui de Reine de l'Univers Mais je dois en être indigne, puisque vous me l'avez ôté. Faites ce qu'il vous plaira, je suis d'une manière à vous que vous ne pourrez sans une injustice et une cruauté effroyable douter que le "S.M." me soit dû.'

And then she goes on to relate the proposal of alliance made by Zetina on Astorga's behalf. We may be tempted to smile at this display of sentiment. What were a couple of initials in comparison with the great questions at issue? And yet there has been, I dare say, for most of us a time when the magic charm of some mysterious A.B. or R.S. has been more to our hearts than all the thrones of the world. Let those who have never experienced this power be the only ones to blame Queen Christina.

Azzolino's answer is very cool. He simply scolds the Queen for having mixed up 'extraneous matter' in a business letter and made it impossible to show it to his friends And he never more writes the precious initials on any note during the rest of the Conclave. I am happy to say they reappear afterwards, and in the last days of his and the Queen's life—he only survived her a few weeks—they seldom are missing.

On the whole Astorga's proposal was a godsend to him. It is true he had already offered his services to Louis XIV, and Christina had in the foregoing November made an agreement for him with Bourlemont, the French Chargé d'Affaires, that they would act in perfect harmony and have no secrets from each other. Bourlemont, in repeating this to his King, had prudently remarked that these were only fine words, but he had replied in the same way, and the Squadron and the French Court had pledged themselves to be close friends and allies.

This compact, however, did not prevent Azzolino from at once accepting Astorga's advance. 'France was the very plague of the Church,' he wrote, 'and Spain its only protection.' Why now wait for the French and give them the glory of showing to the world that they were making the Pope? Better strike at once. He accepted the candidature of Vidoni, which Astorga himself proposed, and bound himself to work for him. That Vidoni was his own choice he did not think necessary to mention.

It might now appear as if there ought to have been plain sailing for Vidoni's election. If Astorga could order the Spanish faction and their Chigi allies to vote for him, and Azzolino could bring his friends around to him, the matter would indeed have ended with a practi-

cally unanimous vote, even before the arrival of the French Ambassador who, besides, as we have seen, also had orders to favour Vidoni. But first, Astorga, though he professed to order about the Spanish cardinals at his wish, had but little power over them. They were an undisciplined lot. Astorga came day after day to give his so-called orders at the door of the Conclave, but Medici and his lieutenants Pio and Visconti acted and voted very much as they pleased. Medici did not like Vidoni, frankly said so, and went about telling everybody that the Court of Madrid did not care for him.

And then Azzolino was not satisfied with Astorga plainly and simply ordering his cardinals to vote for Vidoni. His own friend Barberino would perhaps object to such an order being given, as it would rob all the old cardinals of his own faction of every hope. No, the thing must be done in a more roundabout way. The *modus operandi* was first to put up every other possible candidate, work against them secretly and vote against them openly, and when the field had been cleared, then to bring forward Vidoni as the only remaining possibility.

Astorga might well be forgiven if he thought the scheme a little too complicated. And Medici of course was delighted to say it was impossible to execute. No wonder. Vidoni was to be helped along, Azzolino asked, not directly and openly, but by ruining all the others! It would have been a difficult task to accomplish for a friend. To do it for one who was not more liked by Medici than Vidoni—simply became an impossibility. Medici tried to suggest Bonvisi instead of Vidoni, but Azzolino at once sent word to Astorga that Bonvisi was France's first choice and had two nephews in the French service. His election could not be for the Spanish King's service. Thus baulked, Medici and Chigi fell back once more on d'Elci and Celsi, and their hopes of French help.

The Duke de Chaulnes and the Cardinals de Retz and Bouillon arrived in Rome on January 16. Chaulnes found the situation a little different from what he had expected. Nothing was known in Paris about the union of Chigi with Spain and Medici, nor of the Triple League of defence erected against them by Barberino, Azzolino, and Rospigliosi. The latter cardinal was in high favour at Versailles as being the nephew of the good Clement IX, whom Louis XIV loved to call his Pope. Chaulnes had orders to act in concert with both Rospigliosi and Chigi, who had made strong offers of service, but especially to favour Rospigliosi. And now he found them in opposite camps. There was an end to his happy dream of returning to Paris in a few weeks with a Pope easily elected by the union of the Chigi

and Rospigliosi factions with France. He, moreover, found that Chigi still clung to the hopes of converting him to d'Elci, the man he had already refused to hear of three years before. Celsi he soon learnt would be rejected by the majority of the Holy College, on account of his past and fast reputation. Happily there were Bonvisi and Vidoni left to try. But ill luck would have it that Cardinal Rospigliosi and Bonvisi's nephew, Mgr. Francesco, had once had a quarrel over a trifle and were now enemies. Rospigliosi sent word to Chaulnes beseeching him not to assist Bonvisi. Besides, Barberino was violently opposed to Bonvisi, who, some twenty years before, had been one of the commissioners appointed by Innocent X to inquire into the management of public monies by the Barberino cardinals. Vidoni after all seemed to have the best chance, and Chaulnes made up his mind to try either him or Bonvisi, whichever might appear most feasible. Rospigliosi and Barberino might perhaps be made to drop their objections to the latter.

Thus the French and Spanish Ambassadors both favoured the election of Vidoni. Had they frankly said so, there might have been an end of the matter. Their two factions united with Chigi on one side and Azzolino on the other, would have had more than the forty votes necessary for the election. But Chaulnes and Astorga studiously avoided visiting each other at all, and plain speaking was out of the question in those days. Each one tried to conceal his intentions from the other—that was then the very *acme* of diplomacy—and so well did they succeed that they were not aware that their interests centred around the same man until it was too late. And thus days and weeks were lost in a game of hide and seek.

But first of all Chaulnes must eliminate d'Elci, and as Chigi, though he had repeatedly promised not to urge any candidate without the consent of Louis XIV, still tried to bring him forward, Chaulnes had nothing left but to formally declare that this choice was not agreeable. The message of formal exclusion was delivered on February 10 by Cardinal d'Este to Chigi, and by Retz to Medici. Chigi felt the blow, but said nothing. But Medici lost his temper.

'What!' he exclaimed, 'you exclude d'Elci? Very well, then we will exclude Vidoni, for I can tell you that the Queen of Spain would rather burn down the whole Conclave than see Vidoni elected.'

Retz shrugged his shoulders and replied that he did not care much about Vidoni. But he immediately told his friend Azzolino, who wrote to Queen Christina, who sent for Mgr. Zetina. And through him she demanded an explanation from Astorga of Medici's words. Had not Astorga himself proposed an alliance with Azzolino, and had

they not agreed that Vidoni was the man? How could then Medici pretend that Vidoni was excluded by Spain? Astorga went to the Conclave to reprove Medici for having compromised the Spanish Court and ordered him to retract. Medici found that he had gone too far, but this is the way in which he made the retractation. He went to Retz and said —

'Is it true that you have repeated that I said the Queen would rather see the Conclave burned than Vidoni elected?'

'Certainly,' replied Retz. 'I have said so. When the head of the Spanish faction makes a declaration like this to me, a cardinal of the French faction, it is my duty and my right to repeat it to those I think ought to know it.'

'You are a gentleman,' replied Medici. 'These priests would have beaten around the bush, and answered, "Yes," "No," "I have not said," "I may have said," and so on. But let me explain I did not mean to say that the Queen of Spain would rather see the Conclave burnt than Vidoni elected, but that the Queen of Sweden would burn down the Conclave if Vidoni was not elected.'

This explanation of Medici did not convince Retz. Still, he made believe to take it for good, and the matter was allowed to drop. Alas, poor Cardinal Vidoni's chances got dropped at the same time. Medici's declaration against him, though unwarranted, had given the whole Conclave a strong impression that Vidoni would at any rate not be very agreeable to Spain, even if he was not formally excluded. And to Medici himself it now became a matter of the utmost importance to prevent the election of a man from whom revenge might well be feared. He had no difficulty in persuading Chigi to join him against Vidoni. Chigi's friends, the Colonna family, had taken a great pleasure in having the epigrams from the famous Pasquino read aloud at evenings in their homes. There were a great many against Vidoni, and these had been particularly relished because Vidoni was considered the most dangerous rival of Bonvisi, whom the Colonnas favoured next after d'Elci Don Lorenzo Colonna, fearing reprisals if Vidoni should be elected, besought Astorga and Chigi to put him aside. Nor was Chigi loath to be talked over. He had, it is true, given Vidoni fourth place on his list of candidates, but he had hardly expected that he ever would have to run him seriously for a winning race. Moreover, he had begun to suspect the relations of Vidoni with the Squadron, and that altered his position considerably. He desired Vidoni's election as long as he thought that he alone would be his great elector. If he had to share that glory with Azzolino and his Squadron, Vidoni became less, nay not at all, desirable. He had

once sent his cousin Sigismondo to ask Vidoni if it was true he had allied himself to the Squadronists, whom Chigi considered his personal antagonists, and Sigismondo had received an explicit denial. At the same time Chigi had been informed that an exchange of notes took place every night between Vidoni and Azzolino. Naturally this increased his suspicion. Azzolino, who had his spies in the Chigi camp, soon got informed of this, and his fertile mind imagined a plot to bring Chigi round. He wrote a note to Queen Christina, saying that all his efforts for Vidoni were mere show, that he made believe to favour him simply to excite suspicions against him and ruin all his chances. In fact, Vidoni was his enemy and the last man he wanted. This note Azzolino managed, on February 25, to drop in the Loggia when a servant of Chigi was passing. It was picked up and carried to Chigi. But the ruse was too thin and deceived no one. Chigi now joined Medici in praying Astorga not to interfere any more in favour of Vidoni, and the Ambassador was soon brought round He announced to the Spanish faction that, although Vidoni was not excluded, he wished, as his words were, that 'there should be no more talk about him.'

This definitely shelved Vidoni. Still, Azzolino and Christina did not give up their hopes about him, and for two months more they continued to work faithfully for their friend, intriguing against all others in the hope that finally his turn would come again Their fury against Astorga knew no bounds. Christina had used to call him a contemplative fool. Now he was an infamous traitor. Christina went so far as to accuse him of having received from Chigi a *pagarò* or cheque of 11,000 scudi (£2,200).

Azzolino took his best ink and wrote to the Nuntius in Madrid, Mgr. Borromeo, to complain of Astorga's manner of managing 'the service of God and of the King,' but he knew it would take five weeks before the new decisive orders he asked for could reach Rome, and he accordingly prepared to see the Conclave protracted into April. In the meanwhile the Court of Madrid had already been informed from other quarters of Astorga's hesitating behaviour, and had decided that Cardinal Porto Carrero should go to Rome to see that Spain's interests were not sacrificed to those of Chigi and Medici. Porto Carrero had set out on his voyage in the middle of February while the intrigues for and against Vidoni were being carried on in Rome.

Now came Bonvisi's turn to run the gauntlet. Azzolino was more afraid of him than of anybody else as a rival to Vidoni, and he was rather frightened at being informed by Christina of the frequent visits the French Ambassador paid in the Colonna house. The Queen

had written that the beautiful princess and her handsome sister, the famous Hortense, Duchess de Mazarin, of irresistible fame, laid themselves out to captivate his Grace. Hortense had shown herself to Chaulnes dressed as a slave, which evidently meant rather scanty attire! Was not that a scheme to win him for Bonvisi? Azzolino did not trust French Ambassadors in company with pretty duchesses dressed as slaves. Christina tried to tranquillize him. He ought to know that Frenchmen could not live without women's company. And poor Chaulnes was so bored in Rome that the two handsome sisters and their gay house was a godsend to him. But he knew perfectly well how to keep play and business apart, and when he wanted the latter he went to the Queen. As for Bonvisi, there was no question, she felt sure, of putting him forward. At least not just now.

The Queen was right. A stronger attempt than that of the seductive Hortense de Mazarin had been made on Chaulnes (in the last days of February) and failed. The Venetian Ambassador, Antonio Grimani, proposed, what at first sight seemed very reasonable, that Astorga, Chaulnes, and he should together select a candidate and then go together to the Conclave and beg the cardinals to elect him. He suggested Bonvisi. Astorga at once consented. He knew Chigi and Medici would be pleased, and he himself rather liked Mgr Bonvisi, who would be cardinal-nephew if his uncle was elected. But Chaulnes refused to join forces. The plan had been first proposed to and accepted by the Spanish Ambassador before it came to him. This might give the plot an appearance of a Spanish success. Anyhow, the glory of having invented it would not be for him and France, and that was quite enough. Besides, he knew that Bonvisi's election would be a fearful blow to Cardinal Rospigliosi, for whom he had his King's orders to have special regard. Then he calculated that, even with the votes of Spain and France added to those of which Chigi and Medici disposed, Bonvisi would still be a few votes short of the forty required. And to risk a defeat, he was most unwilling. Notwithstanding Chaulnes' refusal, an attempt was made to force Bonvisi through, and on March 5 the rumour spread inside and outside the Conclave that he was to be elected. But Chaulnes persisted in not ordering the French cardinals to vote for him and Bonvisi fell under the joint blows of the Triple League. He only received a few votes at the urns. To accentuate his defeat and their own united power, Rospigliosi and his friends Azzolino and Barberino a few days later organized a *sparata* in collecting together thirty-three votes on the head of Rospigliosi, the highest number ever attained during the Conclave. The details of this

incident, however interesting they might be, I am afraid time would not now allow me to enter into

All the four candidates originally proposed by Chigi were thus disposed of, and general uncertainty again prevailed. The problem seemed to be not so much, 'Whom shall we next elect?' but 'Whom shall we defeat?' It did not help much that Chigi and Medici got in some new supplies of excellent wine to which they treated their friends. Poor Vidoni, who sat abandoned in his cell, wrote indignantly to Azzolino asking what the Protestants, who always criticized everything in Rome, would say if they knew of these wine-bibbings in the cells of the Conclave.

Another candidate was ultimately found. It was good and pious Odescalchi, and it was Astorga who first had the idea to propose him. He suggested his name to the Squadronists, but Azzolino, still true to Vidoni, would not agree. Astorga had better luck with Chigi, who readily accepted the proposal. Odescalchi had taken part in no intrigues, he had no enemies, he was supposed to be equally acceptable to France and Spain, why not take him and get out of this Conclave which had now lasted two months and a half? In a few days the idea had gained ground amongst the cardinals, and the thing seemed nearly assured, when all of a sudden everything fell to the ground. The French cardinals had not yet been advised of what was going on; the *entente* with them had been put off to the last, as the other cardinals not unnaturally wished to show that for once they could help themselves. As it happened, this little detail had quite unforeseen results.

Retz had got wind of the business, and, meeting Odescalchi, addressed him in a congratulatory way. He had no reason to be dissatisfied with any attempt in favour of Odescalchi, even if he did not consider his chances very important, for Odescalchi had hitherto been rather in favour than otherwise with the French.

Azzolino's spies soon reported the matter to him. Odescalchi, it is true, belonged to the same faction as Azzolino, but the latter did not at all relish the idea that Odescalchi should be elected without he himself having done anything to earn the new Pope's gratitude. But better late than never, he thought. So he sat down on the evening of March 18, and wrote a note to Odescalchi, saying that he had been working for him secretly all the while, and that it was he who had persuaded Retz, the chief French cardinal, to congratulate him. He sent a messenger with it to Odescalchi's cell, which was at the other end of the Vatican, close to that of Bouillon. Odescalchi's *conclavista* received the note, which bore no address,

but hearing it was from Azzolino who had never before written to his master, nor been to visit him, he concluded there must be a mistake. So he went and handed it to Bouillon, with whom he knew Azzolino to be intimate.

Imagine Bouillon's surprise at reading that Azzolino, who professed to do nothing without consulting the French, had been trying to start a Pope behind their back. He showed it to Retz, who was more surprised still, as Azzolino had never said a word to him either. The note was at once sent to the French Ambassador. At the same time Chaulnes learnt that Astorga had just been to the Conclave to recommend Odescalchi, and that he had also paid a visit to Queen Christina to ask her to influence the Squadronists for him.

Here was a pretty mess. Azzolino and his friends, who had promised to act in harmony with the French, were starting a new candidate without even letting them know, and were lying about it too. If Odescalchi was elected in this way, it would all be Spain's doing, and Chaulnes and Louis XIV would have had no part but that of onlookers in the whole business. That would never do. Even an Archangel should not be made Pope unless by the grace of France. Chaulnes at once sent word to the French cardinals and the Squadronists that he felt himself offended by the efforts made for Odescalchi, and asked them to stop. That was enough. The Rospigliosi and Barberino factions went with the Squadronists, and Odescalchi's chances were over. Such were the ideas of the time about straightforward proceedings. Still, no one, I am bound to say, was very much shocked; though Chaulnes' interview with the Queen next day was not altogether pleasant.

It has been said and repeated that the French Ambassador pronounced a formal exclusion against Odescalchi on behalf of Louis XIV, but this is not exact. He did no more than has just been stated, and he writes himself about it in the following terms[1]:—

'Je suis pourtant resté ainsi que j'en ai rendu compte à V.M., c'est-à-dire sans exclusion contre le dit Cardinal, son affaire s'étant facilement détruite d'elle-même, parce que hors trois ou quatre cardinaux personne ne le voulait.'

Precious time had been lost, but no one felt eager to take up the battle, as no one was sure of victory. Azzolino and Christina were glad of any delay, as they were counting on the arrival from Spain of Porto Carrero, who they hoped might turn the tables in favour of Vidoni. Besides Easter was approaching and by common consent a sort of armistice was established during Holy Week.

[1] Chaulnes to Louis XIV, 15 avril, 1670.

But the Governments of Europe and the people of Rome were not pleased with the delay. The Turks were again threatening, and the Emperor and Venice both wrote to their Ambassadors to urge the Holy College to come to a decision. The poor Romans could do nothing but grumble and give vent to their discontent in satirical verses and other jokes. The gardener of the Villa Medici named two new varieties of anemones, the fashionable flower of the time, *Sede Vacante* and *Conclave Arrabiato.*

Christina and Azzolino had always been much given to astrology. They now had the horoscopes of the leading cardinals calculated and consulted their male and female 'mathematicians' and astronomers about them. They had the pleasure to find that April would be favourable to their friend Vidoni. We are rather apt to make fun of the passion for astrology, then so strong even amongst the most highly cultured people. Let us remember that a hundred years had not yet elapsed since Giordano Bruno first affirmed the endlessness of space. The people of the seventeenth century still lived under the impression that this poor planet was the one important place in the universe, and that the stars existed for the benefit of the earth. And, in the constant struggle that popular fancy supposed was going on between the forces of God and those of the Devil, the stars were considered to be out of the reach of the latter, and therefore friendly to man. The contemplation of the celestial vault was to our forefathers a pleasure which we can hardly understand. The stars were set there by God for them, to assist them and enlighten them. Astrology was one of the great consolations of mankind—and of such there are not too many.

Another characteristic of the times may be gathered from the following extract from a letter the Queen wrote to Azzolino on April 15.—

'Au nom de Dieu ne mangez jamais rien de ce qu'on vous régale. J'ai su qu'Imperiali s'est trouvé mal pour avoir mangé quelque chose qui lui a été envoyé du Cardinal Delfino. Je crois que ce n'était rien de mauvais, mais profitez de l'avis que Dieu vous a donné et promettez-moi de ne manger ni boire jamais rien de ce qu'on vous envoye. Donnez-moi cette satisfaction pour mon repos, de me le promettre. La rage et l'envie qu'on a contre vous est fort grande, et il faut tout soupçonner de gens qui ne témoignent que trop d'être destitués et de l'honneur et de conscience. Pardonnez la faiblesse de ma crainte à une Amitié, que tous les accidents du monde ne peuvent ni changer, ni affaiblir ou diminuer.'

I must pass rather rapidly over what happened in the beginning of April. Brancaccio's name was brought forward, and Astorga

at first seemed to be quite willing to forget that he had ever been excluded by Spain. But this was mere coquetry, and when it began to look as if the cardinals were running him in dead earnest, he threw away the mask, and even went so far, if Chaulnes can be believed, to threaten that, if Brancaccio was not abandoned, a Spanish battalion from Naples would soon be seen at the gates of Rome. Let me add at once, however, that Chaulnes is not an altogether unexceptionable authority as to Astorga's sayings or doings. His own ideas about the connexion between truthfulness and diplomacy may be gathered from what he wrote to Christina on April 16, about a visit he had just paid his Spanish colleague

'Cette visite s'est passée, Madame, comme elles se passent ordinairement entre les ambassadeurs, c'est-à-dire à qui mentira le plus.'

The long expected Porto Carrero finally arrived in Rome on April 19, and he brought with him an explicit declaration from the court of Madrid that, not only had there never been any exclusion against Vidoni, but that he was, on the contrary, one of the candidates whose election would be especially agreeable to Spain. This Astorga was now ordered to communicate officially to the Conclave. Azzolino and Christina were of course delighted, but that very circumstance which seemed to make their hopes a reality crushed them for ever.

Chigi and Medici not unnaturally feared retaliation from a man against whom they had so long been intriguing. Any humiliation rather than that risk. They openly rebelled against Astorga, and declared they would be guided only by their conscience and by the service of God. No mention this time of the King of Spain. They went to their antagonists, Barberino and Rospigliosi, and made a complete surrender. They would take any one out of their creatures rather than run the risk of having to accept Vidoni. The French cardinals were at once consulted so as to avoid any repetition of the Odescalchi affair, and they requested that one of the Rospigliosi faction should be taken, as Louis XIV's orders were to favour that cardinal. Finally, Altieri was selected. The old man had never been considered very clever. He had been the Nuncio at Naples during the Masaniello affair, and, like so many other unsuccessful diplomatists, he had been transplanted into court life, and spent his last years as the Pope's *Maestro di Camera*, or Court Steward, far away from serious business. Under the circumstances these were as many points in his favour. A long pontificate was not to be dreaded, and everybody might hope to influence him in his direction.

The French and Rospigliosi considered it a victory to get as Pope one of the French king's favourite section; Barberino was glad to see a Pope who was older than himself, and Chigi rejoiced at thinking that Altieri's nephew, Cardinal Paluzzi, who would be the new Prime Minister, belonged to his faction, and would leave him in undisturbed possession of his wealth and influence.

Azzolino was not informed of what was going on. That was the revenge of the French for his double dealings in the Odescalchi affair. Spain was also kept outside. This was Medici's answer to the objectionable orders Porto Carrero had brought from Madrid.

The greatest resistance came from Altieri himself. When on April 28, the cardinals began to flock to his cell, and the heads of the factions informed him that they had agreed to elect him, he begged, cried and implored to be relieved from the burden. 'Why do you not take him?' he cried, pointing to Brancaccio, 'he is the worthiest' But it was of no avail, and with mild violence he was carried to the Sistine Chapel where the solemn vote took place. On April 29, 1670, Altieri was elected by fifty-seven votes out of fifty-nine. It was generally believed that the two votes which were not given to him were those of Azzolino and Ottoboni. But of this there is, thus far, no evidence.

To Christina and Azzolino this result was of course a great disappointment. Altieri had certain obligations to both of them, but after all they had had no hand in his exaltation. Nevertheless, Christina was the very first to enter the Conclave as soon as the barriers were removed. Chaulnes was the first of the Ambassadors to arrive, and he was very glad to find that his rival Astorga did not get to know anything of what was going on until two hours after everything was over.

The Venetian Ambassador wrote home that the fact of a few hours having been sufficient to bring together so many discordant spirits compelled one to acknowledge the interference and assistance of the Holy Ghost. May be, for certainly this result does not do much credit to human wisdom.

As it turned out, Spain got what it had feared most—a decrepit Pope. France, in spite of the triumph Chaulnes claimed to have won, soon found that under the new reign and the new Cardinal Patron the Holy See was more difficult to manage than ever. And yet there had been one man, Vidoni, whom the chief factions and the two Crowns had from the start considered a desirable subject, and who had been left in the lurch simply because none of the interested would divide with the others the 'glory' of making him

Pope, and because frank explanations were not supposed to be possible between opposing parties. In our days Astorga, Chaulnes, Chigi and Azzolino would have settled everything in a few conversations, as they all had his name on their lists, and we may well think diplomacy has made some progress since the time when the meetings of Ambassadors were a competition 'à qui mentira le plus.'

And as to Azzolino, his over-great shrewdness tells us a lesson, the same as that of the celebrated fable of the French poet, *The Fox and the Cat*.—

> 'Le trop d'expédients peut gâter une affaire,
> On perd du temps au choix, on tente, on veut tout faire
> N'en ayons qu'un, mais qu'il soit bon.'

THE PICTOGRAPHIC AND LINEAR SCRIPTS

OF

MINÔAN CRETE AND THEIR RELATIONS

By ARTHUR J. EVANS

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read November 25, 1903.

Mr. Evans briefly traced the earlier stages in the evolution of an indigenous system of writing in Crete as brought out by his researches from 1893 onwards Finally, in 1900, his discovery of the clay in archives in the prehistoric Palace of Knossos had supplied conclusive evidence of the existence of both a semi-pictorial and a linearized system of writing, of a highly developed kind. The relations of the two scripts, however, had remained obscure, as, owing to the circumstances under which the tablets of the pictographic class were first discovered, there was no proof that the two styles were not contemporary. The recent exploration of strata below the later floor-levels now showed that the pictographic inscriptions really belonged to an earlier Palace belonging to the 'Middle Minôan Period' and already displaying a high civilization together with indications of contact with XIIth Dynasty Egypt (c. 2800-2200 B.C.). Mr. Evans was also able to establish various new facts with regard to this conventionalized pictographic script. The numerals, like those of the later, linear script, proved to belong to the decimal system. It was also possible to trace the order of the writing in many cases.

What seemed to have been a dynastic revolution destroyed the earlier Palace about the close of the third Millennium B.C. In the later Palace, which came down to about 1500, a new, linear system of writing is found established. In what relation did this stand to the earlier quasi-pictorial class? The most recent excavations had now produced new comparative material of the highest interest. It appeared that the later Palace itself was divided by some internal disturbance, probably involving some change of government, into two distinct periods. Chambers and repositories were found below

the later floors of this Palace, which belonged to an earlier period in its history. The most important of these repositories, containing relics from a Sanctuary, the central cult-object of which seems to have been a marble cross, also presented clay tablets and sealings with inscriptions in a form of linear script in several respects divergent from that of the latest Palace Period. In certain respects, as in the form of the tablets, the numerals, and some characters, a greater approach to the pictographic types was visible. It did not, however, wholly represent an anterior stage of linear writing, since some signs common to this and the other class appeared in a somewhat more advanced form. It was therefore to be regarded as a parallel and alternative script replaced by the other owing to a dynastic change. It further appeared that this script answered to that of inscriptions brought to light by the Italian Mission in the small Palace or royal villa of Hagia Triada, in this and the preceding year, as well as of an inscription found by the British School at Palaeokastro. The two linear systems had a large element in common, and together revealed a considerable indebtedness to the earlier pictographic signary. The identity of certain sign-groups, moreover, showed that the language of the two was essentially the same.

The linear tablets of the latest Palace Period were much more abundant—about 1600 having now been discovered. Besides inventories of precious vases, ingots, chariots and horses, arms and other possessions, the meaning of which was partly made clear by pictorial illustrations, there were other clay documents which might prove to be deeds or public records. Ink-written inscriptions on vases were also found, pointing to the former existence of writings on papyrus or other perishable materials. Very important were long lists of men and women giving what must certainly be regarded as personal names with the 'man' or 'woman' sign attached to each. A comparative study of these names enabled Mr. Evans to trace the existence of male and female terminations and of changing suffixes, as well as of compound formations of a similar type to the Indo-Germanic. Both linear scripts were provided with a decimal numeration, including signs up to 10,000, and tablets dealing in percentages further showed its prevalence. Most signs seemed capable of an ideographic as well as syllabic or possibly, in cases, alphabetic usage. The artificial variations in certain signs, to supply different nuances of sound or meaning, betrayed the grammarian's hand.

Among the conclusions that might be deduced from the evidence of the different forms of script were: 1. Its indigenous developement. 2. Unity of language in Minôan Crete going back to a remote period

and probably corresponding to the Eteocretan language found later, in a Greek guise, at Praesos. 3. Consequently, an ethnography altogether different from that of the Homeric tradition which included Achaeans, Dorians and Pelasgians, as well as the Eteocretan element. 4. Clear evidence that the language was not Semitic.

In conclusion, Mr. Evans pointed out the parallels existing with signs of the Cypriote Syllabary and the suggestive correspondence of many characters with the probable prototypes of Phoenician letters.

THE EVIDENCE OF GREEK PAPYRI WITH REGARD TO TEXTUAL CRITICISM

By F. G. KENYON

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Read January 27, 1904

The object of this paper is to bring together the materials which up to now have been provided by the Greek papyri discovered in Egypt on the subject of the textual criticism of the classical authors; to see what extent of evidence is now available on this topic, and to consider what bearing this evidence has, either on the actual state of our classical texts or on the methods which should be employed in editing them. The results of such an inquiry will, of course, need revision from time to time, as the mass of our materials increases; but already there is sufficient evidence extant to form a reasonable basis for induction, and to wait until all discoveries have been exhausted would be to emulate the behaviour of Horace's rustic. A future generation may have more ample means for forming its opinions, but that does not exempt us from the duty of forming an opinion to-day, and of coming to provisional conclusions on the evidence which is ready to our hand.

The evidence consists of a multitude of small details, which it would be impossible to enumerate at length, and which relate to a number of different authors; but it may be possible to take each author in turn, to state what amount of evidence with regard to his text is provided by the extant papyri, and to indicate what the general bearing of that evidence is; and then it may be possible to sum up the results and to arrive at some general conclusions with regard to the extent to which textual science has been affected by the discoveries, so numerous of late years, of Greek papyri in Egypt.

The interest of the inquiry lies, of course, in the fact that whereas until recently (but for a few exceptions one might say until the last fifteen years) our knowledge of the texts of the Greek classics rested upon manuscripts written upon vellum or paper between the tenth and fifteenth centuries of the Christian era, we now have a great quantity of texts (mostly small fragments, it is true, but

including several manuscripts of considerable length) written between the third century B.C. and the fifth century A.D., which must necessarily throw some light on the integrity of the tradition represented in our much later vellum MSS., and show us whether, as some have suspected, that tradition has been seriously corrupted in its transition through the comparatively dark ages of the Byzantine empire. The facts, so far as they are at present known to us, appear to be as follows.

The number of published literary papyri, large and small (but excluding theological texts, which form a class by themselves, affected by different conditions), is approximately three hundred and fifty[1]. Nearly half of these[2], however, contain texts not previously known, and consequently are of little or no use in our present inquiry, since we have no adequate means of estimating the accuracy of their tradition. There remain 189 papyri containing texts of authors previously extant, for which we consequently have a basis of comparison. The total sounds large; but it must be remembered that most of them are fragments containing only a few lines, and that, as we shall see directly, more than half of them belong to a single author. The basis, consequently, is not so wide as we could wish. It may be slightly increased, however, by the inclusion of a few fragments on vellum, which have been discovered with papyri and belong to the latter part of the same period, and consequently are a legitimate reinforcement of their evidence.

To come to the individual authors The first place is, of course, taken by Homer, both in date and in the number of extant papyri. Out of the 189 papyri of known authors enumerated above, no less than 109 contain portions of Homer. Of these seventy-nine contain portions of the *Iliad*, six scholia on the *Iliad*, twenty-two portions of the *Odyssey*, and two scholia on the *Odyssey*. Out of the 15693 lines contained in the *Iliad*, 6526 are extant, whole or in part, on papyrus; while out of the 12110 lines of the *Odyssey* only 942 are so represented. This is no unfair test of the relative popularity of the two works in Hellenistic times.

The papyri of Homer fall into two classes. First there is a small group of manuscripts, of relatively early date, which are remarkable

[1] My enumeration gives 347 up to and including the texts in *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, III; other lists would no doubt differ slightly in what they include and what they reject The philosophical texts among the Herculaneum papyri are not included.

[2] 158; papyri containing scholia on known texts are reckoned among the known authors, since they provide evidence with regard to their texts, and are therefore available for our present purpose.

as containing additional lines which do not form part of our common texts. These manuscripts are four in number, three being of the third century B.C. and one of the second century B.C., and to these may perhaps be added one papyrus of the second century after Christ (Oxy. Pap. 20) which contains a single new line in Bk. ii of the *Iliad* (after l. 798). Of the others, the manuscript now known as Brit. Mus. Pap. 689a[1] contains indications of three new lines to eight old ones in Bk. viii, and shows marked variants in three other lines. The Petrie fragment of the eleventh book (now Brit. Mus. Pap. 486d) contains five new lines and omits three old ones in a space of thirty-six lines of our vulgate text[2]. A Geneva papyrus[3] of the last sixty-one lines of Bk. xi and the first nine of Bk. xii has nine new lines in that space and considerable alterations in five others. Finally a Bodleian papyrus[4], containing about seventy much mutilated lines from various parts of Bks. xxi–xxiii, has apparently nine new lines in that space and several noticeable variants. It will be observed that in all these cases of manuscripts containing what may be called an expanded text of Homer the average of additional lines is high, in three cases amounting to about thirteen per cent., while in the very small fourth fragment it is still higher. The phenomenon is not new. Ancient authors have preserved in their quotations similar lines not now found in our vulgate; in fact one of the lines now discovered on papyrus was previously known from a quotation in Plutarch. Nevertheless the discovery of these four fragmentary manuscripts has called fresh attention to the phenomenon, and has also raised our conception of the extent to which it prevailed. With regard to the character of the additional lines, this is not the place for a full discussion of them, especially

[1] Published in Grenfell and Hunt's *Greek Papyri*, II no 2, contains portions of one new line before viii 217 and two after 252. It apparently has Ἀχαιῶν as the last word of 217 and ἑταίρους as the last word of 219, and in 251 it reads εἴδοντο Διὸς τέρας [αἰγιόχοιο] for εἴδονθ', ὅτ' ἄρ' ἐκ Διὸς ἤλυθεν ὄρνις. The new lines after 252 are not duplicates of lines occurring elsewhere.

[2] *Petrie Pap* I 3 (4), contains *Il* xi 502–537, with traces of additional lines after 504, 509, 513, 519, 528, ll. 520, 529, 530 are omitted

[3] Published by J. Nicole, *Revue de Philologie*, xviii 104; traces of additional lines after 795 (two), 804, 805, 807, 838, and three complete lines after 827.

[4] Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri*, II 6, now Bodl. MS. Gr class. b 3 (P); traces of additional lines after xxii 132, 259, 262; xxiii 160, 162, 165, 195, 223 (two) Plutarch quotes l. 223 with the second of these new lines, but has not the first. In xxi. 396 the papyrus has Τυδείδῃ Διομήδει ἄνωγας, in xxiii. 198 ὦκα δὲ Ἶρις (adopted by Monro and Allen) for the ὠκέα δ' Ἶρις of all other codd. There are indications of other variants, but the mutilation of the papyrus makes the exact readings uncertain.

as they have been very fully examined elsewhere, notably by Ludwich (*Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen*, Leipzig, 1898). It will be sufficient to say that, with hardly an exception, they add nothing substantial to the poem, but are just such additions as a rhapsodist might make who was anxious to extend the bulk of his recitation. The papyri would seem to indicate that such expanded texts were not by any means uncommon in the early Ptolemaic age; but they appear to have died out shortly afterwards, and practically disappear before the Christian era.

Over against this small group of nonconformist MSS. stands the great mass of our papyri, of which it may be said, with very little qualification, that they contain the vulgate text of Homer, substantially as it is contained in the much later vellum MSS. upon which our knowledge of the poems rests. The large majority of the extant papyri are only small fragments, containing portions only of some twenty, thirty, or forty lines, with no variants of importance from the vulgate. Out of the whole total nine papyri of the *Iliad* may be selected as being of sufficient size and importance to deserve separate mention, and two of the *Odyssey*. From these we shall be able to obtain a fair idea of the general character of the Homeric texts preserved to us by the papyri.

Brit. Mus Pap. 126[1] is a manuscript of the third century, in book form, containing, in its present condition, a continuous text from ii. 101 to iv. 40, but deliberately omitting the whole of the catalogue of the ships at the end of Bk. ii (as is the case in eleven other MSS. cited by Monro and Allen). Its text is the vulgate, very indifferently written in the first instance, though most of the errors

[1] Kenyon, *Classical Texts from Greek Papyri in the British Museum* (London, 1891), p 81. The more notable variants are ii 108 *νηυσὶ* for *νήσοισι* (corrected in the papyrus), 163 *μετὰ* for *κατὰ* (with most codd , against Aristarchus **a c f g i**), 179 *μετὰ* for *κατὰ* (with most MSS., against Ar. **h** A U^1 al.); the terminations of 163 and 179 (which begin alike) are transposed; 192 *Ἀτρείδαο* for *Ἀτρείωνος* (with other MSS., against L and the Alexandrian critics), 206 om. (with most MSS., against **a b c g h q** Dio Chrys), iii 57 *εἶσο* for *ἕσσο* (with V^5, against other MSS. and critics), 74 *ναίοιμεν* for *ναίοιτε* (with Zenodotus), 94 om. (probably supplied in margin), 126 *ἀνέπασσεν* for *ἐνέπασσεν* (against all MSS), 163 *ἴδῃς* for *ἴδῃ* (with Zen. **b d e f g** B C T al), 165 *Ἄρηος* for *Ἀχαιῶν* (alone), 215 *ἢ* for *εἰ* (with **f** A B T Nicanor Herodian, adopted by M. and A), 235 om. (with M^5 O^5, supplied by corrector), 257 *νεέσθων* for *νέονται* (corrected), 272 om. (supplied by corrector), 349 *ἀσπίδι ἐν* for *ἀσπίδ' ἐνὶ* (with **b l** A G N^4 V^1 V^{12} V^{16} al), 371 *ἁπαλῆς ὑπὸ δειρῆς* for *ἁπαλὴν ὑπὸ δειρήν* (corrected), 428 *πολέμοιο* for *πολέμου*, 436 *δαμασθῇς* for *δαμήῃς* (with **k** A Ge L^{10} L^{18} M^8 Mo N^4 U^{10} V^{12} V^{15} V^{19} Ve al.), 453 *ἐκεύθανεν* for *ἐκεύθανον* This and the other collations of papyri of the *Iliad* are made from the edition of Monro and Allen (Oxford, 1902), and the references to other MSS. are drawn from their *apparatus criticus*.

have been subsequently corrected. Out of some 350 variants revealed by a collation in 894 lines, only about twenty deserve any consideration as representing real divergences of text[1]. In two cases (iii. 74 *ναίοιμεν*, 163 *ἴδῃς*) it has readings of Zenodotus.

Brit. Mus. Pap. 136 *verso*[2] is of the first century, and contains portions of the third and fourth books of the *Iliad*. Its average of noteworthy readings is decidedly higher than in the last case, being thirteen out of 193 in 487 lines on a rough estimate. Two of these readings (iv. 378 δὲ for ῥα: 542 ἐλοῦσ' αὐτὰρ for ἐλοῦσα ἀτάρ, ἐλοῦσ' ἀτάρ, or ἐλοῦσα αὐτάρ) are adopted by Monro and Allen; in the first case the papyrus has the support of a few later MSS., in the second it stands alone.

Brit. Mus. Pap. 128[3] is a much more noteworthy MS. It belongs

[1] Mr Allen's tables (*Class Rev* xiii. 115) give a more favourable appearance to this papyrus, but only because he states the total number of variants as eighty-four. The number of really noteworthy variants given above agrees almost exactly with the number of variants quoted from this MS. in the *apparatus criticus* of Monro and Allen

[2] *Classical Texts*, p 93 The more notable variants are iv 15 ῥ' om (with **h** Eust. al), 174 ἄρουραν for ἄρουρα, 213 δὲ for δ' ἐκ, 303 ἱπποσύνησι for ἱπποσύνῃ τε (with **o** al), 339 λόγοισι for δόλοισι, 353 ἤν κ' for ἢν (vulg) or αἴ κ', 378 δὲ for ῥα (with **h** A T al , adopted by M and A), 398 ἀναπροέηκε for ἄρα προέηκε, 427 ὤρνυντο for κίνυντο (with M^{8} U^{6}), 434 ἑστήκωσιν for ἑστήκασιν (with **g m** A B T al.), 461 om., 524 ὑπέδραμεν for ἐπέδραμεν, 542 ἐλοῦσ' αὐτὰρ for ἐλοῦσα ἀτάρ, ἐλοῦσ' ἀτάρ, or ἐλοῦσα αὐτὰρ (alone, adopted by M and A) It will be observed that these variants are more independent, and find less support in other MSS , than most of those in the previous papyrus

[3] Collation, *ib.* p 100; published in full in *Journal of Philology*, xxi 296–343. Notable variants. xxiii 48 πειθώμεθα (vulg) is altered to τερπώμεθα (ταρπώμεθα V^{1}), 61 ἀπ' for ἐπ' (with **b** V^{10}), 76 νείομαι for νίσομαι (with L^{2} L^{12} U^{8}), 407 λίπησθε for λίπησθον, 427 εὐρυτέρῃ παρελάσσαι (παρελάσσεις vulg , παρελάσσαις **e h** B Ba U^{6} V^{20}, εὐρυτέρη παρελάσσαι M and A.), 434 ἐλαύνων for ἐλαύνειν, 444 καμόντε for καμόντα, 452 ἰόντος for ἐόντος (with **D**), ἀκούων for ἀκούσας, 523 δίσκ' οὖρα for δίσκουρα (with Ba L^{20} Mc M^{11} N^{1} N^{4} O^{5} and attested by scholiasts), 565 om. (with **b g k** A B C Ba etc , and Brit. Mus. Add 17210), 593 ἀπαιτήσειας for ἐπαιτ., 626 om., 640 αὐτόθι for αὐτόφι (with **h p** C U^{13} V^{1} etc , against Aristarchus and vulg ; adopted by M and A), 657 ἀνθρώποισιν for Ἀργείοισιν (corrected), 662 φερέσθω for νεέσθω (with **c f g** A B T al), 679 Θήβας for Θήβασδ' (with **e** N^{1} N^{11} V^{1} al.), 682 μάλα for μέγα, 707 πειρήσεσθε for -σθον, 721 ἐυκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ for -δας Ἀχαιούς (with D N^{1} O^{5} V^{1} V^{16}; an ancient variant), 732 πλησίον for πλησίοι, 739 ἀπομορξάμενοι for -νω, 753 πειρήσεσθον for -σθε (with Zenodotus and Pe), 767 ἱεμενοι for ἱεμένῳ (with the Ambrosian Iliad, **c h p** D V^{1} V^{13} V^{16}), 773 ἔμελλεν for ἔμελλον, 782 φίλοι for πόποι, 804 om. (with many MSS.), 815 ἕλε for ἔχε (with the corrector of U^{4}), 821 ἀκωκήν for -κῇ (with **h** A B C D U^{9} V^{14} V^{20}), 864 om. (with **g** Ba L^{10} etc), 874 ὑπαὶ for ὑπό, 875 μέσσον for μέσσης or μέσσην, 879 λιάσθηι for λίασθεν (with the ed Massil), 892 om., xxiv. 28 ἀρχῆς for ἄτης (with V^{16} and var. in A), 48 ὀδυρόμενος for ὀδυράμενος (with **c e h l m n** A marg. etc), 79 ἐπεστενάχιζε for ἐπεστονάχησε, 119 om., 126 παρέζετο for καθέζετο, 177

to the latter part of the first century B.C., and contains the greater part of Bks. xxiii and xxiv. Except for one column, which has been written by a different hand, evidently to make good a damage to the roll, and which abounds with errors of transcription, the text is notably good and the variants are mostly intelligible. Quite a third of them (fifty-six out of 146) must be regarded as worthy of an editor's consideration, though they may not have authority enough to be admitted into his text. Messrs. Monro and Allen have admitted three (xxiii. 427 εὐρυτέρῃ παρελάσσαι for εὐρυτέρῃ παρελάσσαις, 640 αὐτόθι for αὐτόφι · xxiv 604 υἱέες for υἱεῖς); the first is known as an ancient variant, the last as read by Aristarchus, but neither appears in any other extant MS. Many other readings of this papyrus find a place in their *apparatus criticus*. The MS. is further remarkable as one of the earliest extant MSS. containing the critical symbols of Aristarchus, of which something will have to be said presently.

Oxyrhynchus Pap. 223 [1], of the third century, contains about half of Bk. v, in a fairly correctly written text. Few of its variants (perhaps nineteen) are of some substantial interest. Four lines are omitted (42, 57, 75, 126), in two cases with support from other MSS. Two readings (31 τειχεσιβλῆτα by second hand, 227 ἐπιβήσομαι) are those of Zenodotus, one (293 ἐξελύθη) of Aristarchus. In other respects it is a somewhat undistinguished vulgate text.

Tebtunis Pap. 4 [2], belonging to the end of the second century B.C., and containing 116 lines of Bk ii, is an even earlier example of a MS. with Aristarchan critical symbols than Brit. Mus. Pap. 128. Its

οἷος for οἷον (with G), 179 ἤ κε for ἠδὲ (with A corr D L^{16} M^{8} T), 215 πρὸς for πρὸ (with Bankes pap., **e h m n** D al), 240 ἔπεστι for ἔνεστι, 265 πάντες for πατρὸς, 387 ἀνθρώπων for τοκήων, 421 ἐπ' for ἐν (with Bankes pap , **c e f i** etc), 512 στεναχὴ for στοναχὴ (with Zen.), 515 αὐτίκα δ' ἐκ for αὐτίκ' ἀπὸ, 518 ἄσχεο for ἄνσχεο (with L^{19} M^{1} U^{4} V^{11}), 567 πυλάων for θυράων, 571 [ἐσί]γησεν for ἔδεισεν, 604 υἱέες for υἱεῖς (adopted by M. and A , Aristarchus has both), 693 om (with Bankes pap **a f l** A al.), 697 ἄγον for φέρον (with **h** A L^{16} M^{8}), 704 Ἕκτορα δῖον for Ἕκτορ' ἰόντες, 724 ἱπποδάμοιο for ἀνδροφόνοιο (with Bankes pap , **c e m r** N^{1} V^{1} al).

[1] Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, II Notable variants: 16 θ' for δ', 31 τειχεσιβλῆτα (second hand) for -πλῆτα (with Zenodotus, Macrobius, L^{6} L^{16}), 42 om. (with A B C Et T V^{20} V^{26}), 43 τέκτονος (first hand) for Μήονος, 57 om (with **e** A B C D al.), 75 om., 104 δηθὰ σχήσεσθαι for δήθ' ἀνσχήσεσθαι (with **g k** Ge U^{8} al.), μένος for βέλος (with Ge), 118 τὸν δέ τέ μ' for δὸς δέ τέ μ' (an old variant), 126 om., 128 γινώσκοις for γιγνώσκῃς, 132 δουρὶ for χαλκῷ (corrected), 141 τέτανται for κέχυνται, 178 ἄπο for ἔπι (corrected), 200 Τρώεσσιν ἀνὰ for Τρώεσσι κατὰ, 205 ἔμελλεν for ἔμελλον (with **b** A B D al.), 227 ἐπιβήσομαι for ἀποβ- (with Zenodotus, **b c g** C, against Aristarchus), 234 ποθέοντες for -ντε (with **a c f h** D Ve al.), 293 ἐξελύθη for ἐξεσύθη (with Aristarchus, **b g i l** A B Ve al., against Zenodotus, adopted by M. and A.).

[2] Grenfell and Hunt, *Tebtunis Papyri*.

textual variants are very few. In one case its first hand agrees with Aristarchus (133 Ἴλιον), and it is in accord with Aristonicus in obelizing l. 124. It also omits l. 206.

Oxyrhynchus Pap. 445[1], of the latter part of the second century, contains portions of Bk. vi, with a rather high average of noticeable variants. It has the Aristarchan critical symbols, and in its readings shows rather more traces of the influence of Aristarchus than usual; but its extent is small (only 114 lines), so that its evidence does not amount to much.

The papyrus known (from its discovery at a time when papyri were still so rare as to have the name of their discoverer attached to them) as the Harris Homer (Brit. Mus. Pap. 107)[2] contains the greater part of Bk. xviii in a hand of the end of the first century. Its text is the vulgate, with many mistakes by the first hand, subsequently corrected. Substantial variants are very few, only some eighteen, of which six consist of the omission of lines.

The Bankes Homer (Brit. Mus. Pap. 114)[3], somewhat later in

[1] Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, III. Notable variants. vi 128 *οὐρανὸν*, apparently, for *οὐρανοῦ* (with Aristarchus, **a d q** al), 187 *ἐπερχομένῳ* for *ἀνερχ-* (Ar , vulg), second hand *ἀπερχ-*, which is an ancient variant, 464 *τεθνηῶτα* for *τεθνειῶτα* (with Aristarchus and some MSS.), 478 *βίην ἀγαθόν τε* for *βίην τ' ἀγαθὸν* (ancient variant, with **c e h** C D T al.), 493 *πᾶσι μάλιστα δ' ἐμοὶ* for *πᾶσιν ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα*, 494 *χειρὶ παχείῃ* for *φαίδιμος* Ἕκτωρ (corrected), 523 *ἀλλ' ἀκέων* for *ἀλλὰ ἑκὼν*.

[2] Thompson and Warner, *Ancient Manuscripts in the British Museum*, pt. i (Greek), p. 1. Notable variants. 33 *χειρὸς* for *χεῖρας*, 47 *ἔνθ' ἄρα ἦν* for *ἔνθα δ' ἔην*, 63 *ἴδωμι* for *ἴδοιμι* (with M^{8} M^{10} N^{4} U^{11} V^{10}; adopted by M and A.), 124 *ἀδινὰ* for *ἀδινὸν* (with A corr **r** M^{10} V^{11}, against Aristarchus), 127 *Θέτις κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα* for *θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα*, 138 *ἑῆος* for *ἑοῖο* (with **i**, variant in A), 200–1 om., 357 *βοῶπι* for *βοῶπις* (with **i** A C V^{1} al.), 373 *μὲν* for *γὰρ* (corrected), 376 *δύσονται* for *δυσαίατ'* (with **e g i k l** al.), 381 om (with A L^{10} L^{11} etc), 427 om (with **i r** Ge V^{10}, Brit Mus. Add 17210), 441 om (with some ancient authorities), 459 om (corrected), 508 om (corrected), 550 *βασιλήιον* for *βαθυλήιον* (with Louvre Pap. 3 bis, A B C G Ge al., adopted by M. and A), 552 *πῖπτεν* for *πῖπτον*, 617 *τεύχεα καλὰ φέρουσα παρ' Ἡφαίστοιο ἄνακτος* for *τεύχεα μαρμαίροντα παρ' Ἡφαίστοιο φέρουσα* (with **i** L^{2} N^{4} T V^{11} V^{18})

[3] *Ib.*, p. 6 (description), collation by G C. Lewis in *Philological Museum*, 1832, p. 177. Notable variants: 209 *ποτε* for *ποθι*, 214 *τι* for *ἑ* (ancient variant), 215 *πρὸς* for *πρὸ* (with B. M. Pap. 128, **e h m n** al.), 231 *λευκά* for *καλά* (with **c f h i** A B C al ; adopted by M. and A.), 240 *ἐστὶ* for *ἔνεστι* (with **h i** V^{1} al), 241 *ὀνόσεσθ'* (second hand) for *ὀνόσασθ'* (Ar. Apoll. lex.) or *οὔνεσθ'* (vulg), 292 *ἑὸν* for *ταχὺν* (ancient variant), 344 om., 376 *μένος* for *δέμας*, 397 *δ' ἐμὸς* for *δέ μοι*, 413 *ἦδε* for *ἠῶς* (with **e h m p** D al.), 436 *μωμεύειν* for *συλεύειν*, 479 *παιδοφόνους* (second hand) for *ἀνδροφόνους*, 492 *μολόντα* for *ἰόντα* (with **c g h** al), 521 *ἐξενάριξε* for *-ξα* (with **g**), 526 *ἀχνυμένοις* for *-νους* (with **e h** A D N^{4} V^{1}; adopted by M. and A.), 544 *μακάρων* (second hand) for Μάκαρος (with **h** L^{10} V^{1} V^{10} Dio Prus. Plut), 546 *τῶ* for *τῶν* (with **o p** Ba N^{1} T V^{1} V^{23} al.), 558 om (with **b** D Gf T V^{1} al.), 578

date than the last named, and containing the greater part of Bk. xxiv, has a rather more important text. Monro and Allen accept three of its readings (231 λευκά for καλά, 526 ἀχνυμένοις for ἀχνυμένους, 642 λαυκανίης for λευκανίης: in all these cases the papyrus has the support of several other MSS.), and quote twenty-nine more in their *apparatus*.

Last among the more notable papyri of the *Iliad* may be mentioned the MS. containing the greater part of Bks. xiii and xiv, originally discovered and edited by Mr. A. S. Hunt, now Brit. Mus. Pap. 732[1]. It is probably of the end of the first century. Its text is normally vulgate, but it contains a considerable number of substantial variants, in nearly all of which it has the support of some among the later vellum MSS. In two cases it supports readings which Monro and Allen prefer to the vulgate (xiii. 190 ὀρέξατο for ἀκόντισε, xiv. 181 ζώνῃ . . . ἀραρυίῃ for ζώνην . . . ἀραρυῖαν). In three cases it is in agreement with Aristarchus, and twice with Zenodotus, but it cannot be said that its evidence is of any one marked type or family. It is observable that its variations seldom coincide with those of the sixth-century palimpsest in the British Museum (Add. MS. 17210).

Of the *Odyssey* only two papyri deserve special mention, and even they are not as extensive as the *Iliad* manuscripts which have just

ἐυσσώτρου for ἐυξέστου (with **h** D T V^1 A marg.), 595 ὡς for ὅσσ', 642 λαυκανίης for λευκανίης (with **e h** A B Gf N^4 T al., adopted by M. and A.), 673 αὐτοῦ for αὐτόθι, 693 om. (with B. M. Pap. 128, **a f l** etc.), 724 ἱπποδάμοιο for ἀνδροφόνοιο (with B. M. Pap. 128, **c e m r** N^1 V^1 V^{28} al.), 740 περὶ for κατὰ, 759 καταπέφνῃ for κατέπεφνεν (with **c h**, variant in A), 760 ἔγειρε for ὄρινε (with **p** L^{10} M^1 M^{12} O^2), 770 ἦεν (second hand) for αἰεί (with **h p** V^{18}), 790 om. (with **b c e g** A Ba etc.), 802 συναγειράμενοι for συναγειρόμενοι (with **c f g h** etc.)

[1] Hunt, *Journal of Philology*, xxvi. 25. Notable variants: xiii. 42 'Αχαιούς for 'Αχαιῶν (with **a d e f h** A D T etc.), 77 δή καί μοι for νῦν καὶ ἐμοί, 166 [ξυν]έηκε for ξυνέαξε or ξυνέηξε (Zen.), 190 ὀρέξατο for ἀκόντισε (with **b** A B C D etc.; adopted by M. and A.), 209 κήδεα τεῦχεν for κήδε' ἔτευχεν, 230 δὲ for τε (with B. M. Add. 17210, **i** etc.), 234 κεν for τις, 245 ἐνὶ for περὶ (with Zen. and Aristoph.), 255 om. (with Ar., apparently, B. M. Add. 17210, **d** A B C D etc.), 301 'Εφύρου for -ους, 316 om. (with A B Ba C D M^4 T V^{16} V^{20}), 318 κείνω for κείνων (with **o** L^6 U^2 V^2 V^5 etc., against Ar.), 327 καὶ for τις, 349 ὀλέσσαι for ὀλέσθαι (with **c d h i k** B C etc.), 358 οἱ for τοι or τω (with Ar. (?), **c k** D al.), 408 τῇ ῥ' for τῇ, 480 om., 464 ἀνδρὶ for ἐστὶ, 485 ὁμηλικίῃ for ὁμηλικίη (with Ar. A B G H L^4 L^{16} T V^{16}), 543 ἔκλινεν for ἐκλίνθη, 565 γαίῃ for γαίης (with **f h i** B C etc.), 584 ἁμαρτήτην for ὁμ- (with B Ba V^{20}, ancient variant), 594 ἐκ δ' ἄρα τόξου for ἐν δ' ἄρα τόξῳ, 668 χερσὶν for νηυσὶν, xiv. 168 τὸν for τὴν (with **m** N^1 N^2 N^4 etc.), 172 ἑανῷ for ἑδανῷ (with Athenaeus and schol. B), 181 ζώνην . . . ἀραρυίῃ for -ην . . . -αν (ζώνῃ . . . ἀραρυίῃ M. and A., with Ar. **h** A B corr. U^1), 235 πείθεο for πείθευ (with **f** etc.), 420 om. (with Ambrosian Iliad, A L^6 L^8 N^4 V^1 V^{13} V^{16}), 437 ἀπέμασσεν for ἀπέμεσσεν (with Zen., **g** A B C D etc., against Ar.), 453 μακρὰ βιβάσθων for μακρὸν ἀύσας (with **f i l** etc.), 474 κεφαλὴν for γενεήν.

been described. Brit. Mus. Pap 271[1] is a beautifully written fragment of the third book, belonging to the first century. It is accurately written, with a few noteworthy readings and some marginal scholia, in which occur the names of Ammonius, Apion, Zenodotus, and perhaps Herodorus. Two of its readings were previously known only from scholiasts, and one was the reading of Aristarchus. An obelus is prefixed to eight lines.

Oxyrhynchus Pap. 448[2] contains nearly 400 lines of Bk. xxii, with a few of xxiii, in a hand of the third century. It has a good text, with few blunders, but with only about a dozen noticeable variants, and those of no special importance.

All the remaining mass of Homeric papyri may be ignored, as consisting of fragments too small to be important for our present purpose, save that they confirm the impression already established by the larger manuscripts in favour of the universal prevalence of the vulgate text of Homer in the period from which they are drawn One other feature of the papyri, however, remains to be mentioned, namely the occurrence in them of the critical symbols used by Aristarchus. Five papyri are as yet known which contain these symbols. The earliest, Tebtunis Pap. 4, of the end of the second century B C., has three examples of the obelus, and one each of the διπλῆ περιεστιγμένη, ἀντίσιγμα, and asterisk with obelus. About a century later, Brit. Mus. Pap. 128 has eleven cases of the διπλῆ and one asterisk. The finely written MS of *Iliad* ii discovered by Petrie at Hawara, and now in the Bodleian Library, has as many as twenty-one examples of the διπλῆ, ten of the διπλῆ περιεστιγμένη, and seven of the obelus. Oxyrhynchus Pap. 445 has ten examples of the διπλῆ, four of the asterisk, and one of the ἀντίσιγμα. Finally the British Museum Odyssey

[1] *Journal of Philology*, xxii 238 Notable variants: iii 290 τροφέοντο for τροφόεντα (with Aristarchus, apparently, and with Apion and Herodorus, according to the scholium in this papyrus), 443 χερσὶ (Herodorus and schol H) for χειρὶ, 469 ποιμένα (first hand, with several MSS., followed by Ludwich) for ποιμένι (second hand, vulg), 472 ἐνοινοχοεῦντες for οἰνοχοεῦντες (with F T, ancient variant), 479 ἂν for ἐν (with T H²), 487 om , 490 ὁ δὲ τοῖς πὰρ ξείνια θῆκεν (first hand, with P J K H² M⁸) for ὁ δ' ἄρα ξεινήια δῶκεν (second hand, vulg), 493 om (so Ludwich and many MSS). The obelus is prefixed to ll. 321, 396, 400, 458, 461, 472, 484, 486

[2] Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, III. Notable variants · xxii 37 τε for δὲ (with U Eust.), 44 om. (with most MSS.), 128 ἐντὸς εἶσαι for εὖ ἀραρυῖαι (with U X Eust), 130 ἑστεῶτ' for ἑσταῶτ' or other forms (with G H P, followed by Ludwich), ἀγχοῦ τῆς for ἄγχ' αὐτῆς, 192 om (with most MSS), 251 μὴ δ' for μή, 255 ἐκέλευσε for -ευεν (with X), 274 τῶν δ' for τῶν, 278 ἄκρην for ἄκρον (with U X Eust), 287 [πολ]υ[κέρτομε] apparently for φιλοκέρτομε (with M), xxiii 192 ὄφρα τέλεσσα for ὄφρ' ἐτέλεσσα.

Papyrus (Pap. 271) has the obelus in eight places. It must be observed, however, that none of these papyri gives anything like a full representation of the critical apparatus of Aristarchus. We know more about his criticism from our previous sources of information, and the papyri, interesting though they may be as showing the system in actual operation, add little that is substantial to our knowledge of the subject.

To sum up with regard to the Homeric poems in general, since their textual history is necessarily on a different footing from that of the other classical writers, it may be said broadly that the papyri have introduced no new element into the discussion, though they have emphasized certain points in connexion with it. They have called fresh attention to the fact of the existence of divergent texts in the early Ptolemaic period, but they have done nothing to show that these texts were either authentic or important. For the rest, they show (if proof were needed) that the vulgate text of Homer, as previously known from the mediaeval vellum MSS., goes back substantially in the same form as far as our evidence takes us. On the other hand, the minor families into which the vellum MSS can be divided[1] are not found in existence in the papyri, and consequently it may fairly be concluded that the archetypes from which they are derived are of later date than the papyrus period. With regard to Alexandrian criticism, the papyri tell us practically nothing. None of them contains a text which can be identified with that of Aristarchus or any other known critic, and it is only comparatively rarely that any of the special readings associated with the Alexandrian critics find support in them. All that we have at present is a considerable accession of witnesses which have to be taken into consideration along with those previously known, not substantially different in character, not equal in character to the text of the vellum MSS., though presenting a certain number of readings which are at least possible, and in some cases probable.

The other classical authors will not need such lengthy treatment. Hesiod, who comes next in point of time, is represented by only four papyri. One of these, a manuscript of the fourth century in the Rainer collection at Vienna[2], is of considerable length, containing

[1] For these see especially T. W. Allen, *Classical Review*, 1899, p. 110 seqq.

[2] Published by Wessely and Rzach in the former's *Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde*, I (1901). Notable variants: *Works* 252 χίλιοι for μύριοι, 260 om., 262 παρκλίνωσι for -νουσι (with B S), 278 ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς for ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς (with Plut., Sext. Emp., Aelian), 293 αὐτὸς for αὐτῷ (with Aristotle, Aristides, etc., followed by editors), 310 om. (with M, Proclus and Stobaeus), 325–6 om., 357 καὶ for κἂν (with M Z B Q V Stob.), δοίη for δώῃ (with Proclus and some MSS.),

fifty-six lines of the *Theogonia*, 247 of the *Works*, and seventy of the *Shield*. The text is good, with little substantial variation from the vulgate. It contains hardly any important new readings, but it generally supports the better class of MSS. In some cases, however, it contains obviously erroneous readings which reappear in the later MSS., and thus shows the antiquity of these errors. Two modern conjectures are confirmed (*Shield* 15 οὐδέ οἱ ἦεν with Hermann, 432 ἐλθέμεν with Nauck), but the rest, which are numerous enough, are unsupported.

Of the smaller fragments, one at Geneva [1], which appears to be also of the fourth century, contains thirty-eight lines of the *Works*, but is remarkable as having traces of four lines before l. 174 which are not in our other MSS. It is on record that l. 169 and the lines following it (καὶ τοὺς ἑξῆς) were condemned in antiquity as spurious; and Weil now ingeniously suggests that the condemnation really applied to these lines of the Geneva fragment. This would account for their presence in the papyrus and for their disappearance from later MSS., though it must be admitted that in the case of Homer the condemnation of critics proved singularly powerless to effect the expulsion of suspected lines from the current texts. It is unfortunate that this part of the poem is not preserved in the Rainer papyrus.

The *Theogonia* is represented by forty imperfect lines in the British Museum [2], and seventy-one at Paris [3]. Both MSS. are

688 ὡς ἀγορεύω for ὅσσ' or ὥς σ' ἀγ. (with B A Q G E Mm²), 788 φιλέοι δ' ὅ γε for φιλέει δέ τε or κε, 793 om., 812 γάρ θ' ἥ γε for γάρ θ' ἥδε, κ.τ.λ., 818 ἑλκέμεναι for εἰρύμεναι · *Shield* 15 οὐδέ οἱ for οὐ γάρ οἱ (conjectured by Hermann), 432 ἐλθέμεν for ἐλθεῖν (conjectured by Nauck), 434 Ἄρεος ἔστη for ἔστη Ἄρηος, 461 σαρκὸς for σάκος (with A H F O V): *Theog.* 631 is placed before 630, 811 χάλκεος is confirmed against the λάϊνος of some MSS. The collation is with Rzach's apparatus; and cf. the remarks of Rzach on the readings of the papyrus, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–16.

[1] Nicole, *Revue de Philologie*, xii. 113. Notable variants: 157 om., 174 ὤφελλον for ὤφειλον (with B L O), 176 παύονται for παύσονται, 210–1, condemned by Aristarchus, are retained, 215 αὐτοῦ for αὐτῆς.

[2] Kenyon, *Rev. de Phil.* xvi. 181; contains ll. 210–238, 260–270. In l. 228 the papyrus appears to have had μάχας τε φόνους τ' for φόνους τε μάχας τ'.

[3] Wilcken, *Sitzungsb. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1887, p. 807; contains ll. 75–145. Notable variants: 80 ἡ γὰρ καὶ with MSS. against Stobaeus (ἡ μὲν γὰρ), 83 ἑέρσην for ἀοιδὴν (with O and schol. against other MSS., Stob., Aristides), 84 οἱ δέ τε for οἱ δέ νυ (with Arist. and Themist.), 87 αἶψά κε for αἶψά τε (supporting a conjecture of Peppmüller against the MSS., Stob., Arist.), 91 ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀν' ἀγῶνα for ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστυ (with schol. Ven. B on Homer), εἰσορόωσιν for ἱλάσκονται (with Plutarch), 93 τοίη for οἷά τε (supporting conjecture of Guiet), 102 δυσφροσυνέων for δυσφρονέων (with M C), 111 om. (with Hippolytus), 112 ἄφενος (with MSS., against Hippolytus' στέφανον), 116 ἤτοι (with MSS., against Aristotle's πάντων), 127 καλύπτῃ for -τοι (with C V O and schol. on Pindar), 141 τεῦξάν τε for τεύξαντο (with M corr.).

assigned to the fourth or fifth century. The only noteworthy variant in the first-named is the name Ὠκυρόην for Ὠκυπέτην in line 267, which appears to have some support from Apollodorus. The Paris MS. has some interesting readings, sometimes agreeing with ancient quotations and sometimes opposing them.

The next author to be mentioned is Solon, in whose case the most notable example of a certain correction of a false reading has taken place. This, as is well known, occurs in the British Museum papyrus of the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία of Aristotle, which contains twelve lines previously known from quotations in Plutarch, two which appear also under the name of Theognis, and twenty-seven known from Aristides (of which one occurs also in Plutarch). The number of discrepancies between the papyrus and the MSS of these other authors is somewhat considerable In five cases the papyrus is certainly wrong while the others are right; in one instance both are wrong; in four cases the decision might be doubtful, though the much greater age of the papyrus is in its favour; and in eight cases the papyrus is certainly right. Three of these are small corrections which had been already made by modern critics; the rest are new. The most notable is of course the reading *τοὺς δ' ἀναγκαίης ὕπο χρειοῦς φυγόντας* in place of the unintelligible *χρησμὸν λέγοντας*, which commentators had striven in vain either to explain or to emend. One modern critic had hit upon the right sense and half the right reading (Sitzler, *δρησμὸν φυγόντας*), but only to be contemptuously dismissed by Bekker in his standard edition of the remains of Solon. The whole episode of these Solonian verses is very instructive as to the value and limitations of modern textual criticism.

Passing on to the Athenian dramatists, Aeschylus is unrepresented except by two small fragments which may possibly come from lost plays, but which are of no use for our present inquiry. Of Sophocles only one papyrus is known (Oxyrhynchus Pap. 22), containing twenty-four lines from the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, in a hand of the fifth century [1]. It shows two variants from the received text which are possible but not necessary, while it also has one certainly erroneous reading, which is consequently shown to be of relatively early date. Euripides, as might be expected, is better represented, but only to the extent of five small fragments of papyrus, and four vellum leaves of the sixth century which may be classed with them. The plays concerned are the *Medea*, *Orestes*, *Hippolytus*, and *Phoenissae*. The *Medea*

[1] Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, I. The readings are 376 με . . γε σοῦ (with all MSS., but certainly wrong), 378 τοῦ for σοῦ, 430 αὖ for οὐ (corrected).

fragment[1], though exceptionally early, being from the first half of the second century B.C., is full of blunders and quite worthless. Of the two scraps of the *Orestes*[2], one is remarkable as being accompanied by musical notes, but neither has any substantial departure from the received text. The *Hippolytus*[3] also, though much more extensive, consisting as it does of four consecutive leaves, containing about 270 lines, shows no important variants. The *Phoenissae* fragment, which contains thirty-five lines, and is of the third century, is more interesting[4]. In three cases it has readings which may be accepted as correct, where the later MSS. are unmetrical; one of these corrections had been anticipated by Porson, another partially by Musgrave. In two cases it shares unmetrical readings with the later MSS. Twenty-three more lines of the *Phoenissae* are preserved on a wooden tablet, evidently intended for use in school, and having on its other side a portion of the lost *Hecalê* of Callimachus[5]. The writing is of the fourth century, and the text is generally identical with the vulgate. In one case (1104 νηΐσταις) it has a form which modern editors have preferred to that of our later MSS.; in another (1132 βάθρων) it confirms a generally accepted emendation of Kirchhoff. On the whole it must be said with regard to Euripides that the evidence as yet extant is small, but that, so far as it goes, it confirms the received text.

Of the known plays of Aristophanes no portion is extant on papyrus, but a vellum fragment which is said to be not later than the sixth century contains fifty-six lines of the *Birds*[6]. In three

[1] Weil, *Monuments grecs* (1879).

[2] Wessely, *Mitth. aus d Sammlung d. Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer*, V. 65, Nicole, *Rev. de Philologie*, xix 165

[3] A. Kirchhoff, *Monatsberichte d k Akademie d Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1881, p 982, contains ll. 242–459, 466–487, 492–515 The only substantial variants are 302 τῷ for τῶν, 430 μὴ προσοφθείην for μήποτ' ὀφθείην, and 510 ἄρτι δ' ἦλθε for ἦλθε δ' ἄρτι

[4] Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, II 224, containing *Phoen.* 1017–1043, 1064–1071. Notable readings: 1019 πτεροῦσσα (correct spelling) for the πτεροῦσα of the MSS (again in 1042), 1022 πολύφορος (i.e -φθορος), πολύστονος for πολύστονος πολύφθορος (some MSS πολύμοχθος), 1023 μιξοπάρθενος for -ον (with some MSS.), 1035 ἐστέναξαν for ἐστέναζον, 1036 ἰηιήιον βοὰν (giving correct metre) for ἰήιον βοὰν (ἰήιον βοὰν βοὰν Grotius, edd), 1038 ἄλλον for ἄλλ' (unmetrical, but with all MSS), ἐπωτότυξε for -υζε, 1040 ἀχᾷ for ἰαχὰ (giving correct metre; ἀχὰ Musgrave), πόλεος for πόλεως (confirming Porson's conjecture and restoring metre), ἀφανίσειεν (with MSS., but metre requires ἀφανίσει').

[5] Weinberger, *Mitth aus d. Sammlung d. Pap. Erzherzog Rainer*, V 74; contains *Phoen* 1097–1107, 1126–1137. Besides the readings mentioned above it has 1101 ξυνῆψαν for -ψεν, 1130 σιδηρονώτου for -οις, 1136 ὕδραν for ὕδρας.

[6] Weil, *Revue de Philologie*, xiii. 179 (1882); contains *Birds* 1057–1085, 1101–1127.

places (1069 probably δάκετα πάνθ' ὅσαπερ, 1078 ἀπαγάγῃ, 1080 πᾶσι om) it has probably correct readings where our existing texts were unmetrical, in the first two of these cases modern editors had anticipated it. Otherwise it supports the vulgate as against modern corrections (e. g. in reading οἳ in 1063, and in confirming πρόλογος in the scholion to 1113 as explanation of πρηγορεών, wherein it agrees with our best MSS. and with Suidas); but the sample is too small to allow of any far-reaching conclusions.

Passing from the dramatists to the historians, Herodotus is only represented by three small fragments of the first book, of which only one contains readings of any value[1]. With Thucydides the case is different, since we have six fragments of his History, one of which is of considerable importance. This is the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus (no. 16) of the fourth book (cc. 36–41) edited by Mr. Hunt and now in the Bodleian[2]. The text, which is of the first century, has been rather extensively corrected, and as corrected is of good quality. It has some ten or twelve substantial variants which deserve consideration; no less than eight of them have been adopted by Hude in his recent edition, and seven in that of Mr. Stuart Jones. One of these improvements, which removes an anacoluthon by the omission of a ὅτι, had been proposed by some editors. The proportion of new and good readings is higher than usual; but all consist of small alterations, and the papyrus lends no support to the theory of extensive corruption by means of the incorporation of ascripts and *marginalia* which has found favour with some editors of the classics, and especially in the case of Thucydides. That some of the roughnesses of his style may be due to the errors of copyists is possible, and even probable; but that any wholesale corruption of his text has taken

[1] Oxyrhynchus Papp. 18 (parts of I. 105–106) and 19 (part of I. 76), and a Munich papyrus (I. 115–116) published by Wilcken in the *Archiv fur Papyrusforschung*, I. 471. The latter, which is assigned to the first or second century, has the following variants: c 115 ἐς τοῦτο εἶναι for εἶναι ἐς τοῦτο, τούτου εἵνεκεν for εἵνεκα τοῦδε, c 116 ἐσήιε for ἐσήει (against MSS, but the correct form, conjectured by Stein), αὐτοὺς (with most MSS., as against ἑωυτὸν, which is generally adopted as giving an easier sense), ἐλευθεριωτέρη for ἐλευθερωτέρη (supporting a conjecture of Portus).

[2] Oxyrhynchus Pap. 16. Notable variants: c. 37 ὅτι om. (so Stephanus and some edd., against MSS.), εἰ βούλονται for εἰ βούλοιντο, ἀνοκωχῆς (second hand) for ἀνακ-, 38 ἔλεξεν for ἔλεγε, οἱ before Λακ om, τὴν ἡμέραν om., διέδοσαν for διεδίδοσαν or ἐδίδοσαν (with K N), 39 οἱ before ἐν τῇ νήσῳ om. (with **f**), σῖτός τις for σῖτος, 40 κἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν for κἀγαθοί. Hude accepts all of these except the last and the omission of τὴν ἡμέραν. Mr Stuart Jones accepts nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, and also σταδαία (the reading of the corrector of the papyrus) for σταδία at the end of c. 38.

place is not only not probable but may almost be considered now to be disproved. The same conclusion is indicated by another Oxyrhynchus papyrus of the first century, containing parts of two chapters of the second book [1]. This exhibits two probable readings for which there is other MS. evidence (91 πρὸς τὴν for ἐς τὴν, *ib.* σχοῦσαι for ἴσχουσαι), and one new reading (ἀμυνούμεναι for -νοι) which removes an anacoluthon and which may consequently be accepted without demur. Otherwise the text is normal.

Oxyrhynchus Pap. 452, of the second or third century, containing part of iv. 87, has three new readings (πλείστους for πλείους, πρῶτον for πρῶτοι, and ἀείμνηστον for ἀίδιον), the last of which cannot be explained as a scribe's error, but must be an example of that phenomenon which is so often imagined and so rarely proved, the intrusion of a scholium. In this instance the reading of the vulgate is probably to be preferred to that of the papyrus, in which case the intrusion did not succeed in corrupting the main current of tradition. The three remaining Thucydides fragments [2] are of no importance.

Xenophon is represented by eight papyri, two of which (Oxy. Papp. 28 and 226) may be dismissed at once as unimportant The other six all have some points of interest. A fragment of the Πόροι at Munich [3] of the second century has one good reading (οἰκεῖσθαι for ᾠκῆσθαι) which modern editors, though in search of an emendation, had failed to find, and one error (οὖν for ἂν) which was perpetuated into the Middle Ages. Oxyrhynchus Pap. 227, of the first century, contains portions of five columns of the *Oeconomica* (viii. 17–ix. 2), and has a few probable new readings [4], besides some variants in mutilated passages, which cannot be satisfactorily deciphered. The papyrus also contains some unquestionable errors. In one place, where all the later MSS. are corrupt, it confirms a conjecture by Schneider which had not met with general acceptance.

Oxyrhynchus Pap. 463, the sole representative of the *Anabasis*, contains portions of seven columns in a hand of the second or third

[1] Oxyrhynchus Pap. 225; contains parts of II 90–91.

[2] Oxyrhynchus Papp. 17 (II. 7–8), 451 (II. 73–74), 453 (VI. 32), all of the second or third century.

[3] Wilcken, *Archiv*, I. 473; contains Πόροι I. 5–6.

[4] viii 17 ὁμοίως for ὅμως, 19 ἀλλὰ κομψὸς for ἀλλ' ὁ κομψὸς ὅτι, 20 ἤδη που om., πάντων τούτων for τούτων, 21 ἔφην (after ἔξεστιν) om, 22 ἅπαντα om., ἕκαστον κεῖται for κεῖται, ix. 2 τῆς γε οἰκίας for τῆς οἰκίας (γε inserted elsewhere conjecturally by Cobet and others), ποικίλμασι πολλοῖς for ποικίλμασι, αὐτὸ (apparently) for αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἐν ἑκάστῳ for ἑκάστῳ (confirming Schneider's emendation of the certainly corrupt MSS.).

century[1]. This text is of sufficient extent to allow of a comparison with the families into which the mediaeval manuscripts fall, with the result that the papyrus is found to agree six times with the Paris MS. (C), which is regarded as being the best, against the inferior MSS., but also six times with the inferior MSS. against C and its allies. In these cases the truth probably lies with the inferior MSS. (in four instances Gemoll had already adopted their readings), the conclusions to which we are directed being thus: first, that the papyrus has a relatively good text, secondly, that it is prior in date to the division into families observable in the vellum MSS.; and thirdly, that among these vellum MSS. the truth is not always to be found with the family which modern editors have agreed to regard as superior.

A Vienna papyrus of the *Cyropaedia*[2], of the second century, is notable for its large apparatus of scholia giving alternative readings. Many of these were already known to us as variants occurring in one or other of our existing MSS. The text of the papyrus also shows a considerable number of new readings, though none very revolutionary. Like the *Anabasis* MS. just mentioned, it does not range itself uniformly with any of the families into which our later MSS. are divided.

Another papyrus of the Rainer collection, of the third century, is the longest Xenophon papyrus hitherto discovered, consisting of

[1] Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxy. Pap.* III p. 119, contains *Anab* VI. vi 9–24 The collation gives the following readings. § 10 *ἐδόκει τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι* for *τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐδόκει* (A B C E) or *ἐδόκει τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖνο* (vulg), 15 *τι* (with B C E) for *τινὸς* (vulg.), *ἐμαυτοῦ* (E vulg) for *ἑαυτοῦ* (A B C), 17 *εἶπεν Ἀγασίας* (with A B C E) for *Ἀγασίας εἶπεν* (vulg.), 18 *ἐκδῶτέ με* (with edd.) for *ἐκδότε με* (A B C E) or *ἐκδῶτε* (vulg.), *ὅ τι* (with A B C D E F H) for *ὃ* (cett), *πολεμεῖτε* (with A B C E) for *πολεμῆτε* (vulg), *σώζεσθε* (vulg.) for *σώζοισθε* (A B C), *ποι* for *ὅποι* (D F H I K T Z), *ὅπου* (A B C E) or *ὅπῃ* (cett), *μέντοι μοι* (with A B C D E H I K L) for *μέντοι* (cett), 20 *κελεύουσι* (vulg.) for *ἐκέλευσε* (A B C E), *εἴτε* (vulg.) for *εἴ τι* (A B C E), *καὶ* (with O) for *ἢ καὶ* (vulg), 22 *οἶδα αἱρεθέντα* (apparently, with A B C E) for *αἱρ. οἶδα* (vulg), 24 *ἤγες ἢ ἄλλος τις* (vulg.) for *ἡγῇ ἄλλως ἤ τις* (A B C E), *καὶ μὴ* (vulg.) for *ἢ καὶ* (A B C E).

[2] Wessely, *Mitth aus d. Sammlung d. Pap. Erzherzog Rainer*, VI 81; contains V. ii. 3–iii. 26, with mutilations. Notable readings: ii 4 apparently om *εἴ που εἴη αἱρέσιμον τὸ τεῖχος*, 25 *λέξατε* for *λέξατε δή*, *πολεμίους* for *πολεμικῶς*, iii 2 *ἔλεξεν, ὦ ἄνδρες φίλοι* for *ἔλ. ὧδε, ἂν φίλ*, 3 *πάντως* for *πάνυ*, *ποιήσαιμεν* for *ποιήσομεν*, *γνοίη ἂν ὅτι ἐλευθέροις* [-*ους* marg.] *εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ χρυσοῦ ἔστιν* for *γν. ἄν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἔστιν ἐλευθερίους εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ χρ.*, 5 *ἄγει* (*ἥει* marg) for *ἥει*, *αὐτὴν Βαβυλῶνα* for *Βαβ.*, 9 *ὅ τι ἂν* [*λέγῃ εἴδ*]*ητε* (supporting the corrector of G against the various readings of other MSS. and conjectures of modern editors), 12 *στρατεύματα ἔρχονται* for *στράτευμα ἀπέρχονται*, 19 *ἡμᾶς τοιούτους* for *ἡμᾶς, τοιαῦτα* for *ταῦτα*, 22 *χωρίῳ* for *φρουρίῳ*. There are also several variations in the order of words For the scholia, and the various readings to which they testify, see Wessely, *l c.*

seventeen columns (somewhat mutilated throughout) of the first book of the *Hellenica*. It is correctly written, as a rule, and generally supports the vulgate text [1]. It has about twenty peculiar variants, a few of which may possibly be right, but they are of slight importance. In several instances it confirms the received text as against modern conjectures, notably in regard to the chronological sections at the end of the second and beginning of the third chapters, which many critics have suspected. If they are insertions, they are of comparatively early date.

Finally, a small fragment of the *Memorabilia* [2], of the third century, originally published by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt, and now in the British Museum, has a few readings which are worth noting, but does not differ much from the vulgate. In one instance it confirms an early restoration of a corrupt passage, which modern editors had ignored, thus showing how difficult it is for even a correct conjecture to establish itself.

The philosophers are represented at present only by Plato, of whose works however no less than eleven papyri are extant, of which five [3] are so small as to be unimportant. The most important, both in age and in interest of text, are, no doubt, the fragments of the *Phaedo* and the *Laches* extracted by Prof. Petrie from the mummy-cases of Gurob, dating from the third century B.C. Of these the *Phaedo* is the most extensive, though it contains less than a tenth of

[1] Wessely, *ib* VI. 17, contains *Hell* I. ii. 2–v. 8, with mutilations. Notable readings: ii 7 *ἀπέπλευσεν* (so vulg) for *ἔπλευσε*, 11 *ἔπλευσαν* for *ἔπλεον*, *εὐθὺ Λέσβου* for *ἐπὶ Λ.*, 13 *δὲ* for *ὄντα*, *κατέλυσεν* (confirming MSS against *ἀπέλυσεν* of edd), §§ 19 and iii. 1 confirmed (bracketed by edd.), 5 *ἔξωθεν* for *ἔξω*, *ἐβοήθει* for *προσεβ*, 9 *ὤνπερ* for *ὅσονπερ*, *μηδὲ* for *μή*, 10 *τοῖς τε* for *τοῖς*, 11 *ἧκεν* for *ἦλθεν*, 19 *ἐπαγόμενοι* for *ὑπ*, *προδιδοίη* for *προδοίη*, *ἀπολλυμένους* (with one MS) for *-νας*. iv 2 confirms *ὄνομα* (bracketed by edd), *λέγοντες* for *καὶ ἔλεγον*, 6 *κατέσχε* for *κατεῖχε*, *μέμψησθε* for *μέμψηται*, 11 *ἔχοι* for *ἔχει* (with most MSS.), 12 *ἐπειδὴ* for *ἐπεὶ*, 14 confirms *ἄρτι* against Cobet, 15 confirms *δουλεύων* (bracketed by Dindorf), 19 *κατεῖδεν* for *κατιδὼν*, *μετ᾽ αὐτῶν* for *μετὰ τῶν*: v. 3 *ἐπιλίπη* for *ἐκλ.*, 4 *ταῦτά τε* for *ταῦτ᾽*, 7 *προύδωκεν* om, 8 *ταῦτα* om.

[2] Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri*, II. 13, now Brit Mus. Pap 995 b. The identification of the passage was made (by Prof. T. Gomperz) after publication; for an amended text of the fragment after the identification see the preface to Marchant's *Xenophontis Opera Omnia*, tom. ii (Oxford, 1900) It contains part of I iii 15–iv 3. Readings: iii. 15 it supports *ἀρκούντως* which Cobet obelized, *πολὺ* om, iv 1 supports *ὡς* against *οἷς* conjectured by Jacobs and others, *προτρέψεσθαι* for *προτρέψασθαι*, perhaps *πᾶν* for *πάντ᾽*, 2 *θεο[ῖς οὔτε εὐ]χόμενον* (confirming restoration of early editors) for *θεοῖς μὴ μαχόμενον* (A B) or *θεοῖς μηχανώμενον* (vulg), 3 supports *διθυράμβῳ* against *διθυράμβων* which was adopted by Cobet from two MSS

[3] Oxyrhynchus Papp. 24, 229, 455, 456, and Brit Mus Pap. 187 *verso*

the whole dialogue[1]. Many of its readings are very noteworthy and offer a problem of some interest. Such variants as ἢ παίδων ἕνεκα for καὶ υἱέων (p. 68 A), or ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη σωφροσύνην for περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην (p. 68 E), amount to paraphrase, and yet in neither case would one have supposed that a gloss was required to make the meaning clear, which might subsequently have made its way into the text[2]. In two cases the readings of the papyrus find support in Iamblichus, and once a reading which modern editors have adopted from Stobaeus against our MSS. finds confirmation in the papyrus. Many of the variants are only in the order of the words, often resulting in the introduction of hiatus where our later MSS. avoid it; it is obvious that this phenomenon is capable of explanation in either direction. On the whole it may be said that the new readings are not weighty in character, but their number and the extent of variation exhibited in them seem to point, just as the earliest papyri of Homer do, to the existence of a certain amount of licence in copyists of the early Ptolemaic period

A similar conclusion is indicated by the *Laches* fragments[3]; but here the exact amount of deviation from the vulgate text is left

[1] Mahaffy, *Petrie Papyri*, I. 5–8, now Brit. Mus. Pap. 488; contains portions of pp 67 E–69 A, 79 C–81 D, 82 A–84 B Notable readings: 68 A ἢ παίδων ἕνεκα for καὶ υἱέων, πολλοὶ for πολλοὶ δή, 68 B μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι om, 68 C ὧν καὶ om., 68 D ἔφη om., κακῶν εἶναι for κακῶν (with Stobaeus and edd, against MSS), να μάλα for καὶ μάλα, ἄλογον for ἄτοπον, 68 E σωφρονοῦσιν for σώφρονές εἰσι, ὅμοιον for ὅμοιον εἶναι, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀνδραποδώδη for περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη, ὑπ' ἐκείνων for ὑπ' ἄλλων, 69 A συμβαίνει δ' οὖν for ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει, 80 D τὸν γενναῖον for γενναῖον, καὶ φρόνιμον om. (or inserted after θεὸν), 80 E τάδε οὐδὲν for τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν, 81 A μετὰ θεῶν for μετὰ τῶν θεῶν, 81 B γοητευομένη for γεγοητευμένη, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ om., σοφίᾳ for φιλοσοφίᾳ, 81 C ἔφη om, ὦ φίλε om, 81 D a mutilated variant after φαντάσματα, αὐτὰς for ταύτας, 82 B ἀφικέσθαι for ἀφικνεῖσθαι, [ἡμερώ]τερον apparently for ἥμερον, 82 D ταύτῃ δὴ for ταύτῃ, πῶς λέγεις ἔφη for πῶς, 82 E τοῦ δεδέσθαι for τῷ δεδέσθαι (confirming conjecture of Heindorf), 83 B ὂν om, ᾧ δὲ αὐτὴ προσέχει for ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ, καὶ φόβων om (with Iamblichus), ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ (with Iambl.), 83 C μάλιστα δὲ εἶναι τοῦτο for τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, 83 E ἕνεκά φασιν om

[2] ἀνδραποδώδη is no doubt used with reference to the recurrence of the word in p 69 B, and may have seemed suitable on account of the use of κρατουμένοις in the next clause; but its insertion in place of εὐήθη is still very gratuitous.

[3] Mahaffy, *op. cit.* II. 50, now Bodl. MS. gr. class d 22, 23 (P); an additional fragment published by Smyly in *Hermathena*, xxv. 407. Contains pp. 189 D–191 E, with lacunas. Notable readings. 189 D καὶ before ὑμῖν om. (with Bekker), πειστέον μέντοι Λυσιμάχῳ τούτῳ for πειστέον, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, Λυσιμάχῳ, εἶχε for ἔχει, 190 E καλῶς for εὖ, 191 B τὸ ἐκείνων and τό γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων om, 191 C ὃ ἀρτὶ for αἴτιον, 191 E ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν πάντες οὗτοι ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν (apparently) for ἀνδρεῖοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν ἀλλ' οἱ μέν, πυνθάνομαι for ἐπυνθανόμην, 192 A perhaps σκελῶν [ἢ νοήμα]τ[ός τε] ἅ[μα καὶ] φωνῆς for σκ. ἢ στόματός τε καὶ φώνης ἢ διανοίας. In some other mutilated passages also the papyrus appears to have differed from the texts known to us.

uncertain by the mutilation of several passages in which the papyrus appears to have a new reading. The variants are less numerous than in the *Phaedo*, and are not fundamentally important; but where they occur internal considerations are somewhat favourable to their authenticity. They do not amount, however, to a serious disturbance of the vulgate.

Another *Laches* fragment (Oxyrhynchus Pap. 228), of the second century [1], contains a relatively large number of small variants, chiefly in the order of words. There are few obvious blunders, and the text appears to be of good quality, and the variants, though small, to deserve consideration. A fragment of the *Laws* (ix. 862 D–863 C), also from Oxyrhynchus (Pap. 23), of the third century, similarly shows some changes of order, but otherwise has no noteworthy variants, and in a few places supports the majority of our later MSS. against editorial changes [2].

The only Plato papyri which remain to be mentioned are two of the *Gorgias*. One of these, at Vienna [3], of the third century, contains only small variants, chiefly in respect of particles, it has one case of agreement with Iamblichus against our MSS. The other, an Oxyrhynchus papyrus of the second century [4], supports Iamblichus and Stobaeus twice, but generally is against them. It establishes the antiquity of an obvious blunder which is found in all our MSS. (the omission of ἄθλιοι before οἱ ἄθλιοι in 508 B, which is required by the sense), and it has several mistakes of its own, with few variants which deserve consideration. It is occasionally found supporting the Vienna MS. (F) against the Clarkianus.

The last class of authors to be mentioned is that of the orators. Of Isocrates we have two papyri which are small in extent and of

[1] Contains pp. 197 A–198 A The more notable variants are 197 A τὸ τὰς δειν[for τὸ τὰ δεινὰ, 197 C οὔκουν σέ γε for οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ἄμαχον for Λάμαχον (with two minor MSS.), 197 D μὴ and ὅδε om., τὰ πολλὰ for πολλὰ, καὶ πρέπει for καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, προεστάναι for προιστάναι (with some MSS), 197 E μέντοι που for μέντοι, ταῦτα δὴ for ταῦτα δὲ

[2] Thus it apparently retains μὲν after οὕτω (last word of p. 862), and πᾶν after πράττειν in 863 B, and reads ὃν rather than ὧν before ὁ θυμὸς (*ib.*)

[3] Wessely, *Mitth. aus d. Sammlung d Pap. Erzherzog Rainer*, II. 76; contains parts of pp 504 B–505 A. Variants · 504 C ἐμοὶ γὰρ for ἔμοιγε, 504 D ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς for ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψ., 504 E confirms ἔλαττον against conjectures βλάπτον or βλάψει, 505 A λυσιτελεῖν for -εῖ, ουκουν και for οὔκουν or οὐκοῦν (οὐκοῦν καὶ Iambl , οὔκουν καὶ some MSS.).

[4] Oxyrhynchus Pap 454, contains 507 C–508 D. Notable readings: 507 E προσφιλης εἴη for πρ. ἂν εἴη (with F, Iamblichus and Stobaeus), ὅτῳ γὰρ for ὅτῳ δὲ (with Iambl and Stob), 508 B does not insert ἄθλιοι before οἱ ἄθλιοι (with all MSS. but against sense), ἐκεῖνα om. apparently, 508 C οὐδὲ σῶσαι for οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι (with F), 508 D ἐκβαλεῖν for ἐκβάλλειν (in better harmony with ἀποκτεῖναι).

little textual importance (Oxy Pap. 27 and Amherst 25), two which deserve some slight notice, and two which are of great extent and considerable interest. The earlier of these, Brit. Mus. Pap. 132, may be referred to the first century, and is one of the longest classical texts (other than Homeric) extant upon papyrus, containing the greater part of the *De Pace*. It has lately been exhaustively studied by Drerup, whose results have not yet been published; but the incomplete collation of it which already exists[1] is probably sufficient for our present purpose, as showing the general trend of its evidence. In the criticism of Isocrates, as is well known, one MS., the Urbinas (Γ), stands out above all the rest, and has naturally been followed by modern editors wherever it is not manifestly in error. The papyrus, however, shows that such exclusive trust in a single MS., or in one family of MSS, is unsound criticism. In 123 instances it supports the Urbinas, in 54 the inferior MSS., while corrections are occasionally made in both directions. Now without going into the merits of each individual case, this distribution of evidence is sufficient to show that the division into families which we find in the mediaeval vellum MSS. had not been made at the date when our papyrus was written. Consequently, although the balance of probability remains on the side of the Urbinas, it would be very unsafe to conclude that it is invariably to be preferred to its rivals. The truth will be sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, and criticism must do its best to judge between them. The new readings of the papyrus are numerous, but not of great value.

The other MS., a papyrus at Marseilles of the third or fourth century, containing the first thirty chapters of the *In Nicoclem*[2], goes still further in its support of the so-called inferior MSS. In nineteen cases it definitely supports them against the Urbinas, and in no instance does it support the Urbinas against them. It has about thirty new readings, of which two agree with the quotations of Stobaeus and two with the conjectures of modern scholars. Several of the others seem worthy of consideration.

[1] *Classical Texts from Papyri in the British Museum*, p 63 The collation is too long to repeat here. A complete transcript will be published shortly.

[2] Schoene, in *Mélanges Graux*, p 481 ff. Notable readings: 2 *διοικῇς* for *διοικοῖς* (so conjectured by Blass), om. either *ἀναγκάζεσθαι* or *βουλεύεσθαι*, 7 *ἐλάβομεν* for *ἔλαβεν*, 8 *τὰς μοναρχίας* for *ταῖς μοναρχίαις* (so Cobet), 9 *τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν συμπίτνοντα* for *τὰ συμπίτνοντα κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν*, 10 *τούτων* for *τηλικούτων*, *μηδ' ἀμελεῖν* om., 11 adds *δοκιμάζειν* after *τὴν ἑαυτῶν*, *αὐτῶν* om., 12 adds *αὐτὰς* after *ἀξίας*, *ψυχὴν* for *φύσιν*, 20 *ταῖς δὲ ἀληθεστάταις* for *ταῖς δὲ ἀληθείαις*, 21 *ἄλλων* for *φίλων*, *τῶν ἰδίων* for *τῶν οἴκων*, *ἔργον ἐστίν* for *ἐστί*, 22 *καὶ . . . νόμιμον* om., 25 *ἐξεργάζεσθαι . . . ἐπιχειρῶσιν* om. apparently, 28 *ποιῇς ἢ λέγῃς* for *λ. ἢ π.* (with Stobaeus), 29 *ψευδῶς* om. (with Stobaeus, etc.), *ὥσπερ* for *αἴσπερ*, 30 *μὴ* after *εἶναι* om.

The two smaller fragments of Isocrates which deserve notice are both in the Rainer collection at Vienna. The earlier of these [1], which is assigned to the first or second century, contains two imperfect columns from the *Philippus*. In five cases of divergence it agrees four times with the inferior MSS. and only once with the Urbinas. The second MS. [2], like the Marseilles papyrus, belongs to the *In Nicoclem*, containing part of one broad column in a hand assigned to the fourth century. The variants are slight, and about equally divided between the Urbinas and the inferior MSS. In three cases its variants agree with those of the Marseilles papyrus.

Aeschines was wholly unrepresented among our papyri until the publication, a few months ago, of the third Oxyrhynchus volume, which contains two fragments of this orator. The first (Pap. 457) is a column from the *In Ctesiphontem* (§ 167), from a roll of the second century, which exhibits five or six interesting variants from the common text [3]; two of them have some support from other MSS., and one (*προσκαθιζήσει*, if this is the true reading of the mutilated word in the papyrus) is the reading adopted by several editors in place of the unsatisfactory texts of the MSS. The other papyrus (Pap. 458) contains a few lines of the *De Falsa Legatione*, in a hand of the third century, with some mistakes, but no important variants.

We come now in conclusion to Aeschines' great rival, of whose writings more papyri are in existence than of any other author, with the single exception of Homer. They amount to twenty in all, besides a very early vellum fragment which must be reckoned with them. Unfortunately, nearly all of them are but small fragments, and two of the longest belong to some of the least important works, the Epistles and the Προοίμια Δημηγορικά. The *De Corona* appears

[1] Wessely, *Mitth. aus d. Sammlung d. Pap. Erzherzog Rainer*, II 74, contains parts of §§ 114–117. Variants: 114 *βουλεύμασιν* for *βουλήμασιν* (with vulg., against Γ), 115 *ῥᾷον* for *ῥᾴδιον* (with vulg., against Γ), *κτήσασθαι* for *κτ σε* (with Γ, against vulg.), 116 *ἐπὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῶν* for *ἐπί τε τὰς εὐ. τὰς τῶν* (with vulg., against Γ), 117 *ἡμῖν αἰτίους* for *αἰτ. ἡμῖν* (with vulg., against Γ).

[2] Rainer Pap. 8029, Wessely, ib. IV. 136; contains parts of §§ 2–4. Variants: 2 *πολλά ἐστιν* for *ἐστὶν πολλὰ* (with Pap. Mass. against MSS.), *καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν [βουλεύεσθαι]* for *καθ' ἑκ. βουλ. τὴν ἡμέραν* (approximately with Γ), 3 *ἐπιτίθεσθαι* for *ἐπιθέσθαι* (with Mass.), *[καὶ τῶν] ποιητῶν τινες* for *τινὲς καὶ τῶν π.* (with Mass. and Γ), 4 *κατασταθῶσιν* for *καταστῶσιν* (with vulg. and Stob., against Γ), *αὐτοῖς οὐ πλησιάζουσιν* for *οὐ πλ. αὐ.* (with vulg., against Γ), *συνόντες αὐτοῖς* apparently for *συνόντες*.

[3] *συστήσασθαι* for *συστῆσαι* (with **k**), *σὺ Θετταλοὺς ἀφιστάναι σὺ γὰρ ἂν κώμην ἀποστήσειας* for *σὺ Θ. ἀφιστάναι* or *σὺ Θετταλοὺς ἀποστήσειας* (with **e k l**, followed by Blass), *πάρεστιν* for *πρόσεστιν*, *προσκαθιζήσει* probably, with the editors, against *προσκαθίζεις* and other readings, *ἄγαν προσποιήσει* for *προσποιήσῃ*.

in five papyri, all from Oxyrhynchus (Papp. 25, 230, 231, 461, 462). Of these the most important is Pap. 230, a second-century copy of §§ 40–47 [1]. The text of this is good, and the variants from the received text slight; it is chiefly noteworthy for its refusal to endorse the conjectures of modern editors. Pap. 461 has three or four variants, of very slight importance; and the three others offer nothing of interest.

The *De Falsa Legatione* is more fortunate; for besides a small fragment of papyrus (Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri*, II. 9) which has no feature of interest beyond the omission of three words, which must be due to the scribe overlooking a line in his archetype, it is represented by two leaves of vellum, written in a small hand which has nothing in common with the hands hitherto known to us in vellum MSS., but is akin rather to the hands found in certain papyri, and may be assigned to the second century [2]. It contains twenty-two chapters of the speech, with some mutilations, and consequently offers a sufficient extent of text to be really valuable. On the whole it decidedly confirms the vulgate text. It has several differences in the order of words, but larger variants are few [3]; the majority chiefly affect the tenses employed. In no case does it support Blass in his rigid application of euphonic rules. As a rule it supports the MSS. against the quotations in ancient authors, where they differ [4]. Where the MSS. are divided it by no means always supports the Paris MS. (S), which is generally regarded as the best extant MS. of Demosthenes [5]. Where it stands alone against the later MSS. the differences are generally slight, but the probabilities are not always

[1] Notable readings: 40 κέχρηνται οἱ ταλαίπωροι Θηβαῖοι (apparently), 42 om. ἴσως after μᾶλλον, ἐκείνῳ after ἑαυτοὺς (om Bekker and Blass, τῷ Φιλίππῳ most MSS), 43 εἰρήνην αὐτοὶ for εἰ. ἄσμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ (against Bekk , Blass, but with S), ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου (χρ. om. Bekk., Blass), 44 τινὰς ἐκ τῶν for τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν, 46 καὶ τἄλλ' ἃ προσήκει πάντα for καὶ πάνθ' ἃ προσῆκεν (with Hermogenes, against Blass).

[2] Brit Mus. Add. MS. 34473 (1); published in *Journal of Philology*, xxii. 247 ff , with a collation with the text of Blass.

[3] The larger variants are § 20 the insertion of ὑπὲρ Φωκέων after εἰπεῖν, 30 ἀπώλεσε τὸ καθ' αὑτὸν for ἀπώλεσεν ἂν καθ' ἑαυτὸν, 31 ἵνα γνῶτε for ἵν' εἰδῆθ'.

[4] E. g. § 17 ἀληθῆ for τἀληθῆ (with MSS., against Aristides), 23 οὔτε πιστεύειν ἠβούλεσθε ἄλλα πλὴν for οὔτε πιστεύειν ἐβούλεσθε πλὴν (with MSS , against Priscian), 24 οἱ δ' ἀντιλέγοντες for ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων (with MSS., against Libanius), 30 πολλάκις ἀνθρώποις and παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις (omitted by Sopater and Schol. Plat Alcib. II. 147 D).

[5] E g. § 13 ὧν προειρήκει with Q marg. (ὥνπερ εἶπον εἰρήκει S Q, ὧν ὅπερ εἶπον εἰρήκει vulg), 21 αὐτῷ with most MSS. (ἑαυτῷ S), 22 εἶναι δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο (εἶναι μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο S L O Y, εἶναι μέντοι τι καὶ ἄλλο vulg.), 30 τῶν Φωκέων with F Q etc. (τῶν om. S).

in favour of our MS., and sometimes are clearly against it. On the whole, therefore, a very conservative MS.

The *Philippics* appear in two instances (Amherst Pap. 24, of *Phil.* ii. 1. 5, fourth century, on vellum, and Fayum Towns Pap. 8, of *Phil.* iii. 38–40, 42, second century); but neither has any important readings. A papyrus of the *In Phormionem* (Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri*, II 10) has two new readings in as many chapters[1]. Of two papyri of the *Contra Timocratem* (Oxy. Papp. 232, 233) one contains nothing of importance, the other has one departure from the MSS (§ 57 ἥνπερ ἐκείνων for ἥνπερ τῶν ἐπ' ἐκείνων, where several MSS., including S, omit τῶν), but otherwise supports the MSS. against the alterations introduced by Blass. Oxyrhynchus Pap. 459, a large leaf from a papyrus codex of the third century, containing ten chapters (110–119) of the *Contra Aristocratem*, exhibits a text generally correct, the variants being unimportant and in almost all cases already otherwise known[2]. It shows no special adhesion to any one MS. or group of MSS. Pap. 460, of the *De Pace* (§§ 21, 23, early third century) has one marked new reading, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτοῖς κέρδος ἦν for οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει εἶναι (where, however, if either is a gloss, it is the reading of the papyrus), and one confirmation of the Paris MS. (the omission of εἶναι in § 23) against the rest of the MSS. These two variants are of some interest.

A Berlin papyrus (P. 5879) of the first or second century, containing a mutilated text of about seven chapters of the *In Leptinem* (84–91), has three slightly noteworthy readings[3], but otherwise gives a correct representation of the vulgate. A well-written fragment of the *Contra Meidiam* (§§ 41, 42) exhibits one trifling mistake, but no new readings. More extensive is an Oxyrhynchus papyrus (Pap. 26) of the Προοίμια Δημηγορικά, containing seven columns in a hand of the first or second century. It confirms one conjecture (Wolf's κοινῶν for κοινῶς in § 26, accepted by Blass), and has three or four good readings besides[4]. It does not support Blass's strict theory of ellipses.

[1] § 6 retains δραχμάς after χιλίας (with S F Q, against Bekker), 7 ποιῆσαι (after ἤμελλε) for ποιήσειν (vulg) or ποιεῖν (F Q, which also omit πᾶσι).

[2] § 113 τί δή ποτε τὸ αἴτιον for τί δή ποτ' αἴτιον (with F), καὶ τὰ παρόντα for τὰ π., 114 πολεμεῖν ἐστιν for πολεμεῖν, ἔχοι for ἔχει (with most MSS.), ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ for ἑαυτοῦ (with **k r s v**), 116 τοίνυν inserted by corrector after τοῦτο, between πεισθῆτε and εἰδότες there was apparently more than κἀκεῖνο, 117 τουτονὶ for τοῦτον (with **k r s v**), 118 καὶ φίλον deleted by corrector, in agreement with S.

[3] § 87 παρ' ὑμῖν for ἐν ὑμῖν (with **G t v**), ὡς ἂν om , 88 om. ἂν before ἀντείποι (haplography).

[4] § 26 νῦν βεβουλευμένων for νῦν μὲν βουλομένων, οἷς for οἷα (with F), ἀκοῦσαι συν[for ἀκ. τούτων, 29 ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο for τοῦτο δὴ τοῦτο (τοῦτο δὴ ταὐτὸ Reiske), ἔτι for ὁτιοῦν.

Passing by two or three unimportant scraps, there remains only the British Museum papyrus of the greater part of the third Epistle[1]. This is an exceptionally early MS., belonging to the first century B.C., it is also the longest extant papyrus of Demosthenes. Its text is good, and is generally on the side of the Paris MS. (S). It has, however, several marked variants which are peculiar to itself, and which certainly require attention on the part of future editors. The most noticeable is in § 13, where we find *ἐν παρρησίᾳ ζῶντες* for *ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ παιδείας μετέχοντες*. Others are § 4 *τοὺς μὲν βοηθήσοντας τῷ πλήθει* for *τοὺς μὲν βοηθήσαντας ἂν τῷ δήμῳ*, *ibid.* *εἵλετο ἃ συμφέρειν ᾤετο* for *εἴχετο τούτων ἃ συμφέρειν ἡγεῖτο*, and several substitutions of synonyms, such as *μῆκος* for *πλῆθος*, *προσήκει* for *συμφέρει*, *μᾶλλον* for *μεῖζον*, *πλήρης* for *μεστός*, *κ τ λ*. In one case where the later MSS. are certainly corrupt it provides a sound reading (§ 30 *ἂν ἔδειξεν* for *ἀνέχεσθε*). It would seem as if the text of the letters was not much cared for, and deteriorated in later copies more than is the case with the orations. It is also noteworthy that this papyrus confirms a much larger proportion of editorial conjectures than is generally the case. No less than ten such conjectures thus receive now documentary support from a manuscript of very early date and apparently good character.

This concludes our survey in detail of the materials provided by the papyri hitherto discovered; it remains to consider the general results to which they would seem to point. On a broad, general view the result is reassuring. Taken in the mass the papyri confirm the authenticity of our generally received texts. The hypothesis that difficulties and obscurities in the classics are due to extensive corruption by ignorant scribes in the later Byzantine period may now be ruled out of court altogether. We have evidence, reaching back in most cases to the second century and not unfrequently some centuries earlier still, which is unanimous in assuring us that the classical texts of the age of the Antonines were substantially identical with those which we have hitherto known from manuscripts of the eleventh and later centuries. More than that, it can be affirmed that the best vellum MSS. of these later ages are often superior in correctness to the papyri. Nor is it unnatural that this should be the case, when once the hypothesis of Byzantine corruption has been exploded; for the vellum MSS. no doubt represent the tradition of the libraries, where good archetypes and trained scribes and revisers would be available, while the papyri must often be the work of

[1] Brit Mus Pap. 133; collation in *Classical Texts from Papyri in the British Museum*, p. 56 ff.

provincial scribes with limited resources or even of private individuals.

In general, then, the result is reassuring; but there are some qualifications in detail which require consideration. In the comparatively few instances in which papyri take us back to the earlier part of the Ptolemaic period, there are signs of greater instability in our texts than in later periods. The earliest Homeric papyri, the Petrie *Phaedo*, to some extent the Demosthenic Epistle papyrus, give indications to this effect Texts with frequent, if not individually important, variations from the vulgate would seem to have been far from uncommon at this period. This is a fact which criticism has to take note of, though its practical bearings are less important than at first sight may seem to be the case. At first sight the natural inference would seem to be that our present texts are due to the activity of the famous Alexandrian critics, who, it might be said, formed a standard text in accordance with their own critical views, and handed it down to subsequent generations. With regard, however, to the most important case, that of the Homeric poems, we have ample evidence that this is not the case. It has been conclusively shown by Ludwich, and confirmed by others—not from the papyri, but from quotations, scholia, and other sources—that the vulgate text existed before the days of Aristarchus and his colleagues, and that it persisted through and after that age, practically unaffected by their critical labours. The same, there is every reason to conclude, was the case with other authors. The period of Alexandrian criticism may well have been one of some unsettlement in textual matters, and may have led to the bringing to light of divergent texts in different parts of the Greek world; but the vulgate text, however formed and from whatever source derived, seems to have persisted through it, unaffected to any material extent by the theories of the critics. Probably a conservative tendency in the traditions of the libraries and the scribes counteracted the more revolutionary leanings of individual scholars.

An examination of the internal evidence leads to the same result; for the quality of the new readings contained in these early papyri is not in favour of their authenticity. In the case of Homer it may safely be maintained that none of the more marked novelties presented by the papyri of the third century B.C. has any claim to acceptance; and though some of the readings of the Petrie Platos are of better character, yet the total amount of modification in our received texts which any editor would be likely to make on the strength of them is assuredly small. On the whole, therefore, the earliest papyri, in

spite of their difference in character from their successors, do not materially affect our conclusion as to the authenticity of our generally received texts.

Nevertheless it would be a mistake to conclude that the papyri have no influence on the course of textual criticism. If on a broad view they confirm the integrity of our existing texts, in other respects their evidence is less satisfactory. No one would deny that many errors have found their way into our tradition, that many passages have come down to us in a corrupt state. The papyri as yet discovered touch upon only an infinitesimally small proportion of these, and, where they do, they do not always remove the difficulty. Some errors are shown to be of earlier origin even than our papyri, and, where the papyri do help us, they so rarely (on the whole) confirm the conjectures which critics have proposed, as to make us doubt the power of modern scholarship to arrive at correct conclusions without their aid. It is in this direction, in its bearing upon the powers and limitations of critical theory, that the evidence of the papyri is perhaps most valuable and interesting.

In the foregoing survey of the individual papyri, some instances were quoted of the confirmation of modern critical conjectures by recently discovered papyri; and in these it is possible that some of the earlier and more obvious corrections, made by scholars when modern criticism was younger, and since generally adopted in all printed editions, have been overlooked. But it cannot be denied that in general the papyri do not support the conjectures of modern scholars. When they do the variations have generally been quite small; in no case, it may safely be said, has any sweeping change been justified by the papyri.

Of the two aids upon which textual criticism is wont to rely in dealing with a doubtful text, the acumen of the critic and the scientific handling of the documentary evidence, the former is thus shown to be of very limited value. The chances against successful divination are great; and, even if a critic should chance to be right, it is hardly possible to demonstrate his success. Consequently the presumption will always be against any emendation (except the simpler corrections of a newly discovered text), until documentary evidence can be produced in its support. But when documentary evidence is producible, then critical scholarship has its proper function, to decide between the alternatives offered, and often to prefer the evidence of a single witness to that of a considerable number. But even here the papyri have weakened its resources. The favourite method of modern scholarship, and one by which much has been

gained in textual criticism, has been to endeavour to trace the relationships of the various manuscripts of an author, to divide them into families, to determine which manuscript or family represents the best tradition, and then to follow the evidence of this family or manuscript in almost all cases of doubt But the papyri have shown us decisively in some cases, and allow us to argue by analogy to others, that these family-divisions are of relatively late origin, and that the better MSS. have no sort of monopoly of ancient and correct readings. In future, though still, in default of better means of arriving at the truth, the critical editor will own a general allegiance to the best manuscript or group among his authorities (and it may be placed to the credit of modern criticism that its judgements as to which are the best MSS. are generally supported by the papyri), yet he will have to be prepared to find the truth not unfrequently among the witnesses who usually are inferior, and to exercise a freer judgement in deciding between them. In this respect critical insight will regain some of the liberty of which the demonstration of its limited capacities in the sphere of conjectural emendation has deprived it, though even so it will behove the critic to go softly, in view of the possibility that the explorer's spade may any day bring his imaginations to a decisive and indisputable test.

[Since this paper was set up in type the fourth volume of *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* and the Berlin papyrus containing the scholia of Didymus on Demosthenes have been published. The former includes twenty-nine fragments of the *Iliad* and eleven of the *Odyssey*, with no very notable readings; Hesiod, *Shield* 466–80, with two new variants; Sophocles, *Electra* 993–1007 (995 ποτε βλέψασα with one MS., 996 ὁπλίζῃ with MSS. for the ὁπλίζει of editors); Apollonius Rhodius, iii. 727–45 (739 om., with MSS., 745 ναυτίλοι, confirming Porson's conjecture against the ναῦται of the MSS.) and 908–13 (909 μετὰ for κατὰ, confirming Stephanus' conjecture), iv. 77–90; Theocritus, xiii. 19–34; Herodotus, v. 104–5; Thucydides, iv. 28–35 (parts of six more columns of the MS. described on p. 14, with several interesting readings, notably the confirmation of τοῦ θαρσεῖν τὸ πλεῖστον in ch. 34. 1); Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, I. vi. 3-11 (not agreeing with either of the two main families of MSS., but generally supporting that represented by D, Bodl, and Stobaeus), and the last sentences of book I, in which is included the clause (τοιαῦτα μὲν . . . Περσίδος) which generally stands as the beginning of book II, Theophrastus, *Characters*, 25, 26, in a form even more compressed than the common one, Demosthenes, *De Cor.*, pp. 230, 231; *Contra Timocr.*, pp. 720,

721, *Contra Boeotum*, pp. 1023, 1024, Aeschines, *In Ctes.* §§ 94, 96 (ζώντων before or instead of δρώντων, ἀπορίαν ἔσεσθαι for ἔσ. ἀπ., ταῦτα μὲν δὴ for ταῦτα μὲν); Isocrates, *Contra Sophistas*, §§ 16–18. More important is the Didymus papyrus, which contains considerable extracts from *Phil.* IV and the speeches on the Epistle of Philip and περὶ συντάξεως, in the form of *lemmata* to the scholia. As usual, the readings of the papyrus are not revolutionary, and do not support any one family of MSS exclusively or very predominantly, but on the whole it agrees most with the better MSS., and especially with S. Altogether there is nothing in the new evidence to modify the conclusions of this paper.]

THE CENTENARY OF KANT'S DEATH

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read February 12, 1904

IMMANUEL KANT, to do honour to whom, and in grateful commemoration of whose services to philosophy, we have assembled on this twelfth day of February, 1904, which is the centenary of his death,—Immanuel Kant was born in the city of Konigsberg, the capital of East Prussia, on April 22, 1724. His father, who was of Scottish extraction, was a leather-strap cutter, working for himself in a small way, in that city. Immanuel was one of a large family. He owed much to the careful training and religious teaching of his mother, whom, however, he lost early in life, at the age of thirteen, and to the regular domestic habits of the household. His schoolboy days were passed at the *Collegium Fridericianum* in Konigsberg under the head-mastership of Franz Albert Schultz, by whom among others he may have been made familiar, later in life, with the current Leibniz-Wolf philosophy, which his own was destined to supersede; Schultz being also a Professor in the University, and a convinced expositor of that elaborate scholastic form into which Christian Wolf had thrown, or with which he had incorporated, the newest philosophical ideas of the day, those of Leibniz. At the age of sixteen and a half Kant entered as a student at the University of Konigsberg, selecting Mathematics and Philosophy in the wide sense as his special departments, in which he attended the lectures of Professor J. G. Teske and enjoyed the instruction and friendship of Professor Martin Knutzen, who gave him the run of his own library, and made him acquainted with the works of the English Newton. These studies bore fruit in Kant's first publication, *Thoughts on the True Way of Estimating Living Forces* (*vis viva*), in 1747. Schultz's lectures in Theology he also attended.

On completing his student course, Kant decided for the profession of a teacher, and earned his living for nine years as a tutor in private families. His father's death in the year 1746 had left him entirely dependent on his own exertions. In 1755 he took the degree of Doctor, and qualified as a Privatdocent at the University, his

inaugural dissertation being entitled *De Igne*, which was followed soon after by his *Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidatio*. He worked steadily in this capacity for fifteen years, till the year 1770, when he was appointed to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysic, the duties of which office he continued to perform till forced to relinquish them, shortly before his death in his eightieth year, by the advancing infirmities of age.

Kant's life was thus the purely academical life of a student and teacher. It would seem that he seldom left Konigsberg, and was never beyond the boundary of the province of East Prussia. Short in stature, slight in figure, and far from robust in constitution, but at the same time endued with a deep and genuine love of knowledge for its own sake, as well as with a strict sense of morality, the student's life was one for which he was eminently fitted, and fitted to adorn. A glance at the list of his works, with their dates, which is given in the collected edition of Rosenkranz and Schubert, will show the wide range of subjects in which he was at home. Physics, Astronomy, Anthropology, and Theology seem to have been his favourites. His work entitled *General Natural History of the Heavens on Newtonian Principles*, written in 1755 and dedicated to the King, Frederick the Great, which has been compared to Laplace's theory which appeared long afterwards on the same subject, was deprived of effective publication at the time by the failure of a bookseller at Leipsic Fair. (I take this fact, along with the others relating to Kant's life, from the late Professor W. Wallace's *Kant*, in Dr. W. Knight's series of Philosophical Classics, published by Messrs. Blackwood, which again is itself based upon Schubert's *Life of Kant*, contained in the collected edition above mentioned.) Kant was never satisfied till he had, as it were, worked out to the end, and obtained a full *rationale* of, any subject which offered problems or suggested questions requiring an answer, and so had arrived at the ultimate *data* involved in it, and the law of their combination. The honesty and thoroughness with which he worked at this task, whatever were the subjects in hand, are that which make his writings so extremely valuable and instructive. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri*,—so at any rate may one say who belongs in philosophy to an opposite school of thought, the school of those whose aim is to arrive at a true analysis of experience, and who may be called Experientialists, as opposed to those who proceed by speculating on its sources and its validity, and who may properly be designated *A priorists*. And if Kant himself were present with us to-day, I would appeal to him in extenuation of my temerity in undertaking this Address, and say—Suffer yourself

to be commended—*Sit fas et ab hoste laudari*—where truth is the common object, all enemies are friends.

But I have yet to mention that part of Kant's intellectual activity which is his most enduring title to renown, the Critical or Transcendental Philosophy. If Kant's activity had ceased before his bringing out the first edition of *The Kritik of the Pure Reason* in 1781, his fifty-seventh year, his influence on the thought of civilized man would have been comparatively slight, and we should not have assembled here to-day to celebrate his memory. It was because it affected the subjective aspect of experience, our knowledge or surmise of the universe, of which we find ourselves inhabitants, as distinguished from the objective aspect of that experience, the universe of persons and things as it appears to be in itself independently of experience, that Kant's new theory of the composition of experience had such far-reaching and spirit-stirring effects. It was a theory of the generating principles or factors of that experience as such. This world and the material universe of which it was a part, said Kant, we knew only by means of, or as part of, our experience; then how came about our experience itself, how was it composed, what was its value? It could not come as a direct impression or picture from the world or the material universe as they appeared to be independently of ourselves, because, as they so appeared to be, they were the *result* of our experiencing,—they might contain, or be the appearance of, some factors of that experience, but we ourselves, as we appeared to ourselves, must contain others, which did not appear, but which were no less essential.

Kant's answer to this question, the theory which he devised to answer it, speaking broadly, was this,—Our faculties, the faculties of our apperceptive Ego (which never appeared as *in itself* it was), worked in modes which supplied certain definite Forms, into which the Matter (as he called it) of Sense or Feeling was cast on coming into contact with our faculties, and in virtue of which it appeared as the ordered experience of our empirical Ego on the one hand, and of a material world and universe on the other. 'Reason,' says Kant in the Introduction to the first edition of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, 'is the faculty which supplies us with the principles of *a priori* knowledge. Hence Pure Reason is that which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely *a priori*.' Its forms, therefore, according to Kant, spring from, and connect us with, what would otherwise be wholly transcendent and unknowable; as connecting us with the transcendent they are transcendental. 'I call all knowledge *transcendental*,' he says, 'which busies itself not only with

objects but with our *a priori* conceptions of objects generally. The name for a System of such conceptions would be a Transcendental Philosophy' (Rosenkranz und Schubert's edition of *Collected Works*, in twelve volumes, 8vo, Leopold Voss, Leipzig, 1838-42, Vol. II. pp. 24 and 25). Many faculties are thus included under that of Reason (*Vernunft*) in this large sense.

Our faculty of Intuition (*Anschauung*) casts the matter of sense into its own *a priori* forms of Space and Time. Our faculty of Understanding (*Verstand*) works in forms, called by Kant Categories, which are the means of our rationally thinking, or reducing to rationality, any relation between feelings or forms, whether real or imaginary, so as to form concepts of objects. The Categories are twelve in number, three under each of the four heads of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. For applying the Categories to objects in Space and Time our faculty of Judgement (*Urtheilskraft*) works in special forms called Schemata. These are the Schema of Substance, the Schema of Cause and Causality, the Schema of Mutual or Reciprocal Action, the Schema of Possibility, the Schema of Reality (*Wirklichkeit*), and the Schema of Necessity. 'The Schemata,' says Kant, 'are therefore nothing but Time-determinations *a priori*, according to rules, and these apply, following the order of the Categories, to the Time-series, the Time-content, the Time-order, the Time-comprehension in respect of all possible objects' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Rosenkranz und Schubert's edition, Vol. II. p. 128. The passage appears also unaltered in the second edition of the *Kritik*). 'The schemata, then,' says Wallace in the work already cited, p. 173, 'are the true scientific categories. They are in Kant's words, "the true and only conditions for securing to the categories a bearing upon objects—of giving them, in short, import and meaning."'

Our Judgement-faculty, says Kant, works in two ways, analytically and synthetically; analytically it is busied only with a given object and what is already contained therein; its first principle is the Axiom of Contradiction (*Satz des Widerspruchs*), a principle which belongs to, and is applied by, ordinary formal Logic;—'What is contradictory of any given object cannot be predicated of it.' Ordinary formal Logic, however (*die allgemeine Logik*), has nothing whatever to do with explaining the possibility of Synthetic Judgements, these judgements being those in which, says Kant, 'I go out beyond a given object or concept, in order to bring something not contained therein into relation with it;—a relation, therefore, which is never one of Identity or of Contradiction, and in asserting

which the truth or error of the Judgement itself is not to be seen.' And again, 'The highest principle of all synthetic judgements is therefore this: Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.' This distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, and the essential part which synthetic judgements play in the production of experience, seems to have been considered by Kant as perhaps the most important among all the several corner-stones of his system as a whole. We must have a power of synthesising impressions, it is that power which is most essential to experience. 'The possibility of experience,' he says, 'is that which gives objective reality to all our *a priori* cognitions.' And again, 'Since therefore experience as empirical synthesis is the only mode of cognition which gives reality to all other synthesis, it follows that experience, as *a priori* cognition, has truth (agreement with the object known) only when it contains nothing more than what is necessary for the synthetic unity of experience generally.' (The four foregoing passages appear in both the first and second editions of the *Kritik*.)

It was in its finding a suitable place for, and giving a satisfactory account of, the sense of *necessity* in some parts and domains of our knowledge, as for instance in Logic and in Mathematics, that Kant saw the great and decisive advantage of his own theory over that which preceded it, so far as that was based merely on the Leibnizian principle of there being a Sufficient Reason for the real existence of things, as distinguished from their logical possibility. 'How,' he asks in his Essay on *The Progress of Metaphysic since Leibniz and Wolf*, an Essay belonging to the later years of his life, 'can a Leibnizian (who knows of no *a priori* intuition of Space) maintain the necessity of Space having three and only three dimensions, since this representation of it, as he himself maintains, is of merely empirical origin, which affords no justification for the attribution of necessity?' (Rosenkranz und Schubert, Vol. I. p. 512).

The Principles (*Grundsatze*) of the Pure Understanding are next enumerated, and brought under the four heads: (1) Axioms of Intuition, (2) Anticipations of Perception, (3) Analogies of Experience, and (4) Postulates of empirical thinking generally. In treating of these Principles, there is inserted, though only in the second and later editions, a *Refutation of Idealism* of the Berkeleyan type. And then comes the well-known chapter on the Distinction of all Objects into *Phaenomena* and *Noumena*, with an Appendix on the *Amphiboly of the Reflective Conceptions*, the amphiboly arising from our comparing conceptions together, without first ascertaining

that they belong to one and the same cognizing faculty, that is, whether they belong to Sensibility or to Understanding. There are four relations under which concepts forming part of a complex state of mind can be relevant to one another—Sameness and Difference of Kind; Accordance and Discordance; Inner and Outer; the Determinable and its Determination (Matter and Form). Ascertaining this reference constitutes a Transcendental Topic. 'We can compare concepts together logically,' says Kant, 'without troubling ourselves to inquire to what domain they belong, whether to the Understanding as *Noumena*, or to Sensibility as *Phenomena*. But when we would approach the Objects, with the purpose of applying those concepts in understanding them, then transcendental Reflection (*Ueberlegung*) is requisite, in the first place, to see whether the concepts to be applied belong to the Understanding or to Sensibility. Without this Reflection I make a very uncertain use of the concepts, and there arise fictitious synthetic principles, which the critical Reason cannot recognize, but which are founded solely on a transcendental amphiboly, that is, a wavering to and fro between objects of pure understanding and phenomena' (Rosenkranz und Schubert, Vol. II. p. 221. The passage appears also in the second edition). Kant maintains that Leibniz's *Intellectuelles System der Welt*, as he calls it, was largely based on this insecure foundation. Leibniz, he says, intellectualized phenomena of sense; Locke, on the other hand, sensibilized concepts of the understanding.

Kant ends this whole division of his work with an explanation of the four senses in which the word *Nothing* (*Nichts*) is used:—

Nothing.

1. Empty Concept without Object (*Ens Rationis*).
2. Missing Object of a Concept (*Nihil Privativum*).
3. Empty Intuition without Object (*Ens Imaginarium*).
4. Missing Object without Concept (*Nihil Negativum*).

Kant has now completed the first Division of his Transcendental Logic, its Analytic, and passes to the second and concluding Division, the Transcendental Dialectic, the domain or field of operation of the faculty of Pure Reason itself in its strict sense, which Kant characterizes as the seat of transcendental *Schein*, mere Appearance, or Illusion. It was his criticism, or critical examination and theory of the Pure Reason in its operations under this Division of the subject, which gained for Kant the title of *der Alles-zermalmende*, the all-shattering, Kant. The first Division of Kant's *Kritik* is thus directed against Scepticism, the second against Dogmatism. His opening sentence is—'We have above named the Dialectic generally, a Logic

of Illusion (*Schein*).' Its principles carry it, the Pure Reason, beyond the region of possible experience; they are not only *a priori* and transcendental to experience, but they hypostasise pure concepts or notions, and are, along with their objects, transcendent principles, transcendent objects. Yet this operation is unavoidable and necessarily involved in the logical function of the Pure Reason itself. What the Reason seeks in logical syllogizing is—'to find the Unconditioned which conditions any given cognition of the Understanding, and so completes it as an Unity' (Ros. u. Sch, Vol. II p. 249).

The first Book of the Dialectic treats of the Transcendent Reason-Concepts of the Pure Reason, which Kant calls *Ideas*; the second and concluding Book treats of the transcendent and dialectical conclusions of the Pure Reason. first, its *Paralogisms* relating to the Soul, second, its *Antinomies* relating to the Cosmos; and third, its *Ideals* relating to God. 'All pure concepts whatever have to do,' says Kant, 'with the synthetic Unity of Representations (*Vorstellungen*), but concepts of the Pure Reason (transcendental Ideas) have to do with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions. Consequently all transcendental Ideas may be brought under three classes: first, the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the Thinking Subject; second, the absolute unity of the series of Conditions of Phenomena; and third, the absolute unity of the Condition of all Objects of thought generally' (Ros. u. Sch., Vol. II. p. 269)

Now, what is it which renders all this business of the Pure Reason illusory, and reduces it to a mere appearance, as we have seen that in Kant's view it is? It is the circumstance that Ideas of the Reason are formed out of pure concepts of the Understanding alone, concepts which can never be themselves given in experience, though they are that form of thought upon which all our understanding of experience is founded. They treat these pure concepts as if they were concrete experiences, consisting of sensibility or sensible imagery as well as of forms of thought. At p. 258, Vol. II, of the Ros. u. Sch. edition, he gives a *scala* of modes of representing objects, which makes this clear. 'The *genus*,' he says, 'is *Vorstellung* at large (*repraesentatio*). Under it stands *Vorstellung* with consciousness (*perceptio*). A Perception which relates solely to the Subject as a modification of its state is *Empfindung* (*sensatio*), an objective perception is cognition, *Erkenntniss* (*cognitio*). This is either Intuition or Concept, *Anschauung* or *Begriff* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former of these refers immediately to the object, and is singular (*einzeln*), the latter is mediated by a mark, something which may be common to a plurality

of things The Concept is either an empirical or a pure concept; and the pure concept, so far as it has its origin solely in the Understanding (not in the pure Image of Sensibility), is called *Notio*. A concept formed out of Notions, which goes beyond the possibility of being experienced, is the *Idea* or *Reason-concept*. Any one who has accustomed himself to this mode of distinguishing, must find it intolerable to hear the representation of a red colour called an *Idea*. It is not even to be called a Notion, or Understanding-concept.'

Yet, notwithstanding all the foregoing destructive criticism of his own Ideas on Kant's part, the Ideas of the Pure Reason are not wholly and entirely illusory, the source of mere appearance only. True, they are not constitutive of Realities, but, since they are involved in the nature and operation of the faculty of Pure Reason itself, they are necessarily regulative of its procedure, supply the goals or ideal ends towards which the efforts of our thought should be directed, and keep us away from following arbitrary fancies. As Wallace expresses it, in the work already cited, pp. 182-3.—

'The ideas, strictly as ideal, have a legitimate and a necessary place in human thought They express the unlimited obligation which thought feels laid upon itself to unify the details of observation, they indicate an anticipated and postulated convergence between the various lines indicated by observation, even though observation may show that the convergence will never visibly be reached; or they are standards and model types towards which experience may, and indeed must, if she is true to the cause of truth, conceive herself bound to approximate. Such is the function of ideas, as regulative; they govern and direct the action of intellect in the effort to systematize and centralize knowledge. Our thought is thus guided by its own threefold maxims of homogeneity, specification, and continuity; the first of which enjoins the unlimited reduction of special laws and forms to more general, the second demands indefinite liberty to mark out distinctions, and the third insists upon gradual and unbroken passage from species to species Even the more concrete forms of the ideas have their use. The idea of a supreme intelligence, as regulative of the universe, serves as a clue to suggest the discovery of new relationships in the objects of nature. The idea of a soul serves to supply a principle of unity for our study of the mental phenomena; and the idea of the world serves to keep before us the way in which natural phenomena are always indicating an increasing unity and interdependence'

Moreover, and this is an important point in estimating Kant's theory as a whole, the Ideas, being strictly ideal, and not verifiable or realizable in experience, supply us with the possibility of introducing another kind of Causality, besides the familiar one through invariable Laws of Nature, namely, a Causality through Freedom in rational beings, which, though not verifiable, is also for the same reasons not disprovable, by our actual experience.

In the remaining and much shorter Part, which completes the

whole work, the Doctrine of Method (*Methodenlehre*)—the whole of the first Part being styled Doctrine of Elements (*Elementarlehre*)—Kant seems to be making use of this Regulative Function of the Pure Reason. The whole of it is distributed under four heads — first, its Discipline, which treats of dogma, polemics, hypotheses, and proof; second, its Canon, treating of its ultimate End or Purpose, its ideal of the *Summum Bonum*, and the relative nature and value of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief; third, its Architectonic, or the Systematic Construction combining its parts; and fourth, Its History, in which the views of some few philosophers, beginning with the Greeks, are alone touched upon, and that with extreme brevity.

The publication of the first edition of the *Kritik of the Pure Reason* in 1781 marked an important epoch in the development, not of Kant's philosophical thought only, but in that of Germany and of Europe. Its centenary was celebrated in this country by the publication of the late Professor Max Muller's English Translation of it, and in Germany by the appearance of the first volume of Dr. H Vaihinger's careful and seemingly exhaustive Commentary, a work still in progress (W. Spemann, Stuttgart). It was a splendid and assiduous effort of thought, kept up by Kant for many years, which enabled him to carry it to completion—by no means a case of a theory rapidly worked out—to make room and account for some new insight, or some newly discovered facts. It required the devotion of a student inspired by a deep and genuine faith in the trustworthiness of rational thought, not in speculative matters only, but also in matters of practice, social and political, in morals and in religion. It is Kant as a man that we are led to venerate by a study of this, the great work of his life, which is the foundation of those later works which completed his system, the *Kritik of the Practical Reason* in 1788, and the *Kritik of the Judgement* (*Urtheilskraft*) in 1790.

Kant, we have already seen, qualified as *Privatdocent* in the University of Konigsberg in the year 1755. Now it was in that very year that there appeared Sulzer's translation of Hume's *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*—so says Wallace, in the work already cited, p. 117, adding that in the very next year Kant is found recommending it to his class. It is, then, to the period beginning at that date or shortly afterwards, that we may refer that 'rousing from dogmatic slumber' which Kant in the *Prolegomena* (1783) says that he had received many years before from David Hume, and which he says 'gave a wholly different direction to my investigations in the region of Speculative Philosophy' (Ros. u. Sch.,

Vol. III. p. 9) The early part of his period of intellectual ferment thus coincided, or nearly so, with the Seven Years' War. Several works written between 1762 and 1766 seem to contain indications of the new lines of thought then opening before him. Among these may be mentioned: the *False Subtilty of the Four Syllogistic Figures*, 1762; *Attempt to introduce Negative Quantities into Philosophy*, 1763; *The only possible Ground of Strict Proof of God's Existence*, 1763; *Observed Facts relating to the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, 1764; and *Dreams of a Spirit-seer* (meaning Swedenborg) *illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysic* (meaning Leibniz), 1766. To which may be added his Dissertation *De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis*, 1770, on occasion of his being called to the Professorship of Logic and Metaphysic. After that there followed a very decided lull in his production of works for the press—a lull which it would seem was broken only once, and then only by his *Program* in preparation for his University Lectures *On the Different Races of Men*, in 1775—until with 1781 came the publication of the first edition of the *Kritik of the Pure Reason*.

But the period immediately following that publication in 1781 was one of very great activity. The greatest interest and attention had been aroused by it, and Kant himself was aware that his system was, as yet, very far from completion. The application of its results to the whole range of human action and in elucidation of natural phenomena had still to be given. To mention only the most important of the works belonging to this period—in 1783 appeared the *Prolegomena to any Metaphysic which in the future may lay claim to a Scientific Character*; in 1785, the *Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals*; in 1786 the *Metaphysical Bases of Natural Science*, in 1787 the second edition of the *Kritik of the Pure Reason*; in 1788 the Articles *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy*, and that work which perhaps of all others fixed the attention of the public, the *Kritik of the Practical Reason*; in 1790 the last of the three works which together contain Kant's whole system—the *Kritik of the Judgement-faculty* (*Urtheilskraft*), in two Parts, the first of which treats of Aesthetics and the sense of the Beautiful and the Sublime, and the second of the Teleology in Nature. But the works now mentioned are very far from representing Kant's whole output, in these years and onwards to the close of his life. For this I must again refer to the list of works given by Rosenkranz and Schubert in the eleventh volume of their collected edition.

Nor can I attempt to give even a sketch of the line of argument followed by the two great *Kritiks*—the *Kritik of the Practical Reason*

and the *Kritik of the Judgement-faculty*. I restrict myself to calling attention to what is in Kant's own estimation the central idea, the central fact, in his whole system, giving unity to all its branches, the idea and fact of *Freedom*, exhibited by him as the essential characteristic of Reason as a Reality or Rational Agency, or in other words of a Will which is Rational, giving to itself the law under which it acts—a law, therefore, which is binding *a priori* upon all rational creatures, and constitutes what Kant calls a *Categorical Imperative*, as opposed to a conditional imperative, or one binding only supposing it is desired to attain a particular End. The absolute generality or universality of this law, its being inherent in the very nature of a rational activity, is that which constitutes its moral necessity, and the Freedom of that activity belongs to its essence simply as activity or active power. This Categorical Imperative belongs, therefore, to the Form, not the Matter, of Actions, and is thus expressed by Kant, 'Fundamental Law of the Pure Practical Reason,—Act so, that the Maxim of thy Will can always at the same time be valid as the Principle of an Universal Lawgiving' (Ros. u. Sch., Vol. VIII. p. 141). The Freedom of the Will does not consist in its being free from Law, but in its *autonomy*, or acting according to a law which as an activity it prescribes to itself, or which is its form as an activity.

'The Concept of Freedom,' writes Kant in the Preface to the *Kritik of the Practical Reason*, 'so far as its reality is proved by an apodeictic law of the Practical Reason, is the key-stone to the entire structure of a system of the pure, including even the speculative reason; and all other concepts (those of God and Immortality), which as mere Ideas remain in this latter without holdfast, now cleave to this concept of Freedom, and by it and through it attain stability (*Bestand*) and objective reality; that is, their possibility is demonstrated by the fact that Freedom is actual (*wirklich*); for this Idea manifests itself by the Moral Law.' And in a note he adds, that 'Freedom is the *Ratio Essendi* of the Moral Law, while the Moral Law is the *Ratio Cognoscendi* of Freedom. For were not the Moral Law first clearly known to thought in our Reason, we should never hold ourselves warranted in making the assumption of anything like Freedom (although it contains no contradiction). But if there were no Freedom, then there would be no Moral Law at all to be found in us.'

It was this part of Kant's system, his doctrine of Freedom and the Moral Law, affecting so profoundly as it did the whole range of our ideas concerning life and practice, which gave to the whole theory

of which it was a part its spirit-stirring interest in the eyes of his own contemporaries, an interest which it retains and is likely to retain so long as the questions which it raises are still the subject of debate among philosophers, no solution of them having met with general acceptance. I feel myself, however, bound to add (seeing that I have classed myself above with opponents of the Kantian school) that for my own part my belief is, that Kant's views of Freedom, the Categorical Imperative, and the Law of Moral Right and Wrong in conduct, as distinguished from a Law determined by the pursuit of Happiness, are the expression of a true insight, and will in the end, in some form or other, be accepted as true by philosophers of all schools, that is to say, whatever may be the method they adopt of approaching the facts to be explained.

Speaking briefly, in conclusion, of the position occupied by Kant's system as a whole, I think we may say, that it replaced the Cartesian conception of an Universe consisting of two separate Realities—the *Res extensa* and the *Res cogitans* (Matter and Mind), by the conception of an Universe consisting of two inseparable aspects or modes of Reality—Things as they really were, though unrevealed and unrevealable to man, and the Revelations of those things to man, their Phenomena or *Erscheinungen* to him—man himself, like everything else, bearing both characters, and his knowledge of himself being a knowledge of himself only as an *Erscheinung*.

But it was not against Cartesianism in the shape given to it by Descartes that Kant's theory was directed, it was against the theory which Leibniz had previously deduced from it and erected in its place. Leibniz had previously constructed the Universe out of an innumerable plurality of Cartesian *res cogitantes*, which he called Monads, all differing in quality from one another, of all degrees of qualification and endowment, and all held together in a Harmony Pre-established by a Monad of Monads, whom he called God, and conceived of in the same way as he conceived of the human Soul, namely, as a self-conscious Monad holding together the plurality of lower Monads which constituted its living body or organism. Matter and Space were conceived of by Leibniz as confused perceptions or thoughts of those Monads which were souls. This theory was an Idealism in virtue of its identification of active force or power with consciousness, so reducing the Cartesian *res extensa* to a confused perception on the part of Monads or *res cogitantes*.

In this theory what Kant denied was mainly this—first, that the Monads could be known as they were *in themselves*, and secondly, that Matter was nothing but a perception on the part of the Monads

Kant's theory was thus essentially a criticism, critical of an existing positive or dogmatic theory; it treated experience as a product of factors, which by virtue of that very way of treating them were conceived of as *in themselves* unknowable. As a speculative theory of the Universe it was, therefore, avowedly and of necessity incomplete. It introduced by its main conception an Unknowable into the Universe.

But after the communication of so powerful a stimulus to thought, by the suggestion of so novel an idea, it was not to be expected that men should rest satisfied with the avowed incompleteness of the theory, its avowed inability to know the ultimate truth of things, things as they were *in themselves*, as well as in their appearances to themselves and others. The distinction was felt to be self-challenging, self-accusing. There must be some sense discoverable, so it was felt, in which Things-in-themselves and their Phenomena were identical. Hence came into existence the various Absolutist and Idealistic systems of philosophy, which sprang successively from Kant's, those of them which obtained the most vogue being those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, Hegel's in particular seeming for a time to command universal acceptance and approval. Among these should perhaps be classed the theory of the late Professor J. F. Ferrier of St. Andrew's, founded by him on the fact, supposed to be at once unambiguous and incontestable, of self-consciousness, and expounded in his well-known and admirably written *Institutes of Metaphysic* (second edition, 1856, Blackwood and Sons).

But 'back to Kant' has now for many years been the almost universal cry in Germany. It is now felt that the absolutist and idealistic line of development of Kant's doctrines was not the true line for philosophy to take, though the readiest and most natural under the circumstances. The cry, however, if it is not to be misleading, must be understood to mean—Begin where Kant began, examine again the facts, not in order simply to adopt, but in order to verify, and in Kant's own sense *criticize*, his distinction between Things-in-themselves and Phenomena. Use that distinction solely as a lantern to the path. The avowedly Neo-criticist system founded on an union of Leibnizian and Kantian principles, by the late Charles Renouvier in France, the latest exposition of which is to be found in his last admirable work *Le Personnalisme*, published in 1903, a year before that veteran philosopher's death, would seem to be an advance in this direction.

Kant founded, it is true, in the first of his three *Kritiks*, a new science which he called Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge; but

he founded it on the hypothesis of several distinct psychological faculties, each of which faculties he left undistinguished from the formal part of the consciousness, of which it was the bearer or the agent. To draw this distinction between the agent or agency and its form, and between both and the resulting consciousness, would seem to be the next problem to be solved by philosophy, in its onward progress from the vantage-ground already gained by Kant. Consciousness stands, or seems to stand, in a twofold relation to realities which are not consciousness, first in the relation of a knowing to its objects known, secondly in the causal or really efficient relation of a producer to its product, or vice versa, or both. The nature of this second, causal, or really efficient relation, which of course includes that of the real producer or Subject, as being one at least of its terms, is what has now to be determined. And in fact we are now witnessing, and some of us assisting in the solution of this problem. Psychology is now taking, even if it has not already taken, rank as a special positive science. I need only point to the appearance, in the January of this present year, of the first number of the *British Journal of Psychology*, and the first article therein 'On the Definition of Psychology,' by one of the Editors, who is also one of our own Fellows, Professor James Ward.

If this step forward from Kant shall be securely and successfully taken, if Psychology shall become established as a positive science, based upon a definite conception of the real agent or Subject, and moving forward, like other positive sciences, by means of hypothesis, the result will be to raise what Kant called Epistemology to the rank of Philosophy in the strict sense of the term, namely, a systematized account of our whole knowledge or surmise of the nature of the Universe, of which we find ourselves inhabitants—a Rationale of the Universe so far as attainable by man. Such a Rationale, supposing it attained, or even supposing its essential foundations laid and secured by the unanimous acceptance of all philosophical schools, would be the logical *prius* of all the positive sciences, physical, biological, psychological, practical. But I need hardly say, there is at present no prospect of an agreement among philosophers upon any set of known facts, which as known facts could serve as the essential foundations of philosophy. There are many and various philosophies, but there is at present no philosophy. It is still engaged in struggling for its *status* and organization. Kant's labours show the enormous difficulties and perplexities attending the attainment of one. Is the taking of the next step forward destined to be delayed till the appearance of another Kant?

ORIENTAL STUDIES IN ENGLAND AND ABROAD

By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read February 24, 1904.

I AM very sensible of the honour of having been asked to read a paper on this subject before the British Academy. Had the choice of a subject been left to me, I should have preferred, indeed, to discuss some question of historical criticism, or of archaeological discovery. But a consideration of the facts will show that the question resolves itself mainly into a question of the organization of the higher teaching. And such a question cannot fail to be of interest to the Fellows of our Academy.

In attempting to state what is the actual provision made at present in Great Britain for the teaching of Oriental subjects, we must distinguish between the teaching of the colloquial use of the dialects and languages now spoken in the East, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right interpretation of the ancient inscriptions and literatures, the right use of the rich historical evidence they have preserved for us.

But here we are met, at the very outset, by a curious difficulty. The continental returns not only make this distinction, but also, by a consistent use of the titles given to the teachers, prevent any misunderstanding as to the meaning of the record. If a man is entered as professor we know that a suitable maintenance is attached to the professorship, and that the professor can, therefore, devote his whole time to the duties, either of teaching or research, implied in his holding the post. If a graduate in training for a professorship is honoured, by his university, with the title of teacher, he is then paid for his teaching work only by fees, to which a nominal salary is occasionally added. But he is then always, in the foreign lists, distinguished by a different title—*Privatdocent, suppléant, chargé de cours*, or so forth. And even if his research work, during this period of his career, shall have shown so much promise that, pending the time when a professorship shall have become vacant, he is granted a special diploma as titular professor, even then the very title of titular professor is sufficient indication of the temporary and nominal character of his remuneration.

In England no such indications are given by the titles used. And the complication between university and college payments tends further to obscure the real facts. In the list of teachers attached to the London University and its component colleges there is an imposing array of professors of Oriental subjects. Only one of them holds a real professorship. Another has a small allowance, scarcely sufficient for a research scholarship, attached to it. The rest are unpaid. We have therefore the amazing absurdity of men, appointed as professors, and yet compelled, by the arrangements made, to spend daily the best hours of the day, not in the work of their chairs, but in earning their living as clerks or secretaries, librarians or journalists. Some, in spite of these adverse conditions, have done good original work, and have been able to invite students to work in that direction. But these have usually been men of some private means. So far as the system is responsible, the result is that the services of the men so hampered are lost to science. And it is necessary, in drawing up any statistical statement, to keep such posts distinct from the real professorships.

A similar state of things existed, and still exists, though in a less degree, at our old universities. In the roll of professors, both at Oxford and at Cambridge, there is entered a Lord Almoner's Professor of Arabic. One could easily imagine that this means a livelihood for the professor. The income, in each case, is in fact insignificant. These professorships have been held by distinguished scholars. They have been a real encouragement to research. But they are honorary or titular, not real, professorships. Facts of this kind must therefore be borne in mind when estimating the amount of financial support afforded in our country to Oriental research.

Apart from the teaching of Hebrew to theological students the provision made in Great Britain and Ireland is as follows:—

There is a chair of Sanskrit at Edinburgh, founded by the late Dr. Muir. There are also chairs of Sanskrit at Oxford and Cambridge, the former supported by private endowment, the latter provided by the university. There are two chairs of Arabic, apart from the Lord Almoner's annual grants just referred to, at our old universities. Both of these are due to private beneficence. The chair of Egyptology, lately founded at University College, London, by Miss Edwards, should perhaps be added to the list. Egypt has been so intimately connected, through the centuries, with its Asiatic neighbours in Syria, Assyria, and Arabia, that the problems with which Egyptology has to deal are in a large degree identical with those of Oriental research. There are in all, then, five chairs, or six

if this last be included. And, of these six, one has been established by the university itself.

To these have to be added the titular chairs, insufficiently endowed, but still provided with a certain annual income Though some of them are personal grants, the majority of them are permanent, and the others tend to become so. They are, therefore, to the extent in each case of the grant, encouragements to Oriental research. The grants range from less than fifty to as much as two hundred pounds a year; and are given for work in the following subjects.—

4 Chinese—Oxford, Cambridge, London and Manchester.
3 Arabic—Oxford, Cambridge and Dublin.
1 Zend—Oxford.
1 Semitic—Manchester.
1 Assyriology—Oxford.
1 Sanskrit—Dublin.

The preponderance, in posts of this kind, for Chinese is due to the fact that men who have served in our consular service in China, and retired on pension, are able to accept such posts with only a nominal salary. All four have been filled in this way. Very similar in value and standing to these are the readerships in Sanskrit and Persian at Cambridge, of Zend at Manchester, and of Egyptology at Oxford and Liverpool.

There are also certain posts in our museums and libraries filled by Orientalists. At the British Museum, under the present management, English Orientalism is persistently and successfully encouraged. Nine Orientalists are engaged there, and there may be half a dozen elsewhere. But it has not been found possible to obtain facts and figures as to similar appointments abroad; the secretarial and other duties of such posts are too exacting to leave much time either for teaching or for original work, and they can scarcely be called university appointments. For these reasons they are not included in the following tables.

The total of teaching of a university standard is therefore, for Great Britain and Ireland, with a population of about forty millions, and with fourteen universities, as follows:—

5 chairs, or six if the one of Egyptology be included,
11 titular professorships with the emoluments only of readerships,
5 readerships.

On the continent we find a different state of things. Holland with a population less than that of London, and with only four universities, has eight fully paid chairs and eight readerships—a far better equipment in the most important matter, than we feel it

necessary to provide. And if we turn to the countries nearly equal in population to our own, we find that Germany has no less than fifty-one fully equipped chairs, besides fifty other lesser posts. The details are as follows:—

	Professors	*Extraordinary (Assistant) Professors*	*Titular Professors*	*Privat-docents*
BERLIN				
Aryan	2	1	1	1
Semitic	2	1	...	4
Other subjects*	2	1	...	...
BONN				
Aryan	2	1	...	...
Semitic	1	...	...	1
Other subjects		1	...	...
BRESLAU				
Aryan	2	1	1	...
Semitic	1	...	...	...
ERLANGEN				
Aryan	1	...	...	...
Semitic	...	1	...	...
FREIBURG				
Aryan	1	...	...	...
Semitic	...	1	...	...
GIESSEN				
Aryan	1	...	...	...
Semitic	...	1	...	...
Other subjects	...	1	...	...
GOTTINGEN				
Aryan	2	...	...	...
Semitic	2	1	1	...
Other subjects	1	1	...	...
GREIFSWALD				
Aryan	...	1	...	1
Semitic	1	1	...	...
HALLE				
Aryan	1	1	...	1
Semitic	1	...	...	1
HEIDELBERG				
Aryan	2	...	...	...
Semitic	2	...	...	1
JENA				
Aryan	2	1	...	...
Semitic	1	...	...	1
KIEL				
Aryan	2	...	...	...
Semitic	1	...	...	1
KÖNIGSBERG				
Aryan	1	1	...	1
Semitic	1	...	...	2
Total	35	17	3	15

* These 'other subjects' in the following list are usually Assyriology and Egyptology.

	Professors	*Extraordinary (Assistant) Professors*	*Titular Professors*	*Privat-docents*
Brought forward	35	17	3	15
LEIPZIG				
Aryan	2	1	.	1
Semitic		2	...	...
Other subjects	2	1	...	...
MARBURG				
Aryan	1	...	..	1
Semitic	1	...	...	..
MUNICH				
Aryan	1	1	...	1
Semitic	1	...	...	1
Other subjects	.	...	...	2
ROSTOCK				
Aryan	...	...	...	1
STRASSBURG				
Aryan	1	...	...	...
Semitic	3	1	.	1
Other subjects	...	1	...	..
TÜBINGEN				
Aryan	1	.	.	
Semitic	1	..	..	..
WÜRZBURG				
Aryan	1	...	..	...
Total	51	24	3	23
Aryan	26	9	2	8
Semitic	20	9	1	13
Other subjects	5	6	...	2
Total	51	24	3	23

It may possibly be suggested, in order to explain away the importance of these figures, that German professors are notoriously ill-paid. That is, however, not now so much the case as it was. And the idea is largely due to the confusion we make between the different classes of professors. If an average be struck between the salaries of *all* the professors of various kinds—sixteen [5 + 11] in England and seventy-eight [51 + 24 + 3] in Germany respectively—the amount would be greater in the German average. If the average be struck between the different classes separately, then the German average in the first class, the ordinary professors, would be lower, but only a little lower; while the German average in the second class, the assistant professors or university readers, would be much higher. These professors of the second class are the cruisers of the fleet. We have sixteen [11 + 5] as against twenty-seven [24 + 3]. And we cannot gain much comfort, in the face of the overwhelming foreign superiority in battleships and cruisers, by comparing the figures as to the minor craft.

The elements of several of the more important vernaculars spoken in India are taught at different universities in Great Britain and Ireland to assist candidates selected for the Indian Civil Service in passing their second examination. Sometimes Indian Law and the Modern History of India are added; and other Oriental languages, useful for candidates elsewhere. The list is as follows:—

Cambridge:—Hindustani, Marathi, Bengali, Burmese, Tamil, Modern Law and History, and native teachers for Turkish and Egyptian Arabic

Dublin.—Hindustani and Indian History (one teacher for both), Indian Law, Tamil.

London —Hindustani, Bengali, and Hindi (one teacher for all), Marathi and Indian Law (one teacher for both), Tamil and Telugu (one teacher for both), Burmese, Gujarati, Japanese, Turkish, Russian, Egyptian Arabic, and Modern History of India.

Oxford:—Hindustani, Persian, Tamil and Telugu, Marathi, Bengali, Burmese, Indian Law, and Modern History of India.

The teachers in this list are all, except those in London, paid. The universities vie one with another for this class of students, who pay fees; and the India Office helps Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin, to the extent of paying for about one teacher. But the instruction given is perforce most elementary; and the fact that schools are broken up into four, instead of being combined as one, leads to further weakness[1].

The corresponding schools abroad are united at the various capitals; and the equipment is different. In Berlin, for instance, an Oriental seminary has been established, in close connexion with the University, and presided over by the eminent Arabist Hofrat Sachau, an honorary member of our Royal Asiatic Society and a member of the Berlin Academy. It has an annual grant of £8,000 a year, besides the necessary buildings, a fine library is provided, and the seminary publishes an admirably conducted, and very full, quarterly journal. There are now 162 regular students, who must all be undergraduates of the university, and sixty-six other hearers at the special lectures. The students have the advantage of attending the higher philological and historical courses delivered by the fourteen professors and other teachers at the university. But there is also

[1] Since the above was written it is reported that the India Office has decided to support also the Indian School in London to the same extent as in the cases of the older universities.

provided a special staff of teachers for their more practical wants. There are:—

A professor, a sub-professor, and a native teacher for Chinese;

A professor and a native teacher for Japanese,

Two professors of Arabic, and native teachers of the Arabic dialects spoken in Syria, Egypt, and Morocco;

A professor and a native teacher of Swaheli;

A professor of Haussa, and a European teacher of other African dialects;

Teachers of English, French, Modern Greek, Russian and Spanish, two of these having the status (and pay) of professors;

Two professors of the technical knowledge of the products of Asiatic countries;

A teacher of the laws of health to be observed by travellers or settlers there;

A professor of the political economy and finance of the German colonies, and

A professor of colonial law.

Twenty-four salaried officers in all: eleven professors, four European assistant professors, and six native teachers of the vernaculars, with an office clerk, and two librarians.

This equipment gives some idea of what the Germans consider a necessary staff for a practical school of this kind for a nation with colonial and foreign possessions of the extent of those held by Germany. Considering the extent of our own, one might think that, if they are right, then two or three such schools would not be too much to satisfy our needs. But are they right? It may seem to us no less than absurd that the Germans should spend so much thought and money on an organization which we, with our much larger experience and our vast interests in the East, have not found necessary. But the facts show that the wisdom of their action is at least recognized by others.

The French have in Paris a very similar school—the 'École spéciale des langues orientales vivantes'—with fourteen professors, five assistant professors, and six native teachers of the vernaculars—presided over by M. Barbier de Meynard, an honorary member of our Royal Asiatic Society and a member of the 'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres.' The school has a separate allowance of 167,300 francs, say between six and seven thousand a year, besides the necessary buildings. It publishes a journal, and a series of textbooks and treatises, and is equipped with a library of 35,000 volumes, 6,000 pamphlets, 630 MSS., and 400 maps. These statistics are, I am

afraid, tedious. But they show, better than any description of mine could do, what are the real facts with which we have to deal. The students at this college number more than 400, and associated with it is another college at Hanoi, in French Cochin China, to which advanced students can be sent with special research scholarships provided by Government. This recently established college at Hanoi has a well-equipped library and museum, and has already, under M. Finot and M. Foucher, done excellent work, and has amply justified the views of its promoters.

In Vienna the arrangement is different. There is an Oriental Institute, in close collaboration with the university, for higher work. And there is the well-known Consular Academy with seven professors of political economy and mercantile knowledge, seven of law, and eleven teachers of various grades for Turkish, Chinese, and other languages.

In St. Petersburg the arrangements are again different. But Oriental learning is perhaps more recognized there than anywhere else. There are four faculties in the university—one of History and Philology, one of Law, one of Natural Science, and one of Orientalism. Similarly there are four divisions in the Academy, the members of which are paid, and one of these four is Oriental study. There are twelve posts (for that branch of learning) of professorial status and emoluments, four assistant professors, six privat-docents, and five teachers of Oriental vernaculars. And there is a finely equipped college at Vladivostok, conducted on lines very similar, but not quite the same as the French college at Hanoi.

This matter of the faculties is suggestive. How great must be the revolution in English opinion on Oriental studies before, out of four faculties, one shall be devoted to those studies—in other words, that Oriental studies should be reckoned as one-fourth of human knowledge, or at least, as one-fourth of those studies which a university should promote. The London University is just being built up on what are supposed to be the most advanced lines. When the question of faculties was being discussed a formal application was made to the authorities to establish a faculty of Oriental study. In the event, extra faculties beyond those hitherto recognized in England were, in fact, established. They have a faculty of Engineering, and one of Music. But so absurd was the application referred to apparently considered that no reply was even vouchsafed. The utmost extent yet reached is that in Oxford, Cambridge, and London a degree can now be taken in Oriental studies, and in the older universities a student has occasionally availed himself of this privilege. But

what are the opportunities afforded him to prepare for such a degree, as compared with those afforded abroad, appears all too plainly from the above figures.

Now what are the reasons for this comparative fervour that we find abroad in Oriental work? Primarily, there can be no manner of doubt, the surpassing intellectual interest of the problems involved. For what is Oriental study? It is the study of the origins of all the great religions of the world, and the history, through the centuries, of most. It is the study of three, at least, of the most interesting and original systems of philosophic thought. It is the study of the political movements, the literary achievements, the social and economic conditions, the arts and the industries, of a large majority of the human race from the beginnings of history down to to-day.

And it is not only the extent and historical importance of these studies that has to be considered. There is another reason. We all know how keen was the intellectual pleasure of that small band of scholars in the West of Europe who, in the fifteenth century, were able to appreciate the meaning and the value of Greek MSS. Whoever has had the good fortune to study the entrancing story of that time will be able to realize the vivid state of expectancy with which the advent of each new manuscript was hailed. The scholars had a very considerable knowledge of what had been written in Greece, and had been lost, or not yet rediscovered. They devoured each new manuscript to see whether it would fill up any of the gaps. Too many of these gaps are, alas! still unfilled; and hope has almost faded away now. But, in those days, almost anything could be hoped for. And the indescribable charm of reading something quite new, of editing a work never edited before, of translating a book never translated before, of adding to human knowledge in some one of many important branches, was within the reach of all. That is the charm of the Oriental studies of to-day. It is no disparagement to the paramount importance and undying interest of Greek scholarship to say that, in the course of four centuries of devoted labour, the mine has been almost exhaustively worked. In Oriental study the nuggets lie still on the surface. In the older studies, for each new document or fragment discovered, there is a small army of workers. In Oriental study, for each new worker there are a hundred MSS. as yet unread, a hundred inscriptions as yet undeciphered.

It would be tedious, and is unnecessary I trust, to give examples. But I may be allowed to mention, as one instance out of many, that the little band of workers, pupils of my own or foreign scholars, whom I have been able to induce to work at Pali, have in the course

of the last twenty years edited, from the palm-leaf MSS., more than fifty *editiones principes* of ancient texts, every one of them interesting, many of them of great historical importance, throwing light on the origin or development of intellectual efforts that have moved the world. And there are still in my collection alone, a number of such MSS., as yet unread by Western eye, as to the contents of which we can only vaguely surmise, but which, when published, will certainly fill up the gaps of our knowledge about the places and the persons, the thoughts and the events of those far-off times. Yet Pali is only the Cinderella of the family, the youngest and least known of those many branches of study that make up the vast domain of Oriental learning.

It need hardly be said that no one, without a competence of his own, can devote himself to Pali. He would gain no living by his knowledge of it, and were he to try to gain his living otherwise, he would run great risk of creating the impression, precisely because of his knowledge of Pali, that he was fit for nothing else. Whether at college or in the Church, at law or in medicine, in the City or in the services, it would be reckoned against him. Opinion in England is not in favour of any sort of knowledge outside the ordinary lines.

It is much the same with all these studies. Their historical interest is great enough to attract students, and to attract them easily But the class from which possible students could be drawn cannot, as a rule, afford to neglect all question of income. So they are compelled to pass, though sometimes not without an intellectual regret, to the professions or to trade.

The higher education abroad being entirely in the hands of the respective Governments, it has been possible, slowly but gradually, to make room in the staff of the different universities for a few of the more distinguished scholars in these new and entrancing fields. In the United Kingdom, owing mainly to the great wealth of our old universities, it has been considered an axiom that Government interference with the higher education is unnecessary and undesirable. But our universities are not really rich. They have little or no funds to dispose of. The old endowments, great as they undoubtedly are, are all ear-marked. Hampered as they are by the not always very wise restrictions of these old endowments, and by the wretched system, or rather want of system, under which they are compelled to work, the authorities have done well. The time has come when the nation must seriously consider the problem how far, and in what manner, the powers of the administrators of all our universities must be extended and strengthened.

For the neglect of the vast domain of Oriental learning is only one of the many symptoms of a chronic disease. Our universities and university colleges are governed by a multitude of boards, each one of them with certain limited duties to perform, certain specified matters of detail to settle. It is impossible to speak too highly of the loyal and disinterested service given gratuitously to these boards by their various members. Most of our university professors have to serve on them. Many of them give to such boards much of their time. Some of them give actually more time to the boards than they can give to the duties of their chairs. A return of the time spent by the professors in settling little matters of detail would be pathetic. It is not only using razors to cut stones with; it is also the very best method by which to prevent any efficient organization, and to postpone indefinitely the carrying out of any change that may be desirable.

The annual incomes, with which the boards have to deal, represent a capital of some two hundred millions. No one knows in what proportions this amount is devoted to the several studies. It is no one's business to know. No one of the boards is allowed to consider any question so broad. Even small matters of change in subjects to be taught have often to be referred to that ridiculous body called Convocation.

Each separate board and each separate corporation, whether college or university, is hampered by lack of funds. The question of fees, of attracting students who can pay fees, becomes of so much importance that it often influences a decision to the detriment of the right organization of the higher studies. When, by any chance, a sum of money not already ear-marked for the old studies—Classics, Theology, or Mathematics—becomes available, then there ensues a pretty struggle for the proceeds. But of late years that handsome and (from the financial point of view) so promising young vulture, Applied Science, often swoops down, and carries off the spoil. It is a mere chaos of conflicting interests. No one has the right, no one has even the opportunity, of voting upon the whole question of university training. Each new victory of Applied Science adds one more voice to the babel of voices, secures one more vote in the conflict of votes. We seem to be in sight of the end of the long struggle between Classics and Science, when Classics, amid shouts of triumph, will be pulled at last right over the line. And meanwhile there is not the slightest sign of any attempt to bring order into the chaos, or even of any sense that a system is desirable. We seem content to blunder along, without a system, with the inevitable consequent muddle, with the inevitable consequent overlapping, with the inevitable consequent

waste. To quote the words of the President of the Royal Historical Society at its last annual meeting.—

'It used to be a general belief that the English were the most practical people on the face of the earth, and the average Englishman still cherishes this conviction on no better grounds than because, whatever difficulties we get into, we always "muddle through somehow." He forgets that to "muddle through somehow" is the most unpractical thing in the world. No doubt in a sense the average Englishman, taken by himself, is practical. . . . He has a happy knack of governing inferior races; he has a genius for reconciling, in political matters, "imperium et libertatem", he can run an ordinary business with a due mixture of caution and enterprise. But of the higher practicality which consists in forethought, preparation, system—the qualities which make for national efficiency—he has, I fear, but a very small share.'

Under present conditions no hope is possible. Wherever one turns powerful and vociferous vested interests block the way. And others are growing up now in the same haphazard way as in the past. But we can at least ascertain the facts. The first step, and the most immediate pressing necessity, is the appointment of a Minister of Public Instruction with power to call for facts and figures. Only when these are known, and tabulated, and compared with the similar facts and figures from abroad, will it be possible to draw up such a report as would suggest how best to retain the advantages we undoubtedly have, without losing those we might have but have not. It would necessarily be long before any action could be taken on such a report. The local authorities would have to be, not weakened, but strengthened. They must have power to utilize, under proper conditions and restrictions, the ancient endowments for the new necessities. They must have power to teach whatever they think ought to be taught, irrespective of whether it will, or will not, produce a good financial result in fees. And there must be some means of setting aside, under equitable terms, such vested interests as hinder or hamper the business-like application of the available funds. An Act of Parliament will be required. It must be, even were there a consensus of opinion among those most competent to judge, a matter complex and difficult, and of no value as a party cry. It would not, therefore, be reasonable to expect that anything will be done in the near future to place Oriental studies in a fit and proper position at our universities.

The question of the establishment of a technical school is not, perhaps, quite so hopeless. I have given the details of the magni-

ficent equipment, in foreign capitals, for the technical training in Oriental matters of merchants and civilians. Opinion is, I believe, in England, not much in favour of such training. There may have been a time when that opinion was, to some extent at least, justified. Character is always of more importance than technical training. But it is very doubtful whether that view is as much justified now as it may have been in the past. Our merchants find that they are now having to compete with men who are able to take full advantage of the greater knowledge they possess. And even in our consular, colonial, and Indian services, it would probably do no harm if the knowledge were a little greater than it is. There is, of course, a great deal to be said for the view that, if you take a man endowed with the moral standard and social training of our universities, give him a smattering of the native language, and put him in charge of a district or consular post, he will soon pick up any further knowledge that may be necessary for useful and practical work. He can learn 'all about' the religion, customs, and sentiments of the people with whom he has to deal, at first hand—from their own mouths—either through an interpreter or otherwise. But it may be suggested that, in the more ancient communities, among peoples with an historic past, and a varied literature, such a man would converse to greater profit and advantage if his were the standpoint of one who had an insight into that historic past and that varied literature, rather than the standpoint of the ignorant inquirer.

We are learning that, in all matters of public administration, training and efficiency are matters of the first importance. It is all a question of degree. No one wants our public servants to be bookworms. But some increase in technical training and historical knowledge is by no means incompatible with other qualities more consonant with the official mind. The fact is that in this matter, exactly as in the other matter of university teaching, we are content to drift. The chief officials at the Foreign, Indian, and Colonial Offices, and in the services abroad, and also our leading merchants, have acquired their present high positions by qualities and abilities of a high order, among which Oriental learning, save in certain exceptional instances, is not included. They are apt to consider it of little value; and not only do not encourage, but often discourage it. Yet the list of the exceptions would show that it is not detrimental to distinguished service, but rather the reverse. We do not dream of appointing to administrative posts at home men whose minds are a clean slate with regard to the history and literature of England. It may be questioned, therefore, whether it is altogether

wise to encourage ignorance of the history and literature of the countries where they serve in men appointed in our services abroad.

And we must never forget that the conditions have now changed; and that just as we consider, in our naval estimates, foreign activity, so also we should, as practical policy, make our Intelligence Department, in Oriental matters, at least as strong as that of any two of the other Great Powers. By the present neglect by our Government of this Intelligence Department, we are running great risk. What happens at present is that the Treasury makes grants, not to any central body, but to the various departments. These use the funds partly to give prizes or rewards to men who pass certain examinations, and partly to provide teachers. Each department has its own scale of prizes and salaries, and the teachers usually reside not in England, but abroad. The standard, both of teaching and of salaries, is low. The examinations are for the most part, as regards Oriental subjects, only linguistic. No knowledge of ideas, of history, or of literature is encouraged. The teachers are often natives whose education is not up to university standard, and a university training is not considered necessary even for the examiners. There is no opportunity for students, studying alone with a native teacher, either of mixing with other men taking other subjects for their life-work, or of coming into contact with those who know what is being done throughout the world in their own subjects. There is no opportunity for men, coming home on leave, to visit a central institute, where they can exchange views with others, or make use for themselves or others of the special knowledge they may have acquired abroad. The loss in intellectual stimulus must be irreparable. It would be interesting to know how many men, having scrambled through their pass examination, ever look again at a native book, or could read it if they did. It would be instructive to learn how many could even talk intelligently and fluently, and without making ridiculous mistakes, on any subject outside of the ordinary affairs of daily life, such as form the staple of conversation with their servants or inferiors.

It is not probable that a system thus grown up haphazard should be the best possible. But vested interests have grown up with it. And it will not be easy to persuade those who derive profit or power from it that it is desirable to change it. The question is whether the national interests are, at present, strong enough to cope with these vested interests. And considering the ridiculously small sum that would be required, the weighty words of our President, in his annual address to the Royal Asiatic Society in 1898, are only too amply justified. After a careful consideration of the facts, he was of

opinion that the present state of things is nothing less than a disgrace to this country, and that an immediate change was a matter of vital national importance.

To sum up :—

1. The dominant factor in the situation is the supposed enormous wealth of our old universities, and the corollary that is always drawn;—that is, the pernicious and fatal one that Government should do nothing for higher education in England.

2. Our competitors abroad have taken, in recent years, very judicious and important steps towards supplying their existing deficiencies both in university teaching, and also in technical training in these matters.

3. The funds abroad are provided entirely by Government, and the fees charged to students are either non-existent, or so small as to be scarcely worth consideration.

4. We have an excellent example of the best method of providing for our wants in the action taken by the German Government.

5. The neglect of Oriental studies at our universities is only one portion of a larger question. It is not probable that local jealousies would admit of any central interference. But we might have at once a Minister of Public Instruction with authority to call for facts and figures. To him might be transferred all the powers now exercised by various departments in relation to higher education.

6. Oriental history should be assigned the importance it deserves in the schools of history at our universities; and every candidate in history should be compelled to show a moderate acquaintance with the main results of Oriental research in this department.

7. Oriental philosophy should be recognized in the schools of philosophy at our universities; and every candidate should be compelled to show a moderate acquaintance with its main features.

8. The neglect of technical education in Oriental matters is due mainly to want of co-ordination. Our various public departments already spend, between them, more than the sum that would suffice to establish one good Oriental school. The value of the results obtained would be increased if the funds so spent were spent in one place, and on a well-thought-out system.

9. The Government might be approached to appoint a small committee to ascertain the facts, and report on the possibility of systematizing these expenditures, and on the question whether they should, or should not, be supplemented.

10. The ideal would be one school in London, managed and governed on the same lines as the school in Berlin; and branch schools both in Bombay and in some place in the Far East.

SUMMARY

SHAKESPEARIANA, 1598-1602

By I. GOLLANCZ

SECRETARY OF THE ACADEMY

Read April 27, 1904.

1. The Paper put forward a theory explanatory of Shakespeare's use of the name 'Polonius' for the 'Counsellor' of the King of Denmark, in place of 'Corambis' or 'Corambus,' found in the First Quarto, evidently the name of the character in the old play which belonged to about 1587. Corambus, discarded by Shakespeare in *Hamlet*, was used by him as a passing name in *All's Well.* The name Corambus, probably invented by the older dramatist, suggested connexion with the Latin phrase *crambe repetita* (cp. *coramble*, and its variants, in Latin-English dictionaries of the period), adopted into English in the sixteenth century as *crambe*, and used as a synonym for tedious and unpleasant iteration. 'Corambus' was thus merely a variant of 'Old Crambo' The character was probably easily suggestive of Burleigh. The aged statesman had died in 1598, and his son, Robert Cecil, was one of the foremost men of the State. Shakespeare, working at the old play after that date, was anxious to make it clear that his 'Counsellor' (Quarto 2 oddly reads 'Counsel, as Polonius') was not a stage caricature of the great English statesman, so he called the character by the new name. It was contrary to historical data that the Counsellor of the King of Denmark should bear a name which could only mean the Polonian or the Pole. Had it been Sweden, it would have been more in accordance with actual contemporary events. The young King of Poland, who was also King of Sweden, was at war with his usurping uncle, who had unlawfully seized the crown of Sweden. England was deeply interested in the struggle. Shakespeare created the name 'Polonius,' with special reference to the ideal 'Counsellor' as depicted in a work famous throughout Europe, *De Optimo Senatore* (Venice, 1568), written by Laurentius Grimalius Goslicius, perhaps the greatest Polish statesman of the time. An interesting reference to the work (the author's name being anglicized as Grimaldus) was to be found in Gabriel

Harvey's *Pierces Supererogation* (1593). An English translation appeared in 1598, the very year that Burleigh died, with a long descriptive title, setting forth the contents of the book —

'A golden work replenished with the chief learning of the most excellent philosophers and lawgivers, and not only profitable but very necessary for all those that be admitted to the administration of a well-governed Common-weal; written in Latin by Laurentius Grimaldus (*sic*), and consecrated to the honour *of the Polonian Empire.*'

The name of the translator is not given The treatise is in two books; the author admits at the end of Book I. the possibility of 'wearying the reader's mind, and thereby becoming over-tedious.' A second edition of the English translation, or more likely the old book with a new title-page, appeared in 1604, the year of Grimalius's death. In 1733 an elaborate English version, done directly from the original Venetian edition, was issued by Oldisworth, the political pamphleteer of the period. It had a long and eulogistic preface. Oldisworth's biography could not be trusted. Perhaps the most accurate account of Goslicius is to be found in the Encyclopaedia published by Orgelbrandt, Warsaw, 1862. Estreicher, in his *Polish Bibliography*, mentions among other authorities 'Lopinski, Goslicius, Halle, 1872,' but search and inquiry far and wide has failed to discover the work in question. The great Polish bibliographer was evidently unacquainted with the fact that there was an Elizabethan version of *De Optimo Senatore*; nor was he aware of a seventeenth-century English version. In 1660 there appeared, without the slightest indication of its being anything but an original work, what was really a translation of the greater part of *De Optimo Senatore* under the title of *The Sage Senator . . . to which is annexed the New Models of Modern Policy, by J. G.* Oldisworth in his Preface rightly states that in his work

'the author has traced the Counsellor from the cradle to the school, and thence to the University, the Bar, and the Bench of Justice. He has followed him in all his travels, and through every stage of his private and public life, to his last and highest attainment as a Minister of State.'

By way of illustration passages were quoted from the work —

'I doe therefore think expedient that in the person of our Counsellor there should be such ripeness of age as might exercise the virtues beseeming so honourable a personage, and in his calling hold so great a gravity and reputation as all other citizens and subjects may hope at his hand to receive comfort, quiet, and counsel profitable to the whole commonwealth.'

'Among all creatures contained within the circle of the earth, that which we call man is the chiefest and of most reputation, for he alone of all other living things of what nature soever is made not only an inhabitant and citizen of the world, but also a lord and prince therein.'

'Reason doth make men like unto God.'

'The wise man by his virtue resembleth the likeness of God'

'But what is that which in man is most excellent? Surely Reason!'

'The chief duty of man is to know that his original proceedeth from God, and from Him to have received Reason, whereby he resembleth his Maker. But for that the Reason of man is shut up within the body as a prison whereby it knoweth not itself, it behoveth the mind to break forth from that place of restraint, and to win liberty.'

'Our Counsellor then instructed in the precepts of Philosophy shall not from thenceforth be shut up, &c.'

'The commonwealth therefore requireth the counsell of some notable and divine man, in whom it may repose the care of her happiness and well-doing By his directions and government all perils, sedition, discords, mutations and inclinations may be suppressed, and thereby enjoy a happy peace and tranquility.'

'It behoveth him to be witty, docible, of good memory, of sound understanding, circumspect, provident, warie, and wilie.'

'Let the Counsellor know his own wit'

'Our Counsellor should be circumspect, not only in those things which do happen privately, but also in every other that may be hurtful to the Commonwealth'

Many illustrations might be adduced showing how counsellors,

> . . . 'Of wisdom or of reach,
> With windlasses and with assays of bias,
> By indirections find directions out' (ii. 1. 58-60).

But it is not merely to the words of Polonius that parallels may be found in *The Counsellor*. Some of Hamlet's noblest utterances sound like echoes from passages in the book, e. g. : —

'What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!' (ii 2. 294, &c.)

The Paper further dealt with the probable influence exercised by *The Counsellor* on *Measure for Measure*, written about the same time as *Hamlet*. A great part of Grimalius's work bore on the responsibilities of the Counsellor as judge, and some of the most striking passages in the book had reference to magistrates good and bad 'The evil example of magistrates works more ill than their virtues work good,' wrote Goslicius, and he amplified the theme. Shakespeare, who had already, with lighter touch, portrayed vain and testy magistrates, now in Hamletian mood portrayed 'Angelo'—this Counsellor 'most still, most secret, and most grave,' deputy of his Duke, *whom he supposed travelled to Poland.* The very spirit of Goslicius seemed to speak through Shakespeare in the famous words, 'He who the sword of Heaven will bear,' &c. (iii. 2. 274).

The history of the relation of England and Poland in the sixteenth century was surveyed, from Laski onwards.

2. The Paper next considered the character of Malvolio, and attempted to determine the original of the character. The name Malvolio was evidently a punning on the name Willoughby. Ambrose Willoughby, a member of the family of Lord Willoughby of Parham, was Queen Elizabeth's chief server, one of the most important offices of the household. A scandalous quarrel took place between him and the Earl of Southampton in January, 1598, as might be seen from the Sydney Papers, where there is a letter from Roland White noting some unkindness 'between 3000 (= Southampton) and his mistress, occasioned by some report of Mr. Ambrose Willoughby.'

'The quarrel of my Lord Southampton to Ambrose Willoughby,' he wrote on January 21, 'grew upon this: that he with Sir Walter Raleigh and Mr. Parker being at primero in the Presence Chamber; the Queen was gone to bed, and he being there as Squire for the Body, desired them to give over. Soon after he spoke to them *again*, that if they would not leave he would call in the guard to pull down the board, which, Sir Walter Raleigh seeing, put up his money and went his ways. But my Lord Southampton took exceptions at him, and told him he would remember it, and so finding him between the Tennis Court wall and the garden shook him, and Willoughby pulled out some of his locks. The Queen gave Willoughby thanks for what he did in his Presence, and told him he had done better if he had sent him to the Porter's Lodge to see who durst have fetched him out.'

The play was evidently written for Christmas, 1598, or rather for Twelfth Night, 1599. There can be little doubt that the incidents here referred to were cleverly utilized by Shakespeare, and that Willoughby was probably well hit off and easily identified, as, for example :—

'My masters, are you mad? or what are you? Have you no wit, manners, nor honesty, but to gabble like tinkers at this time of night? Do ye make an alehouse of my lady's house, that ye squeak out your cosiers' catches without any mitigation or remorse of voice? Is there no respect of place, persons, nor time in you?' (*Twelfth Night*, ii 4.)

In addition to the identification of Willoughby with Malvolio, the theory was important as helping to fix the date of the writing of the play before (not after) the tragedy of Essex's fall and the imprisonment of Southampton.

3. Finally, the Paper dealt with the contemporary Shakespeare critic Judicio (hitherto unidentified), who figures in the *Return from Parnassus* (*c.* 1600–2). There can be little doubt that Henry Chettle was intended, Shakespeare's first panegyrist, about whom additional information has long been sought. The ascertained facts were corroborated and supplemented by the identification, and new light thrown on the authorship of the play, from the standpoint of the literary environment in which the author or authors worked.

BACCHYLIDES

By SIR RICHARD C. JEBB

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read June 29, 1904

THE Bacchylides papyrus reached the British Museum in the autumn of 1896. It was then in about 200 pieces: from these it was reconstructed by the skill and industry of Mr. Kenyon, who published the *editio princeps* in 1897. The MS. is a fine uncial, with traits of the Ptolemaic type, and was written probably not later than the middle of the first century B. C. Of the poems wholly or partly preserved in it, thirteen are odes of victory, six are lyric pieces of mythical narrative, such as the Alexandrians called by the general name of dithyrambs. The total number of verses represented by the papyrus is about 1280. Of these, about thirty-four were previously known from quotations in ancient writings; besides which, about ninety-five verses, not found in the papyrus, are preserved in such writings. Owing to the mutilation of the papyrus, the lacunae are very numerous; otherwise the text is in a fairly good state.

The dates of the poet's birth and death are unknown. If, as seems probable, he was born about 507 B.C., he would have been about thirty-nine years younger than his maternal uncle Simonides (born in 556), and about eleven years younger than Pindar (born probably in 518). This paper will touch on three subjects. First, the illustration which some poems of Bacchylides receive from works of ancient art. Secondly, the traces in his work of earlier or contemporary literature. Thirdly, his relation to Pindar.

I. Some of the legends or incidents related by Bacchylides have left no other trace in ancient literature, or else occur only in late writers, but are illustrated by vase-paintings. The story of Croesus is an example. As Herodotus tells that story, Croesus and his sons are placed on the pyre by command of Cyrus; the pile is just beginning to burn, when Cyrus relents; Croesus then invokes Apollo, and the flames are quenched by rain. After his deliverance, Croesus sends a message to Delphi, upbraiding Apollo with ingratitude; and

the god dictates an elaborate reply, which convinces the fallen king that his own dullness had been the cause of his misfortunes. In later days the Croesus of Herodotus figures as the friend and adviser of his conqueror; he lives to admonish Cambyses, and how or when he died, we are not told. The version given by Herodotus was the only one known from literature until the papyrus of Bacchylides was found. It was probably, in substance, that followed by Xanthus in his Λυδιακά (*c.* 470 B.C.), it was accepted by Ctesias, the contemporary of Xenophon, and by Nicolaus of Damascus (perhaps from Xanthus); it was also known to Lucian. But with Bacchylides the legend assumes a different form. On the capture of Sardis by the Persians, Croesus voluntarily resolves to burn himself, with his wife and daughters, in order to escape enslavement to the conqueror. At his bidding, an attendant kindles the pyre; but Zeus quenches it with rain. Then Apollo, in recognition of the munificence shown to Delphi by Croesus, transports him and his family to the happy land of the Hyperboreans. There is no other literary trace of this version. But that it was current before the poet's time is proved by a well-known red-figured amphora, dating from the close of the sixth century B.C. or the early years of the fifth, in the Museum of the Louvre. The vase-painter shows Croesus enthroned on a great pyre, which is just alight. He is clad in royal robes, and crowned with laurel; his left hand bears a sceptre, while with his right he pours a libation. An attendant is bending in front of the pyre, and applying to it, with both hands, objects which some suppose to be torches, but which are more probably 'whisks,' περιρραντήρια, for sprinkling lustral water. A majestic serenity, or even gladness, is the sentiment indicated by the picture; and this is marked by the name written above the attendant, Εὔθυμος. The act of Croesus is manifestly conceived as voluntary.

What were the sources of this version, which clearly was current at the beginning of the fifth century, and then dropped out of view? It dignifies Croesus by an intrepid resolve, and spares him humiliation: the conception is also of an oriental cast. These features suggest a native Lydian origin. At the same time it is honourable to Apollo, who promptly recompenses his devout servant by a supreme reward. But it is improbable that this account of Apollo's action came from Delphi. The Delphian legend is clearly embodied in the answer of the Pythia to the complaint of Croesus, as reported by Herodotus. At the central shrine of Loxias it was for the prestige of the priests to keep up the tradition that a great Lydian king had been guided from Delphi, even though they had only a lame

defence for the ambiguous responses which lured him to his ruin But the Aegean seat of Apollo had no such responsibility for oracles given to Croesus. We note, too, another point. Here, and here alone, the Hyperborean land is an Elysium to which mortals are translated without dying; and the Hyperborean legends had a prominent place in the Apollo-cult of Delos. (See Herod. iv. 32-35, and the article of Otto Crusius in Roscher's Lexicon.) Further, the words of Bacchylides are—'Then Delos-born Apollo carried the old man to the Hyperboreans.' The Ionian poet of Ceos would know the Delos temple-legend: we find that he wrote for Delian festivals. I should infer, then, that the form of the Croesus-story given in his ode (written in 468, and attested by the somewhat earlier vase) was one which originally came from Lydia, and was worked up at Delos. A little later in the fifth century, this form of the story gave way to that found in Herodotus, which represented the Asiatic-Greek conception of the manner in which a Persian conqueror would act, while it also suited the interests of Delphi. Herodotus, as we have seen, makes Croesus survive the capture of Sardis by many years. It can scarcely be doubted that he had some evidence for that, derived from local tradition in Asia Minor, but such evidence would at once dissolve the Delian myth, the free creation of Ionian fancy, as to Apollo's prompt removal of his pious servant to the seats of the blest.

Now let us turn to the legends of Theseus, as they appear in Bacchylides. They are the subjects of his sixteenth and seventeenth odes. Theseus is a distinctively Ionian hero, whose cult is closely connected with that of Poseidon: he is especially the mythical embodiment of Ionian adventure and achievement on the sea. His significance is curiously illustrated by the double myth as to his paternity. In the popular legend, his putative father is Aegeus, king of Athens, while his real father is the god Poseidon his mother is Aethra, daughter of Pittheus, king of Troezen, one of the chief seats of Poseidon's worship. The key to the ambiguous legend is that Aegeus and Poseidon were originally identical. Αἰγεύς is connected with αἶγες, 'waves,' αἰγίς, 'storm-wind,' αἰγιαλός, 'shore.' Then Αἰγεύς, from being a name for the sea-god, became an independent hero, with a shrine of his own at Athens. Athens claimed Theseus as the son of Aegeus, her hero of the waves; while Troezen asserted his birth from Poseidon, her sea-god. In the first half of the fifth century the cult of Theseus became prominent at Athens, under the patriotic impulse given by the victory at Marathon, followed as it was by the development of Athenian sea-power. His temple at

Athens, the so-called Theseion, was built about 474–470 B.C.; his reputed relics were brought from Scyros by Cimon, and deposited there, in 467. It is not surprising, then, that Theseus should hold a large place in the work of an Ionian poet who lived at this period.

The seventeenth poem of Bacchylides deals with the earliest adventures of Theseus, on his journey from Troezen to Athens. It is of peculiar interest as being the only extant example of a dithyramb in the form of a dialogue. Aegeus, in converse with the leader of an Athenian chorus, reports the news brought by a herald as to wondrous deeds wrought by an unknown youth who is approaching. The points which I wish to note here concern the relation of this poem to the vase-paintings. Diodorus and Plutarch, who relate this journey of Theseus, mention six feats which he performed on the way. Five of these are given by our poet, but he omits the first of their series, viz., the slaying of the robber Periphetes at Epidaurus. This omission might be ascribed to the fact that the poet's narrative starts only from the Isthmus of Corinth (see v. 16). But it has been pointed out by Carl Robert (*Hermes*, vol. 33) that Periphetes is absent from the earlier illustrations of this journey in works of art, and occurs first on a Munich vase of which the date is not earlier than about 450 to 440 B. C. He conceives that Periphetes was added in order to bring the number of feats done by Theseus, before reaching Athens, up to half a dodecathlos. Be this as it may, the coincidence is remarkable. There is another point also in this poem where the vases come to our aid. The herald reports, says Aegeus, that Theseus has only two men with him. The tone of the passage indicates that these are not mere attendants; we are to understand that two heroes are his comrades. Carl Robert suggests, with great probability, that these are Peirithous and Phorbas, whom some vase-paintings associate with Theseus in the carrying off of the Amazon Antiope. There are also vases which give Theseus two companions in other feats of this journey, viz., in the slaying of Sinis and of Procrustes. This point seems very significant in its bearing on the relation of Bacchylides to the currents of mythology represented by the vase-paintings. For it is evident that the presence of comrades with Theseus on this journey is repugnant to the spirit of the original myth, the essence of which is that the young Theseus braves the perils of the road without support. The motive of the innovation was apparently to associate him in his earliest exploits with the comrades of his later deeds.

The sixteenth poem deals with the voyage of Theseus to Crete. It is a paean for Apollo, written to be sung at Delos by a chorus of

Ceans. The story is briefly this. Minos had come to Athens to claim the victims for the Minotaur. He is now on board ship with them, sailing before a north wind to Crete. Besides Theseus, there are seven Athenian youths and seven maidens. Minos makes advances to one of the maidens, Eriboea, and Theseus sternly rebukes him, threatening to use force should he persist. If Minos is the son of Zeus and Europa, Theseus is the son of Poseidon and Aethra. Minos, angered, prays to Zeus for the sign of the lightning, which is granted; and then challenges Theseus, if he be indeed Poseidon's son, to bring back a gold ring which he throws into the sea. Theseus springs overboard: dolphins carry him to Poseidon's home, where Amphitrite gives him a wreath and a mantle. Presently, wearing these gifts, he reappears, to the dismay of Minos, near the stern of the ship; and the young Athenians raise a paean. Here the poem breaks off. The Delian audience could supply the sequel; how, on landing in Crete, Theseus vanquishes the Minotaur, and brings his youthful company to Delos, where they dance the *geranos* to Apollo, and then return safely to Athens.

In this story, which Bacchylides tells with much spirit and beauty, there are two elements. The first and oldest is the welcome which Amphitrite, Poseidon's wife, gives to the young Theseus, her husband's son by a mortal bride. There is an Ionian graciousness in this; it might be contrasted with the Dorian legend of Hera's relentless enmity to the son of Alcmena. This element of the myth was as old at least as the beginning of the fifth century. It appears on the cup (kylix) of Euphronius in the Louvre, a very fine red-figured vase found at Caere, of which the date is about 500-490 B. C., and which is the oldest known document for any part of the story in our poem. It should be observed, however, that the Amphitrite of the vase bestows no wreath on Theseus. In another and probably earlier legend, the wreath was a gift to Theseus from Ariadne, daughter of Minos. The substitution of Amphitrite as the giver was possibly an Attic touch, and was presumably later than the date of the Euphronius cup, though not much later. The other element of the myth is the challenge given by Minos when he throws his ring into the sea. This is partly a contrivance for bringing Theseus into the presence of Amphitrite in her submarine home: it is the relatively late invention of a poet, linked on to the older idea. But this poetical combination had been made before *circa* 474 B.C.; for the substance of the story, nearly as Bacchylides tells it, was painted by Micon on a wall of the Theseion (Paus. i. 17). The earliest extant illustration in art is afforded by a red-figured crater of the

fifth century B.C., now in the Museo Civico at Bologna. Theseus, supported by a Triton, clasps the knees of Amphitrite in suppliant fashion, she holds out in both hands the wreath which she is about to place upon his head. Four Nereids stand or sit behind the queen, not dancing, as in the poet's ode, but one of them plays a tambourine. In the lower part of the picture Poseidon reclines on a couch, watching the scene, while a winged Eros pours out wine for him: and it should be noted that in our poem Poseidon is not mentioned as greeting Theseus; the interest centres in Amphitrite. On the left is seen the stern of the ship from which Theseus had dived, also the Sun-god's chariot rising from the waves; for the painter's plan was to show both the sea-depths and the upper world in section. Robert holds that this painting on the Bologna vase reproduces a part of Micon's painting in the Theseion, viz, the central and right-hand portions. In Micon's painting, he supposes, the whole of the ship, with its crew, was shown on the left. It may at least be said that this hypothesis is quite consistent with the account given by Pausanias of Micon's work. He observes that the story (which he relates) is not quite clear from the painting, partly because Micon has not painted the whole (οὐ τὸν πάντα ἔγραψε λόγον). The meaning of these words is clear, if Micon's scheme was that of the vase. Here is the ship,—there is Theseus received by Amphitrite; but the painter could not also show us Minos throwing the ring, or Theseus diving.

The ring itself raises a curious question. Pausanias is careful to let us know that Theseus returned to the surface with the ring as well as the wreath. Hyginus (*Poet. Astronomica* ii. 5) tells the story nearly as our poet does, save that he makes Thetis the giver of the wreath, while noting that others name Amphitrite; but he does not fail to mention that the ring of Minos was restored to Theseus by the Nereids. Bacchylides, however, says nothing as to Theseus bringing back the ring. This omission has been regarded as deliberate; thus Gomperz remarks, 'It would be unworthy of the hero to give the proof in precisely the form prescribed by his adversary', Weil says, 'He established his divine birth without making himself a servant of the king of Crete.' I cannot, however, help surmising that our poet, preoccupied with the wreath and the mantle, simply forgot the ring. But in any case,—and this is the more important point,—the omission makes it improbable that Bacchylides was the inventor of the ring-motive; had he been so, he would have treated it with more care. It seems probable, then, that there was some older source for the story, a source common to Bacchylides, Micon, and the vase-

painters. Whether that source was a poet, a compiler of legends in prose, or merely floating folk-lore, we cannot tell. But we may note certain divergences of detail between Bacchylides and the painters. (1) The ring-motive is absent from the vases,—perhaps merely because it was unmanageable,—except in one very doubtful case. This is the Tricase vase, of about 450 B.C., where Theseus, whose right hand grasps Poseidon's, holds in his left an object which Petersen takes to be a box containing the ring. Others regard it, however, as merely a fold of drapery brought over the girdle. (2) The mantle given by Amphitrite is ignored by the vases; they know only the wreath. (3) In the poem, dolphins convey Theseus to his father's abode. This may be an invention of Bacchylides, prompted by the Arion and Phalanthus legends. On the Euphronius cup and the Bologna crater, it is a Triton who renders this office to his mortal step-brother.

Within the limits of this paper I can notice only one other instance in which, as it seems to me, the vases throw light on the poet's work. The twelfth ode is mutilated at the beginning. As we have it, it opens in the midst of a prophecy concerning the destiny of Heracles. The person who speaks is watching that hero as he struggles with the lion at Nemea,—the first of his labours: he has thrown aside his useless sword, and is in the act of strangling the monster. 'See,' the speaker cries, 'how the scion of Perseus, skilled in every resource, lays a crushing hand on the savage lion; for the gleaming bronze, slayer of men, refuses to pierce the dread monster's body; the sword has been bent back. Verily I prophesy that here the Greeks shall strive for wreaths in the strenuous toil of the pancration.'

Who is this speaker? Blass and Wilamowitz suggest that it is Nemea, the nymph of the place which bears her name; but a tone so lofty and authoritative seems scarcely suited to her. It may also be noticed that the words are spoken of Heracles; they are not addressed to him: and we might therefore expect the presence of a third person. The struggle of Heracles with the Nemean lion is found on many vases, both black- and red-figured; and on several of these a female figure, standing on the left, behind Heracles, represents the nymph Nemea, or else the water-nymph Galene. But in that scheme there is another female figure on the right, facing Heracles,—viz., his half-sister and guardian-goddess, Athena. It is Athena, I believe, who speaks here, addressing the tutelar nymph of Nemea. At this, his first labour, the goddess, who is to protect him through all, predicts his destiny,—to be the purger of Hellas,—

δίκας θνατοῖσι κραίνων, as she says,—'confirming the reign of law for mortals.' Prophecy by Athena was an idea not unfamiliar to Greek poetry, as the Attic dramatists show.

II. These are some of the instances in which the mythology of Bacchylides is illustrated by the vases. We may next glance at the influence on his work of earlier or contemporary literature, and first, at certain cases in which he deals with themes which are known to have been treated in poems no longer extant.

The title of his fourteenth ode,—the first of the dithyrambs,—is, 'The Sons of Antenor, or the demand for the restitution of Helen.' The subject is the embassy of Menelaus and Odysseus from the Greek camp at Tenedos to Troy, for the purpose of demanding that Helen shall be restored. This event is supposed to take place just before the beginning of the ten years' war. The envoys are hospitably received by the Trojan Antenor, whose wife, Theano, is priestess of Athena. Our ode begins somewhat abruptly. Theano is now with the two envoys at the temple of the goddess on the acropolis of Troy; she has taken them thither, probably, in order that they may supplicate the goddess to prosper their mission. After a lacuna in the papyrus, which seems to have contained at least one short speech, we find the sons of Antenor conducting the envoys to the market-place, while their father proceeds to inform Priam of their errand. Presently heralds, hastening through the city, summon the Trojans to the assembly. 'Everywhere,' says the poet, 'the loud rumour ran abroad, and men lifted up their hands to the gods, praying for rest from their woes.' He proceeds, in epic style,—'Say, Muse, who was the first to plead the righteous cause?' A short speech by Menelaus follows, and then the poem, as we have it, breaks off. It was Menelaus, son of Pleisthenes, who spake, counselled of the fair-robed Graces:—

'Warriors of Troy, Zeus, who rules on high and beholds all things, is not the author of grievous woes for mortals. No, open before all men is the path that leads to unswerving Justice, attendant of holy Eunomia and prudent Themis: happy the land whose sons take her to dwell with them. But Insolence,—the spirit void of reverence, who luxuriates in shifty wiles and illicit follies,—who swiftly gives a man his neighbour's wealth, but anon plunges him into a gulf of ruin,—she it was who destroyed the Giants, overweening sons of earth.'

There the poem breaks off, as abruptly as it began. It would not be unnatural to suppose that it is mutilated, or that its author left it unfinished. But that does not seem probable. Some of these

dithyrambs of Bacchylides might be described as epic vignettes,—glimpses or hints of a situation, which make no attempt at a full narrative. In any case, there is little doubt as to the source on which Bacchylides drew. It was 'the Cyprian epic' (Κύπρια), of uncertain authorship, but written by some one who knew the *Iliad*, and probably as old as about 700 B. C. It formed an introduction to the *Iliad*, narrating the events which preceded the ten years' war, and the war itself down to the moment at which Zeus ordained that Achilles should withdraw from the field. We have seen that the Trojans, on being called to the agora, obey gladly, 'praying for rest from their woes.' On this Weil has remarked that Bacchylides seems to conceive the embassy as occurring in the course of the war, and not before its commencement. But the point is explained by the summary of the *Cypria* which we owe to Proclus The *Cypria* spoke of two battles between Greeks and Trojans as taking place soon after the landing of the invaders, and before the embassy. In the first encounter the Trojans were victorious, in the second, they were defeated.

From a scholium on the *Iliad* (24. 496) we know that Bacchylides spoke of Theano as having borne fifty sons to Antenor; a mention which doubtless occurred in the verses of this poem which our papyrus has lost. That number,—which the scholiast notes as prodigious,—seems to admit of a simple explanation. The poem was a dithyramb. We know from Simonides that in 476 B. C. the number of a κύκλιος χορός was still fifty. The Antenoridae, as such a chorus, may have formed the spectacular element in the production of this dithyramb. I may add one other remark. The epithet which our poet here gives to ὕβρις is the rare word ἀθαμβής. It is used in precisely the same way (i. e, as meaning 'devoid of reverence,' much like ἀναιδής) by Ibycus, who applies it to the ruthless Eros (frag. 1. 8). It seems very probable that Bacchylides took it from Ibycus.

The fifteenth ode of Bacchylides,—the second dithyramb,—which has no title in the MS., concerns Heracles and Deianeira. The first eleven verses,—sadly mutilated,—form a prelude. It begins with a reference to the temple of the Pythian god. The general bearing of this prelude is explained by a peculiarity in the routine of worship at Delphi. During the three winter months, when Apollo was supposed to be absent, the cult of Dionysus came into the foreground, and dithyrambs took the place of paeans. This poem of Bacchylides was a dithyramb written for performance at Delphi, probably towards the end of winter. The poet says in effect,—

so much is certain, though some details of the lacerated text remain doubtful,—that he will repair to the Pythian shrine, as Urania has provided him with songs suited to the season. Apollo is now disporting himself on the banks of the Hebrus, rejoicing in the song of the swan, and awaiting the time when he shall return to his home at Pytho to receive that tribute of paeans which Delphian choruses offer before his temple.

In this prelude we cannot hesitate to trace the influence of Alcaeus, who described Apollo's visit to the Hyperboreans in a hymn of which Himerius gives a prose abstract, and who is known to have praised the river Hebrus. The same hymn has left its impress on those exquisite lyrics in the *Birds* of Aristophanes which describe how the swans on the Hebrus sing their songs to Apollo. In the case of Bacchylides, a small trait of language confirms the hypothesis of an Aeolic source. Nowhere else does he use the Aeolic πεδά instead of μετά: but here we find πεδοιχνεῖν.

From the prelude he passes to Heracles. That hero has sacked Oechalia, and has come to Cenaeum, the north-western promontory of Euboea, where he is preparing to offer sacrifice in thanksgiving to Zeus. Then it was that irresistible Destiny inspired Deianeira with the fatal thought of sending him the tunic anointed with the gift of Nessus,—when she learned that Iole was coming to her home. The passage relating to the hero's arrival at Cenaeum, and to the sacrifice, presents a general parallelism with some verses in the *Trachiniae* of Sophocles, a play of which the probable date falls between 420 and 410, i.e., far below the latest date which could be assigned to the poem of Bacchylides. But a closer examination shows that there is no ground for supposing that Sophocles imitated Bacchylides; there is, indeed, only one phrase that lends any colour to such a theory, namely the ἀμφικύμον' ἀκτάν of the lyric poet as compared with the ἀκτή τις ἀμφίκλυστος of the dramatist; and this has no force. Such general resemblance as exists would be sufficiently explained by a common source; and it is not difficult to indicate that source. It was, we may conjecture, the old epic entitled the *Capture of Oechalia* (Οἰχαλίας ἅλωσις), popularly ascribed to the Ionian Creophylus of Samos; a poem of which the fame is attested by an epigram of Callimachus.

In his fifth ode, Bacchylides gives the legend of Heracles going down to Hades and there meeting Meleager, who relates the story of his own death. From a literary point of view, this episode exhibits the poet's skill in narrative, and his pathetic power, in a degree not surpassed by any extant specimen of his work; and it is

also of considerable mythological interest. Heracles went down to Hades that he might bring up Cerberus to the light. 'There, by the waters of Cocytus, he perceived the souls of hapless mortals, countless as leaves quivering in the wind, where flocks graze on the gleaming headlands of Ida.' We note in passing that Marlowe, in *Tamburlaine* (Part II, iii. 5. 3), says of a great army, 'In number more than are the quivering leaves Of Ida's forest' a remarkable coincidence, where a debt to Bacchylides on Marlowe's part is impossible; is it not a warning to some critics who seem to find it inconceivable that two poets should hit on the same phrase? When Alcmena's son descries the shade of Meleager, he is about to launch an arrow; but Meleager draws near and calms him; and presently tells his story. He was the son of Oeneus and Althaea, and dwelt at Calydon: Artemis was wroth with his father, and sent the wild boar to waste their land. In fighting against that pest, the men of Calydon were helped by their neighbours, the folk of Pleuron, called Curetes. But, when the boar was killed, the Calydonians and the Curetes fell to fighting with each other for the hide. Then it was that Meleager unwittingly slew two of his uncles, Althaea's brothers. The Curetes were routed, and fled towards their city of Pleuron, pursued by the Calydonians. Meleager, victorious, had just reached the walls of Pleuron, and was slaying a foeman, when fate claimed him. His mother Althaea had kindled the brand. 'The sweet life grew faint within me, and I knew that my strength was ebbing away. Ah me! and as I drew my latest breath, I wept, hapless one, at passing from my glorious youth.' The myth ends with this short dialogue. Heracles, deeply stirred, says to Meleager: 'It were best for mortals that they had never been born, and never looked upon the sunlight. But, seeing that these laments avail not, a man should speak of that which he can hope to accomplish. In the halls of the warrior Oeneus is there a maiden among his daughters like in form to thee? Fain were I to make her my queenly bride.' And to him spake the spirit of Meleager, steadfast in war: 'I left Deianeira at home, in the fresh bloom of youth, a stranger still to golden Aphrodite, the enchantress.'

Pindar had told this story, as we learn from a Homeric scholiast, but with at least one difference. It was Meleager, according to Pindar, who proposed a marriage with his sister to Heracles,—as though he knew that Achelous was her suitor, and that she needed a protector. That trait was in keeping with the spirit of the myth: Meleager, in the shades, seeks aid for Deianeira from the only living champion who can worthily fill her brother's place on earth. But

the version given by Bacchylides is better suited to enforce the sentiment with which Meleager prefaces his tale,—'*It is hard to turn aside the purpose of the gods*', since here the first suggestion of the fatal marriage proceeds from Heracles himself. This meeting in the nether world was, it may be added, the subject of a famous picture by Parrhasius, which Pliny mentions as existing at Rhodes.

How far has Bacchylides been indebted to the Meleager-myth in the ninth book of the *Iliad*? Very little: only for the introductory matter, i. e., the wrath of Artemis, the hunting of the wild boar, and the subsequent strife between Calydonians and Curetes. There is nothing, in the Homeric version, about the flight of the Curetes towards Pleuron,—that city is not even mentioned,—or about the death of Meleager under its walls, or Althaea's burning of the brand. According to the Homeric poet, Althaea's anger against her son Meleager was vented in a curse; she smote the earth with her hands, calling on Hades and Persephone to kill him; and the Fury that walks in darkness heard from Erebus. There is nothing about a brand; nor does Homer tell us how or when the imprecation was fulfilled. That, then, was one account of the cause by which Meleager perished,—Althaea's curse, which delegated her vengeance to the powers infernal.

But there was, we know from Pausanias, yet another version, which represented Meleager as slain in battle by Apollo. This, as Pausanias tells us (x. 31, § 3), was found in two old epics. One was the Hesiodic Ἠοῖαι. The other was the Μινυάς, ascribed to Prodicus of Phocaea, which dealt with the taking of the Minyan Orchomenus by Heracles; there was a Hades-scene in it, where, very likely, Meleager told his story. The agency of Apollo, it will be noted, cannot be combined with Althaea's curse: the god of light could not do duty for the Erinys. Lastly, there was the story that Meleager died because Althaea burned the brand which, as the Moirae had told her, was the measure of his mortal span. The earliest mention of the brand which Pausanias knew was by the dramatist Phrynichus, in the early years of the fifth century. Phrynichus alluded to it in a lyric passage of his play called the *Women of Pleuron* (Πλευρώνιαι). Pausanias (iv. 33) quotes the following words from him:—'For he (Meleager) did not escape a dire doom; his life was consumed by the swift flame of the torch, burned by his mother's cruel design.' Then Pausanias adds a comment which deserves attention:—'We do not find,' he says, 'that Phrynichus develops the story at greater length, as he would naturally do if it had been his own invention: he has merely touched

upon it, as if it were something already notorious throughout Hellas.' That is to say, the mention of Althaea's brand by Phrynichus was (according to Pausanias) merely a passing allusion,—like that of Aeschylus to the same story in a lyric passage of the *Choephori* (607 ff.). What was the subject of this drama of Phrynichus, the *Pleuroniae?* It has been supposed that it had to do with the Calydonian boar-hunt, that the scene was at Calydon; and that the *Pleuroniae* were handmaids brought by Althaea from her paternal home at Pleuron. Robert, however, has lately reaffirmed the view of Welcker, that the scene of the *Pleuroniae* was at Pleuron, its subject being the siege of that city by the men of Calydon,—the sequel of that pursuit up to the walls of Pleuron of which we read in Bacchylides. The persons of the play, he suggests, might be Thestius (the father of Althaea), one or two of his sons, and two messengers. The messengers' speeches might have contained narratives of the boar-hunt, the subsequent fighting, the rout of the Curetes, and the death of Meleager. At all events, Robert thinks it indubitable that the story, as told by Bacchylides, answers substantially to the contents of the *Pleuroniae*. It is difficult to speak with any confidence on such a matter. But one remark is obvious. If the comment of Pausanias was well-founded,—and it may well have been so, even though the whole play of Phrynichus was then no longer extant,—then it is hard to see how his comment can be reconciled with the hypothesis that the death of Meleager through the burning of Althaea's brand had, in the *Pleuroniae*, been narrated at length in a messenger's speech. All that is certain is that Phrynichus is the oldest recorded authority for the story. It is possible that Bacchylides derived it from Phrynichus. But the comment of Pausanias seems strongly in favour of the supposition that the common source of Phrynichus and of Bacchylides was some earlier poem, probably epic, of which we know nothing.

So much for lost literary sources. Now a word as to the use made by Bacchylides of extant works or fragments. With regard to Homer, the most noteworthy point is one which occurs in the twelfth ode, where Bacchylides describes the Trojans as led by Ares and Apollo in their attack on the Greek ships. Here there is a marked divergence from our *Iliad*. Ares takes no part in that affair, being under the general interdict laid by Zeus on the gods; once he is tempted to do so, in defiance of Zeus, but Athena detains him in Olympus. The only poet whom Bacchylides cites by name is Hesiod (ode v. 191); the quotation cannot be verified in the extant Hesiod, but, curiously enough, tallies almost exactly with a verse of

Theognis. In the ninth ode Bacchylides paraphrases twelve extant verses of Solon, condensing them into six. Simonides is known to have related the death of Archemorus, the voyage of Theseus to Crete, and the story of Idas and Marpessa: all these are treated by his nephew, but the last, at any rate, with some differences of detail. In ode viii. 13 the corrupt word ἀσαγεύοντα was corrected by the late R. A. Neil to ἀωτεύοντα; if this be right (as I deem it to be), it is illustrated by the Danaë fragment, where Simonides uses ἀωτεῖς, without the Homeric addition of ὕπνον, in the sense of 'sleeping.' The use of the epithet ἐραννός, limited in epos to places, was extended by Simonides, whom his nephew follows. It can be shown that Aeschylus had a marked influence on the diction of Bacchylides (e.g., the phrase πόντιον ἄλσος in ode xvi. is from the *Persae*), but I have no space for the proofs here. Our poet's treatment of the Io-myth is essentially Aeschylean, though perhaps due to older sources.

III. There is something to be learned from comparing Bacchylides with the greatest of his lyric contemporaries; but the process demands care. Pindar is unique in his kind; his magnificent phrases, so fitly set in the fabric of his spacious strophes, his daring and brilliant imagery, his swiftness, his range of imaginative vision,—these have no counterpart in the work of the Cean poet. Yet a comparison is, in certain respects, not altogether unprofitable. Take the first ode of Bacchylides. In the earlier part, of which only fragments remain, he told the local myth of his native island,—how Euxantius, son of Minos and Dexithea, was born there, and became lord of Ceos. In the next part, which is preserved, he speaks of the Cean boy Argeius, whose Isthmian victory he is honouring. He then concludes with a passage of twenty-five verses, consisting wholly of general aphorisms. He flows on in a gentle moralizing strain, and ends without again referring to the immediate theme of his ode. A stronger contrast to Pindar's manner could hardly be found. Pindar's maxims or precepts—usually abrupt and pointed—are always interwoven with his theme: he would never have committed the fault in art of closing an epinikion with a purely gnomic passage of such length. This ode, it might be conjectured, was one of our poet's earlier efforts. But now turn to his fifth ode, written for Hieron in 476. Here we find an unmistakable approximation to Pindaric style, though it is only partial and occasional, as in this passage near the beginning:—'The eagle, cleaving the deep ether on high with his swift tawny wings, messenger of wide-ruling Zeus the lord of thunder, trusts boldly to his mighty strength . . . And so for

me a boundless course is open on every side to hymn your prowess.' The phrase here, μυρία παντᾷ κέλευθος, actually occurs in an ode of Pindar (*Isthm.* iii. [iv.]) written perhaps in 477 B. C. Then Bacchylides breaks off the myth with Pindaric abruptness; 'White-armed Calliope, stay thy well-wrought chariot there.' This art of swift transition, it may be observed, was one which Pindar seems to have regarded as peculiarly his own; in one place (*Pyth.* iv. 248) he hints that other poets have copied it from him. More, however, than any particular trait, the general plan of the fifth ode shows that Bacchylides had advanced in structural skill since he wrote the first, and we cannot doubt who had served him as model. In the third ode, written six years later (in 468), we again catch the Pindaric note in this passage:—'I speak words of meaning for the wise: the depths of air receive no taint; the waters of the sea are incorrupt; gold is a joy' . . . And at the end of that ode he links his own name with Hieron's, as Pindar does at the close of the first *Olympian*,—only not in Pindar's haughty manner, but more gently and modestly, when Hieron's glories are extolled, he says, men will think also of 'the sweet singer, the nightingale of Ceos.' On the other hand, his principal epinikia differ from Pindar's not merely in the prevailing stamp of their diction and lyric composition, but also in two characteristics of method. In the first place, the tendency of Bacchylides is to dwell more than Pindar does on the details of the particular victory. Thus in the fifth ode he describes the running of the horse Pherenicus at Olympia, who was always in the front from start to finish. In the eighth ode, for a winner of the pentathlon at Nemea, he describes the great crowd applauding the athlete as he throws the quoit, hurls the javelin, and brings his opponents to earth in the wrestling-match. This is a trait which seems to have marked the epinikia of Simonides,—the earliest odes of that class on record. Secondly, the treatment of myths by Bacchylides is widely different from Pindar's. Pindar's tendency is to take particular moments or episodes of a myth, which he presents in vivid and dramatic scenes: Cyrene in the presence of Apollo; Teiresias prophesying the future of Alcmena's child; Heracles the guest of Telamon in Aegina. Even in the most epic of his odes, the fourth *Pythian*, this is his method; he describes the young hunter from the Magnesian forests suddenly appearing in the market-place of Iolcus; the ship Argo, with her crew of heroes, weighing anchor, while her captain at the stern pours his libation and makes his prayer to Zeus; Jason ploughing with the dread oxen of Aeetes. But this is not the way of Bacchylides. When he weaves a myth into an epinikion,—be it Croesus, or Meleager, or the

daughters of Proetus flying from Argos and healed at Lusi,—he tells it continuously, in simple epic style; his models here were perhaps the epic hymns of Stesichorus. This plan suited the Ionian genius; it also gave scope to our poet's special gift for picturesque detail.

It is interesting, and not uninstructive, to compare Bacchylides and Pindar in their relations with Hieron of Syracuse. Both had been his guests, and had doubtless met at his court. Hieron's victory in the horse-race at Olympia (476 B.C.) was celebrated by Pindar in the first *Olympian*, and by Bacchylides in his fifth ode. In 474, probably, Pindar sent Hieron his third *Pythian*, not an epinikion of the ordinary kind; it refers to an earlier victory of the horse Pherenicus at Delphi, but is mainly an ode of comfort and exhortation; Hieron was then ill. In 470, Pindar's first *Pythian* commemorates Hieron's victory in the chariot-race at Delphi: the fourth ode of Bacchylides (a little piece of twenty verses) was sent to Hieron soon after that event. It was in 468—the year before his death—that Hieron won the chariot-race at Olympia. For this victory, the most important of the series, Bacchylides wrote his third ode. We note that Pindar did not write, though in the same year he composed an ode for a private citizen of Syracuse who was a winner at the same festival. In considering the attitude of the two poets towards Hieron, we should try to see him as they saw him. Athens was not yet the intellectual centre of Hellas. Hieron, during the ten years of his reign, made Syracuse such a centre for men of letters as existed nowhere else. To them he was in some degree what Augustus was to Virgil and Horace, what Lorenzo de' Medici was to Politian and Landino. If there was a seamy side to his government, not much of it, perhaps, would be seen by visitors to his court from over sea. Both Pindar and Bacchylides speak of Hieron as a discerning patron of poetry. Both describe him as a just and firm ruler, of fine gifts, who owes his high fortunes to the favour of Heaven. It may be observed, however, that Hieron's virtues are best indicated by Pindar. 'Gentle to the folk,—not jealous of the noble,—to strangers a wondrous father' (*Pyth.* iii. 71 f.); 'culling the choice flower of all excellence' (*Olymp.* i. 12),—such is Pindar's estimate. There is nothing in Bacchylides so explicit or so comprehensive as this. But the main difference is of a broader kind. Pindar, whose range of view is Panhellenic, recognizes Hieron as the champion of Western Hellas against the barbarian; as one who fought against the Carthaginian at Himera, and whose fleet overthrew the Etruscan at Cumae. The finest known tribute to Hieron is that rendered to him by Pindar in reference to his intervention on behalf of the

Epizephyrian Locrians (*Pyth.* i. 72 ff.):—'Son of Deinomenes, the maiden of Locri in the West sings of thee before her door, because, after the bewildering troubles of war, thy power hath taken fear away from her eyes.' Bacchylides ignores this aspect; he speaks, indeed, of Hieron as a warrior, and once alludes to the battle of Himera, but merely in a vague and colourless phrase: for him, Hieron is only the ruler of Syracuse. It is to Pindar alone that Hieron's memory owes the larger picture of his place in Hellas. And yet the attentive reader must feel that Pindar is no match for Bacchylides in the art of pleasing such a prince. Splendid as are Pindar's praises, there is one thing which they lack, they never have the note of deference. His ode of comfort to the suffering Hieron is the noble expression of a solicitude which we can believe to be sincere; but it fails to convey the tender and delicate sympathy which can be felt in the latter part of the younger poet's third ode. Pindar, the scion of the Aegeidae, has the Aeolian pride and fire; Bacchylides has the flexible grace and ease of an Ionian. There may well be some truth in the Alexandrian tradition that Hieron preferred the poems of Bacchylides to those of the greater Theban.

In several passages of Pindar the Alexandrian scholiasts detected allusions to Simonides and Bacchylides, or to one of them. The most noteworthy of these is the passage in the second *Olympian*. 'The poet,' says Pindar, 'is he whose mind is rich by nature's gift; men shaped by lore (μαθόντες) have sound and fury, effecting nought, 'tis a pair of crows, chattering against the godlike bird of Zeus.' The dual γαρύετον is taken by the scholiast as referring to the uncle and the nephew. For my part, I think that this interpretation is probably the true one. No other explanation of the dual will hold (for Corax and Teisias are surely out of the question); nor can the dual be removed by any likely tolerable emendation. Twice elsewhere Pindar exalts the natural gift (φυά), and pours scorn on the man of mere lore and schooling,—a taunt levelled, it would seem, chiefly at Bacchylides, and especially as the disciple of Simonides. In the extant work of Bacchylides there is not the vestige of a feeling against Pindar. But there is at least one utterance which looks curiously like a quiet rejoinder to Pindar's repeated disparagement of the poet who learns from others. It is in one of the old fragments (no. 14 of Bergk) preserved by Clement (ἕτερος ἐξ ἑτέρου σοφός, κ.τ.λ.); 'Poet is heir to poet, now as of yore; for in sooth 'tis no easy task to find the gates of virgin song,'—ἀρρήτων ἐπέων πύλας ἐξευρεῖν. 'To throw wide the gates of song' is a Pindaric phrase (*Olymp.* vi. 27). Is it with a light touch of irony that our poet echoes it here?

It has been the aim of this paper to indicate some of the claims of Bacchylides on students of Greek antiquity, and indeed on a larger circle of readers. We have seen that he has a value for mythology, enhanced by the fact that (unlike Stesichorus and Pindar) he did not originate or innovate. He gives us also several glimpses of lost Greek literature, and of the manner in which it could be applied. He excels in picturesque narrative: he has much grace, much charm. And he enlarges our conception of Greek lyric poetry in the fifth century just because he is a minor poet.

JOHN LOCKE AS A FACTOR IN MODERN THOUGHT

By A. CAMPBELL FRASER

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By an interesting coincidence the representative Englishman whose philosophical thought prevailed in the eighteenth century, and the representative German who has been the intellectual ruler of the nineteenth century, closed their lives in the fourth year of the centuries with which they were thus associated. Last February, accordingly, the British Academy commemorated the Centenary of the death of Kant, and to-day it commemorates the Bicentenary of the death of Locke. These two centuries have been philosophically engaged with the answer to the question which Locke first proposed two hundred and fourteen years ago in the famous *Essay concerning Human Understanding*: the complement to Locke's incomplete and even ambiguous answer to his own question was delivered nearly a hundred years later in Kant's criticism of speculative and moral reason. Locke was the critic of the data of experience: Kant was the critic of the rational and moral implicates of experience. But it is the special distinction of Locke that he inaugurated criticism of human experience of reality; as the pathway to a settlement of its inevitable limitations, and to the foundation of certainties and probabilities within those limits.

Locke and Kant, although they are thus connected chronologically and also as conjoint factors in modern philosophical thought, differed significantly in the attributes of their personalities as well as in the influential circumstances of their lives.

Locke, born in 1632 in Somerset, the son of a Puritan father, passed his youth amidst the English civil war—the father a captain in the army of the Parliament, the son in the end repelled by intolerance in the name of liberty in the party to which his father was attached. At the Restoration in 1660 the young Locke thus sarcastically refers to the preceding government of the sects: 'I no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself in a storm, which has lasted almost hitherto. I find that a general freedom is

but a general bondage; that the popular asserters of public liberty are the greatest engrossers of it too, and are not unjustly called its *keepers*.' Already in youth John Locke was attracted by supreme questions which concern the duty and final destiny of man. But uncommon intellectual honesty, and consequent aversion to ecclesiastical dogma, seemed to forbid office even in the Church of England. So he betook himself to professional study of medicine, and to physical inquiry, in the spirit of Sydenham and Boyle and the Baconian method of induction. In 1669 a fortunate incident transferred his interest to affairs of state, as secretary and confidential friend, as well as medical adviser, of the first and famous Earl of Shaftesbury, with whom he lived in London during the intrigues and troubles of Charles the Second's reign, 'in the society of great wits and ambitious politicians,' varied by visits to the Continent, and with that increasing indifference to abstract speculation which this manner of life was apt to produce. After five years of political exile in Holland, he returned to England at the Revolution, to begin a life of authorship in a retirement that was occasionally interrupted by the exigencies of affairs of state—for he was a trusted adviser of King William and the leading statesmen of his reign, and the constant advocate of reasoned liberty in religion and in civil government. He had already devoted some prolonged intervals of leisure in his busy life to that critical examination of his intellectual relations to the universe of reality in which man finds himself, which, at the age of fifty-seven, took expression in the famous *Essay*. And the *Essay* was accompanied and followed by vindications of its principles, and applications of them to society and religion, which occupied his later years in a charming retirement at Oates on the border of Epping Forest, the manor house of Sir Francis Masham, whose wife, one of Locke's Somerset friends, was the daughter of Cudworth, the English theological philosopher. In this seclusion, retaining to the end with increasing tolerance the sentiment of religious reverence, he ended his life, in his own words on his death-bed, with 'a feeling of perfect charity towards all men, and of sincere union with the Church of Christ, by whatever name distinguished.'

It was otherwise in many ways with Kant. His life was recluse, wholly academic. In youth a humble origin imposed strenuous self-reliance and endeavour. And it is told that in his eighty years he never moved more than forty miles away from his native Konigsberg, where he taught philosophy for almost half a century. He was educated in the dogmatic theology of the Lutherans, and in the dry verbal philosophy of Wolf; but he was roused out of this

'dogmatic slumber' by the total disruption of human knowledge and experience which Hume precipitated in an empirical interpretation of Locke's philosophy. Startled by this spectre, Kant was led to devote the remainder of his long professorial life to deeper critical analysis of the inevitable rational and moral constituents of all genuine experience than that which satisfied the practical good sense of Locke. Kant's life so far resembled Locke's that his awakened intellectual interest was first directed to the physical sciences, especially astronomy and cosmology, and in these, unlike Locke, he made his appearance as an author before he appeared as a critic in metaphysics. By another coincidence his famous *Kritik of Pure Reason* was produced in his fifty-eighth year, being the exact age at which Locke produced his *Essay*. Unlike Descartes and Spinoza, Berkeley and Hume, both Locke and Kant entered upon philosophical authorship when they were approaching old age. The mature caution of their intellectual work is in harmony with this.

It is significant of the character of English philosophy that its successive guides have been for the most part men of the world, much engaged in human affairs. The leading philosophers of Germany, on the other hand, have mostly looked at life from the academic chair. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hartley, Bentham, and the Mills were not professorial theorists. On the other hand, except Leibnitz, the great Germans, Wolfius, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Lotze, and others, habitually breathed the air of the university, and were devoted to speculations which the practical Englishmen overlooked, or regarded with languid interest, if not with aversion. The opposite defects of the English and the German philosopher are largely due to those opposite points of view.

The unfinished *Instauratio Magna Scientiarum* of Bacon and the *Essay* of Locke are the most memorable works in English philosophy. The *Instauratio* presents Bacon's magnificent ideal of an all-comprehensive philosophy, in contrast to the 'verbal chicane' attributed to the mediaeval schools, and to the presumptuous empiricism which was taking the place of mediaeval scholasticism. The portion of the *Instauratio* called *Novum Organum* 'proposed' a better use of reason than the past in the investigation of things. And the last part of Bacon's great unfinished work promised an exhaustive unification of knowledge, inductively generalized and verified, according to the method disclosed in the *Novum Organum*. 'To perfect this last part,' he confessed, was above his power. 'The destinies of the human race must complete it,' he said, 'in such

manner perhaps as men looking only at the present would not readily conceive possible.' The splendid vision could be realized only in the remote future of the human race.

The *Essay* of Locke, while conceived in sympathy with the inductive method of the *Novum Organum*, may be said to have raised the fundamental question (underlying the *Instauratio*) concerning the inevitable limits of human knowledge, and its validity and value within those limits. It seems to throw cold water on the sanguine conceptions of Bacon, although the opening aphorism of the *Novum Organum* might be taken as a motto for the *Essay*—

'Homo, Naturae minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de Naturae ordine, Re vel Mente observaverit; nec amplius scit aut potest.'

But the sober sanity of Locke restrained his temperate and even prosaic imagination, and made him ready to resist the faith that 'human understanding' could ever compass the ideal which inspired the *Instauratio.* Instead of indulging in its expectation of complete intellectual empire, Locke announced that *his* purpose was soberly to investigate the ideas or objects that can come within the range of human understanding, and the *rationale* of those probabilities on which man depends, when completely reasoned knowledge is unattainable.

The immediate occasion of the *Essay* is told by Locke himself in his 'epistle' to its readers. It seems that when he was about forty years of age, 'five or six friends,' meeting in his chamber, and discoursing on a subject which seemed remote from criticism of human intelligence, found themselves at a stand by difficulties that arose on every side. 'After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a solution of our doubts, it came into my thoughts,' he says, 'that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see *what objects* our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance to this Discourse; which, having been thus begun by chance, was continued by entreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resumed again as my humour or inclinations permitted; and at last, in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it.' So the

Essay, the issue of an accident, was given to the world in his fifty-eighth year, written in snatches, the work of nearly twenty years in a busy and troubled public life. It bears marks in its contents of the conditions under which it was produced.

Few books in the literature of ancient or modern philosophy are so characteristic of the age and country in which they appeared. Political, ethical, and theological thought, as well as philosophy proper, long bore the stamp of the *Essay* of Locke, to an extent that is hardly explained by the comprehensiveness and depth of his insight, or by the force of his genius. The widespread popularity of the book is hardly equalled in philosophical literature. In the fourteen years that passed between its appearance in 1690, and the death of its author in 1704, it passed through four editions, followed by nearly forty since; besides abridgements, translations into Latin and French, and innumerable critical comments. From the first it produced controversy. Opposite interpretations were put upon its central thesis, by Stillingfleet and Leibniz, in Locke's lifetime; afterwards by Voltaire and Condillac in France, by Reid and Stewart in Scotland; more recently by Coleridge, Cousin, and Green among the many who read the *Essay* as an expression of incoherent sensuous empiricism, and by Webb and Tagart, as well as recent foreign critics, who lay stress on its implied recognition of intuitive reason. But for a long time the *Essay* has been spoken about more than studied; and some, even historians of philosophy, have dealt with it largely at secondhand, or at least without that candid comparison of the parts with the spirit and design of the whole which is needed in the case of a book that approaches high questions in the inexact language of common life; also without sufficient allowance for the fact that it was the work of a sagacious Englishman, averse to abstract speculation, who touched questions of philosophy with a view to temporary interests of human life, and in an unphilosophical age.

The visions of Plato, the subtle abstractions of the schoolmen in the adopted language of Aristotelian dialectic, the 'innate ideas' of Descartes, who nevertheless was himself the first to rouse philosophical curiosity in Locke, and the ontological demonstrations of Spinoza, embracing in their sweep the infinite universe of Being, warned Locke of the need of a humbler conception of the intellectual empire of man than philosophers had been wont to assume. 'Beginning at the wrong end,' as he says, they took for granted, without critical inquiry, that the boundless extent of Being was the undoubted possession of a human understanding, wherein there

was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that of necessity escaped its comprehension. If by first inquiring into the limitations necessarily involved in all human understanding of things, he could discover to what mind in man is in any degree proportionate, and where it fails us, he believed that this might induce us to be cautious in meddling with things exceeding our comprehension, to stop when at the utmost extent of our tether, and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, after critical examination, are found to be beyond our reach. 'Although the comprehension of *our* understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet men have reason to be satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them; since He hath given them whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life, and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of a universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is (i.e. of Omniscience), yet it secures *their* great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable. The candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much about as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.'

It was in this temperate spirit that Locke examined the possible range of human thought and knowledge, in order to determine the boundary of man's speculative imagination, and *a fortiori* of his real knowledge and probable beliefs.

He began by taking one fundamental postulate for granted. We cannot even think or imagine without having objects to think about. Concepts empty of individualizable objects are unthinkable, except negatively. In other words, having ideas, i.e. something to think about, and speaking intelligibly, amount to the same thing. Whence, then, come our 'ideas,' within which our boldest flights of imagination and speculative reason must be confined?

This is the preliminary question with Locke, and it is answered by him in one ambiguous word. The data of intelligence all come from Experience. Our intellectual empire must be finally measured by experience. 'In that all our knowledge is founded, and from

that it all ultimately derives itself.' And 'experience,' as Locke sees, is of two sorts. For observation may be 'directed' to external objects, or to the internal operations of our own minds which succeed one another in self-conscious experience. We have ideas that are conditioned by our five senses, and we have ideas which appear in forms of feelings, or thoughts, or acts of will. The causal relation between these two sorts of ideas is an ulterior question which Locke dismisses. Enough that within them is contained *our* region of concrete intelligibility. In man's wildest flights he cannot picture a material world clothed in other qualities than those of which he has experience in his organism of sense,—although other self-conscious beings, endowed perhaps with a hundred or even a thousand senses may have 'ideas' which he is as unable to have as a man born blind to conceive colours. In like manner, the contents of self-conscious experience form the limits of our capacity for conceiving what is supersensible,—active moral Reason, in analogy with our own, must therefore be our highest idea of God. When either the thinker or the man in the street pretends to transcend those data, sensuous and spiritual, he must be pleasing himself with empty words.

It follows, according to Locke, that supposed ideas, got in neither of these two ways—ideas 'innate' or totally inexperienced, in which some philosophers have revelled—must be an illusion of insufficiently criticized knowledge. Empty verbalism, encouraged by intellectual indolence, gives currency to this speculative and misleading hypothesis.

Nor let any one think, Locke adds, that these two fountains of experience—bodily sense and reflection—are 'too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takes its flight further than the stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts even beyond the utmost expansion of matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible inane. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any *simple idea* which is not received from one of those (two) inlets already mentioned, or any *complex idea* not made out of those simple ones. Nor will it be strange to think these few simple ideas sufficient to employ our quickest thought or largest capacity; and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge and more various fancies of mankind, if we consider how many words may be made out of the various compositions of twenty-four letters; or if, going one step further, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations that may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas, i.e. Number, whose stock is

inexhaustible; or what an immense field doth Extension alone afford to the mathematicians.'

Our 'ideas,' Locke grants, are not originally presented in simplicity and isolation. They emerge in groups from the first, in all concrete experience. The ideas of children are concrete and complex. These are afterwards generalized by the abstracting activity which combines, separates, and correlates in innumerable ways, under a few fundamental conceptions or categories, the original data of the senses, and also our original spiritual ideas. But, in whatever new complex forms the empirical data may be constructed by plastic imagination or by reason, the resulting construction must always resolve into ideas that have been sensationally or spiritually experienced.

As it were in verification of this fundamental thesis, Locke examines some apparently ultimate conceptions—forms and categories of knowledge, as Kant would say—which appear to contradict his thesis, by containing more than the data of experience can be credited with. These might be called 'crucial instances,' seeing that if even *they* issue from experience, *a fortiori*, all that is conceived and known by man must be experienced.

He takes for example, the idea of Quantitative Infinity, necessarily involved in our thoughts of space and of duration in time. The idea of space, at first given in sight and touch, and the idea of duration, within which all finite and concrete existence seems to be confined, are somehow found at last to evade *complete* comprehension: the one is lost in inevitable Boundlessness; the other in inevitable Endlessness, or boundlessness of succession. Locke treats both of these as 'negative conceptions,' which we are 'somehow' *obliged* to have. 'We conceive space and time boundless, as they certainly are,' he says. 'Our positive conceptions of places in space and of periods of time are so much of the infinite oceans of Eternity and Immensity as are set and distinguished from the rest; and are so made use of to denote the *position* of finite real beings in respect to one another, in those infinite oceans in which they are contained.' But we can have no image of either *in its infinity*, which indeed must transcend quantity. Locke does not try to show how contingent data in experience explain this, or can give rise to the experienced intellectual necessity for Boundlessness. Finite periods of time are intelligible. Endlessness is an insoluble mystery of which we can have no objective experience.

The conceptions of Substance and of Personality are notable amongst Locke's other 'crucial instances' in proof of the sufficiency

of 'experience' to explain even the highest conceptions. But our conception of Causal Order and Active Power is the most signal of all. It is under this supreme category that the placed and dated universe of material things and spiritual persons is conceived as a universe or unity. Let us see how Locke finds it in experience.

He says that we are all 'accustomed to observe changes' in finite substances, and to observe that the change has always arisen 'from the due application and operation of some other being that has power to produce substances and their changes.' The centre round which metaphysical speculation moves is indeed the universal fact of change; with the presupposition, somehow formed, that all change must be interpretable or orderly at the root. Take Locke's own example. We are 'accustomed' to see fluidity 'invariably' consequent upon the application of a certain degree of heat to wax; accordingly we 'somehow come to conceive' heat as 'the cause' and fluidity as its 'effect.' But Locke nowhere explains this 'somehow,' except so far as he refers it to a (hitherto) invariable 'custom' of our finite experience; nor does he show how a limited experience can in reason *oblige* us to attribute universality in the future to the causal nexus. We cannot infer necessary universality from any finite number of instances observed by an individual, or even by mankind.

Natural causation conducts to the conception of Active Power. Here Locke vacillates, in an important chapter, which went through many alterations in successive editions. He points to self-consciousness, or our spiritual experience, as the root of this supreme idea. 'The idea of the beginning of motion or change we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves when we find by experience that, *barely by willing, we* can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest. Bodies afford us not any idea of power to begin motion or thought. From consideration of the extent of the power of the mind or will over the bodily actions of the man arise the ideas of human liberty and the necessity of nature.' Yet, with Locke, in the end 'moral freedom' of man seems to mean no more than unimpeded will to accomplish what he intends. The volitions themselves at last resolve into invariable consequents of 'motives,' by which they are reasonably or unreasonably determined. A man is free, in this sense, when nothing forbids the overt change to follow the motived volition. But the volition itself is not the absolute act of the so-called agent; and is therefore non-moral, as far as he is concerned. The man is not its creative cause. The Supreme Mind and Will is the only free agent; Divine Omnipotence excludes the creative activity of a morally responsible Will in man.

Yet sometimes Locke seems ready to regard this inconsistency as merely the result of the intellectual limitation of man. He wrote thus in his old age to Dr. Molyneux: 'I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding; and though it be unquestionable that there is Omnipotence and Omniscience in God, and although I cannot have a clearer perception of anything than that I am free; yet *I* cannot make freedom in man consistent with Omnipotence and Omniscience in God; though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth I most firmly assent to. And therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question.'

In this way the criterion of human experience, as the ultimate measure of human conception, and *a fortiori* of human knowledge, was perhaps understood by Locke in a meaning which implies *incomplete ideas*, which we can neither get rid of, nor unite in consistent intellectual unity; while yet we cannot see enough of them to assert that they involve absolute contradiction. Locke accordingly leaves them in this condition. He 'ceases to consider' how they are reconciled in Infinite or Divine Knowledge,' taking this as the most philosophical treatment of them by man, and then looks at the difficulty only in terms of morality and practical life. Centuries of vain theological and philosophical speculation are thus virtually dismissed as irrelevant to man's limited share of Divine Reason. The simpler religion, which was his favourite ideal, was one issue of this cautious philosophy.

But let us now see how Locke's reflex of human experience, with its consequent limitation of our speculative imagination, is made to determine the validity and extent of man's Knowledge of the concrete existence that emerges 'in the infinite ocean' in which men are so apt to lose themselves. His main thesis implies that the realities can be approached, even by those who are most profoundly philosophic, only in terms of our sensuous and our spiritual experience. When we try to go further, our supposed knowledge can only be an aggregate of meaningless propositions, the consequence of 'beginning at the wrong end,'—the end remote from human experience.

Notwithstanding this limitation, Locke claims that experience gives him three ultimate ontological certainties—knowledge of his own existence; knowledge of the existence of God; and some knowledge of a universe of things and persons external to himself, in which he is himself included, and to which he is intellectually and practically related in innumerable ways.

For I have, he says, self-evident spiritual experience of my own individual existence, as a conscious person with continued identity; although I cannot conceive what continued identity means during intervals of unconsciousness, in sleep or otherwise. These gaps, however, are practically bridged over by memory and the sense of moral obligation, so that I cannot be blind to the reality of my Personality.

Then my experience of my own existence, including as it does assurance that I began to be, absolutely demonstrates 'the existence of God,' when the principle of causality, already explained as due to a 'custom' in experience, has been applied to it. 'God,' Locke says, in a letter to Anthony Collins, means 'that infinite, incomprehensible Being which, for want of right and distinct conceptions, is by *us* called Mind 'or the Eternal Mind.' He takes the existence of this incomprehensible Being as the one absolutely demonstrable necessity in all 'concrete existence'; even his own individual existence, although an assured experience, not being infinitely and absolutely necessary, like the existence of God.

It is different with the existence of the ever-changing external world of interrelated things and persons that is to a small extent opened to mankind in the perceptions of sense, and to a much smaller extent opened to each individual person. While things are actually present to our senses, we experience the ontological certainty of their *present* reality. Not so when they are distant in place or time. Then the certainty of knowledge gives place to expectant faith and probability. So all 'science' of external things and persons, with its inferences of invariable coexistence and sequence, important in all human life, is in Locke's philosophy an aggregate of judgements, more or less probable. Probability is the guide of life; complete knowledge is the ever-receding ideal of science. We can have no absolutely necessary truths concerning sequences in nature. To our limited experience they must all appear to be contingent, and to depend on Power that transcends them. Inductive science cannot rise above probabilities. Locke sees absolute demonstration only in abstract mathematics and abstract morality, and in concrete theism. Concrete science of the causal relations of finite things is undemonstrable, and must at last be accepted in blind faith. Is it not instead, one might ask, the venture of a faith that is rooted in the Divine or Moral constitution of the universe, inevitably presupposed in all our experience? But this is foreign to Locke's attitude, who tries to *prove* the existence of God, instead of *necessarily presupposing* Active Moral Reason at the heart of things.

On the whole our estimate of the philosophy of Locke evidently depends upon the meaning that may be associated with the word Experience. Is experience a synonym for the contingent and finite data of external sense and of spiritual life? or is it tacitly permitted to include intellectual and moral implicates, without which the universe would be wholly uninterpretable and experience unintelligible? Here Locke's ambiguity was his weakness as a factor in modern philosophical thought. But it led, through Hume, to the altered attitude of Kant, and his universal presuppositions of active Reason, synthetic in the heart of experience—the attitude which, followed by Hegel, has so modified theology and metaphysics in the nineteenth century. In what he calls his 'demonstration that God exists,' Locke is obliged to recognize absolute intellectual necessity in the principle of Active Causality, and so he makes it the major premiss of an infinite conclusion. No number of instances which could enter into a finite experience would justify this. Infinity is an illegitimate conclusion from finite premisses. We must presuppose Divine Reason as actively immanent in the universe of finite experience, unless the whole is an enigma, and science an idle dream. The God of Locke is still one object among many, at a distance from the other objects, occasionally interposing. It has been the work of Kant and his successors to disengage the elements of speculative and moral Reason that are presupposed in a sane yet limited experience, and so to justify faith in the ultimate moral trustworthiness of the universe, or assurance that reason and conscience cannot be put to utter confusion at last.

Otherwise one does not get in experience rational assurance regarding any concrete fact or event that lies outside present data in consciousness, or at any rate that lies outside the record of memory, as David Hume afterwards argued. Felt Sense and remembered Sense is here the measure of certainty. There is no reasonable security for that enlargement of experience into infinity which theology and philosophy presuppose. The disposition to this enlargement was (inconsistently) regarded by Hume as a physical effect of custom, or past invariable associations among otherwise isolated ideas. In calling this 'custom' he was giving it a name, without recognizing its rationality—unable, as he said, to go further; satisfied if he could go so far.

But can we, in an 'experience' thus intrinsically empty of reason, go even so far as Hume has gone? Is memory or even sense really possible in an irrationally-constituted experience? And invariableness of sequence can be reached neither in sense nor in memory;

how, then, dare we assume it? Sense and memory unarticulated by all-pervading Reason are themselves abstractions: certain knowledge and even probability of course dissolve. For human science presupposes Divine Reason immanent in the universe of passing experience. Those who participate in an insane experience, absolutely incapable of being rationally articulated, cannot reason sanely about anything. Blind sense takes no security for the scientific and ultimate trustworthiness of the pervading Power.

Accidentally associative connexion, taken by some as the ultimate synthesis of experience, plays no such part in Locke's hands. The short chapter on 'association of ideas' appeared first in the fourth edition of the *Essay*, as concerned, he says, with 'something which has not that I know been hitherto considered, and has, I guess, a greater influence on our minds than has hitherto been taken notice of.' This remark almost implies ignorance of Hobbes. But Locke, midway chronologically between Hobbes and Hartley, introduced association, not to explain experience, as they did, but to explain the misinterpretations of experience which appear in the errors and the prejudices, or irrational categories, peculiar to individuals and societies. 'I have in the second book of the *Essay* treated of the association of ideas historically,' he says, 'association being as frequent a cause of error as perhaps anything else that can be named, and a disease of the mind as hard to be cured as any, it being a very hard thing to convince any that things are not so, and habitually so, as they constantly appear to him.'

The shyness of Locke when he approaches the ultimate rational constituents of experience was apparently due to dread of that enemy of truth that he thought he saw in principles called 'innate,' which were supposed by him to claim total independence of the concrete data of experience. In them he saw the source of the chief intellectual misfortunes of mankind—the empty verbalism of abstract philosophies, and the hard dogmatism of those who were too lazy to think and investigate for themselves. 'When men,' he said, 'have found some general propositions that could not be doubted, it was a short and easy way to conclude them *innate*. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another to be the dictator of unquestionable principles, and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them. Whereas, had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them

to result in the minds of men from the being of *things themselves when duly considered.*' In short, advance in intelligence of the concrete universe, proceeds not through abstract reasoning about Being considered *a priori*: this is beginning 'at the wrong end', we thus 'lose ourselves in the ocean of infinity.' Whereas, by beginning at the other end, amongst successive phenomena of sensuous and spiritual perception, God or Active Moral Reason is revealed gradually, and things may be increasingly known. This was the ideal of Locke. Writing to Dr. Molyneux, he says. 'I perfectly agree with you concerning general theories—the curse of the time, and destructive not less of life than of science; they are for the most part a sort of waking dream, with which, when men have warmed their heads, they pass into unquestionable truths. This is beginning at the wrong end. It is more easy to build castles of our own in the air than to survey well those that are on the ground.' But these wise words must not be permitted to obscure the distinction between progressive insight into principles common to all rationally constituted experience, and prejudices due to the individuality and surroundings of individuals.

No passages in Locke's writings are more characteristic than those in which he dwells on love of truth, and the illusion which confounds this with love for our own opinions. Truth was his chief end; and supposed inconsistency of this with 'enthusiasm' probably led him to exaggerate the ill consequences of enthusiastic sentiment in withdrawing men from truth, and that 'indifference' which he regarded as the essence of intellectual integrity. 'There is nobody in the commonwealth of learning,' he says, 'who does not profess himself a lover of truth; and there is not a rational creature who would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet, for all this, one may truly say that there are very few lovers of truth *for truth's sake*, even among those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth inquiry; and I think there is one unerring mark of it, viz.—the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident), lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain that all this surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth . . . In any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence, or by the force of demonstration, the *arguments* that gain it assent are the vouchers and gauge of its probability to

us. Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon is owing to our inclination that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth as such; which, as it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests, so it should receive no tincture from them.' Perhaps exclusive regard for the *lumen siccum* made him apt unduly to disparage emotion and imagination, faith and will, as factors in the final human interpretation of existence, and to forget that all that is highest in man must be in response to all that is highest in existence, in order to a true insight of the realities.

John Locke is apt to be forgotten now, because long ago he so well fulfilled his intellectual mission of *awakening* modern criticism of human knowledge as such, and of diffusing the spirit of free inquiry, with its implied spirit of universal toleration, in accommodation to the added limitations of individual experiences, which has since pervaded the civilized world. If he failed to go deep enough in his analysis of experience to meet the demands of sceptical thinkers, and if ambiguity in his fundamental position makes a philosophically coherent interpretation of his language difficult, it was by those very defects that he induced Hume negatively, and Kant and his successors constructively, to continue what it was his own distinction to have begun. He has not bequeathed an imposing system, nor even a striking discovery in metaphysics, but he is a typical example in the Anglo-Saxon world of the love of truth for the sake of truth and goodness. 'If Locke made few discoveries, Socrates made none.' Both of them are memorable in the record of human progress.

LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE STATE

By SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read October 28, 1904

LOCKE's *Essay on Civil Government* is well known, and is probably the most important contribution ever made to English constitutional law by an author who was not a lawyer by profession; certainly there is nothing to be compared to it until we come to Bagehot in our own time. Still I do not know that it has ever been analysed by an English lawyer with reference to its immediate purpose and circumstances. In fact Locke's political doctrine holds quite a secondary place in such accounts of Locke as are generally current in the hands of the educated public. The *Essay on Civil Government* has been overshadowed by the *Essay on the Human Understanding* and the *Letters on Toleration*. This, together with the special occasion, may perhaps be a sufficient excuse for the present attempt.

The first thing to bear in mind about the *Essay on Civil Government* is that it is essentially an apologia for the Convention Parliament, no less than Hobbes's *Leviathan* and *Behemoth* were an indictment of the Long Parliament. It is true that in the body of the work the language employed is studiously general. But the date of publication, 1690, would alone be enough to remove any doubts of the intention, and moreover that intention is clearly stated in the Preface to the two treatises of which the Essay is the second. It may be well to cite Locke's own words. 'Reader, Thou hast here the Beginning and End of a Discourse concerning Government; what Fate has otherwise disposed of the Papers that should have filled up the Middle, and were more than all the rest, 'tis not worth while to tell thee. These which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the Throne of our great Restorer, our present King *William*; to make good his Title, in the Consent of the People; which being the only one of all lawful Governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any Prince [illegible]*m*; and to justify to the World the People of *England*, wh[illegible]e of their just and natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruin.' The doctrine which Locke had

to confute was, as is well known, that of absolute monarchy; the champion whom he attacked by name and elaborately demolished in the first of the *Two Treatises of Government* was, however strange it may seem to us nowadays, not Thomas Hobbes but Sir Robert Filmer. For us Hobbes is the recognized founder of the English school of politics and jurisprudence; while Filmer, as the late Prof Croom Robertson incidentally observed in discussing Hobbes (and I see no reason to doubt the soundness of the remark), is saved by Locke from oblivion. In Locke's time Sir Robert Filmer was fashionable among royalists and Hobbes was not. Hobbes's uncompromising rejection of ecclesiastical claims made it, in fact, impossible for a party bound up with Anglican prelacy to have anything to do with him, and his justification of obedience to any *de facto* government in being was hardly less distasteful to maintainers of the divine right of kings. Express controversy with Hobbes was therefore quite useless for Locke's purpose. Nevertheless Locke must have seen that, apart from the party strife of the moment, Hobbes was the really formidable adversary. Moreover Filmer, with all his absurdities, had one fundamental point in common with Hobbes. Indeed he was the only publicist of the time, so far as I know, who mentioned Hobbes with approval, though a limited approval. 'With no small Content,' says Filmer, 'I read Mr. Hobs's Book *De Cive*, and his *Leviathan*, about the Rights of Sovereignty, which no man, that I know, hath so amply and judiciously handled I consent with him about the Rights of *exercising* Government, but I cannot agree to his means of *acquiring* it[1].' Again: 'We do but flatter ourselves, if we hope ever to be governed without an Arbitrary Power. No: we mistake, the Question is not, Whether there shall be an Arbitrary Power; but the only point is, Who shall have that Arbitrary Power, whether one man or many? There never was, nor ever can be any People govern'd without a Power of making Laws, and every Power of making Laws must be Arbitrary: For to make a Law according to Law, is *Contradictio in adjecto*[2].' This, I need hardly say, is pure Hobbism. The impossibility of a limited government or 'mixarchy[3]' is the very burden of Hobbes's *Behemoth*.

We need not be surprised, therefore, either at the lack of specific dealing with Hobbes in Locke's *Essay*, or at the ample internal evidence that Locke had in fact studied Hobbes's doctrine with quite as much critical attention as Filmer's.

[1] Preface to *Observations Concerning the Original of Government* (1679).
[2] Preface to *The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy* (1679).
[3] This word was restored by Dr. Tonnies from Hobbes's MS.

There is no occasion for us to trouble ourselves with Locke's polemic against Filmer, even so far as it runs over from the First Treatise into the Essay[1]. King Charles I's imaginary title as right heir of Adam is as grotesque to any modern lawyer as Adam's imaginary political dominion over the world can be to any modern publicist. Good Sir Robert wholly failed, as Locke was at the pains to show at large[2], to prove what was the rule of succession to Adam's original title, why it should have been primogeniture rather than equal division, and whether it is discoverable by the light of nature or imparted to us by any and what revelation. It would be too curious, perhaps, to consider whether he supposed the course of descent to be in fee simple, tail male, or how otherwise, and whether after the Deluge Noah took by a new grant and became a new stock of descent, or was in as of Adam's old estate. I have known only one man capable of doing full justice to that theme, my lamented and most learned friend Mr. Challis. Locke does point out that the whole of Filmer's theory falls to the ground unless he can make out that Shem was universal monarch[3]. Adam's original title, moreover, had already been relied on to quite the opposite purpose by the section of the Independents known as Levellers. They deduced to all men, as sons of Adam, 'a natural property, right, and freedom' which could be duly exercised only in a pure democracy[4]. Sir Robert Filmer, then, is out of the story; nor is it worth while to guess what kind of reply he could or would have attempted if he had been living; and we may proceed to Locke's own account of political power.

At the outset the object of inquiry is thus defined: 'Political Power . . . I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the regulating and preserving of Property, and of employing the Force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and in the Defence of the Commonwealth from foreign Injury, *and all this only for the publick Good*.' The last clause, which I have italicized, gives the keynote of the whole Essay. Princes and rulers hold their powers, whatever may be their legal form, not by an absolute right founded on grant, covenant, or otherwise, but on conditions in the nature of a trust, and under liability to forfeiture if the conditions are not fulfilled.

[1] Chap. vi, of 'Paternal Power.'

[2] First treatise, chap xi, 'Who Heir?' And see the Essay, *ad init.*

[3] First treatise, §§ 139-142; see too §§ 32-39.

[4] Scherger, *The Evolution of Modern Liberty* (New York and London, 1904), p. 130.

Locke was no lawyer; but it is allowable to believe that the peculiar doctrines of the English Common Law as to conditional estates, and of English Courts of Equity as to the duties of trustees, although the latter was still in its infancy, had a distinct influence in moulding his dialectic. For absolute originality there was no room. Every kind of material for political construction was ready to hand in the polemics of the Reformation controversy, not to speak of the mediaeval writers who had become to Locke's contemporaries far more obscure than they are to us. The researches of modern scholars, among whom the first place is undoubtedly Gierke's, have shown that all possible theoretical combinations, except the much later system of Cabinet Government which has democratized our monarchy, were anticipated, if not developed, by the political writers of the sixteenth century. Locke's work was inevitably eclectic, and must have been so even if it had not been conditioned by a definite practical aim. He is so far from professing to be original that he is almost ostentatious in following Hooker, whom he vouches at several points in fairly copious extracts. Hooker, of course, was an authority whom Anglicans were bound to treat with respect. The skill and judgement of Locke's performance were proved in the most conclusive manner by the commanding position which the doctrine formulated by him acquired forthwith and held for nearly a century.

Locke's political system, like all such systems for a long time before and a long time after him, purports to be founded on natural law, that is to say, on rules of conduct which the light of reason, without aid of any special revelation, and without assuming the existence or authority of any form of society, can discover as generally applicable to man as a rational being. This, I think, is a sufficient account for our purpose of what Locke's contemporaries understood by the law of nature, however widely they differed in their methods of ascertaining its principles, and in the results which they derived. Hobbes was as ready as any man to declare that the laws of nature are immutable and eternal[1]; which however did not prevent his laws of nature from being unlike other people's, or other people from regarding several of Hobbes's immutably true propositions as not only mischievous but demonstrably false. It is important for any fair appreciation of Locke to remember that, although the mediaeval tradition was interrupted, the mediaeval assumption that there is a law of nature, and that when ascertained it is supreme, was still prevalent. This indeed had never been contradicted, save so far as any Protestant controversialists maintained with Dumoulin that the

[1] *Leviathan*, chap. xv.

text of Scripture came first. Possibly both Locke and his English opponents would have accepted the Reformers' position on that point; it was not one which they had occasion to consider. But Locke does not confine the obligations of the law of nature to mortal men. He proves *a fortiori* that those obligations are binding on princes (§ 195). They 'are so great, and so strong, in the Case of *Promises*, that Omnipotency it self can be tied by them. *Grants*, *Promises*, and *Oaths* are *Bonds* that *hold the Almighty*.' Locke may or may not have read in an earlier writer rediscovered for modern readers by Gierke that 'Deus ipse ex promissione obligatur.'

Thus Locke was bound to begin with the 'state of nature.' No other way of answering either Hobbes or Filmer would have given formal satisfaction. But this state, for Locke as for the Schoolmen, is rather a perfectly conscious abstraction than an attempt to construct the actual origin of society. The question is what a man's rights would be in the absence of any positive institutions. Nevertheless an actual state of nature exists between independent princes and rulers, and between any subjects of different states (or jurisdictions) who may meet in a place where there is no civilized government (§ 14). Under what law (to put a modern example) are a Scot and a French Canadian in the Khaibar Pass? Modern jurisprudence can in most cases lay hold of some circumstance to obtain a working answer. But the topic may not be pursued here. Hobbes is met with flat contradiction (though not explicitly, for the reasons already given) at the earliest possible point. All men are equal by nature in the sense that no one man has an original claim on any other's political obedience, not in any other sense, and so far we are at one with Hobbes. Every man is entitled and bound to preserve the existence which God has given him. But (contrary to Hobbes) he is no less bound to preserve other men, being his fellow creatures and fellow servants, 'when his own preservation comes not in competition.' This amounts to saying that the problem is not to account for the existence of society, but to ascertain its best or normal mode of existence. I should be the first to admit that Locke's way of saying it is both less frank and less sound than Aristotle's. As against the opponents he had to reckon with, it was effective and ingenious, being so framed that no one who accepted the authority of Scripture could well traverse it without manifest risk of impiety. Hence every man's natural power over others is already not arbitrary, as Hobbes would have it, but quasi-judicial. Every man has natural judicial and executive power until such powers are regularly constituted[1]. Hence,

[1] There is a strange verbal parallel in that strangest of mediaeval vagaries the

again, the law of nature authorizes all necessary acts of self-defence; and this, even under the rule of settled law, is the only ground for the jurisdiction of any government over resident aliens: a curious opinion which seems to be peculiar to Locke, and gratuitous; for one does not see why the theory of submission by tacit consent, on which Locke has to rely later, is less applicable to temporary than to permanent allegiance. This doctrine of the executive power is doubtless open, says Locke, to the objection that it makes every man a judge in his own cause. That is so, and the use of civil government is to remedy such inconvenience. But absolute monarchy fails just in this respect, for the absolute monarch so dear to Hobbes and Filmer remains in a state of nature with respect to his own subjects, and therefore judge in his own cause [1].

Further, there is a 'plain difference between the state of Nature, and the state of War, which however some men have confounded': for 'men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them' may live in peace if they will, and such is their will so long as they are reasonable. 'Want of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of nature'; but it is only some act of aggression, 'force without right upon a man's person,' that makes a state of war. Political authority is instituted to avoid the risk of a state of war, not to put an end to a state of war necessarily existing. In short, in the state of nature there may be peace, though a precarious peace. This is, of course, intended as a mortal stroke against Hobbes's theory, and implicitly denies his position that the worst of governments is always more tolerable than the state of nature. Slavery is the result of conquest in a state of war, and freedom is not the absence of all rule, but 'is to have a standing rule to live by' as opposed to being subject to an arbitrary power like a conqueror's. Not that even a conqueror's power is unlimited of right; for Locke argues in a later chapter, the connexion of which with his main purpose is not made very clear, that a conqueror does not acquire general dominion over the property of the conquered, but is entitled at most to a charge upon it for an indemnity.

Locke thinks it prudent to establish a natural right of property (chap. v) antecedent to political institutions. His solution of the

Mirror of Justices, the work, as I conjecture, of some eccentric foreign clerk settled in England, whose authorship and purpose are still mysterious 'Ordinary jurisdiction has every one who is not deprived of it by sin (!), for every one may judge his neighbour according to the holy rules of right.' Book IV, chap. ii.

[1] This argument is developed in chap. vii

problem is that appropriation is the reward of labour. A man acquires a right in severally to that which 'he hath mixed his labour with.' The preceding assumption that 'every man has a property in his own person' appeared safe and easy to Locke, but it is certainly not good law, and was expressly contradicted by Ulpian ('dominus membrorum suorum nemo videtur[1]') The rights of every man to personal safety, reputation, and so forth, are not marketable or transferable, and are wholly distinct in kind from rights of property. Locke's attempt to make an extended conception of Occupation bear the whole burden of Property was eminently that of an ingenious layman. It is far from obvious, assuming Locke's premisses, how any one can claim the sanction of the law of nature for appropriating more than is necessary to support himself and his family. Locke sees the difficulty, but cannot be said to remove it. This economic digression, however, is now of little interest. It is explained by Locke's anxiety to set up as many barriers as possible against arbitrary interference on the part of the State. He seems even to ignore the doctrine of Eminent Domain, of which he must have heard. We cannot suppose that he would have actually denied the moral right of the State to take private property for public purposes on payment of just compensation, but he may have thought it so liable to abuse as to be best kept in the background.

Property cannot be made secure by natural right alone, and for the better securing of their properties men have entered into civil society. The will of the body politic, when formed, is determined by the will of the majority, and of a bare majority if there be no different express agreement. For this Locke does not give any reason but the necessity of the case, it is certain that much worse ones have been given. As a matter of fact, we now know that a majority vote has not been generally recognized in archaic societies; the difficulty of obtaining nominal unanimity was overcome (as in special cases it still has to be) by various methods, including varying elements of force and fiction. This does not apply to the original agreement to form a society, which is assumed to be unanimous, and includes only the actual parties to it. Any one who stands out may go his ways and provide for himself elsewhere. It would seem that the community is entitled to enforce his departure, it is certain, on Locke's principles, that it has not the right to detain him against his will. Could he agree to stay in an inferior capacity like that of a resident alien? But it is needless to pursue the auxiliary fictions which might be devised. A body politic, then, is formed by consent;

[1] *D.* 9. 2. ad 1 Aquil. 13, pr.

the essential term of the agreement is that every member gives up his natural judicial and executive power to the community (not, as Hobbes maintains, to an irresponsible sovereign), and this consent is renewed, tacitly if not expressly, in the person of every new member; for one cannot accept the benefit of a settled government except on those terms on which it is offered. Locke is bold to assert that 'a child is born a subject of no country or government,' and may choose his allegiance for himself at the age of discretion: this is another opinion which no modern lawyer will accept, least of all a continental one It is however necessary to Locke's theory, and is one of the many details in which his individualism, and every scheme of individualism, breaks down. He guards himself to a certain extent by adding that a man does not make himself a member of an existing commonweal merely by accepting the protection of its government. Nothing short of 'positive engagement and express promise and compact' will confer citizenship.

As to the historical objection for want of proof that governments were in fact originally founded by consent, Locke answers, first that historical evidence of what men did before the beginning of history is not to be expected, and secondly that examples of states being founded by consent, such as Rome and Venice, are not wanting. More recent and more striking examples might have been drawn from the settlement of New England, but the fact that the colonists remained and professed to remain subjects of the king of England would have given too much of a handle for controversy, not to mention that the Pilgrim Fathers, whose deliberate constitution of themselves into a body politic is on record, were not at all like primitive or prehistoric men. This last consideration, however, would have had no weight among seventeenth-century disputants. The general prevalence of monarchy in early times is admitted as a fact, but not admitted to be any argument against the origin of government in consent. Why should not the consent and intention of the founders have followed the precedent set by the existing usage of families? We may suppose if we like that 'a family by degrees grew into a commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in his turn growing up under it tacitly submitted to it, and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed to have confirmed it and settled a right of succession by prescription' (§ 110). This is of some interest as showing exactly how near Locke could come to a historical point of view.

Summing up his argument (in chaps. vii and viii; I have not closely followed the order, as it is somewhat clumsy to a modern

reader) Locke states (chap. ix) the reasons which move men to restrict their natural rights by mutual agreement, and unite into commonwealths 'for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, Property.' In the state of nature this cannot be assured. The defects of merely natural society are—

1. Want of established and known law. 'For tho the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures, yet Men being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of Study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them, in the application of it to their particular Cases.'

2. The want of 'a known and indifferent Judge.'

3. Power to execute sentences; for though every man is, in default of positive law, 'both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature,' the ability is often not proportionate to the right.

Locke, then, admits that mankind are 'but in an ill condition' when left to the state of nature; he is not really very far from Hobbes's well-known description of the state of war. Some surrender of natural right is necessary, where Locke differs with Hobbes is in holding that, as the surrender is for a definite purpose, it is not unlimited, but conditional on that purpose being fulfilled. Accordingly the natural powers of self-preservation and punishment are put 'into the hands of the Society' not absolutely but 'to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the good of the Society shall require'; and the power of the Commonwealth or its legislative organ 'can never be supposed to extend farther than the Common Good.' Whatever be the form of government, it must be administered according to known law, and 'directed to no other End, but the Peace, Safety, and publick Good of the People.' Towards the end of the *Essay* (chap. xviii 'Of Tyranny') Locke cites an unexpected witness, no other than King James I, in support of this fundamental position.

The legislative power, once constituted by consent, is the supreme power in the Commonwealth, but not arbitrary (chap. xi). We find the reason of its supremacy given very shortly in a later passage (§ 150): 'what can give laws to another must needs be superior to him.' But the legislative authority is bound by its trust and by the law of nature to govern by established laws, to act in good faith for the common advantage, not to raise taxes without the consent of the people by themselves or their deputies, and not to transfer its power of making laws (being only a delegated power) to any other hands.

This is the most meagre and least satisfying part of Locke's work.

He does not seem to conceive the possibility of a legislature having powers limited by express convention but plenary within those limits; nor does he consider at all the partial exercise of legislative power by bodies having a merely delegated authority. He could not be expected to anticipate the constitutions of self-governing colonies, but he must have known that the University of Oxford and his own House had statutes and he must have desired to see the latter, at any rate, better secured from arbitrary interference than they had been in his own case. Yet he does make a very apt reference, in distinguishing absolute from arbitrary power, to the example of military discipline, where the officer may have power of life and death over the soldier, but cannot 'dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods.' Neither does Locke touch at all on what is now called constitutional amendment, except negatively. He seems to assume that nothing of the kind can be done, in any form of government, without express provision for that purpose. What makes the omission of argument on this point the more remarkable is that Sir Thomas Smith, writing a century and a quarter earlier, had enounced the unqualified sovereignty of Parliament in terms so full and explicit that Blackstone, after the lapse of just two centuries, could add nothing to them; while on the other hand the necessity of unalterable 'fundamentals' in any scheme of government had been much discussed under the Commonwealth, and maintained by Cromwell himself among others. Sir Thomas Smith's *Commonwealth of England* is now, for want of a modern edition, not so well known as it ought to be; but it was more than once reprinted in the seventeenth century, and one can hardly suppose Locke to have been unacquainted with it.

In fact there was in Locke's time respectable authority for three different theories of the supreme power in England. The King was absolute, according to the ultra-royalists and Hobbes: Locke demolished this contention once for all, whatever we may think of his constructive work. Parliament, or the King in Parliament, was absolute according to Sir Thomas Smith and the practice of the Tudor reigns: this view was accepted by Blackstone and has been the only tenable one among English lawyers ever since. According to a third doctrine prevalent among students of the Common Law down to the early part of the eighteenth century, there are bounds set by natural justice or 'common right' even to what the King in Parliament can do; that is to say, the judges ought to disregard an Act of Parliament if it is manifestly contrary to natural justice, and perhaps if it attempts to subvert the foundations of the

constitution, for example, if it purported to abolish the Monarchy or the House of Commons. Locke's opinion is in substance a less technical version of this last; and it is worth while to observe that existing legal authorities were in his favour. Sir Thomas Smith, whose opinion ultimately prevailed, was not a common lawyer but a civilian.

Locke touches on the separation of legislative from executive power, which was to become a constitutional dogma for his eighteenth-century followers; he gives only the practical reason that there is no need for the legislative to be always in being, but executive power for both domestic and foreign affairs must be constantly ready for action. The foreign department of government is distinguished by the not very happy epithet of 'federative,' which was not adopted, so far as I know, by any one.

We have now seen the whole of Locke's principles of polity. The last seven chapters of the *Essay* are a justification in detail, but by way of elaborate allusion, of their application to English affairs in the Whig theory of the Constitution, and in particular of the Revolution of 1688. Power being entrusted to rulers only on condition, that condition is enforceable at need, whatever be the legal forms of government: 'there remains still in the People a supreme power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the Trust reposed in them.' In this sense the Community is supreme, 'but not as considered under any form of government, because the power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved.' In other words, the ultimate reserved power is extra-legal and superior to the positive forms of the Constitution. Blackstone, whose criticism of Locke is in the main intelligent and fair, does not do him complete justice on this point. In a constitutional Monarchy the 'single Person' at the head of the Executive may 'in a very tolerable sense' be called supreme; and he is entitled to personal allegiance not 'as supreme legislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others.' The 'power of assembling and dismissing the Legislative' may be vested in the Executive by the Constitution, but, like all governmental powers, it is held in trust for the public, and abuse of it may justify the people in recourse to their ultimate rights. On the other hand, Locke suggests that the representation of the people in the Legislative may perhaps be amended at the discretion of the Executive, provided that such action is taken in good faith. Parliamentary reform by Order in Council was not so obviously remote from practical politics two

centuries ago as it is now; but what English princes down to Elizabeth had done in the way of creating new boroughs was not of encouraging example, and I do not know that Locke's suggestion was taken seriously by any one. The failure of Temple's plan to establish an efficient and independent Privy Council had in truth made it impossible beforehand. It is an important question, but a question of modern politics and far outside Locke's field of view, whether the latent capacities of the Privy Council may not yet be developed for the purposes of co-ordinating the resources of the Empire and giving the self-governing colonies an effective share—all the more effective for not being too rigidly defined—in the handling of affairs of common interest.

Prerogative is identified by Locke with executive discretion, including some (he avoids saying how much) extraordinary discretion in emergencies, tempered, like legislative power, by the possibility of forfeiture. Selden's way with the supposed mysteries of prerogative[1] was more straightforward and profitable; but Locke wanted to conciliate moderate royalists.

It is obvious that Locke's position as to the reserved power of dissolving government is not formally unassailable. A Hobbist would say that a political power 'not as considered under any form of government' is a contradiction in terms, and is not only extra-legal but anarchical. Dissolve existing government, under whatever pretence, and you are remitted to the state of war which we set out to avoid at all costs. Locke's reply is indicated later (§§ 224, 225). Its effect is that neither Hobbes's nor any other dialectic will make men tolerate an intolerably bad government. In extremity they will act on the belief that institutions perverted to ends other than the public good 'are so far from being better, that they are much worse, than the state of Nature, or pure Anarchy.' To this no further answer seems possible. Nowadays we should all agree with Locke as against Hobbes that government is the instrument and not the creator of society. We should also have something to say of the force of custom as a fly-wheel in the social machine, steadying and maintaining the common course of affairs notwithstanding technical or even substantial abeyance of legality. But of this Hobbes takes no account at all, and Locke only just touches upon it ('People are not so easily got out of their old Forms, as some are apt to suggest,' § 223).

The final chapter 'Of the Dissolution of Government' undertakes to show, but still under a transparent disguise of verbal generality,

[1] *Table Talk*, s. v.

that the conduct of James II was in fact such a breach of 'the fundamental Appointment of the Society' as justified the people in exercising their ultimate right of self-preservation. It does not seem useful to follow Locke through the details of his propositions, as nothing short of a minute historical commentary would illustrate them to any material extent.

The subsequent influence of Locke's *Essay* may be traced, as the President of Corpus has hinted, not only throughout the formal political philosophy of the eighteenth century, but in the doctrine received among English constitutional lawyers, and in the principles enounced by the promoters of American independence and the conductors of the French Revolution in its early stages. Blackstone substantially followed Locke, though he borrowed some ornamental phrases, not to be taken too seriously, from continental writers. He was prudent enough, indeed, to repudiate the assumption of mankind having actually lived in a state of nature, and proceeded to form society by a 'convention of individuals'[1]; and, writing as a lawyer, he was naturally more anxious than Locke to vindicate the Revolution settlement as not only justifiable but legal. It is none the less true that Bentham, when he sounded the note of destructive criticism in his 'Fragment on Government,' was really attacking Locke's theory of the State through Blackstone. Again, Blackstone's *Commentaries* were a vehicle of Locke's doctrine (though not the only one) to a numerous and public-spirited audience in the American colonies; and that doctrine was at the foundation of the several Bills of Rights of the American States, among which Virginia gave the first example, and of the Declaration of Independence itself. More than this, it has been shown by modern American scholars that these instruments became well known in France, and served as precedents for the Declaration of the Rights of Man[2]. On the whole it seems that Locke had as much to do as Rousseau with the Principles of 1789, or more. The fatal domination of Rousseau's ideas belongs to a later stage. It would be idle to consider what Locke himself would have thought of his latest spiritual posterity.

[1] *Comm.* i. 47; as to the ultimate remedy of dissolving government, *ib.* 162; Blackstone seems to have thought 'theoretical writers' a term peculiarly apt to include Locke, as to the Convention of 1688, *ib.* 152.

[2] See Parts iii and iv of Scherger, *The Evolution of Modern Liberty.*

SUMMARY

PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN GREEK SCULPTURE

By PERCY GARDNER

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read November 16, 1904.

THE paper was an attempt to trace, not the history of Greek sculpture, but the underlying tendencies in the sculptor which made it what it became The only professed attempt of the kind was Taine's *Philosophie de l'Art en Grèce*, but much may be found in the works of Brunn, Loewy, and other writers. In the first place it is interesting to see what the Greek philosophers had to say on the subject of art. Socrates, as reported in the *Memorabilia*, made some very judicious remarks on the sculptor's art. Plato looked down on representative art, and considered it ethically dangerous. Aristotle, on the other hand, grasped the truth that higher art does not merely represent visible objects, but looks beyond them to underlying idea and type, and so appreciated the ideal character of contemporary art Modern psychology shows how great a part in sculpture and painting, especially in early times, is taken by mental construction, and this element is notable in all Greek art. Like Greek philosophy and poetry, art emphasizes the human element; but its scope is directed not towards man as he is, but towards man as existing in the divine idea. Greek idealism differed from modern in having in it less of the personality of the artist, more of the school and the race; so it is generic, or even belonging to the whole human race. The qualities marking Greek work in art are simplicity and intelligence. In sculpture excellence was attained: (1) by familiarity with athletic sports; (2) by selection of points of excellence, and combining them so as to surpass nature. The sense of beauty thus produced was carried even into portraiture, producing types like the heroes of Plutarch. In producing the types of the gods the Greeks proceeded in the same way, on a frankly humanist basis. While Oriental art has tried to represent the functions of the deities by symbolism, Greek art embodies those functions in the figures of the deities themselves Of this there

are many examples. Thus they adopted and modified their finest human types. Aesculapius is the ideal physician, Hermes the ideal athlete. In Greece there were various strains of religion, the civic, the poetic, the mystic; it is the two former which have close relation to art: the Homeric poems have nearer connexion with it than any other part of literature. And as deities and their cities were closely connected, religious art was also patriotic. The productions of Greek art cannot be understood until one has traced the character of the race and the purposes of the artist. And, on the other hand, the Greek spirit, as embodied in literature and history, cannot be fully understood until its working in the field of art also has been traced.

THE CENTENARY OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE

By Sir COURTENAY ILBERT

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Read December 4, 1904.

When I was asked to read a paper on the 'Centenary of the French Civil Code,' I felt much hesitation in complying with the request. The subject of codification is vast, it does not much interest the present generation of Englishmen one is tempted to think that all that is worth saying about it has been said already. But I do not intend to enlarge upon the general aspect of the subject · what I think I may usefully do is to say a few words which may serve to explain the nature and objects of the celebration which was held at Paris during the final week of October last.

The celebration was initiated by two private societies—the *Société de Législation Comparée* and the *Société d'Études Législatives*, who have as their common President M. Baudouin, *Procureur général* at the *Cour de Cassation*. They constituted an organizing Committee for carrying out the work. The proceedings were not official, although they received the countenance and support of the President of the Republic, of the Minister of Justice, and of other great official persons. The object in view was twofold: first, to celebrate an event of great historical importance both in the history of France and in the history of law; and, secondly, to take some practical steps for considering what amendments the Civil Code required, and on what lines they should be effected. Thus the proceedings were partly public and ornamental, partly private and business-like. In the private proceedings I took no part, but I have since been supplied, by the kindness of the Committee, with a copy of the *Livre du Centenaire*[1], which had been prepared under their direction and for the guidance of their deliberations. It consists of two substantial volumes, contains a series of studies, general and special, on the Code itself and on its operation and influence in other countries, and concludes with suggestions as to the lines on which revision might proceed. There is a general introduction by M. Albert Sorel: the first of the general

[1] Le Code Civil, *Livre du Centenaire*, publié par la Société d'Études Législatives. Paris, Arthur Rousseau, 1904.

studies is by M. Esmein, and many of the other contributions are by jurists of acknowledged eminence in Paris, in the other French Universities, and in foreign countries which have been influenced by the French Codes. It is a work of great and varied interest, and I regret that it did not reach my hands until after I had written this paper. And yet, perhaps, from one point of view, it is as well that it did not reach me earlier, for if I had been fully aware of the extent and wealth of materials available, I should probably have shrunk from a task for which I am so inadequately equipped.

The public proceedings consisted of a reception at the Hôtel de Ville and a solemn sitting in the great amphitheatre of the Sorbonne, where discourses were delivered, of a banquet at the Palais d'Orsay, and finally of an evening party given by the Minister of Justice, M. Vallé, at the Chancellerie in the Place Vendôme. M Baudouin was unfortunately prevented from attending, but his place was efficiently taken by M. Lyon-Caen, the Vice-President. I have some reasons for suspecting that the dimensions which the celebration attained considerably exceeded the expectations of the organizers, and that the work of organization imposed a very heavy strain on the organizing Committee and its staff, and it may be that there were some consequential hitches in the arrangements. But speaking for myself and for the two English friends who with me attended the public celebrations, I can only say that we have every reason to be grateful for the kindness and hospitality which we received.

What then is the Civil Code of France? It is the first of the five Codes which were passed for France in the course of the years 1804 to 1810, when Napoleon was either First Consul or Emperor. The other four are the *Code de Procédure Civile*, the *Code de Commerce*, the *Code d'Instruction Criminelle*, and the *Code Pénal*. Of the five Codes the *Code Civil* is the earliest in date, and perhaps the most important; it became law as a whole in March, 1804. It contains such of the rules of the private civil law as it was considered expedient and practicable to embody in a single Code. It consists of three books, preceded by a few preliminary articles on laws in general. Each book is divided into titles, each title into chapters, and each chapter into articles. The original number of articles was 2,281. The first book relates to persons; the second to goods, and the different modifications of property; the third to the different modes in which property is acquired. Some notion of the contents of each book may be gathered from the different titles.

The first title of the first book is headed 'As to the enjoyment and privation of civil rights,' and deals with various questions relating to

nationality and naturalization, the second relates to the *Actes de l'état civil*, that is to say, to the registration of births, marriages, and deaths; then there are titles relating to domicile, absence, marriage, divorce, paternity and affiliation, adoption, *patria potestas*, minority, guardianship and emancipation, majority, interdiction and the judicial council[1]. The titles of the second book are headed (1) Distinction of goods, i.e the distinction between movables and immovables, (2) Property, i.e. practically the rights of accession; (3) Usufruct, use and habitation; and (4) Servitudes The third book embraces twenty titles, with the enumeration of which I will not weary you. They include succession, wills and gifts *inter vivos*, contracts, obligations such as quasi-contracts and delicts which arise without contract; contracts of marriage and the rights of husband and wife; sale, hiring, partnership, loan, mortgage, and prescription.

Such being the Civil Code, let me remind you briefly of the causes to which it owes its existence, and of the circumstances in which it came into being. The Civil Code of France, like the more recent Civil Code of Germany, owed its existence not to a mere desire for improving the form of the law, but to a sense of the intolerable practical inconveniences which arose from the co-existence of several different systems of law within the same political State, and of the need for replacing diversity by uniformity, wherever uniformity was possible. A sense of the pressing need for unity of law—that was the real origin of the Code; and that explains why proposals for codification have been received with comparative frigidity in this country.

Our Plantagenet kings, and their strong central courts, gave England many centuries ago that one body of general law for which France had to wait until the beginning, and Germany until the end, of the nineteenth century.

Consider the condition of French law in 1789. Instead of one Civil Code for the whole country there were at least 360 local codes of civil law, some applying to a whole province, some to a much smaller district[2]. The whole country was divided almost equally into two great legal regions—the region of the written law, based on the Roman law of Theodosius and Justinian, and the region of customary law. Each of these two systems of law was compatible with local diversities, but each of them had its common and distinctive features. The written law was more authoritative and individualist; the customary law was more humane and sociable. Both of them were supplemented, modified, or contradicted by three other general

[1] i.e the council appointed for the care of a prodigal.

[2] See Sagnac, *Législation Civile de la Revolution Française*.

systems of law—the feudal law, which recognized two separate classes of land, with consequential distinctions of personal rights; the canon law, which exercised a preponderating influence on many parts of the law of persons, especially on the law of marriage; and the royal ordinances, which cut into the common law as statute law cuts into common law in this country. All these laws were modified by local usages, expounded by voluminous commentaries, and interpreted by conflicting and varying decisions of numerous courts.

This was the state of things with which the revolution of 1789 was confronted. I speak of 1789 because, although the Codes are usually and justly associated with the name of Napoleon, they were in reality children of the Revolution, like himself. But here, as in other cases, the Revolution merely set loose, or gave an impulse to, forces which had long been at work The unity of French law had been the dream of French kings from the time of Louis XI, if not from the time of Saint Louis. Two factors made for unity: in the south the principles of the Roman law tended to supersede local customs; in the north the custom of Paris tended to supplant other customs. Under Charles VIII and Louis XII vigorous and systematic efforts were made to digest the customary law, and by the end of the sixteenth century the customs of all the provinces had been reduced to a written and authoritative form. From the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries the French law was being frequently altered by royal ordinances; but these ordinances answered to our amending Acts, and whilst they might improve the substance of the law, they did not necessarily make it more simple or uniform. The ordinances of Louis XIV and Louis XV, which were associated with the names of Colbert and D'Aguesseau, were of a different character. They were Codes. They were framed by learned commissions, presented in a complete and systematic form the whole of a particular branch of the law, and extended to the whole of the country. They were the immediate predecessors of the Napoleonic Codes, and to a great extent suggested their form and supplied their materials.

Throughout the eighteenth century almost all enlightened opinion in France—Montesquieu was an exception—was strongly in favour of unifying French law. Pothier was formulating and arranging its principles, and expressing them in terms capable of being transferred bodily into the Codes of the future. It has been said that three-fourths of the Civil Code of 1804 were extracted from his treatises. Everything pointed in the direction of the Codes, but until the Revolution the forces which made for privilege and diversity were still too strong to be overcome. Nor would the *cahiers*

of 1789—the budgets of grievances which were laid before the National Assembly—disclose any strong or general demand for unity of law: they were more concerned with particular local and personal grievances. It was the wonderful night of the 4th of August, 1789, when the privileged classes joined in making a holocaust of their privileges, when the different classes and peoples that made up France were fused into a single mass—it was this night that opened the doors for and ushered in the new legislation. A year afterwards, on the 16th of August, 1790, the National Assembly decreed that 'the civil laws shall be revised and reformed by the Legislature, and there shall be a general code of laws, simple, clear, and appropriate to the constitution.' And the constitution of September, 1791, repeated that 'There shall be made a code of civil laws common to the whole kingdom.'

But it was not enough to declare uniformity of law as a principle. There was a preliminary question, What law was to be adopted? How was the old system based on privilege and inequality to be reconciled with the new principles of liberty and equality? When there was a conflict between the principles of two rival systems, such as the written law and the customary law, which was to prevail? Amendment had to precede codification.

The work of amendment was carried out by a series of revolutionary laws, and the double process, that of amending and that of codifying the rules of the civil law, occupied a period of some fifteen years. This period may be divided into two lesser periods, one from 1789 to 1794, the other from 1794 to 1804. The first was a period of progress, not always enlightened; the second was a period of reaction, not always obscurantist. During the first period the principles which prevailed were those of liberty and equality; during the second period they were order and authority. During the first the influence of philosophers predominated, during the second the influence of lawyers.

Let me touch on the principal changes effected. Under the old régime the law of persons was based on privilege, inequality, disabilities. There were nobles, roturiers, and, in some places, serfs. The clergy had their immunities and their disabilities; the 'religious' incurred civil death. The alien, the Protestant, and the Jew were subject to serious disabilities. A series of enactments swept away these differences and established broadly the principle of equality of civil rights. Marriage, under the old régime, belonged to the domain of the canon law, and was under the control of the clergy. The Revolution set up

civil registers of births, marriages, and deaths, made marriage a civil contract, and recognized divorce. In family law it reduced the power of the father and raised the position of the wife. In the law of succession two rival principles were found in conflict with each other. the principle of individual liberty made for freedom of testation, the principle of equality made against it. The Roman law of the South favoured the former principle, the customs of the North the latter. Mirabeau, though a Southerner, in the great speech which was read to the National Assembly the day after his death, declared for the principle of equality, and it prevailed. The laws of nature were recognized by placing illegitimate children, for purposes of succession, on a footing almost equal to that of legitimate children. Succession in accordance with primogeniture, and entails, were abolished. The enjoyment of the land had been fettered by a multiplicity of burdensome dues, superiorities, and servitudes. The men of the 4th of August proclaimed in general terms the emancipation of the land, and left their successors to work out the problem. It was worked out in very rough and ready fashion. At first an attempt was made to distinguish between feudal dues, which were to be abolished, and contractual dues, which were to be redeemed. But the distinction was found to be untenable, and eventually most superior rights were swept away without compensation. When the State had entered into the inheritance of the *émigré* it endeavoured, for fiscal reasons, to restore some of these rights, but by this time the position of the occupier had become inexpugnable, and the attempt failed.

By all these radical changes the ground was effectively cleared for a code of uniform civil laws. It was the National Convention that first took practical steps for the preparation of such a code. In October, 1792, they appointed a Committee of legislation, consisting of forty-eight members, with Cambacérès as President. The Committee held evening sittings, which began at six or seven, and often lasted until eleven. They worked with enormous industry and with feverish rapidity, but their pace did not satisfy the Convention. On the 25th of June, 1793, a member of the Convention proposed and carried a resolution that the Committee of legislation should present a plan of a Civil Code within a month, and such a plan was actually expounded to the Convention by Cambacérès on the 9th of the following August. This, it will be remembered, was in the midst of the Terror. Cambacérès' Code followed the traditional plan of Justinian's *Institutes*, and was to be divided into four books, of which, how-

ever, the fourth, relating to procedure, was never drawn up. It consisted of 719 articles, and embodied, according to M. Viollet, a 'clear methodical scheme.' The Convention, in the midst of war, tumult, and proscription, peacefully discussed the laws of succession, alluvion, and natural children, from the 22nd of August to the 28th of October, but eventually laid aside the general scheme as too complex, though they passed parts of it into law. I take the subsequent stages from the valuable chapter which M. Viollet has contributed to the eighth volume of the Cambridge Modern History.

'On September 9, 1794 (23 Fructidor of the Year ii), the Committee presented a second scheme of 297 articles, a sort of summary, which only contained the principles involved and their immediate consequences The Convention soon perceived that this was more the skeleton of a Code than the Code itself. The discussion of it was suspended. A third scheme was presented, not to the Convention, but to the Council of Five Hundred, by the so-called Commission for the classification of laws (June 14, 1796—24 Prairial of the Year iv). This scheme, which according to Portalis was a masterpiece of method and exactness, was scarcely examined and remained almost entirely a dead letter Jacqueminot presented a fourth scheme to the Legislative Commission of the Council of Five Hundred (30 Frimaire of the Year viii—December 21, 1799) This project was not discussed. Finally an order from the Consuls (24 Thermidor of the Year viii—August 12, 1800) commissioned Tronchet, Maleville, Bigot, Préameneu, and Portalis, to draw up a fresh project for a Code. This fifth scheme developed into the Civil Code, an imperfect piece of work it certainly was, but wise, well weighed, and saturated with traditional elements'

Napoleon, as is well known, felt a keen interest in the Civil Code. He presided over 57 out of the 102 sittings of the Council of State at which the draft Code was discussed[1]. He took an active and effective share in the discussions of the draft, and, above all, supplied the driving force without which it would probably not have become law. He is reported to have said at St. Helena that his glory did not consist in his having won forty battles, but in the Civil Code and in the deliberations of his Council of State. A brilliant description of the part which he played in the formation of the Code will be found in a chapter which Mr. Herbert Fisher has written for a forthcoming volume of the Cambridge History, and which I have been permitted to see. Napoleon's sympathies were on the whole, and especially in the domain of family law, with the reaction which had set in since 1794 against the principles of 1789. He thought that the Revolution had unduly disturbed the foundations of family life.

[1] This is the ordinary statement, and it has been recently repeated by M. Sorel in his introduction to the *Livre du Centenaire* (p. xxv). But Mr Herbert Fisher, who has examined the *Procès-verbaux*, is unable to account for more than eighty-seven sittings, at thirty-five of which Napoleon attended

He held that the legislator, far from encouraging the indefinite sub division of property, should aim at securing a nation of moderate fortunes. He was a keen advocate of the subjection of women. He thought that it was the function of law to chasten loose morals, to exhibit the solemnity and sanctity of marriage, to strengthen the authority of the father, and to maintain the cohesion of the family group. These views, which were shared by many others, find their reflection in the Code, which, on many points, partially retraces the steps that had been taken since 1789. Civil death was restored. A retrograde step was taken by basing the civil rights of aliens on the principle of reciprocity instead of on the principle of equality. The power of the father was restored, the civil status of women was depressed. The grounds of divorce were diminished in number, but divorce by mutual consent was, mainly through Napoleon's influence, allowed. Illegitimate children were less favourably treated. Testamentary powers were somewhat enlarged. The main lines of the revolutionary law of succession and of property had been too firmly established, and were too consonant with the wishes of the people at large, to be set aside. But on many points the Code is a compromise, and not always a logical compromise. In the conflict between the written law of the South and the customary law of the North, the customary law, which had enjoyed the advantage of being expounded by Pothier, prevailed on the whole, but the southern lawyers were propitiated by an express recognition of the *régime dotal* in marriage, as an alternative to the *régime communal.*

What has been the verdict of history on the Civil Code? Perhaps our opinion will not differ much from Mr. Fisher's summary.

> 'The Civil Code was a hasty piece of work, and the First Consul imported a strong gust of passion and politics into the laboratory of legal science. Civil death—a superannuated, unjust, and immoral fiction—confiscation, and the position of women, are bad blots upon the page. . . . There is also much disproportion and omission There are instances of a subject being discussed in the Council, then forgotten and allowed to lapse The law of contract is lifted almost bodily from Domat and Pothier But, when all deductions have been made for haste, negligence, and political perversion, it remains a great achievement It was a single code for the whole of France, substantially based upon the broad historic instincts of the race, while preserving the most valuable social conquests of the Revolution.'

Two things at any rate the Code has done. It has familiarized all Frenchmen with the principles of the law which they have to observe. It has supplied a model which other nations have eagerly and extensively copied.

In England the law is ordinarily regarded as something technical,

mysterious, not to be understanded of the lay folk. In France the leading provisions of the Codes have become household words. They form the topic of village conversations. Familiarity with them is presupposed in popular literature and on the stage. Balzac, though a legitimist, was saturated with the Codes There are few better commentaries on the French marriage law than his *Contrat de Mariage*, on the French bankruptcy law than his *César Birotteau*. You may hear an article of the French Penal Code referred to by its number on the stage, and the reference at once caught up by the audience. A stage reference to 24 and 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75, would not meet with much response from an English gallery.

To the contagious effect of the French Codes on neighbouring countries a whole series of studies has been devoted in the Centenary volumes to which I have referred, and I will not elaborate the topic here.

The traditional opinion of English judges and lawyers has always been unfavourable to codes. They believe that codes tend to cramp and impede the free and natural growth of law. I have already explained why the most powerful motive for codification has been absent in this country. As to the need for and utility of codes in other parts of the world it would at least be prudent to suspend our judgement. I do not propose to argue the general question. I will content myself with making one remark of general application, and noting one or two facts which have a special bearing on the French Codes.

As long as a nation continues to live and grow, nothing can stop the growth of its law. The rules of law are simply those rules of conduct which are enforced by the State, and they have to be applied with reference to the political, social, and economic conditions of the time. Absence of power to legislate, or failure to exercise it, may impede, cramp or distort the growth, but cannot destroy it. The stream will either burst through, or, more often, find its way by tortuous and unexpected channels. The human mind displays marvellous ingenuity in adapting old forms to new conditions, whether those forms are embodied in codes or in creeds. The principle of development has been applied, not only to theological formularies, but to documents like the constitution of the United States, and, under the pressure of inexorable necessity, is somehow applied in apparent defiance of the rules of logic and of language.

Moreover, are we not apt, in this country, to exaggerate both the flexibility of the common law and the rigidity of codes? Are we not all familiar with cases in which the highest courts of the realm, bound as they are by precedents, have reflected the views rather of

a past generation than of the present, and have found themselves unable to assert for themselves or to recognize in others those principles of liberty and development which are essential to organic life and growth?

Then—in what sense and to what extent, have the French Codes arrested the development of French law? I think that they have to some extent, but more in the domain of procedure than of substantive law, more in the sphere of commercial law, where the Code de Commerce followed too closely antiquated models, than in the sphere of general civil law, and, in the whole field of law, to a much less extent than is generally supposed in this country. French lawyers recognize three modes by which law is developed, legislation, *jurisprudence*, or case-law, and *doctrine*, that is to say, the teachings and writings of learned lawyers. I doubt whether we have realized—certainly I myself had not realized until recently—the extent to which the Civil Code has been altered by legislation, especially within the last twenty years I hold in my hand a little pocket edition of the Civil Code, published in the present year, and showing in a convenient form the existing text of the law and the original articles of the Code. The existing text is printed in ordinary type, the original articles are in italics. I take the first chapter of the first title of the first book. It relates to the enjoyment of civil rights and consists of ten articles. Of these only three remain, the other seven have been repealed and replaced by others. Of the original seventeen articles in the second chapter not one remains, all have gone, including the articles which recognize civil death. The provisions relating to registration of births, marriages, and deaths have been materially amended. Many of the obnoxious articles relating to the position of women still remain, and their survival explains the hostile demonstrations against the Civil Code which were made the other day at the Sorbonne and in the Rue de Rivoli. But wives and husbands have been put on a footing of equality as regards divorce for adultery, and the whole law of divorce has been completely recast by the laws of 1884 and 1886. It may be remembered that divorce was recognized in 1804, abolished in 1816, and restored in 1884, but under different conditions. The power of the father over neglected or ill-used children has been restricted by, and may be taken away under, a law of 1889, which enables the State to intervene in the case of such children.

The law of succession has also been materially altered. The disabilities of aliens in the matter of succession were removed as long ago as 1819. By a law of 1891 the surviving husband or wife was

given a share or interest in the inheritance notwithstanding the existence of children. The rules as to the succession rights of illegitimate children were completely remodelled in 1896. The technical rules which require children claiming a share of the inheritance to account for advances made by the parent during his lifetime were amended in 1898. Succession duties on inheritance are now regulated by the fiscal laws of 1901, 1902 and 1903. The law as to wills made by soldiers and on board ship was amended in 1893 and 1900. In the chapters relating to property law the rules with respect to party walls, boundary fences, and ways of necessity were altered in 1881, and those as to alluvion and water rights in 1898.

The important chapters of the Code which relate to delicts and quasi-delicts have been supplemented and materially altered by the laws of 1898, 1899 and 1902 for regulating the responsibility of employers in the case of accidents to their workmen. The rules as to the contract of service in the case of domestic servants and workmen had been previously expanded and made more precise by a law of 1890.

The famous association law of 1901 with its supplementary decrees, though best known in its bearing on religious congregations, is of much wider application, and in the last edition of the Civil Code finds its place as part of, or a supplement to, the title relating to the *contrat de société*. The law as to aleatory contracts was supplemented by a law of 1900 as to gambling on the Stock Exchange. And, finally, I may note that imprisonment for debt was abolished in 1867.

I have not of course attempted an exhaustive statement of the changes made in the Civil Code since the date of its enactment[1], but I am sure that I have said enough to show that it has never been treated by the French legislature as a sacro-sanct or verbally inspired document.

Bentham looked forward to a time when case law, or, as he preferred to call it, judge-made law, would be superseded by codes. 'Whatever is not in the code of laws,' he said, 'ought not to be law.' 'The great utility of a code of laws is to cause the debates of lawyers and the bad laws of former times to be forgotten.' The codes having been prepared, the introduction of all judge-made law should be forbidden. Judges should not make new law. Commentaries, if written, should not be used. In short the code was to be complete

[1] A full list of amendments to the Code Civil is given in a note to M. Larnaude's paper in the *Livre du Centenaire*, vol. ii, p. 909.

and self-sufficing, and was not to be developed, supplemented or modified except by legislative enactments.

If these views could be accepted the French Civil Code must be pronounced to be a failure. It has not, fortunately for us, stopped or made unnecessary historical inquiries into French law as it stood before 1804. It has not checked the production, or prevented the citation, of commentaries. That it has not arrested the development of *jurisprudence*, the numerous and portly volumes of Dalloz can testify. Expressions not unlike those of Bentham may be found in the reports presented by Cambacérès on his earliest projects of codification. But these were the views, or at least the expressions, of the Cambacérès of the Convention, not of Cambacérès the Consul, and there is no reason to suppose that the framers of the Code of 1804 shared the illusions of 1793. On the contrary, it would be easy to quote from the preliminary report of the Commission of the Year viii passages which lay stress on the inevitable imperfections of a code, and recognize fully the necessity for the completing and supplementary action of judges.

Bentham's views on these points have long since been abandoned. We are all now agreed that a good code must often—perhaps should always—content itself with the statement of general principles, that however complete and full it may be it can never supply rules applicable by an ordinary intellect to every possible case, that the work of interpreting the law and of applying its general rules to particular cases must be left to the judges, that the sound interpretation of legal definitions and legal rules requires a knowledge of legal history, and that the exercise of the power of interpretation and application necessarily involves—whatever the Benthamic Article 5 of the Civil Code may say to the contrary—the formulation of subordinate and supplemental rules. What the Code has really done for French *jurisprudence* has been to simplify and facilitate the work of the judges by substituting for numerous and conflicting laws and usages a harmonious, orderly and authoritative set of leading rules.

Nor is there any solid ground for believing that the codification of French law has been detrimental in France to legal literature or *doctrine*. We are indeed told by some French writers of authority that there was a time when the teaching in the French law schools, and the legal literature which arose out of and gathered round these schools, threatened to degenerate into arid and barren commentaries on the text of the Civil Code, unilluminated by any intelligent study of legal history or by a scientific appreciation of legal principles, and when a gradually widening breach arose between the law as taught in

the schools and the law as developed in actual practice by judicial decisions. Had these tendencies continued they would have supplied the ground for a formidable indictment against codification. But if the same authorities are to be trusted, these tendencies have not continued. I am not in a position to speak from personal knowledge of the character of the teaching now given in French schools of law. It may well be that a good deal of it, as of the teaching in other schools, is lifeless and mechanical. But there seems strong evidence to show that during recent years much has been done in the French Universities to improve the teaching and study of law, and that the tendency during the last quarter of a century has been to stop the threatened divorce between theory and practice, by insisting on study of the texts being accompanied, illustrated, and vitalized by study of judicial decisions, and at the same time to widen and deepen the theoretical study of law by dwelling on its historical and comparative aspects. The influence of M. Esmein, to mention only one well-known name, has been exercised strongly in this direction. Certainly the legal literature of France has no reason to fear comparison with the legal literature of countries which are blessed, or otherwise, with immunity from codes. Take, for instance, the department of legal history. We are indebted to Sir Frederick Pollock and Professor Maitland for a fragment—a most brilliant fragment, it is true, but merely a fragment—of the history of English law. But we have not as yet any comprehensive history of English law as a whole, we have nothing that could be compared with the works of M. Viollet and M. Esmein on the history of French law. The French Society of Comparative Legislation, which was founded in 1869, and which is largely responsible for the celebration of the recent centenary, has done and is doing excellent work in familiarizing French lawyers with the legislation of other countries. And the historical and scientific study of law is by no means confined to Paris. If I needed any illustration of the extent to which it has been carried and the success with which it has been pursued in other parts of France, I might refer to the admirable essay on the origin and development of the testamentary executor which was recently published by M. Caillemer of the University of Lyons, and to the interesting contributions which have been made to the new *Livre du Centenaire* by representatives of local universities.

To the advanced and scientific student of law the Code Civil has supplied a framework to be filled in, supplemented, and illustrated. And to the ordinary student of law it is an inestimable boon that he should be able to find, within reasonable compass, an orderly and

authoritative statement of the leading rules of his craft The other day a young French lawyer wrote to me from a French provincial town, applying to me, as a brother member of the *Société de Législation Comparative*, for information about a point of English legal procedure, and he wound up by asking me, with much simplicity, whether I could refer him to any concise and complete work on English Civil law. I was unable to comply with this request, and was obliged to say that there was nothing in England that corresponded to the French Civil Code. Was this answer quite satisfactory? But could any much more satisfactory answer have been given?

However that may be, there can be no doubt that the current English views about codification are very insular, and are not shared by any of the great continental States. Among the countries which have either adopted the French Civil Code, or taken it as a model, are Belgium, Holland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, besides Mexico and Chili, on the other side of the Atlantic, and Japan in the far east[1]. Germany, working on independent lines, produced a civil code in 1896, after a period of gestation of twenty years, and brought it into operation in 1900. Switzerland passed an admirable law of obligations in 1883, and is engaged in the codification of other branches of its law[2].

Within the British dominions British India has, as we all know, taken the lead in codification, moved thereto in the first instance by pressing practical needs, such as the impossibility of administering the Mahommedan criminal law, and the need of authoritative manuals for the use of untrained judges and magistrates. The draft codes of criminal law and criminal procedure prepared for English use by Sir James Stephen, and based on the Indian models, were in many respects rough and imperfect, but they were a great piece of work, and the failure of the Criminal Procedure Code to become law in 1882, a failure due largely to disregard of parliamentary tactics, has materially retarded the prospects of English codification on any extensive scale In the meantime we are indebted to Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr. Chalmers respectively for three minor but extremely useful measures of codification within the domain of civil law, the Partnership Act of 1890, the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, and the Sale of Goods Act of 1893. Mr. Chalmers's third codifying bill,

[1] For a long list of Civil Codes enacted since 1804 see the *Livre du Centenaire*, vol. ii, p. 927; and for the progress of codification within and without the British dominions see chapters viii and ix of my *Legislative Methods and Forms*

[2] See the *Message* (of May 28, 1904) *du Conseil Fédéral à l'Assemblée Fédérale, concernant le Projet de Code Civil Suisse.*

which deals with marine insurance, has for many years been tossing about among the breakers of the House of Commons, and up to this time has always been left as a derelict at the end of each session. It will become law as soon as the mercantile community have shown unmistakably that they really want it, and are determined to have it, but not before.

Several of the self-governing colonies have been more successful than the home legislature in their attempts at comprehensive codification. For instance the Dominion of Canada has a criminal code of 1882, based mainly on Sir James Stephen's drafts, and Queensland is indebted to Sir Samuel Griffiths for an excellent criminal code, which is framed on more independent lines, and which became law at the beginning of 1900.

If the British Government ever resumes any comprehensive schemes of codification, it will probably do so under the pressure of imperial needs, not for the self-governing colonies, which can take care of themselves, but for the less advanced parts of the British dominions, and for British protectorates, where English law is administered. For these regions there is really great need of a simple and authoritative statement of the leading rules of English civil and criminal law, such as can be understood and administered by officials with imperfect, or without any, professional training. Sketchy and fragmentary attempts at such statements are to be found in some of the Orders in Council which have been drawn up for regulating the exercise of British jurisdiction in protectorates. Many years ago the late Mr. Justice Wright, in whom we have recently lost one of the most acute and subtle intellects that ever adorned the English bench, prepared, at the instance of the Colonial Office, a criminal code for Jamaica, which did not become law in that colony, but which has been applied, with modifications, to some of the other crown colonies. What would seem to be most useful would be the preparation of model civil and criminal codes, not having any independent force of law, but capable of adaptation and application to the regions for which they are required. It is understood that the Colonial Office has been at various times contemplating the execution of such a task, but what progress, if any, has been made with it, I do not know.

I fear that I am being tempted away into a vast and almost boundless field of speculation, and I must return in my very few concluding words to the immediate subject of my paper. In 1815 France lost what she had conquered by the sword; she retained what she had conquered by ideas. She retained for herself her civil and other codes, embodying, as they did, the most valuable and permanent

results of the revolutionary legislation. Though her political frontier receded behind the Rhine, her codes retained possession of the Rhenish provinces[1], of Luxemburg, of Holland and Belgium, and of parts of Italy. She supplied models of legislation which were eagerly copied by her continental neighbours, and a conception of legal unity which was destined to be realized before the lapse of a century by the most formidable of her continental rivals. The Civil Code of 1804 both symbolized and expressed the legal and moral unity of a great nation. It was the realization of a great idea, and on that ground it has been fitly and deservedly commemorated by the centenary that was celebrated in October last.

[1] *In the Rhenish provinces the Napoleonic Code has now been superseded by* the new German Civil Code. A new Civil Code was enacted for Holland in 1838.

OBITUARY NOTICES

HENRY SIDGWICK

Henry Sidgwick was never a Fellow of the British Academy for he died in August, 1900, some months before it received its Charter from the Crown. He had, however, taken a leading part in endeavouring to secure its creation, and every one felt that he would have been not only one of its first members, but one of the members most certain to exert influence within the body, and indeed certain to add lustre to any body to which he might belong. It has, therefore, been held that he ought to be commemorated in these pages as one who did much to call the Academy into being, no less than as the friend for whom many among our members felt both reverence and affection. He was born at Skipton in Yorkshire on May 31, 1838; his father, who was headmaster of the Grammar School there, died when he was three years old, and his mother then left Skipton. He was educated at Rugby, and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he graduated as the first of his year in the Classical tripos in 1859, obtaining also a place in the first class of the Mathematical tripos. He was immediately elected a Fellow of his College, and resided there thenceforth; a few months (during vacation) were spent at Gottingen studying Arabic under Ewald. Appointed lecturer at Trinity, he resigned his fellowship in 1869, because he felt he could no longer take the test then required by law. In 1875 he was elected University Praelector in Philosophy, and in 1883 Professor of Moral Philosophy. He continued to lecture at Cambridge until a short time before his death.

Thus his whole life was occupied with study, the results of which expressed themselves in teaching and in writing. His first reputation was made as a classical scholar. He then turned to Oriental studies, partly in the hope of exploring the problems bearing on Christian theology, and ultimately gave most of his time to philosophical inquiries, while also pursuing Economic Science and Political Science, on both of which, as well as on Ethics and Metaphysics, he was accustomed to lecture.

The following remarks on his philosophical position are from the pen of his friend and colleague, Professor James Ward.—

'Philosophy for Sidgwick was essentially reflected Common Sense—"the common sense of educated persons rectified by a general acquaintance with the results and methods of science." Thus he sided with Reid in opposition alike

to the idealism of Berkeley and to the scepticism of Hume; while he rejected the Kantian "miscalled criticism" with all its later developments as really "dogmatism in the worst sense" On the other hand he was no thorough-going empiricist, but maintained that no cogent inference is possible without assuming some general truth, the validity of which cannot itself be guaranteed by any canon of inference' Unfortunately, however, he has left no enumeration of the primitive truths which he himself accepted, nor yet formulated the criterion by which they can be ascertained, or the method by which they might be systematized. Still there is no doubt that—natural theology apart—he agreed in the main with the Principles of Common Sense as enunciated by Reid.

But he concerned himself primarily with ethics and cognate subjects, and of the growth of his ethical views he has left an interesting account Here, as in his philosophical studies generally, he began as a disciple of J S. Mill. But he soon perceived "the profound discrepancy between the natural end of action—private happiness, and the end of duty—general happiness" A "fundamental ethical intuition" seemed necessary before the Utilitarian method could be made to work. This the Kantian "categorical imperative"—Act from a maxim that you can will to be a universal law—appeared to furnish. But this in turn on further reflection proved inadequate, since it did not recognize the undeniable reasonableness of self-love. Finding, however, that Self-love as well as Conscience was admitted as a natural principle by Butler, who had also proved the existence of disinterested impulses, Sidgwick was led to side with the English Intuitionists against the school of Bentham. And in this attitude he began, taking Aristotle as his model, to examine common-sense morality. The result was twofold: *negatively*, though the Intuitional Ethics disclosed no principle to supersede or even supplement the Kantian imperative or the Utilitarian formula, with which this was in complete accord; yet, *positively*, it proved to be a body of practical rules clearly conducing to the general happiness He saw at length, to use his own words, "that Utilitarianism may be presented in the scientifically complete and systematically reflective form of that regulation of conduct, which through the whole course of human history has always tended substantially in the same direction" "I was thus," he tells us, "a Utilitarian again, but on an Intuitional basis"; or, as his successor, Professor Seeley, puts it, though he adhered fully to Utilitarianism, "it was on an expressly rational ground, not on the basis of naturalism," a difference which is profound. But one difficulty remained to the last unsolved: the religious sanction could not, Sidgwick believed, be demonstrated by ethical arguments alone, and he had therefore reluctantly to abandon the idea of rationalizing morality completely.'

Sidgwick's work in Economic Science is dealt with in the following paragraphs, which are from the pen of his former pupil, Dr. Keynes of Cambridge.—

'Sidgwick's chief contribution to Economics was his *Principles of Political Economy*, the first edition of which appeared in 1883. In 1885 he was President of the Economic Section of the British Association, and his Presidential Address was afterwards published under the title of *The Scope and Method of Economic Science*. Shortly before the end of his life he again dealt with the same topic in an important contribution to Mr. Palgrave's *Dictionary of Political Economy*. He wrote various essays on economic subjects, some of which appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, and he made contributions towards the solution of more concrete economic problems in memoranda which he prepared, by invitation, for

Royal Commissions on the Financial Relations between Great Britain and Ireland, and on Local Taxation.

Leaving on one side the memoranda just referred to, Sidgwick's economic work was mainly of an analytical character, and his most striking contributions to economics consisted of analyses of fundamental conceptions, certain additions to the theory of value on the lines of Ricardo and Mill, and a discussion of the central problems of what he called the Art of Political Economy.

Sidgwick's analyses of such conceptions as wealth, value, capital, were extraordinarily subtle, perhaps too subtle for the ordinary reader, whose main desire is for a simple formula of easy application. He held that economists, generally speaking, were inclined to underrate the importance of *seeking* for the best definition of each cardinal term, while overrating the importance of *finding* it; and the value of his own discussions of definitions is undoubtedly to be found rather in the discussions themselves than in the definitions ultimately proposed. But for the student the discussions are illuminating and suggestive in the highest degree.

In the doctrine of value, Sidgwick cleared up in an effective though simple way some of the ambiguities connected with the notions of supply and demand, and he introduced modifications into the theory of international values that were as important as they were original.

His treatment of the practical side of Economics, which he dealt with as constituting the Art of Political Economy, was abstract and general, but it was marked pre-eminently by impartiality and practical wisdom. In weighing judicially the advantages and disadvantages of given courses of action Sidgwick was unrivalled; and while those who ask for a general solution of practical questions that shall be unqualified and categorical must go away from his book disappointed, those who wish to have both sides presented to them fully and fairly in order that they may form a decision for themselves will never fail to be rewarded by the perusal and re-perusal of his pages'

Some further observations on Sidgwick's Economic writings have been given to me by his colleague Professor Alfred Marshall of Cambridge. They are as follows —

'Sidgwick's contributions to Economic Science are distinguished by strength, thoroughness, courage, and caution. His knowledge of men and things was wide. As President of the Cambridge Charity Organization Society he concerned himself actively with the details of individual lives, and the same interest in concrete study made itself felt in his treatment of public affairs. But his main occupation was with fundamental ideas He analysed them with much subtlety, and showed great skill in bringing them to bear on one difficult problem after another. He sought steadfastly for those underlying causes which are apt to escape attention, but are often in the long run the most important, and the combined breadth and depth of his treatment of large problems will make it live after the particular economic conditions of his own time have passed away

Perhaps his best economic work, and indeed the best thing of its kind in any language, is his treatment of the "Art of Political Economy", to use the name that he chose for his discussion of the economic functions of government and of the public conscience. The warmth of his philanthropic zeal made itself felt specially in this part of his work, in spite of the sense of responsibility that caused him to keep his zeal resolutely down. For he recognized that, in the

advocacy of reform, emotion is likely to darken the mind. He was always ready to act bravely, and to counsel others to act, even on imperfect knowledge, where none better was to be had; but he refused to hide from himself any valid arguments that told against his counsel, or any weakness in the case for it. He thus lessened the popularity and the apparent effectiveness of some of his work; but all the more will his name ever be a watchword to the student.'

Sidgwick was keenly interested in political inquiries, as indeed he was in the actual politics of his time. He had planned a threefold treatment of the subject. One book was to deal with politics in general, analysing fundamental conceptions and examining the problems which recur in most States. Another was to trace historically the development of political institutions. The third would have consisted of a comparative study of the constitutions of Europe and European colonies, in connexion with the history of the nineteenth century, which has seen most of these constitutions framed.

Of these three treatises the first was executed in his lifetime, and appeared in a book entitled *The Elements of Politics*. The second was left in the form of notes for lectures and has been published since his death by his widow under the title of *The Development of European Polity*.

The third did not I think, get beyond the stage of a plan drawn out in his own mind.

The two books I have just named are both of great excellence, the former in respect of its acute discussion, not only of the main problems of politics, but of numerous minor points arising out of those problems; the latter in respect of the skill shown in bringing within reasonable compass a very large subject. Few among Sidgwick's friends knew till this second book appeared how wide was the range of his historical knowledge, and how complete his mastery of historical method. All his writings are marked by ingenuity, subtlety, precision, as well as by perfect lucidity both in thought and in expression; but this book is perhaps that in which his breadth of view and power of subordinating details to principles are most conspicuously shown.

During the last twenty-five years of his life he devoted much time and labour to an investigation of obscure problems connected with the action of one mind upon another in ways not yet scientifically determined, including the phenomena popularly called, for want of a better name, 'Spiritualistic.' He was for a time president of the Society for Psychical Research which has been investigating these phenomena. It was characteristic of his delicately balanced mind that he never, during all that period, committed himself to any declaration either that facts and laws of psychic action, hitherto

unknown, had been discovered, or that it had been shown that there was little chance of discovering them. His attitude was invariably that of an inquirer who thought that phenomena existed which, because hitherto unexplored, deserved investigation, but who was not prepared to draw any positive conclusions from the investigation so far as it had gone. The detection of many impostures did not shake his opinion that inquiry ought to be prosecuted but even when facts seemed to have been established to which no suspicion of imposture attached, he refused to give his sanction to any of the hypotheses which sought to explain the facts by assuming forms of personal existence not cognizable by the usual sense perceptions. In this, as in so much else, he was a sceptic in the old Greek sense of the word, considering every view, but scarcely committed to any.

With great penetration, and an insistent earnestness in getting to the bottom of every question, he had a scrupulously careful habit of weighing as well as analysing all the arguments that could be advanced upon either side. His natural bent was to distrust all that was obvious and to discover flaws in every accepted doctrine. This tended to make his books difficult, because the reader found it hard to carry in his mind all the qualifications and limitations subject to which Sidgwick admitted some view of a previous writer or propounded some view of his own. They are not books for the hasty perusal of those who wish to carry away a body of broad conclusions, fit to be easily remembered and applied. But they are so fertile in suggestion and so acute in criticism, they state every aspect of the matter in hand with such precision and such fairness, as not only to form an admirable discipline for the student's mind, but to leave him with the sense that difficulties have been thoroughly explored, and that no material point needed for the forming of a conclusion has been omitted. It would be hard to find any writer of our time whose devotion to truth and unwearied patience in pursuing it are more conspicuous and more fitted to become a model to others.

Though primarily a thinker and a teacher, Sidgwick was by no means a man of the cloister. He was warmly interested in the political and religious movements of his time. He took a leading part in the discussion of educational problems and exerted great influence in his University. His special interest in the education of women, which forty years ago had but few friends among men, made him one of the founders of Newnham College at Cambridge, and he thereafter watched over its fortunes with unceasing care. Nor was it only by his writings and his lectures that he influenced the

thought of his generation. The extraordinary acuteness and quickness of his mind, joined to a lively sense of humour, made him an admirable talker, and as he was himself full of geniality and kindliness, his company was much sought, and his opinions greatly affected the views and action of an unusually large circle of friends. Few men were so often consulted upon all sorts of questions. few were so unselfishly willing to give the best of their counsel to those who sought it. Even if he had written nothing, Sidgwick would have deserved, by his personal influence as well as by his teaching, to be ranked among the most stimulative intellectual forces of our time.

JAMES BRYCE.

LORD ACTON

As Lord Acton died a few months before the British Academy received its Charter from the Crown, he cannot, in strictness, be described as one of its Fellows. But he had borne a leading part in the action taken to secure its creation and he was universally recognized, not only as one who would have been selected to be among the first members, but also as a man qualified beyond almost any one else both by his attainments and by his wisdom to guide its policy in the earlier years of its course. He ought therefore to be commemorated, if not as a member, yet in a certain sense as a founder, of the body which he so warmly desired to see called into existence.

Born at Naples, January 10, 1834, he belonged to an old Roman Catholic family of Shropshire, settled at Aldenham, not far from Bridgnorth. His father, Sir Ferdinand Acton, was son of the General Acton who had been first Minister of the King of Naples in the beginning of the nineteenth century. his mother was heiress of the renowned house of Dalberg in the Rhineland. After receiving his earlier education at Oscott College, then directed by Dr. Wiseman, afterwards Catholic Archbishop of Westminster and Cardinal, he pursued his studies at Munich under Dr. von Dollinger, whose influence upon his mental habits and the development of his powers was deep and lasting, and with whom he maintained thereafter a close friendship. In 1865 he married the daughter of Count Arco Valley, and thereafter resided partly in Germany, partly in England, till his death, which occurred on June 19, 1902.

During three periods of his life he came into the world of action. The first was while he was a member of the House of Commons from 1859 till 1865. He spoke only once there, but watched all that passed with a keenly observant eye. The second period covers the months that immediately preceded and that saw the sittings of the Vatican Council of 1870, months during which he was one of the most active and most learned of those who were opposing the efforts made to procure the declaration of the dogma of Papal Infallibility. The third period began with his appointment as a Lord in Waiting to the Queen in Mr. Gladstone's ministry of 1895, and lasted for

three years. Though the duties of the post were purely ceremonial, he occasionally represented the Irish Office in the House of Lords, and he was in close and constant touch with the politics of those eventful years. It is always interesting to see how the men of thought and learning comport themselves in the current of practical life, but Lord Acton descended too little into the arena to enable a judgement to be formed. His powers were indeed not well adapted to English parliamentary politics. He knew too much to find himself in full agreement with any party. He was what may be called highly individual in his ideas. Perhaps he was too strenuous in his search for truth. The public sphere in which he might best have shone would have been that of diplomacy, for to an extraordinary familiarity with the courts and leading personages of Europe he added subtlety, clearness and firmness of judgement, easy yet dignified manners, and perfect tact.

These occasional entrances into the world of action were however only episodes, and did little more than give him a better comprehension of that world. Study and composition were the main business of his life. From early years he had set himself to create a library, and when he formed the plan of writing a History of Liberty which should trace the growth of great formative ideas through long centuries, he found a line of inquiry which directed his selection of books.

The great History of Liberty was never written, because the plan was too vast. Many a man with learning and power inferior to Lord Acton's might have treated the theme in a creditable and profitable way. Perhaps some one may yet do so. But his conception of the subject and of the way in which it ought to be handled required so wide a range of knowledge, not only of events but of books, and so strong a stream of thought directed to explain the tendencies that had been at work through many centuries of history, that to complete the task he had set himself would have needed the labour of a lifetime. Years passed while he was preparing himself for it, and while these years were passing, the habit of accumulating materials so grew upon him as to check the impulse to creation. At fifty he had not abandoned the hope of his youth, but at sixty it was gone: nor did he ever produce any single book which can stand as a worthy witness to his amazing gifts. In earlier days he had written copiously. Many articles of his in the *Home and Foreign Review*, and a few in the *North British Review*, are enumerated in the excellent bibliography of his writings compiled by Mr. W. N. Shaw. Latterly he wrote more slowly and

sparingly. Three essays in the *English Historical Review*, one on modern German historical writing, a second on the work of Dollinger, a third on Wilhelm von Giesebrecht, are the most important contributions to literature of his later years.

In 1895 he was appointed by the Crown, on the recommendation of Lord Rosebery, to the Chair of Modern History at Cambridge, and filled that post until his death. Though already an elderly man when he came to this new home and new duties, he quickly adapted himself to the conditions of the one and threw himself heartily into the discharge of the other. His lectures were carefully prepared and drew large audiences. He took a warm interest in his pupils, was easily accessible to them, advised them, answered their questions, became a living force in creating a new school of historians in Cambridge, historians in whom learning and thought were to go hand in hand, learning illumined by theory, and theory never separated from facts [1]. Hardly any misfortune has befallen an English university in our time greater than the premature loss of this illustrious scholar and teacher, who until the Act of 1871 could not, as a Roman Catholic, have held a professorial chair in an English University.

It was upon his learning that Lord Acton's fame among his contemporaries chiefly rested, because in that more than in anything else did he seem to overtop them. But the word 'Learning,' if it be taken simply to mean the possession of an immense store of knowledge, conveys no just notion of the nature and scope of his powers. What was most remarkable in him was not the mass of facts he knew and the number of books he had mastered [2]. It was the complete command he had of all his knowledge: it was the perfect order with which his resources were stored, and the power of bringing out of the treasure-house, at a moment's notice, things new and old as they were needed. It was the insight he had into the meaning of facts, the grasp of great principles running through and connecting facts and giving to them their true significance. He never seemed oppressed by his learning, nor indeed would any one have known, meeting him in ordinary society, that he was anything more than an accomplished and well-read man of the world.

His writing was always full and weighty, and in his earlier years

[1] Some remarks on Lord Acton's work as a University teacher, by Mr. W. A. J. Archbold of Cambridge, one of his pupils, follow this notice

[2] Mr. H. R. Tedder, Librarian to the Athenaeum Club, has contributed a paper on Lord Acton as a master of books, which will be found at the end of this notice.

sufficiently clear. As he advanced in life it became more subtle, more allusive, and sometimes so overcharged with thought as to be obscure. He had formed the habit of making extracts from the books he read, and had, indeed, accumulated an enormous mass of such extracts, which he had arranged on slips of paper in cardboard boxes. His later articles abound in citations, which, by distracting the reader, sometimes perplex him more than they instruct him. A volume of his letters which has been recently published shows what admirable point and force his pen had when it ran straight on. They make one wish that he had been compelled to write, as one may say, against time, upon the great subjects which he was always preparing himself to treat of. So far from being a bookworm, he was not merely a man of the world for social purposes, fond of company and of talk, but was also keenly alive to whatever was passing in the public life of Europe. England was hardly more familiar to him than France, Germany, and Italy. His interest in politics, ecclesiastical and civil, was part of his interest in history. They were to him the same thing. In literature he cared most for what belonged to man and little for what belonged to nature. Dramatic poetry and fiction—for he was an assiduous reader of novels—attracted him more than lyric or epic or descriptive poetry. He studied philosophy, especially what may be called the more concrete side of philosophy, i. e. the philosophy of ethics, politics, and religion, more eagerly than pure metaphysics, and seemed nowise drawn towards the physical sciences. Neither did his friends discover in him any great love for the beauty of the external world, or any interest in its aspects. Human thought and human action occupied his mind almost to the exclusion both of art and of inanimate nature.

It may seem fanciful to connect this indifference to art with his dislike to rhetoric, which led him so far as to warn young students against the allurements of style. But that dislike had another and a deeper root. History is something different to every historian. To Acton it was above all things moral. He condemned alike the Relative School, which judges men's conduct by the standard of their time, and what may be called the Positive School, which judges by the results of the work a man has done. To him the moral standard was permanent and unchanging. Truth was sacred, and the truth of history lay not only in the exact ascertainment of what had happened, but also in the soundness of the judgement passed on the motives and character of the actors.

Accurate himself, and incomparably industrious in investigating a subject to the bottom, he had no indulgence for carelessness or

indolence in the examination and criticism of authorities. The standard of excellence which he set up was so high that few approached it. He would sometimes dismiss the successful work of an eminent writer with the remark, 'It contains nothing new' If any one pleaded by way of excuse for not having exhausted all the sources of information available for the purposes of some inquiry that the time and labour required would have been disproportionate to any result to be expected, he would reply, 'That is to decline the character of a scientific historian.' But for the warmth of his appreciation of some great writers and great books, he might have seemed an altogether too stern and unappeasable critic. His published letters contain dicta regarding such eminent persons as Macaulay, J. H. Newman, and Thomas Carlyle which are startling in their severity; but these must not be pressed as conveying his deliberate opinions, for averse as he was to rhetoric, and judicial as the poise of his mind seemed, his power of expression sometimes ran away with him, and gave too sweeping a character to the condemnation of some particular defect. There was no constitutional asperity in him, no jealousy, no desire to belittle others. He stood far above that vile indulgence. There was often some tinge of moral displeasure in these grim deliverances, which only those who were familiar with his ideas could recognize. He was almost too austere a moralist, with an alarmingly keen insight into the weaknesses of human nature.

Though nearly everything which he wrote bore upon history, he was much more than a historian in the popular or conventional sense of the term. He had read widely and thought deeply upon theology, and upon the political sciences, including constitutional law, the philosophy of law, the foundations of government. It was, however, from the historical side that he preferred to deal with these topics. There is not much speculative thought in his writings, nor did he in talking start speculative hypotheses, but seemed occupied in trying to probe and test the views of others, and to bring facts as well as doctrines into their true relations. Many persons were surprised that such a master of Old Testament and New Testament criticism should nevertheless adhere to the dogmatic teachings of his church, and that one who had so unsparingly exposed some of the historical errors on which the Ultramontane scheme of papal power has by some of its defenders been made to rest, should nevertheless cling devotedly to his membership of the Roman communion. To him there was in this no inconsistency. He saw the church as a living and persistent whole, whose formulae could not bear quite the same meaning to

a later generation which they had borne to an earlier, and which could never hope to express all the truth, an institution which ought to be obeyed and followed in spite of its imperfections, because the human forms in which divine ideas are embodied must be always imperfect. He was a pious Christian; and he would possibly have been as much out of sympathy with any form of Protestantism as he was with Vaticanism.

Acton's figure was a unique one in modern England. He was hardly more an Englishman, in respect of his love for liberty, order, and good sense, than he was a Frenchman in the fine edge of his wit, a German in his learning, an Italian in his flexibility. Few persons who have known so much have been so free both from pedantry, and from the wish to display their knowledge: few possessed of such powers have cared so little for the applause of the world; few have combined such a passion for freedom with so complete a sense of the dangers incident to freedom, and with so much reluctance to disturb the existing ecclesiastical and civil order. He has left less than his unrivalled gifts might have given us, had they been spurred by the ordinary impulses or ambitions of literary men. But he remains one of the most remarkable personalities of his time, whose way of thought has entered into and affected all those who had the good fortune to know him either as friends or as pupils.

JAMES BRYCE.

LORD ACTON AS A CAMBRIDGE PROFESSOR

To throw oneself into new duties involving new habits and new associates must always be a dangerous experiment for a man past middle age. Especially so in the case of one who was thoroughly interested in his work, and who had so high a standard of what was due as had Lord Acton. His lectures worried him a good deal. Even when he repeated them he was constantly revising them, and spent more time in the revising than most men do in preparing. As a rule—there were notable exceptions—he disliked public speaking, so that he did not take pleasure in lecturing, although his lectures aroused extraordinary interest. On his arrival he was, as is customary, made a member of various Boards and Committees, and attended, usually silently and patiently. Occasionally a question would be put

to him and he would answer in the manner and language so peculiarly characteristic of him. On the whole it may be said that the public duties of his position were something of a burden.

But the impression he made upon Cambridge was profound and far-reaching. One has to go back to Thompson to find anything of the same kind of influence; or possibly to Whewell. Not that Lord Acton really compares with these men, for he does not, but there was in all three weight, force, motivity. Whewell and Thompson were academic types, and therefore marked with the necessary limitations arising from interests mainly centred in university politics. But Lord Acton when he became a don, whilst sharing in the common task, remained a member of the great world without, of a world too that extended very far both east and west. Probably it was this great experience of life, in conjunction with his own character, that made him so interesting to scholars of so many kinds. Cambridge is the temple of the specialist, and Lord Acton's friends were chosen from many fields of thought. As all will know who have studied his writings, he was much more than a historian, and nothing was more characteristic of him than the fire that he struck from the mathematician, the economist, or the man whose days are passed in the laboratory; unless perhaps it was the inspiration, the suggestion coming from wide cosmopolitan reading, the learning matured by thirty years of leisured thought, which he contributed. If Lord Acton was at a university party every man felt it and did his best. And yet he was so simple and good natured, his laugh told you that clearly enough, that all this was unconscious. It was the natural working of a powerful mind. But it was also the ascendancy of an experienced man of the world.

Those who have read the first essay in the *English Historical Review* will understand the reverence which all teachers of history in the University felt for Lord Acton, though they will not realize the effect of his artillery at short range. If to read that essay suggested to some Keats and Chapman's *Homer*, to talk with its author has been to many the beginning of a new intellectual life. With his wide definition of history he suggested, as he would have said, new angles to the most experienced. He took his stand in mid Europe, and knew whole literatures that were either unknown when he began to teach or at best were neglected. His learning was arranged. He co-ordinated authorities, traced the progress of ideas, furnished new illustrations. Who is there, of those who discussed such matters with him, who has not profited, for instance, by his masterly expositions of American constitutional history? He had none of

that contempt for old lights so characteristic of the half-illuminated enthusiast. He had valued and placed the great masters, and would not allow them to be dethroned. A young man would tell him that So-and-so was out of date. 'He taught me more than any one else on his subject,' would be the reply. But he was rarely so downright as this, because, being keenly sensitive, he was afraid of wounding others. He could on occasions meet you with a firm negation, but he preferred to make his opinion known by a quotation or an epigram; earnest people occasionally triumphantly carried away an impression of agreement which cooled on reflection. But words are cold to describe the wealth he poured out, the learning, the sympathy, the encouragement, the books lent, the letters written, the advice given, the wonderful patience with some, the good nature with all.

Undergraduates know a man when they see him, and they appreciated Lord Acton. They were frightened of him at first—a very excellent symptom—but they became his disciples even though they never lost their awe of him. It may be doubted whether the relations between a Professor and those *in statu pupillari* could have been better managed. He was always glad to see them and talk with them; some he kept to historical studies, who would have gone astray; some he taught at the proper stage to do original work. The undergraduate who is not in the first flight is in danger, especially if he be at a college where there are many ahead of him, of thinking his studies unimportant, a respectable task. Lord Acton's kindly word and obviously genuine interest often transfigured such men. He formed too a small historical society where papers were read and discussions took place; it became the centre of an influence of the most important kind on both teachers and pupils.

There is one word that must not be left unsaid. Every one who came in contact with Lord Acton here felt that as well as being a learned man and a delightful companion, he was sincerely and truly a good man. No one had less of the prig in him, and any morality he preached was taught rather indirectly than directly. But apart from the reverence without which there never was a good teacher, there was a simplicity of life, a nobleness of purpose, and a solid basis of principle of which all were conscious, even those who were incapable of fathoming the gulfs and drifts of his wonderful mind.

W. A. J. ARCHBOLD.

LORD ACTON AS A BOOK-COLLECTOR.

I HAVE been asked to put on paper my recollections of Lord Acton as a book-collector and the founder of a great library. For this task I may possess some qualifications as I knew Lord Acton intimately for about thirty-three years, and in 1873 and 1874 enjoyed the honour of acting as his librarian. This association I shall always regard as one of the greatest privileges of my life.

Lord Acton collected books at an early age. He seems to have begun his intellectual career with the noble ambition of mastering two subjects, which indeed interested him to the very end. One was the history of liberty in ancient and modern times, and the other the history of the papacy, more particularly during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Inspired by the enthusiasm of Dollinger, he planned a course of study of extraordinary thoroughness. He ransacked all the bookshops of Europe, he bought whole libraries, and acquired by inheritance the old Dalberg collection at Herrnsheim. In course of time he accumulated about 60,000 volumes which overran the family mansion at Aldenham. His chief activity as a book-collector lasted about thirty years, that is to say from about the age of twenty to fifty. After he was fifty or thereabouts he still bought and read books, but they were mainly modern works. The same chronological division may be partly applied to his mental life. For thirty years he read original authorities with the industry of a Benedictine; during the last fifteen or sixteen years of his life he seemed to turn more to the nineteenth century. He began to be more curious to learn what his own contemporaries thought. He gave more attention to modern political and economical history than to the scrutiny of dry sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers

It is not for me to speak of Lord Acton's writings or of his professorial work at Cambridge. I shall always remember him best in his library, the collection and arrangement of which was the great achievement of his life. There have been more famous historians: in modern days there have been few scholars of equal learning. In mere dogged power of reading he rivalled the heroic Dutch and German students of the seventeenth century. Seen among his own books, so familiar to him that they appeared to be not mere bundles of paper and leather but sentient entities, he was a never-to-be-forgotten figure. A whole subject was before him in its literature. His knowledge of books went far beyond the facts to be found in bibliographical

treatises and literary histories. It was so complete and exact that he never seemed to be speaking of dead and forgotten writers, but of living persons. Gradually all his books grouped themselves into a mighty storehouse for the history of the great religious struggles of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. I cannot believe any person can have studied the history of this period so minutely and thoroughly as did Lord Acton. He possessed and had read all the books of the famous controversialists, he knew their lives as if he were of their own days, he followed them in their epistolary correspondence, he knew their friends, their living places, their education and the very formation of their ideas. He was acquainted not only with printed but also with MS. sources, for all European archives were familiar to him either in person or by deputy. His industry was colossal, and equalled by the rapidity with which he read. Knowing so much, he had the art of only looking for what was new to him. Nearly every volume in his collection bore his special marks—a pencil tick in the margin to indicate a salient fact, and a thin slip of paper for a point of more importance.

My own work at Aldenham was in the first instance to make a catalogue of the whole library, but this was interrupted by much reclassification on the shelves and the duty of turning out the duplicates, which ran to some thousands of volumes. Some other pieces of interesting work fell to my share. One instance may be mentioned. I had to make an index of all the letters and other MS. authorities used by Pallavicino in his *Istoria del Concilio di Trento*. This, by the way, is an illustration of Lord Acton's method. For his studies of the Council of Trent he had acquired from the Vatican and other archives copies of the original letters and diaries of the ecclesiastical dignitaries who attended the Council. He then intended to use my index to compare the authorities and to test the accuracy and trustworthiness of Pallavicino in writing his book. Lord Acton's own method in reading was to copy passages which specially interested him on slips of paper of a uniform size. Long lists of authorities were also written on similar slips and all arranged in a multitude of boxes under subjects.

It has been found necessary to reclassify the Acton Library in its new home at Cambridge, but I like to dwell in memory on the books as I recall them arranged under the eye and by the hand of the owner at Aldenham, where they formed a part of himself. Here on the left hand of the entrance hall was the study, where stood the bibliographical works, library catalogues, indexes of MSS. in all countries, which formed his working tools. From the entrance

hall one reached the saloon or billiard-room, a kind of inner hall, in which on the left hand were arranged English, Irish, Scottish and Colonial history with that of the United States, and on the right-hand side the history of the various states of the German Empire. There was a gallery above. The shelves of a large and a smaller drawing-room on the right of the entrance hall were filled with English, French, German, and Italian *belles-lettres*. From the drawing-room one passed through the dining-room to a small anteroom, in which was a large press full of copies of MSS. from the Vatican and other archives. One then entered the library proper, a fine cruciform apartment specially built nearly forty years ago. The great mass of the collection was in this large room, which was lighted by lantern lights and large French windows opening upon a formal garden. An iron gallery, also shelved with books, ran all round the walls. On entering one saw Greek and Latin classics on the one hand, and Fathers of the Church on the other. Turning to the left was a large recess devoted to the various Italian states. In the recess and elsewhere about the room were large upright stands with books on both sides. At the end facing the entrance door was French history and French local collections. Turning back to the entrance one found theology at the right hand with special sections devoted to ecclesiastical history, moral theologians, canon law, councils, the Inquisition, Jesuitica, indexes of prohibited books, the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, the Reformation, the Port Royalists, Jansenism, the French Huguenots, the Jews, liturgies and biblical controversy. In the gallery were universal, ancient, and oriental history, the history of Hungary, Holland, Scandinavia, Russia, Spain, Portugal, &c., letters and epistolary correspondence, jurisprudence, political economy, science, art, and geography. In the garrets were a great collection of pamphlets, periodicals, and the remainder of the Dalberg library.

Lord Acton was not a mere bibliomaniac, curious in title-pages and rarities. He knew and valued a fine book and had a taste for bindings, but he never despised an imperfect or shabby volume if it contained what he wanted. He used a handsome half morocco for clothing his unbound books, and indeed spared no money on the acquisition and upkeep of his treasures. His library contains not many rarities which would be highly priced in booksellers' catalogues, but it is full of very scarce books of no great pecuniary value. For this reason the probable selling price of the collection would be much less than the cost to its owner. Unfortunately, some years before Lord Acton's death he found it necessary to dispose of the great

library which had been the chief work of his life, and the collection was completely disorganized in the course of being shifted for the purpose of being catalogued for sale by auction Before it came to the hammer, however, it was bought privately by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who left it in Lord Acton's possession for life. It was then given by Mr. Carnegie to Mr. John Morley, and by him presented to Cambridge, where it is now being catalogued and arranged as a worthy memorial of a great historical scholar and an illustrious University Professor. Lord Acton's own estimate of the number of his books at about 60,000 volumes may probably considerably outnumber the collection now at Cambridge, as it included a vast number of duplicate, triplicate, and quadruplicate copies of favourite books, and it is possible that the library may have suffered in its travels.

With all his great acquirements Lord Acton was perhaps not seen at his best in formal literary composition. His pen seemed to be cramped by too much knowledge, and the clearness of the thought was hindered by excessive literary and historical allusion, but he was an admirable letter-writer, with a crisp style and delicate touch, wanting in his more serious writing His chief charm was in his conversation. A fine presence, a most courtly manner, a thoroughly amiable and kindly nature gave added grace to rich and varied mental gifts, to extraordinary knowledge of books and men, to a wonderful aptness in quotation and illustration, to a keen interest in all modern phases of thought.

To have known Lord Acton was to respect and admire the man and the scholar. To remember him now is to regret the great loss which the learned world has sustained by his early death.

HENRY R. TEDDER.

PROFESSOR DAVIDSON

PROFESSOR ANDREW BRUCE DAVIDSON was born in 1831 at Kirkhill Farm, in the parish of Ellon, about twenty miles north of Aberdeen. His father was a sturdy, honest farmer, keenly interested in the grave constitutional questions which shortly after 1831 began to agitate the Church of Scotland: indeed, the action taken by the presbytery of Strathbogie, and its minister at Ellon, Dr. J. Robertson, was one of the principal causes which led ultimately to the great disruption in the Church of Scotland, and the formation of the Free Church, in 1843. Davidson's boyhood was passed among these stirring movements, and the side taken in them by his father to some extent determined his future career. It fell to his mother to provide for his education: and she, in 1845, managed to send him to the Grammar School of Aberdeen, where he learnt much, especially in educational method, from its head master, Dr. Melvin, and whence, six months afterwards, he gained a small bursary in the Marischal College, Aberdeen. There, in due course, in 1849, he took his degree; and after this was for three and a half years teacher in the Free Church School, which had just been established in his native parish of Ellon. These three and a half years were the formative period of his life. he worked hard and made himself master, not only of Hebrew, but also of French, German, and other modern languages. In 1852 he entered the Divinity Hall of the Free Church in Edinburgh, called the New College. After the usual four years' theological course he was, in 1856, licensed to become a preacher: he did however but little preaching, or other parochial work, except temporarily; and in 1858 was appointed assistant to the celebrated John Duncan, who was at that time Professor of Hebrew at the New College, a man of remarkable force and originality of character, who no doubt exerted upon Davidson a stimulating influence, but who was destitute of the faculty of teaching a class. After holding this post for five years he was, in 1863, appointed Professor Duncan's successor in the Chair of Hebrew and Oriental Languages. For nearly forty years, till his death on Jan. 26, 1902, he held the same position, making his Chair almost

from the very first, partly by his writings, but chiefly by his personality, one of commanding influence.

Professor Davidson, it may be here added, was LL.D. of Aberdeen, D.D. of Edinburgh and Glasgow, and Litt.D of Cambridge. He was also a highly valued and influential member of the Old Testament Revision Company.

The following are Professor Davidson's principal publications: *Outlines of Hebrew Accentuation* (1861); an unhappily never completed grammatical and exegetical *Commentary on Job* (1862); an *Introductory Hebrew Grammar* (1874), which has passed through numerous editions, and been very widely adopted as a class-book; a *Hebrew Syntax* (1894), intended for more advanced students, and a repertory of minute and exact information on the subject with which it deals; commentaries on the *Epistle to the Hebrews* (1882), *Job* (1884), *Ezekiel* (1892), and *Nahum, Habakkuk, and Zephaniah* (1896)—the last three in the well-known 'Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges'; a compact and admirably written 'Bible-class Primer' on *The Exile and the Restoration*; numerous articles in the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, the *Theological Review and Free Church Quarterly* (1886–90), the *Critical Review of Theological and Philosophical Literature* (1891 ff.), the *Expositor*, the *Expository Times* (1891 ff.), the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* ('Apocrypha,' 'Job,' and 'Proverbs'), the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* ('Ecclesiastes'), Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* ('Angels,' 'Covenant,' 'Eschatology of the Old Testament,' 'God,' 'Hosea,' 'Immanuel,' 'Jeremiah,' 'Prophecy and Prophets'); and (published posthumously) *Biblical and Literary Essays* (1902); *Studies in the Book of Isaiah* (1905); two collections of sermons—*The Called of God* (1902) and *Waiting upon God* (1904); and last, but not least, two important volumes based upon his lectures, viz. *Old Testament Prophecy* (1903) and *The Theology of the Old Testament* (1904).

Professor Davidson was a man of rare powers, and of still rarer qualities of mind. Whatever subject he touched, his treatment of it was at once masterly and judicial. No one had a better power of penetrating to the heart of a subject; no one was more skilful in the discovery and delineation of the characteristics of an age, the drift of an argument, the aim of a writer; no one—witness his *Job*—could more powerfully analyse moral feeling or exhibit the conflict of motives in a difficult moral situation. His mastery of a subject was always complete: he grasped it firmly, he saw it under all its bearings, he expounded it with clearness, and he enabled his reader to see it with him. He was thus able to deal with equal power and success alike

with the language, the exegesis, and the theology of the Old Testament. And his treatment of a subject was, moreover, always judicial. His native insight and discrimination never failed him. He weighed reasons, he balanced opposing considerations, he could always distinguish the certain from the hypothetical. His exegetical works are of the highest excellence: as one reads them the impression forces itself more and more upon one that whatever opinion he puts forth is the result of long and mature study, that he has considered the subject from every point of view, and applied the best available methods to ascertain precisely what his author thought and meant. And so one feels that his interpretation of a difficult passage, or conclusion on a controverted question, has an antecedent presumption of being the best attainable. The same qualities are displayed in his volumes on *Prophecy* and *Old Testament Theology*, and in his *Dictionary* articles: all alike are remarkable for power and breadth of treatment, for wide and careful induction of facts, for close reasoning, and for clear and logical statement of conclusions.

But great as Professor Davidson was as a writer, he was yet greater as a lecturer. It was in the lecture-room that his power and individuality came out most strongly, and here, as all who ever heard him agree, was to be found the true source and secret of his influence. Of a small and spare figure, quiet and unpretending in speech and manner, retiring in disposition and shunning publicity, he nevertheless in the lecture-room riveted the admiration and affection of many generations of pupils, and gained, unsought, an influence over them which those who know what it was unanimously describe as unparalleled. Thus Professor S. D. F. Salmond, of Aberdeen, writes[1]:—

> The qualities of a great teacher are possessed by him in unusual measure and in happiest combination. Easy mastery of the subject, lucid and attractive discourse, the faculty of training men in scientific method, the power of making them think out things for themselves, are united in him with the gift of holding their minds, quickening their ideas, and commanding their imaginations. Flashes of insight, rare turns of expression, phrases that stick like arrows, sudden sallies of quiet humour check the wandering attention and charm the hearer, while to all is added the fine contagion of his spiritual feeling for the messages of the Old Testament.

Others who have been his pupils have spoken in similar terms. He had a keen sense of humour; and the quiet sarcasm with which he would sometimes expose ignorance, pretentiousness, or unreasonable self-confidence was as entertaining as it was effective. He was

[1] *Expository Times*, July, 1897, p. 444.

not very willing to occupy the pulpit; but when he could be persuaded to do so, he was a forceful and striking preacher. His published sermons show freshness, independence, religious sympathy, and penetration.

Professor Davidson's central aim, to which everything else may be said to be subordinate, was to realize the *historical* significance of the Old Testament, to show what its different writings were to those who first heard them uttered or read them, to trace the historical progress of religious ideas, to cultivate, in a word, *historical* exegesis[1]. At the time when he began to lecture, the Old Testament was practically never studied from this point of view, the historical books were read uncritically and superficially, the other books were regarded chiefly as a collection of dogmatic utterances, and the whole was treated as of equal value, both historically and doctrinally, throughout. Davidson's pupils have declared what a revelation it was to them to discover from his lectures that the prophets, for instance, were men of flesh and blood like themselves, interested in the political and social movements of their times, and keenly intent upon influencing for good their own contemporaries. They had not then heard what is now a commonplace, that the prophets were men with a message addressed primarily to their own age[2]. At the beginning of Davidson's professoriate, Ewald was the leading Biblical scholar, who had done so much, at least in Germany, to introduce the historical view of the Old Testament; and for a while Davidson followed in his steps. But in 1878 Wellhausen, the most brilliant of Ewald's pupils, published his epoch-making *Geschichte Israels*, in which, while accepting in the main Ewald's general principles, he developed a new theory of the historical position of the ceremonial law of Israel; and Davidson, not indeed at once, but slowly and cautiously, and guarding the new theory against misconceptions, advanced substantially to the same position[3]. But, from first to last, it was the historical interest by which he was prompted; and indirectly, if not directly, he has probably been more instrumental than any other scholar in naturalizing the historical view of the Old Testament in this country. For nearly forty years the ablest young men destined for the ministry of the Free Church passed through his class-room, were trained in his methods, and kindled by his spirit; and Professors W. Robertson

[1] Cf. *Biblical and Literary Essays*, p. 320.

[2] See the striking words in which Prof. G. A. Smith, in the second of the articles cited below, p. 289, describes the illuminative change thus wrought by Davidson's lectures in his pupils' minds.

[3] Cf. his *Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 18 f.

Smith and George Adam Smith, the two most brilliant and influential popularizers of this view, both received from him the initial impulse which made them the teachers that they afterwards became.

Davidson's work was a great one. His lot was cast in a time when opinions which had come to be regarded by many as axiomatic were being rudely disturbed, and when influence and wise guidance were greatly needed. Davidson supplied both. He moved circumspectly; but he was gifted with openness of mind, and when he saw the way, even though it might be a new way, he did not hesitate to follow it. The judgements of a man, whose temper and habits of mind were such as Professor Davidson's were known to be, naturally commanded confidence; and he was the means of guiding many through a difficult and trying transition. With a warm and profound appreciation of the deep spiritual importance of the Old Testament he combined a vivid sense of the historically progressive character of the revelation contained in it: he thus widened at the same time both the spiritual and mental horizon of those who came under his influence; and he taught them to understand and maintain with himself the reality of both these aspects of the Old Testament Scriptures.

For further particulars respecting Professor Davidson's life and teaching, see the reminiscences (by various writers) in the *British Weekly* for Jan. 30, 1902; Professor W. G. Elmslie in the *Expositor*, Jan. 1888, p. 29 ff.; Professor S. D. F. Salmond in the *Expository Times*, July, 1897, p. 441 ff.; two particularly excellent articles by Professor G. A. Smith in the *Biblical World* (Chicago), Sept., 1902, p. 167 ff., and Oct., 1902, p. 288 ff.; and the Biographical Introduction by A. Taylor Innes, prefixed to *The Called of God*, pp. 3–58. A complete list (so far as is known) of his publications, including articles in Reviews, &c., is given in the *Expository Times* for July, 1904, p. 450 ff.

S. R. DRIVER.

DR. S. R. GARDINER

SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER was born at Ropley, near Alresford in Hampshire, on March 4, 1829, and was the son of Mr. Rawson Boddam Gardiner and Margaret, daughter of Mr. William Baring Gould. On the father's side he was descended from the Protector Oliver Cromwell, by the marriage of Cromwell's eldest daughter, Bridget, with Henry Ireton. This descent, which lends an additional interest to Gardiner's historical work, was afterwards verified and worked out in detail by the investigations of Colonel J L. Chester.

Gardiner, who was educated at Winchester College as a commoner, matriculated at Christ Church, Oxford, in October, 1847. In 1850 he was given a studentship by Dean Gaisford, and in 1851 he obtained a first-class in the School of Literae Humaniores. In the same year he took the degree of B.A., but theological reasons prevented him from keeping his studentship, and he did not proceed to the M.A. till 1884. In 1855, he married Isabella, the youngest daughter of Edward Irving, and soon after his marriage set to work upon the great task which was to occupy his life. Carlyle, Forster, and many other popular writers had already treated the struggle between the Stuarts and their people, but it seemed to Gardiner that their version of the story was inaccurate and their treatment of the actors unfair. He resolved to relate its history fully and exactly, depending entirely upon the original authorities for his facts, and allowing neither religious nor political prepossessions to influence his conclusions. Unendowed, and depending largely upon teaching for a livelihood, he began his investigations, and produced in 1863 the first instalment of his work—two volumes entitled *A History of England from the Accession of James I to the Disgrace of Chief Justice Coke*, 1603–1616. This was followed in 1869 by two further volumes entitled *Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage*. About 140 copies of the first work were sold, but most of the edition went for waste-paper; the second had a circulation of about 500, but did not bring the author anything. Gardiner persevered, and his third instalment, published in 1875, *A History of England under the Duke of Buckingham and Charles I*, 1624–1628, actually

paid its expenses. In 1877 came the fourth instalment, *The Personal Government of Charles I*, 1628-1637, and in 1881 the fifth, *The Fall of the Monarchy of Charles I*, 1637-1642.

From the first the merit of Gardiner's book had been warmly appreciated by scholars, and it began at last to reach a wider circle of readers. The publication of a revised edition of the ten volumes in cabinet form in 1883 marked the turn of the tide. Gardiner's services to English history were now publicly recognized. In 1882 Mr. Gladstone gave him a Civil List pension of £150 a year, and in 1884 All Souls College elected him to a research Fellowship in order to assist him to continue his investigations. After his tenure of that Fellowship came to an end, he was elected to a similar one by Merton College in 1892, and was a Fellow of Merton at the time of his death. Degrees and other distinctions were conferred upon him by various universities and societies both English and foreign. In 1874 he had been elected a corresponding member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, and he was also made a member of the Royal Bohemian Society of Science, and of those of Copenhagen in 1891 and Upsala in 1893. In 1887 the University of Gottingen conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, whilst Edinburgh gave him the degree of LL.D. in 1881, Oxford that of D.C.L. in 1895, and Cambridge that of Litt.D. in 1899. Meanwhile Gardiner's work was gradually nearing completion. Three volumes issued separately in 1886, 1889, and 1891, under the title of *The Great Civil War*, brought the story down to the execution of Charles I; and three more, of which the last appeared in 1901, carried *The History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate* to the middle of the year 1656. Gardiner had originally intended to end his book at the Restoration, but finally the knowledge that his health was failing made him resolve to conclude it with the death of Cromwell. Even this was denied him. In March, 1901, he was stricken by partial paralysis, rallied for a time, and hoped to resume his work, but died on February 23, 1902. One chapter of what should have been the final volume was published after his death, and is included in the second edition of his *Commonwealth and Protectorate.*

Gardiner's life is the record of a single purpose persistently pursued, but in spite of his concentration upon his work, no man did more by his personal efforts to forward the progress of historical studies in England. No scholar was ever more ready to assist others; a beginner was sure of help and advice, and of kindly appreciation for his first efforts at research. In all enterprises for the promotion

of historical learning in England he took a leading part. From 1873 to 1878 he practically edited the historical department of *The Academy*, to which he contributed many notable estimates of contemporary historical books, and a number of unpublished historical documents of interest. To the *Revue Historique*, between 1876 and 1881, he supplied a series of 'bulletins' on the progress of historical literature in Great Britain. From the foundation of the *English Historical Review*, in 1886, he was one of its chief supporters, and from 1891 to 1901 its editor. His time, of which he was a rigid economist, and his labour, of which he was unsparing, were both freely given to societies for the publication of historical documents. Director of the Camden Society from 1869 to 1897, he edited for it twelve volumes of papers, besides several smaller collections printed in its 'Miscellanies.' Besides this, he published two volumes on *The First Dutch War* for the Navy Records Society, and a volume on *Charles II and Scotland in 1650*, for the Scottish History Society. These volumes represented a portion of the materials utilized by Gardiner in the production of his history, which he was anxious to make accessible in print, partly on account of their value to historical students in general, and partly because they formed the evidence on which he relied in his treatment of certain crucial episodes in his narrative. They were chips from his workshop. Twelve volumes of MS. of the same character, including papers copied with his own hand at Simancas, he presented to the British Museum for the benefit of students.

Gardiner did much to promote historical education, and we owe to his hand a number of textbooks. For the *Epochs of English History*, published by Longmans, he wrote, in 1874, *The Thirty Years' War*, and in 1876, *The Puritan Revolution.* These are models of concise and lucid statement which exemplify his skill in presenting, with a few bold strokes, the pr nciples underlying a series of events and the character of the actors in them. He published also an *Outline of English History* (1881) for children, and a *Students' History of England* (1892) for the higher classes in schools, together with a *School Atlas of English History* to serve as a companion to them. All these attained a wide circulation.

During the greater part of his life, Gardiner was himself engaged in the teaching of history. From 1872 to 1877 he was a lecturer, and from 1877 to 1885 he was professor of Modern History at King's College, London. Between 1877 and 1894 he lectured regularly for the Society for the Extension of University Teaching in London. He also taught for some years at Bedford College, in various schools

near London, and conducted a class at Toynbee Hall. Besides this, he acted as examiner at Oxford and Cambridge, and in the University of London.

As a lecturer Gardiner was excellent. He used no notes, and spoke in a simple, fluent, conversational way, arranging his matter very clearly, making his points effectively, and weaving the different threads of his story into a connected whole with remarkable skill. His perfect familiarity with his subject, and the sense of reserved knowledge it gave, with the breadth of view and elevation of thought incidentally displayed, combined to make the result singularly impressive. The six lectures on *Cromwell's Place in History* given at Oxford in 1896, though not printed exactly as they were delivered, because they were not written till Gardiner was subsequently asked to publish them, exemplify his method, and form a memorial of this side of his activity.

Regret has often been expressed that a man so eager to spread a knowledge of history, and so skilful in communicating it, should have spent his time in elementary teaching or popular lecturing, when he might have been giving instruction in the higher branches of his subject. 'Being one of the two or three most solid historians in England,' complained Lord Acton in 1882, 'he has to teach at an inferior girls' school,' and foreign scholars could not conceal their amazement that neither Oxford nor Cambridge sought to enroll him amongst the teachers in their History Schools. Two years later, Dr. Stubbs, in his farewell lecture as professor, referred to Gardiner as 'a great constructive historian' who 'must be reclaimed for Oxford.' Nevertheless no employment of the kind was offered Gardiner till the last years of his life. If the chance had come earlier he would probably have accepted it, but when it arrived circumstances made him hesitate to make any change in his way of living. London was the best place for his researches. 'Nothing,' he once said, speaking of a friend who had taken a professorship in Scotland, 'would induce me to put four hundred miles between myself and the tracts in the British Museum'; and the same reasoning applied in some degree even to less distant seats of learning. Besides this, elementary teaching was easy to him, and demanded less time and exertion than advanced teaching would have required. More and more he felt the necessity of husbanding his strength for the completion of his History. For these reasons he refused the Regius Professorship of Modern History at Oxford, when it was offered to him by Lord Rosebery in 1894, but consented to fill in 1896 the newly-created office of Ford Lecturer there, as it involved merely the delivery of a single

course. On that occasion he gave the six lectures on Cromwell's Place in History referred to above. Outside his History he published, during the later years of his life, only two works of importance—a monograph on Cromwell for Goupil's series of illustrated biographies, in 1899, and a critical examination of the history of the Gunpowder Plot, in 1897. The latter, entitled *What Gunpowder Plot Was*, is an answer to Father Gerard's endeavour to prove that the plot was the contrivance of Cecil and the government, and a crushing refutation of that theory. It is an example of Gardiner's critical method, and of the care with which he tested received traditions before accepting them.

This combination of exact criticism and exhaustive research makes the eighteen volumes of Gardiner's *History of England* an achievement of permanent value. His workmanship is sound throughout, and the fabric rests upon broad and firm foundations. Gardiner searched the national archives of France, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands for the materials for the history of English diplomacy, and worked systematically through our own foreign and domestic state papers. He mastered the printed literature of his period with the same thoroughness, and ploughed through that vast mass of pamphlets and newspapers in the British Museum, in which the minutest incidents of the Civil War and all the shades of political and religious opinion to which the struggle gave birth are alike recorded. At the same time he made no one-sided use of any kind of material: state-papers, diplomatic reports, newspapers, and parliamentary speeches—each kind of evidence was employed in its proper place and proportion. Nor did Gardiner yield to the temptation to overestimate the importance of the new manuscript materials his researches brought to light, and undervalue that which was already published in print. One feels throughout that the materials have been strictly tested and examined, and that no piece of evidence has been admitted till its value has been carefully scrutinized. Neglect adequately to criticize their sources is a defect which vitiates the work of many English historians, but in this respect Gardiner's technical skill and conscientious thoroughness make him a model. Thanks to them he avoided many errors into which his predecessors had fallen, and destroyed many legends which passed for truth.

The most obvious characteristic of Gardiner's method of exposition was his strict adherence to chronological arrangement. Some critics complained that he carried this to excess, and termed him a chronicler rather than an historian. However, the choice was made deliberately; from the scientific point of view it had great advantages which fully

compensated for its drawbacks from the literary; if it was not the cause of some of the peculiar merits of his book, it assisted in producing them, and it gave freer scope than any other way of writing to Gardiner's special gifts as an historian.

According to his view it was the historian's business not merely to relate what happened, but how and why it happened. It was therefore incumbent upon him to adhere to the natural order of events in order to show the sequence of cause and effect. For it was only by adherence to this order that it was possible to judge fairly either men or events, and to make complicated questions plain. In his hands this process was eminently successful. Thanks to it he elucidated much that had been obscure, set in their true light many things which had been distorted, and cleared away many misconceptions. It was not only a guide to truth, but also a security against error. The most invidious danger that besets the historian is the danger of being biased in his conception of a problem by his knowledge of the way in which it was finally solved. Unless he is careful, history may become in his hands merely the science of justifying foregone conclusions. Gardiner escaped this danger by putting the sequel out of his mind in order that both he and his readers might better understand the real nature of events and their gradual evolution. He traced, month by month and year by year, the development of a policy, the growth of a party, or the gradual culmination of a crisis, in order to show how circumstances, and even accidents, shaped results which appear, at first sight, inevitable. Thus, by eliminating one great cause of error, he not only elucidated the connexion of cause and effect, but explained more clearly than before the relative share of personal and general causes in producing the revolution he narrated.

Just as in relating events Gardiner endeavoured to put himself in the position of a contemporary, so in estimating the actors in them he seeks to judge them from the standpoint of their own age, and by the light of their own ideas. He lays down the rule that 'the first canon of historical portraiture is to start by trying to understand what a man appears to himself, and only when that has been done to try him by the standard of the judgement of others.' Instead of drawing full-length historical portraits of the conventional type, he leaves his personages to reveal their nature bit by bit in their acts or utterances, confines himself to comment upon the characteristics revealed, and allows the character to develop itself with the progress of events. His own judgements of statesmen are not only impartial, but inspired by a certain sympathetic imagination. He

seeks the key to their character in the ideal they pursued, and asks how far they acted up to the light that was in them. He is prone, therefore, to dwell upon the best side of the men he describes, and to adopt the most favourable explanation of their motives. 'Probably,' he says, 'the most lenient judgement is also the truest,' and his condemnation of their errors is always modified by a knowledge of their difficulties, and an appreciation of their position. Gardiner judges parties with the same fairness. He shows what gave each its strength, what constituted its weakness, and what each contributed to the political life of the nation. He gives us for the first time a history of the great struggle of the seventeenth century, in which neither all the vices nor all the virtues are exclusively on one side, and the attitude of men and parties is shown to be the natural outcome of their training and position.

In estimating Gardiner's place amongst historians, the comparison with Ranke, suggested in several foreign appreciations of his work, inevitably arises in the mind. Gardiner possessed neither the qualities nor the defects of Macaulay or Froude, whilst in more than one respect he resembled the great German scholar. Like Ranke, he endeavoured to see things exactly as they were, and to let the facts speak for themselves; he was like Ranke too in his breadth of view, in his constant sense of the connexion between national and European life, and in the independence and equity of his judgements. As an investigator Gardiner was at least the equal of Ranke, if somewhat inferior to him as a writer. But no historian of Gardiner's rank ever devoted himself simultaneously to the work of historical investigation and to the popularization of historical knowledge. Gardiner had a very high conception of the place of history in popular education, and especially of its political value. The historian, he wrote in one of his prefaces, cannot do much directly to help the statesman, though he may be of some assistance in sweeping away false analogies and making plain the causes of existing evils. Indirectly he can do a great deal by teaching the mass of educated men to understand the nature of political problems, and thus creating the enlightened public spirit which helps the statesman in his task. It seemed to Gardiner that in making clear the history of a time which passion and prejudice had obscured, he was doing work which had a practical as well as a scientific value. 'It has always been my wish,' he wrote to a friend, 'that I might so be able to write the story of that period as to convey something better than information. It seems to me that, without any attempt at preaching, merely to explain how men acted towards one another, and the reason

of their misunderstandings, ought to teach us something for the conduct of our own lives.'

For further particulars of Dr. Gardiner's life and estimates of his historical work, see—*The Times*, February 25, 1902; *The Athenaeum*, March 1, 1902; *The English Historical Review*, April 1902 (article by the late Professor F. York Powell); *The Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1902 (by Dr. J. F. Rhodes); and *The Quarterly Review*, April, 1902 (article by the author of the present notice). The most important foreign estimates of his work are to be found in Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. lxxxix, p. 190, by Alfred Stern; *Historisch-politische Blatter*, vol. 129, p. 7, by A. Zimmermann; *Revue Historique*, vol. lxxix, p. 232. A full bibliography of his historical writings was edited by Dr. W. A. Shaw, for the Royal Historical Society in 1903.

C. H. FIRTH.

EDWARD BYLES COWELL

The late Professor Cowell was born on January 23, 1826, at Ipswich. His father, a merchant, took a prominent part in the civic life of the town, and was an able public speaker; he was also a man of large ideals, corresponded with George Grote and William Cobbett, and read Bentham and Hallam, Guizot and Arnold. The father died when Cowell, then only sixteen, was still at the Ipswich Grammar School, a studious lad, too short-sighted for games, but devoted to reading. He used to frequent the small public library at Ipswich, and when fifteen years old had found there a copy of Sir William Jones's Works, and had read his translation of the famous drama *Śakuntalā*, written in Sanskrit and Prakrit. In his address to the Royal Asiatic Society on the occasion of his being presented, in 1898, with the Society's Gold Medal, he said: 'I well remember the joy of finding a Persian grammar among his (Sir William Jones's) works, and I soon learned the characters and, with the aid of a glossary at the end, began to study the anthology of beautiful extracts with which he illustrates his rules. It was with Jones's Grammar that, some thirteen years afterwards at Oxford, I gave Fitzgerald his first lesson in the Persian alphabet.'

He saved up his pocket-money, about the same time, to purchase a copy of Wilson's *Sanskrit Grammar*. And soon after this he was introduced to Colonel Hockley, an old Bombay officer settled in Ipswich. With him he read Persian poetry, his first introduction into the unknown Oriental world. On his father's death he had to take up the business, and carry it on till his younger brother should be able to take his place. This was, of course, a serious task for one so young, but he nevertheless found time in the early morning to carry on his Persian studies. And during the years 1842–7 he published in various periodicals a number of translations of extracts from Persian poetry.

In 1845 he became engaged to marry Miss Charlesworth, daughter of the Rev. John Charlesworth, rector of Flowton near Ipswich, and began the study of Sanskrit with his betrothed. The marriage

took place on October 23, 1847, and throughout their long and happy married life, Mrs. Cowell was a constant help and comrade to him in all his literary work and aspiration. In 1850 his younger brother, Charles Henry, becoming competent to take over the office work, Cowell was able to think seriously of devoting his life to Oriental studies, and, for that purpose, of going to Oxford. He matriculated in that year, and, being a married man, lived in lodgings, and entered his name at Magdalen Hall. Professor Wilson was then Boden Professor of Sanskrit, and with him Cowell used to read Sanskrit every week.

In 1853 he published his first important work—his edition, with notes and translation, of Vararuchi's *Prakrit Grammar.* In 1856 he was appointed Professor of History and Political Economy in the Presidency College, Calcutta, and in 1858 became President of the Sanskrit College in that city. There he remained for six years, leading the strenuous simple life of an enthusiastic teacher and scholar, both learning and teaching Sanskrit, carrying on his Persian studies, writing learned articles in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* more popular articles in more popular journals, superintending the work and organization of the college, and editing Sanskrit texts. He says in a letter of this period. 'Besides my daily lectures in two colleges, always four and frequently five hours, I am secretary of the Asiatic Society, editor of two Sanskrit books in the press, member of the University Senate, &c., &c., so that "from morn to dewy eve" life runs on in an endless round of things to be done which can only be got through by vigorously dispatching every duty as it comes, and taking as little credit as possible from the morrow.'

In 1864 he came home on leave, and when, shortly afterwards, the Professorship of Sanskrit was established at the University of Cambridge, he applied for the post and was successful. The duties were not light. The chair had been established with a view as much, or more, to the teaching of comparative philology as to the teaching of Sanskrit. Cowell had devoted little or no attention to this subject. He had to work it up for the lectures. He lectured also on Persian, and in all these subjects did all the most elementary as well as the more advanced teaching. The classes were not large, often only one or two, but they were numerous; and Cowell's ideal of teaching was unstinting in its generosity. 'When the patient exposition of verbal elements was done, some allusion or name, or some classical passage illustrating a grammatical point, would open the treasures of his learning. He poured out the wonders of Eastern thought and fancy

not as one who has read them in books, but as one who has lived with them [1].' With such teaching the hours fly, and it is not surprising to find that for many years the zealous teacher was unable to complete any original book of his own, though he contributed a number of reviews to popular periodicals, and about an article a year to one or other of the learned journals.

In 1878 he published in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, with a translation, one important text of the mediaeval philosophy of the brahmins; and completed an edition of another left unfinished by Professor Goldstücker. In 1882 he published, in collaboration with Professor Gough, the translation of a tractate by a fourteenth-century brahmin giving an abstract of the philosophical views held in a number of the various schools of thought in India. In 1886 appeared, this time in collaboration with Mr. Neil, the Sanskrit text of a large collection of Buddhist legends, dating from about the third century A.D. In 1893 and 1894 he issued the text and translation of another work in Buddhist Sanskrit—a poem in eighteen cantos on the life of the Buddha, about a century older than the last. He was continually working during these last years at the translation of the huge collection of Buddhist Jātaka stories, in Pali of the fifth century. But he called himself only the editor, and gave all the credit of authorship to the collaborators—Mr. Chalmers, Mr. Neil, Dr. Rouse, and Mr. Francis. Finally, in 1897, he published, in collaboration with Mr. F. W. Thomas, the translation of a romance founded on historical incidents, written in very difficult and allusive Sanskrit of the seventh century.

If we look at this list and bear in mind also the books he had previously published in Calcutta we are struck by two facts—firstly the very wide range of his studies, and secondly his constant habit of working together with others.

The texts he edited or translated belong to almost all the many phases in the long history of the development of the literary forms of language in India. From the Taittirīya Veda through the Upanishads, the early and late Buddhist Sanskrit, the Pali of the fifth-century commentators, the classical Sanskrit and the Prakrits, down to the mediaeval scholastics, he knew them all, though they differed from one another more than the earliest Latin from the latest Italian. No Indianist has had the same mastery. The Jaina Māgadhī and the earliest Pali are the only important literary dialects with which he was not familiar. And all this was only a part of his linguistic attainment. Late in life, during several visits to Wales,

[1] Sir Frederick Pollock in the *Pilot*, Feb. 21, 1903.

he became interested in the language, and taking up this difficult study for the mere pleasure of it, was able to contribute, in 1878 and 1882, important papers to the learned journal of experts in Welsh, the *Y Cymmrodor*. He spent much time in reading Italian and Spanish and, up to the last, kept up his knowledge of the classics and of Persian poetry. To this he added the study of the ancient Persian, the Zend of the Zoroastrian books And his very last article, written in 1902 for the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, was a translation of three episodes from a poem in old Bengālī. Cowell's interest in this vast range of inquiry was philological, literary, and philosophical, rather than historical How thankful we should have been for a work from his hand on the curious history of the literary languages of India, or on the gradual changes in philosophic thought, or on the evolution of logical theory and the methods of reasoning.

The other point to which allusion has been made is Cowell's habit of working with others, and especially with younger scholars. This arose no doubt partly from the desire to encourage them to undertake work which they would otherwise have scarcely ventured to begin. But like his willingness to carry to completion work left unfinished by others, often a very thankless and always a tedious task, it was evidence also both of the peculiar modesty and generosity of his character and of his simple-hearted devotion to the cause of knowledge. Beneath that retiring exterior there beat, all unsuspected by most, the heart of a missionary. One cannot do better than quote the closing words of the address he himself gave at his last public appearance. It was at the presentation to him, already referred to, of the Gold Medal of the Royal Asiatic Society. After referring to the influence of Hamilton, from whom, then a prisoner at Paris, Schlegel 'caught the enthusiasm,' as Cowell calls it, he goes on .—

'There is nothing more interesting than to trace, where it is possible, these electric currents of influence but how many such there must be which we can never know! Each of us can exercise this influence around us, to help on that investigation of arts, sciences, and literature, in relation to Asia, for which our Society was founded. . . . *Tat tvam asi*, "That art thou," may well ring in our ears when we would join any great movement, whether it be in the sphere of religion, philanthropy, science, or literature. Each of us can feel that he is himself a part of the movement; he has a share in its work, a personal stake in its success. All the members of the Royal Asiatic Society are fellow workers in a noble cause. "Lux ex oriente" is their motto, to help in the diffusion of that light is their work. The several generations of members pass away, but they are all

continuously linked together by their common aim, and the former and the present members are all parts of one long series:

'Et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt[1]'

With what devotion he himself lived up to this noble ideal is proved by the whole record of his life. The story of it has been amply and admirably told by Mr. George Cowell in the just published *Life and Letters of Edward Byles Cowell* (London, 1904), which gives a most interesting and touching picture of Cowell both as a scholar and a man. Appended to it is a full bibliography of all the articles and books he wrote, but his *karma* survives also, and perhaps in a more potent form, in the inspiring influence felt by those of us who had the good fortune to come into personal contact with him.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

[1] *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1898, p. 693.

MR. LECKY

MR. WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY was born in Ireland in February, 1838. He was educated at Cheltenham and at Trinity College, Dublin, where he graduated B.A. in 1859, and M.A. in 1863. After taking his degree he spent some four years on the continent of Europe, reading largely in foreign libraries and 'deriving great profit as well as keen pleasure from the study of Italian Art.' He had originally intended to take holy orders, but growing doubts, which made it impossible for him to subscribe the Thirty-nine Articles, induced him to abandon the Church for literature. In 1859 he published anonymously a small volume of poems; in 1860, also anonymously, a short book on *The Religious Tendencies of the Age;* and in 1861, again anonymously, *The Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland*, a book which he recast and enlarged towards the close of his life, and which good judges are disposed to place in the forefront of his historical writings. This book was followed in 1865 by *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, in 1869 by *The History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, and, in instalments from 1878 to 1890, by *The History of England in the Eighteenth Century.* A volume of *Poems* followed in 1891; *Democracy and Liberty* in 1896, and *The Map of Life* in 1899.

Passages in *The Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland*, and in *The History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, had induced the belief that Mr. Lecky was disposed to look with favour on the claims of Ireland for some kind of autonomous institutions; and his readers were, therefore, surprised when he came forward as the strenuous opponent of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill. The Unionist party, delighted at securing the services of so distinguished an advocate, naturally facilitated his entrance into Parliament; and, in 1896, Mr. Lecky was elected to represent his old University. He continued in the House of Commons till the closing months of his life; and though his thin voice, a disability in debate, and his tall willowy figure, which made him a favourite subject for caricature, placed him under disadvantages, he succeeded in attaining an almost unique position in the House of Commons. In 1897 his status in politics and literature was recognized by his admission to the Privy Council; in 1902 he was selected as one of the original members of the new Order of Merit. He died, after a protracted illness, in October, 1903. His death removed the last of the great English historians or eminent writers on historical subjects—Buckle, Freeman, Froude,

Gardiner, Green, and Stubbs—whose work was chiefly done in the last half of the nineteenth century. It may be too soon to appreciate the position which he will ultimately fill in historical literature, but his fame must rest on four books: *The Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland*, *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, *The History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, and *The History of England in the Eighteenth Century*.

The second of these books was an explanation of a change of thought in the author himself. His faith in dogmatic religion, and the aspirations which had been possible while he still believed in the dogmas of the Church, had been destroyed by philosophic doubts, the result of his wide reading. 'The decadence of theological influence,' so he discovered, 'had been one of the most invariable signs and measures of our progress'; and Mr. Lecky accordingly set himself to expound what Mr. Birrell has called 'the beneficence of Scepticism, the good done to the world by the man who first had the courage to say "I don't believe you."' The conclusions which he formulated in this work led him perhaps naturally to examine in his next book the rival merits of Paganism and Christianity. *The History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne* is an inquiry into the Ethics of Pagan Rome and Christian Europe. Reverently as Mr. Lecky approached his subject, willingly as he acknowledged that Christ in 'three short years of active life had done more to regenerate and soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and all the exhortations of moralists,' he evidently thought that, with Christianity, the ultimate standard had been lowered by theological dogmata of questionable morality, some of which, like 'the Augustinian doctrine of the damnation of unbaptized infants,' surpassed in atrocity any tenets that have ever been admitted into any pagan creed. On the other hand, he paid Paganism a striking compliment by saying that philosophy had made a Pagan Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, who had 'embraced the fortifying "principles of Zeno in their best form," as nearly a perfectly virtuous man as has ever appeared on our world.'

The books were fortunate in the time at which they made their appearance. The controversy which had followed the publication of *Essays and Reviews*, and the doubts which a colonial bishop had thrown on the authenticity of the Pentateuch, had accustomed the reading public to a little freer criticism than would have been readily tolerated a dozen years before. Mr. Lecky spoke to an age which was prepared to listen, on a text which had not previously been made the thesis of a work. But the two books also commended themselves by their matter and their manner. So far as their matter

was concerned, they were constructed on a mass of authority which reminded their readers of Buckle's methods. And it is certain that Buckle's example had a large influence on Mr. Lecky at this period There is, indeed, a wide difference in the use which the two men made of the vast stores of information which they had acquired. Buckle, like the deductive reasoner that he was, frequently made his facts fit his theories Mr. Lecky, on the contrary, like a true Baconian, invariably builds up his conclusions on his facts. So far as manner was concerned, Mr. Lecky's style had always a quiet dignity of its own. But in his earlier works he occasionally rose to an eloquence from which his sensitive nature shrank in his later writings. The description of St. Peter's, for example, in the first volume of the *Rationalism*, might have proceeded from Macaulay himself.

It is doubtful whether the two works, to which brief allusion has thus been made, were a good preparation for the longer history which was to occupy so many of Mr. Lecky's maturer years The plan on which both of them had been constructed was not altogether suited for the history of a nation. For history depends upon narrative; and in Mr. Lecky we get a luminous and comprehensive survey rather than the narrative which we expect from the historian. If in civil affairs his narrative is deficient, military affairs are almost wholly neglected. Mr. Lecky, indeed, dealt adequately with the causes and the consequences of the great wars which occurred in the century. But the reader cannot hope to find in his pages any informing account of the strategy of a campaign or the tactics of a battle-field. The eighteenth century, however, was largely occupied with foreign wars and foreign conquests; and a writer who dismisses Blenheim in a sentence, and who records the death of Wolfe and Montcalm in a parenthesis, can hardly hope to make his readers' blood tingle. It is fair, however, to recollect that this omission was intentional, and that Mr. Lecky deliberately stated in his preface that he had not attempted to 'give a detailed account of military events.'

It is not difficult to see why Mr. Lecky selected the eighteenth century as the theme of his longest work. For it was the century in which the lay mind, strengthened by the discoveries of Kepler and Newton, by the progress of scientific knowledge, and the evolution of scientific thought, shook itself free from many of the worst superstitions on which the Church had insisted; and with Mr. Lecky the decadence of superstition was a sign of progress. And there was one other reason which attracted Mr. Lecky to this century. For in that century the misgovernment of Ireland by England, which his admirable series of biographies of great Irishmen had impressed on him, reached its climax. Unluckily, this consideration induced him to

devote an excessive amount of space to Ireland (the two first volumes relate the history of England from 1700 to 1760, the two last volumes are exclusively concerned with Irish history from 1793 to 1800), and the history, in consequence, lacks proportion. Mr. Lecky himself was so sensible of this defect that in his later editions he separated his English from his Irish chapters, and turned one book into two histories. But if in one sense his work gained, in another sense it lost, from this division. For it is no more possible to separate the affairs of Ireland from the history of England than to relate the story of Napoleon's military achievements from 1809 to 1814 without referring to the Peninsular War.

When, however, all this has been said, the fact remains that there are few histories in the English language which are so conspicuous for fullness of research, lucidity of treatment, and sobriety of judgement. Mr. Lecky used to say that he had no patience with the historian who 'scamped' his work. It is, at any rate, certain that the rule, which he expected others to observe, he applied rigorously to himself. 'Turn wheresoe'er you may' the book is based on wide reading and careful thought. The reader is everywhere equally impressed with the author's knowledge and his impartiality. Epithets, which have proved a fertile source of danger to other writers, are almost always rigorously excluded. In no place does the work fall below the high standard which the author evidently set up for his own guidance; while in some passages, for example in the account of the administration and character of Sir Robert Walpole, of the religious revival of the eighteenth century, of the causes of the American War, and of the conditions which preceded and led to the Irish rebellion of 1798, it rises to a level which has been attained by few other historians of England.

In one respect, Mr. Lecky was surpassed by no other historical writer. He possessed to an eminent degree that essential characteristic of all great historians: the love of truth. He complained in his *European Morals* that the Church had exchanged 'the love of truth for what they call the love of the truth.' It was truth, not the truth, for which Mr. Lecky strove. 'To love truth sincerely,' so he wrote himself, 'means to pursue it with an earnest, conscientious, unflagging zeal; to follow the light of evidence to the most unwelcome conclusions. . . . To do this is very difficult, but it is clearly involved in the notion of earnest love of truth.' When he laid down his pen on the completion of his history in 1890, he must have had the satisfaction of feeling that from the first page to the last of his eight volumes he had worthily followed the rule which he had prescribed in 1869.

S. WALPOLE.

DR. GEORGE SALMON

DR. SALMON, who was born in 1819 in the city of Dublin, received his early education at a private school in Cork kept by a Mr. Porter, where he exhibited so much promise and was so well trained that by the time he was fourteen years of age he was fit for the university. At Trinity College, Dublin, he had a brilliant undergraduate career, gaining a classical scholarship and graduating in mathematics with the best honour degree of his year. He won his fellowship in 1841, and settled down at once to the work of a college tutor, and to the study of pure mathematics. During the next twenty-five years his life was thus spent, and by the end of that period he had gained a wide reputation in Europe as a mathematician, and his books had been translated into the principal European languages. In 1866, by the advancement of Dr. Butcher to the see of Meath, the Regius Professorship of Divinity in the university became vacant; and Salmon, who had made his mark not only as a mathematician but also as a preacher and theological lecturer, was offered the position. He thought it his duty to accept it, although it involved the resignation of his fellowship, and for two-and-twenty years he devoted himself to Biblical criticism and theology with the zeal and industry which characterized all his academic labours. These were critical years for the Irish Church, disestablished and disendowed in 1870, and it was of the utmost importance that the Divinity School should be under the control of a prudent and learned scholar, with a wider outlook than the shores of Ireland. During this busy and anxious period his best theological work was done; his principal books, *An Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament* and *The Infallibility of the Church*, being expansions of his statutory lectures as Regius Professor. In 1888 the last great change of his life came, when he was nominated Provost of Trinity by the Crown, and until his death on January 22, 1904, in his eighty-fifth year, he ruled the college to whose service he had given all his working days.

Such is a bare outline of his life. It may be added that among the honorary distinctions which he received were the following:— D.C.L. (Oxon.), LL.D (Cantab.), D D. (Edinb.), D Math. (Christiania), the Cunningham Medal of the Royal Irish Academy, and the Royal and Copley Medals of the Royal Society, of which he was a fellow. He was also an honorary member of the Royal Academies of Berlin, Gottingen, and Copenhagen, a foreign member of the Institute of France, and a fellow of the *Reale Accademia dei Lincei* of Rome. In 1878 he was president of the Mathematical Science Section of the British Association.

To few men is it given to attain to the first rank of investigators in two distinct departments, and yet this was Salmon's case. He had made his name as a mathematician before any one outside Ireland had heard of him as a theologian, and his mathematical textbooks are still widely read The first to be published (in 1847) was his *Conic Sections*, which achieved an immediate success, and has gone through many editions. It was followed, in 1852, by a treatise on the *Higher Plane Curves*, a subject which heretofore had only been discussed in the memoirs of learned societies. About this time the theory of the invariants of quantics was being worked out by Professors Cayley and Sylvester in England, as well as by mathematicians on the Continent, and Salmon, perceiving the importance of this new and powerful calculus, published in 1859 his *Lessons Introductory to the Modern Higher Algebra*, in which he made public the researches of the past twenty years into the theory of transformations of binary forms. This work, which was originally undertaken with special reference to his books on the analytical treatment of conics and the higher curves, grew under his hands until it became a formal and elaborate treatise. Upon it he spent an immensity of labour, all of which was not equally fruitful, although the book as a whole was, and is, invaluable to the student The calculations necessary, for instance, in order to formulate the E invariant of a sextic (a formula which occupied thirteen pages when printed) must have taken an amount of time and patience that few men would have been willing to bestow. In 1862 the first edition of his last mathematical book of importance, his *Geometry of Three Dimensions*, appeared, a volume which exhibited all the best qualities of its predecessors, in its exact acquaintance with recent investigation, its masterly statement of general principles, and its free and independent handling of special problems. There was nothing of the pedant about Salmon, and he broke loose at a very early stage from the traditions of the English mathematical school of his day, in

refusing to be bound by any one uniform method of treatment. He had been bred up among geometers, and he never scrupled to use a direct geometrical proof if one occurred to him, where the plan of his treatise would rather have suggested algebraic methods. His shrewd common sense displays itself even in his mathematical treatises, and this adds greatly to their interest, for the student feels at each stage that it is Salmon who is teaching him, and that he is not dealing merely with x, y, z.

For the newer developments of mathematics, such as the Theory of Quaternions, Salmon had no taste He had a rooted distrust of metaphysical speculation, and always preferred *facts*, as he used to say, to *ideas*. And his 'facts' must be established with all the rigidity of mathematical logic. He never cared for the sciences of experiment or observation, or even for applied mathematics. But in the region of geometry and algebra he delighted, and even when an old man he spent many hours, as a pastime, in working at endless calculations which had to do with the theory of numbers. It was in these departments that he felt himself to be strong; and it is as a geometer of remarkable sagacity and an algebraist of unwearied industry that he will be remembered by historians of the progress of mathematics during the nineteenth century.

When Dr. Salmon became Regius Professor of Divinity, the speculations of Baur and of his disciples as to the origin and character of the books of the New Testament were beginning to affect English theological criticism, and it became incumbent upon him to inquire into their solidity. The result of his investigations is given in his masterly *Introduction to the New Testament*, perhaps the most powerful polemic in English against the Tubingen school of critics. It was not published till 1885, but it had been given in substance to his pupils many years before. It is strongly conservative, and has had a considerable influence in moulding the opinions of students in the United Kingdom. While it was in preparation, he was also engaged upon a series of important articles for the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, chiefly upon the writers of the second century and upon the history of Gnosticism. This work, which proved so fruitful, was undertaken in the first instance at the solicitation of Lightfoot, who begged Salmon to write upon the early chronologers, a subject which it was natural to think would be congenial to a mathematician who had been converted to theology. It is not too much to say that some of his best work is contained in the pages of this *Dictionary*. Salmon did not care for metaphysical theology, nor did he occupy himself very specially

with problems of textual criticism (although a little volume published in 1897 showed how thoroughly he understood the principles of that science); his chosen field was history, and he was one of the most sagacious of historians. His critical insight was a perpetual wonder to those who worked with and under him; and whatever difficulty one felt at times in following his line of argument it generally happened that his conclusions were confirmed by later research.

His second theological treatise of importance was his book on the *Infallibility of the Church*, a subject too controversial for these pages. It is an unsparing polemic against the Roman Catholic doctrine of infallibility, and reveals not only the wide learning of the author, but his remarkable powers as an advocate and a controversialist. Most readers, whether they acquiesce in Salmon's conclusions or no, will agree that this book exhibits his sagacity as a critic in a marked degree. It is not a constructive treatise, and, indeed, leaves many questions open as to which theologians are accustomed to make positive pronouncements. But that is characteristic of its author. Salmon's intellect was analytic rather than synthetic; he was more of a critic than of a dogmatist; and in every department of thought he was more ready to point out the incongruity of suggested theories than to exhibit a constructive scheme of his own. This did not arise from any uncertainty as to his own theological position, but from the temper of his mind, and the same characteristic was often noted in his handling of practical matters of administration. He never founded a school of theology, although the number of his pupils was very large and the veneration they had for him unexampled in Ireland. But the reason was that he was more anxious to train men to see clearly than to train them to see what *he* saw. The impression which Dr. Salmon left upon those who came into contact with him may be well described in the words of the late Bishop Stubbs of Oxford. 'The Provost,' he said, 'is an extraordinary man. The first day I met him I was most struck by his gracious courtesy; the second day by his learning; the third day by his humour, and every day by his humility.' Those who knew him, however slightly, will not need to be assured that the words give a true picture of the most eminent of Irish theologians in the nineteenth century.

Principal publications:—*A Treatise on Conic Sections; Lessons Introductory to the Modern Higher Algebra; The Higher Plane Curves; Geometry of Three Dimensions; The Eternity of Future Punishment; Introduction to the New Testament; The Infallibility of the Church; Some Thoughts on the Criticism of the New Testa-*

ment; Commentary on *Ecclesiastes* in Bishop Ellicott's edition of the Old Testament; *Introduction to the Apocrypha* in the *Speaker's Commentary*, many articles in Smith's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, and five volumes of cathedral and university sermons.

Further particulars respecting Dr. Salmon's life and work are to be found in the obituary notice in the *Times* of 23 Jan, 1904, and an article in the *New Liberal Review* for March, 1904, both by the present writer, who has drawn on them for this summary.

J. H. BERNARD.

SIR LESLIE STEPHEN

How great a man went from among us when Leslie Stephen died becomes apparent if we think for a moment how much might appropriately be said in this place of him and his work, and then think how large a part of him and his work would still remain unnoticed. If, as perhaps we ought, we try to leave out of sight the critic, the essayist, the biographer, if we shut our eyes to the 'Sunset from Mont Blanc,' refuse to listen to the 'Praise of Walking,' and endeavour to forget the 'Forgotten Benefactors,' we still see the historian of philosophic thought, the scientific moralist, the rational assailant of theology, the organizer of the grandest historical enterprise that the England of our age has seen. But if ever man was one and indivisible, that man was Leslie Stephen: a great contemner of boundaries, whom no scheme of the sciences, no delimitation of departments, would keep in the highway if he had a mind to go across country. And across country he would go, thinking freely and speaking plainly.

Leslie Stephen was born on Nov. 28, 1832. He was younger by three and a half years than his brother the future Sir James Fitzjames. One contrast between them soon disclosed itself. Leslie was a very delicate child It long was doubtful whether he would ever be capable of any strenuous exertion of mind or body. To stimulate his intellect or his imagination was unnecessary; on the contrary, doctors prescribed life in the open air and a strict abstention from poetry, for poetry went to his head like wine. Even stories of adventure were too exciting. When he was eight years old he for about a year attended a school at Brighton, but only as a day boy. In the spring of 1842 he went to Eton, but again only as a day boy. He left Eton when he had just turned fourteen. Though he had not much bullying to complain of, he could afterwards recall the sufferings of 'a pale, delicate boy with thin limbs and spider fingers, and a sensitive organization, set down amidst some hundreds of lads as mischievous and thoughtless as monkeys—a poor little fragment of humanity, kicked contemptuously aside, and heartily ashamed of himself for his undeniable atrocity.' He had shown ability and diligence in his school work, especially in such mathematics as were

taught at Eton; but his tutor 'spoke strongly of his want of success in composition,' and his father removed him, thinking that time enough had been wasted in an unsuccessful attempt to produce Etonian elegiacs. For a short time he went to a school at Wimbledon, but only as a day boy, and afterwards for about two years he was by way of going to King's College, London, but his attendance there was intermittent, and two winters had to be passed in the warmth of Torquay. In the October of 1850, when he was not yet eighteen, he began his career at Cambridge as an undergraduate at Trinity Hall. By this time his robust brother was finishing his course at Trinity. A small college—it was then a very small college—was chosen for Leslie, because it was thought that the examinations at Trinity would be too severe a tax for his strength, and Trinity Hall was chosen as being the college of which his father, who by this time had quitted the Colonial Office, and become Professor of Modern History, was a distinguished member. Leslie became enamoured of Cambridge. His health was rapidly improving. He read mathematics diligently, and in the tripos of 1854 was twentieth wrangler. he was a very young competitor, and to the last was being warned against overwork.

Before the end of the year a certain 'bye fellowship,' which was in effect a sort of chaplaincy, was bestowed upon him, and in the spring of 1856 he became one of the two 'presbyter fellows' and tutors of Trinity Hall, having been ordained a deacon in December, 1855. By this time he had become a vigorous, though not in all respects a strong man, keenly enjoying all manner of sports and capable of some wonderful feats of endurance. His first visit to the Alps he paid in 1857, and very soon he was in the front rank of English mountaineers. The prospect of a career at Cambridge was extremely attractive to him, and though, as he afterwards said, 'he took a good deal upon trust,' there is no reason whatever to doubt that his religious opinions lay well within the limits of Anglican orthodoxy, even in 1859 when he became a priest. As a college tutor he was brilliantly successful. Pupils of his say that it must be doubtful whether any tutor has been more 'worshipped,' and attribute to him a decisive influence upon the rapid growth of Trinity Hall. While admitting that his enthusiastic encouragement of rowing and other sports was one main cause of their worship, they speak with no less warmth of more serious matters. Those who were very intimate with him knew, for example, that on his long walks he could recite poetry by the mile. When therefore in 1862 he said that he could no longer read the service in chapel and resigned the tutorship, he was

abandoning a career that he dearly loved, and his courageous resolution was the outcome of an acutely painful struggle. He was very uncertain whether he was likely to succeed in any other walk of life. Beyond translating Berlepsch's *Alps* (1861) for the purpose of improving his German, he had done nothing in the literary way, and he was then and ever afterwards exceedingly diffident. He could not at once tear himself from Cambridge. He lingered there for two years and a half, reading philosophy and political economy, examining in the moral sciences, straying further and further from the paths of orthodoxy, writing an article for *Macmillan's* which was rejected, and another on 'An American Economist' which was accepted, walking matches against runners, championing his friend Henry Fawcett in divers electoral enterprises, serving as editor, sub-editor, and staff of a 'campaign newspaper' (the *Brighton Election Reporter*), pamphleteering about 'The Poll Degree,' and ardently advocating the cause of the North against all comers with 'outbursts of burning eloquence,' which have not been forgotten by those who heard them. His enthusiasm for the northern cause induced him to visit America in 1863. He went as far west as St. Paul and St. Louis, slept under canvas with Meade's army in Virginia, had some words with Seward and a word with Lincoln, his object being the collection of powder and shot for the warfare in which he was engaged at Cambridge; but incidentally he saw Lowell, Longfellow, Emerson, Hawthorne, Holmes, and other men of letters. Lowell and he became from that moment fast friends, and this friendship, as also that with Professor C. E. Norton, were of the greatest service to Stephen when a few years later he was diffidently making his first serious efforts as an author. Few incipient authors have stood in greater need of encouragement. A more proximate result of the journey to America was a spirited onslaught upon the *Times*, which took the form of a pamphlet published by 'L. S.' in 1865. In 1864 he was still hesitating. He had to earn his living; his Fellowship, which he yet retained, would expire if he married. At the end of the year he resolved to settle in London, and try his hand at journalism.

His diffidence is the more remarkable because by this time his brother had been ten years in London, and, while labouring successfully at the bar, had already done an immense amount of writing for newspapers and magazines. Leslie at once found favour with the editor of the *Saturday Review*, who was willing to take all that he would write, if it were not about politics or religion. Then the *Pall Mall Gazette* was founded (1865), and among his first contributions to it were the 'Sketches from Cambridge by a Don' which

in the same year appeared as his first book. It is less generally known that in 1866 he became the English correspondent of the New York *Nation*, and that to it for some seven years he sent a fortnightly letter dealing with current politics as well as other events. He attended important debates in Parliament and had strong opinions about what went on there. Indeed, it was not because he was no politician, but rather because he was an uncompromising politician, that he did not seek employment as a writer of 'leaders.' Among magazines *Fraser* and the *Cornhill* were open to him, and *Fraser* was willing to receive outspoken articles about religious matters such as he was desirous of writing. He left Cambridge with the idea of a great book in his mind. It was to have been a work on political theory; but, as he read, the history of religious speculation became more and more interesting to him, and politics fell into the background. Though he read deeply as well as widely, he could hardly find time for the composition of a lengthy book. He was desirous of freeing himself from journalistic drudgery; but by this time he was married (1867) and had lost his fellowship. He was even compelled to think of being called to the bar, and began 'eating dinners' at one of the Inns of the Court. However, in 1871 he acquired a little more liberty by becoming editor of the *Cornhill*. Then came book after book · from 1871 the *Playground of Europe*; from 1873 *Free thinking and Plain speaking*; from 1874, 1876, and 1879 the *Hours in a Library*. Meanwhile in 1876 the *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* had conclusively proved that, besides being an admirable essayist and a vigorous thinker, he had become a man of unusual learning. When this heavy piece of work was off his hands, he began to meditate the *Science of Ethics*, which was not published until 1882. In rapid succession he wrote *Johnson*, *Pope*, and *Swift* for the series of 'English Men of Letters,' to which he afterwards added the *George Eliot* and posthumously the *Hobbes*. His mastery in books of this order was admitted on all hands. A request that he would write the life of his friend Henry Fawcett was answered affirmatively by return of post, and the book that was then written was surely a model for all biographers. Meanwhile, however, towards the end of 1882, he took charge of the projected *Dictionary of National Biography*. He was hard at work upon it for two years before the first volume was published. Gradually he discovered that the task was far more laborious than he had expected, and when it became apparent that the Dictionary, however highly it might be praised, was not going to be a financial success, this only made

Stephen the more anxious to do with his own hand all that he possibly could. The incessant work began to tell upon a frame which had its weak as well as its strong points. In 1888 there was an alarming illness, directly attributable to mental strain; there was another in 1889. In 1891 the editorship was transferred to Mr. Sidney Lee, who from the beginning had been Stephen's right-hand man and in 1890 had become joint editor. From that time onward Stephen could only work at what he regarded as half pressure, and sorrows came upon him thick and fast; but the tale of what he did is amazing. He had projected a sequel to his *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*. Often it had to be laid aside and as often it was resumed. It at length appeared in 1900 as three volumes on the *English Utilitarians*. To this we must add the *Agnostic's Apology* (1893), which some think the best of all his books, the life of his brother Fitzjames, which is worthy to stand by the side of the life of Fawcett, two volumes called *Social Rights and Duties* (1896), four volumes called *Studies by a Biographer* (1900 and 1902), the *Letters of J. R. Green* (1901), the Ford Lectures for 1903, which he was not strong enough to deliver and which were published a few days before his death, and the *Hobbes* (1904), which he never saw in print. He wrote until he could no longer hold a pen and read until his eyes closed. It is a splendid record.

In his last days he would sometimes say that he had 'scattered himself' too widely, that he was jack of all trades and master of none, not a scholar, not a philosopher, not an historian, only an amateur. Possibly in these pages it ought to be admitted that there is a particle of truth in this judgement, and fairly certain it is that if Leslie Stephen had done less, he would seem to have done more, for we are apt to think that anything that he does is bye-work lying outside his proper province. But such an amateur, if that be the right term, such a contemner of the conventional boundaries, so untramelled a thinker, so sincere a speaker is worth more to the world than many professionals, especially if he is as incapable of affectation as he is incapable of pedantry. So much might be allowed by those who knew Leslie Stephen only upon paper. Those who knew the man have another tale to tell of a noble life, of tender love and warm-hearted friendship, of heavy sorrows gallantly borne, and of last days that were like some glorious sunset—even the Sunset from Mont Blanc.

F. W. MAITLAND.

ALEXANDER STUART MURRAY

ALEXANDER STUART MURRAY, the eldest son of George Murray, of Arbroath in Forfarshire, was born on the 8th January, 1841. He was educated at the Edinburgh High School and at Glasgow University; and he subsequently spent some time as a student at the University of Berlin. With this equipment he entered the service of the Trustees of the British Museum at the close of his twenty-sixth year, being appointed, on the 14th February, 1867, an Assistant in the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities, of which Charles (afterwards Sir Charles) Thomas Newton was then the Keeper. There Murray was destined to pass the rest of his life.

It was only a few years before his appointment that the old Department of Antiquities of the British Museum had been subdivided into the three Departments of Oriental Antiquities, Greek and Roman Antiquities, and Coins and Medals. Thus, during his official career, Murray witnessed the growth of his Department almost from its beginnings to its later full development in which he personally took so large a part. The departmental staff was at first a small one; but this was not a disadvantage to its members, and, not being confined to any one branch of antiquities, Murray had rare opportunities for making himself accurately acquainted with the whole of the Greek and Roman collections of the Museum. Aided by a correct eye and a retentive memory, he was able to store up during his early years of service an abundance of archaeological knowledge which he afterwards turned to such good account, both for the Trustees and for the public, when he came to administer the Department.

Murray succeeded Newton in the Keepership on the 13th February, 1886, having served an apprenticeship of just nineteen years. And now with his learning matured and with his acquaintance with the collections intimate, he was ready to undertake a scheme of a more scientific re-arrangement of the Greek and Roman Antiquities, and with the aid of an increasing staff to prepare and issue catalogues which it had been impossible to do while the Department had been insufficiently manned.

It is chiefly with the re-arrangement of the collections that

Murray's name will be identified in the public memory. The excellent taste displayed in his grouping of the vases and in the accessories employed in their mounting is manifest to all who visit the galleries. The bronzes, the engraved gems, the gold ornaments,—in a word, all the smaller objects of the collections were set out in a scientific and attractive order that had not been hitherto attempted. But above all Murray devoted himself to the better arrangement of the great groups of Greek sculpture which are among the chief glories of the British Museum. Under his hands the *disjecta membra* of the Mausoleum gathered shape; the great chariot group again rose into being, and an appreciation of the proportions of the architectural 'order' was made possible by a restoration and piecing together of original fragments. Improvements followed in the setting of the Elgin marbles, of the Nereid tomb, and of the Phigaleian collection But Murray's archaeological skill was perhaps most effectively displayed in the arrangement and restoration of the sculptures and architectural remains from the Hellenistic temple of Artemis at Ephesus, and from the archaic temple on the same site. To him is due the recognition of the relations between the several members of the columns of the later temple, and hence the key to the architectural elevation. Moreover, his ingenuity was keenly exercised in finding the clue to the restoration of the columns and details of the earlier building from the veriest fragments; never was there a better illustration of the proverbial 'ex pede Herculem.' It is to be regretted that his life was not spared to deal with the fragments which are being recovered from the excavations now in actual progress, and which might have given further scope for the exercise of his archaeological sagacity. It has almost become the traditional ambition of the Department, since the days of Newton's discovery of the Mausoleum, to take in hand from time to time the exploration of some ancient Greek site. Wood's excavations at Ephesus were left incomplete; and it was not till last year that the prospects for re-opening the ground could be considered favourable. It was one of Murray's last services to make the preliminary arrangements for the resumption of the Ephesian excavations which have been actually undertaken since his death. Still he had an opportunity afforded to him for exploration in Cyprus by the munificent bequest of Miss E. T. Turner to the British Museum; and excavations were carried on during three years, 1894–6, at Amathus, Curium, and Enkomi, in the last of which he personally took part. The results were given, under his editorship, in one of the departmental publications.

With all his official duties, Murray still found time to carry on his private studies. Almost yearly he devoted some portion of his vacation to travel in Italy or Greece or other countries, always with archaeological research in view. He published, among other works, a History of Sculpture, which went through two editions in 1880 and 1883, a Handbook of Greek Archaeology in 1892, and, lastly, a book on the Sculptures of the Parthenon in 1903, which was based upon a course of lectures delivered to the students of the Royal Academy.

As an archaeologist Murray must be regarded as belonging to the conservative school. His strength lay in his mastery of detail and in the possession of that sagacity in following clues which seems to amount almost to an instinct in the scientific mind. These qualities and his caution fitted him most excellently for the official position he held. Among modern archaeologists he was almost alone in withholding assent to the early date generally assigned to Greek antiquities of the Mycenaean period.

Small in stature, with a strongly-marked Scottish personality both in voice and feature, Murray was a favourite among his friends, a good public servant, and a loyal colleague. Yet he had the courage of his own convictions; and his outspokenness sometimes gave offence. But, if he did so, there could never be any question of his honesty of purpose. To see him at his best, was to get him to describe some favourite object of antiquity, when the subtle details were dwelt upon, the story warmed as it went on, the enthusiasm glowed, and the Scottish tone and accent, not unpleasing to a southern ear, became more and more marked till the end was reached. 'And how well he told it!' has been the remark of more than one listener made to the present writer. Of a healthy constitution and never afflicted with sickness, he did not appreciate the seriousness of the chill that was to prove fatal. After a few days' illness he died on the 5th of March, 1904.

Murray was an honorary LL.D. of Edinburgh; a Corresponding Member of the Royal Prussian Academy and of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres of the French Institute; a Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries, and a Vice-President of the Hellenic Society. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy, on the 1st of March, 1904.

E. MAUNDE THOMPSON.

APPENDIX

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACADEMIES
SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SECTION OF LETTERS

Thursday, May 26, 1904.

Present—

Prof. de Goeje, Amsterdam.
Prof. Diels, Berlin.
Prof. Pischel, Berlin.
Prof. Goldziher, Budapest.
Prof. Heiberg, Copenhagen.
Prof. Kielhorn, Gottingen.
Prof. Leo, Gottingen.
Rt. Hon. James Bryce, London.
Prof. Rhys Davids, London.
Sir C. P. Ilbert, London.
Sir R. C Jebb, London.
Sir A. Lyall, London.
Lord Reay, London.
Major Martin Hume, Madrid.
Prof. Krumbacher, Munich.
Mons. Boutroux, Paris.
Mons. Leroy-Beaulieu, Paris.
M. le Comte de Franqueville, Paris.
Mons. Lair, Paris.
Mons. Collignon, Paris.
Mons Paul Meyer, Paris.
Mons. Omont, Paris
Mons. Perrot, Paris.
Count Ugo Balzani, Rome.
Dr. Salemann, St. Petersburg.
Prof. Gomperz, Vienna.
Prof. J. von Karabacek, Vienna.
Prof. von Schroeder, Vienna.

Lord Reay (President of the British Academy), Vice-President, took the Chair at 10 15 a m.

1. Secretaries were appointed as follows:—

German . . .	Prof. K Krumbacher, Munich
French . . .	Mons. Paul Meyer, Paris.
English . . .	Prof. I Gollancz, Sec. Brit Acad.

2. Prof. Diels presented the Report from the Royal Academy of Sciences, Berlin, on the loan of MSS. No final action had yet been taken between the Governments of the different countries concerned, because an action of the Italian Government, tending to the same aim as suggested by the International Historical Congress in Rome, 1903, had crossed the diplomatic negotiations which had been approved by the Association in 1901, and had been entered upon by the Prussian Government. These negotiations had been carried on so far that there was every prospect of the agreement of Germany and Italy. Progress would probably be made by the Berlin Academy during the next year, if the initiative in the matter were left in its hands.

Prof. Goldziher spoke on the importance of including Oriental Libraries, more especially the Khedivial Library at Cairo, within the scope of the Berlin Academy's diplomatic action.

Prof. Salemann reported that the St. Petersburg Academy had called together a Conference to consider the proposals of the Berlin Academy, and that the proposals were approved for the various libraries represented, with the exception of the libraries of the Holy Synod (Klosterbibliotheken).

Prof. Karabacek stated that most of the Austrian Libraries were in favour of some such plan of action as that proposed by the Berlin Academy.

Mr. Bryce pointed out that, while the initiative might be left to Berlin, the Section could not commit itself to any definite agreement so far as the right of action of each Academy was concerned, more especially as regards the relation of the different Governments towards the various National Libraries concerned. He called attention to the fact that the Bodleian Library and other important public libraries were independent of the Government.

Sir C. P. Ilbert spoke to the same effect.

M. Paul Meyer discussed the methods at present in vogue, explained the French system, and was of opinion that the sending direct from library to library was more practicable than through the agency of the Foreign Office.

Sir A. Lyall referred to the practice of the India Office of sending direct to the applicant.

Count Balzani reported that the opinion in Italy was also favourable to the sending of MSS. direct from library to library without application to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A recommendation from the Historical Congress in Rome, on this subject, had been forwarded to the Minister of Public Instruction, and had been taken into favourable consideration.

After some further discussion the following recommendation was carried unanimously:—

'In adopting the Report of the Royal Academy of Sciences, Berlin, the Section recommends that the Berlin Academy, as the initiating Academy, should include within the scope of its diplomatic action the Khedivial Library at Cairo, in view of the importance of the MSS. in the Library for the purposes of Oriental research.'

'La Section adopte le rapport de l'Académie des Sciences de Berlin, et propose, à titre d'addition, de comprendre la bibliothèque Khédiviale du Caire, en raison de son importance pour les études orientales, dans le nombre des bibliothèques entre lesquelles le prêt mutuel des manuscrits peut avoir lieu.'

'Die Section nimmt den von der Berliner Akademie erstatteten Bericht entgegen und beschliesst, die Berliner als die initiierende Akademie moge ersucht werden, dahin zu wirken, dass in die auf Verleihung der Handschriften gerichtete diplomatische Aktion auch die Khedivialbibliothek in Kairo einbezogen werde, da die erleichterte Benutzung der handschriftlichen Schatze dieser Bibliothek für die europaischen Orientalisten von hervorragender Wichtigkeit ist.'

3. The Section considered the plan for a critical edition of the Mahābhārata submitted by the Academies of Gottingen, Leipzig, Munich, and Vienna. A 'Promemoria uber den Plan einer kritischen Ausgabe der Mahābhārata' was presented by the initiating Academies, drawn up by Profs. Jacobi in Bonn, Luders in Rostock, and Winternitz in Prag.

L'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (Institut de France) submitted by M. Perrot a statement urging that, while every effort should be made to hasten the preparation of the work, no definite steps should be taken so far as its actual carrying out was concerned —'Note de la Commission chargée d'examiner le projet tendant à la publication d'une édition critique de Mahābhārata.'

After some remarks from Prof. Kielhorn in support of the plan drawn up by Profs. Jacobi, Luders, and Winternitz, Prof. Pischel dealt with the objections advanced by the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres He was of opinion that the difficulties to be overcome in publishing a critical edition of the Mahābhārata had been exaggerated in the Note of the Institut de France. The Javanese and Canarese versions were not to be taken into account, since they were no exact translations but free versions. The same held good of Kshemendra's work. Moreover, if a critical edition of the Mahābhārata was deferred, the difficulties twenty or thirty years hence would by no means be lessened, but would very probably be even greater. Now there were at least four accomplished scholars who know the Mahābhārata thoroughly—Profs. Hopkins, Jacobi, Luders, and Winternitz, who were willing to undertake the heavy task. This might not be the case later on. He had himself collated parts of a very good MS in Berlin which contained very important readings, and would greatly improve the published texts of the Mahābhārata. He asked the Association to approve of the plan laid before it.

Prof. von Schroeder spoke against any delay in the carrying out of the plan. He presented a preliminary proposal made by the Publisher, Herr Alfred Holder, of Vienna, who was willing, if the project received the strong support of the Association, to undertake most of the financial burden, at all events to bring to accomplishment the realization of the project so far as publication was concerned.

Prof. Leo pointed out that the undertaking could not be described as the work of the Association, for the Association in its corporate capacity did not undertake any definite project, but merely supported

by its authority proposals initiated by constituent Academies. It was of great importance that the resolution passed in respect of the present project should make this clear.

Prof. Rhys Davids and Prof. de Goeje spoke also in support, and after much discussion Prof. Kielhorn's motion was carried unanimously:—

> 'The Section declares that the intended edition of the Mahābhārata is of general scientific importance, and expresses its approval and appreciation of the preparatory work already undertaken, and trusts the project will be carried through to a successful issue.'

> 'La Section est d'avis que l'édition de Mahābhārata proposée par les Académies de Gottingen, Leipzig, Munich et Vienne présente un intérêt très général; elle apprécie hautement l'importance des travaux préparatoires faits en vue de cette édition, et espère que cette œuvre considérable pourra être conduite à bonne fin.'

> 'Bezuglich der von den Akademien Gottingen, Leipzig, Munchen, Wien geplanten Mahābhārata-Ausgabe erklart die Section, dass diese Ausgabe von grossem allgemeinem wissenschaftlichem Interesse ist, begleitet die in Angriff genommenen Vorarbeiten mit ihrer Billigung und Sympathie und spricht ihre Hoffnung aus, dass das Unternehmen zu erfolgreichem Abschluss gefuhrt werden moge.'

4. Prof. de Goeje presented the following Report on the Encyclopaedia of Islam.—

La commission des délégués des Académies, chargée de la surveillance de l'Encyclopédie de l'Islam, avait désigné MM. Karabacek, Goldziher et moi pour rédiger un règlement. Nous n'avons pu nous acquitter de ce mandat que vers la fin de l'été 1902; en Novembre j'ai pu faire parvenir aux Académies ce règlement et j'y ai ajouté une évaluation des frais de l'entreprise, en priant les Académies de vouloir bien accorder un subside — de préférence un subside annuel pour la durée de dix ans — afin que le projet de publication pût se réaliser.

De leur côté, MM. les rédacteurs Houtsma et Herzsohn ont continué à travailler à la composition d'un index alphabétique des articles que l'Encyclopédie devra comprendre. M. Houtsma ne pouvait y donner qu'une petite partie de son temps, et l'on n'osa pas choisir d'autres collaborateurs, tant qu'on n'avait pas la certitude de pouvoir disposer des fonds nécessaires. Au cours de 1903 des subsides ont été accordés par les Académies d'Amsterdam, de Budapest, de Copenhague, de Leipzig, de Saint-Pétersbourg, et aussi par l'Académie de Madrid, à laquelle j'avais adressé les mêmes pièces qu'aux autres Académies. Je reçus encore une promesse officielle de la part de l'Académie dei Lincei à Rome et une promesse officieuse de la part de l'Académie de Vienne. On a déjà choisi un collaborateur, bientôt on en nommera

un second. M. Houtsma m'a écrit qu'il espère pouvoir terminer l'index des articles vers la fin de l'année Cette liste sera envoyée d'abord au Comité de Rédaction, puis à tous les membres de la Commission, qui indiqueront en marge les articles qu'ils désireront voir retranchés ou ajoutés. Dès que l'index sera définitivement arrêté, les articles seront répartis entre les divers collaborateurs. Je puis donc, à ma grande satisfaction, assurer l'Association des Académies que l'entreprise est en marche et sera continuée et menée énergiquement à terme, pourvu seulement que les sommes indispensables à l'exécution ne fassent pas défaut. C'est pourquoi je prends la liberté de prier les Académies qui n'ont pas encore pris une décision sur ma demande, d'accorder un subside. Je serais très heureux si les Académies de Berlin et de Gottingen elles-aussi voulaient prendre ma demande en considération sérieuse, maintenant qu'elles ont la certitude que la publication de l'œuvre ne dépend plus que de la question de savoir si la Commission pourra disposer de fonds suffisants.

L'Académie de Madrid a délégué M. F. Codera y Zaidin pour la représenter dans la Commission. Les Académies de Christiania, de Munich et de Stockholm n'ont pas encore désigné un de leurs membres pour faire partie de la Commission.

Prof. Goldziher, in supporting the Report, expressed the hope that the Association would eventually be able to give substantial support to the Encyclopaedia. He called attention to the fact that at the International Oriental Congress held in London in 1892, Prof. Robertson Smith had given the first impetus to the undertaking; he pointed out the great importance of the work, especially so far as English interests were concerned.

Mr. Bryce expressed the hope that the project would be favourably considered by the India Office, the Government of India, and the authorities in Egypt. He also emphasized their indebtedness to the late Prof. Robertson Smith.

Sir Alfred Lyall spoke also in support.

After an expression of thanks from the Chair to Prof. de Goeje the Report was approved and adopted, in the following terms :—

'The Section approves and adopts Prof. de Goeje's Report on the Encyclopaedia of Islam, and desires to record its thanks to him for the plan which he has presented.'

'La Section donne son approbation au rapport présenté par M. le Prof. de Goeje, de Leyde, et lui adresse ses remerciements pour le plan qu'il lui a présenté.'

'Die Section billigt den von Prof. de Goeje uber die Encyclopaedie des Islam ausgearbeiteten Plan und spricht ihm hiefur ihren Dank aus.'

5. Prof. Krumbacher presented to the Section, on behalf of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences, the plan for a Corpus of Greek Records of Mediaeval and Modern Times :—'Plan eines Corpus der

griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit.' The plan, prepared by Prof. Krumbacher and Prof. Jireček of Vienna (drawn up in accordance with the resolution passed at the first General Assembly of the International Association of Academies at Paris in 1901), deals with the contents, scope, grouping, and technical arrangement of the Corpus. Appended to the plan is a 'Register uber das Byzantinische und Neugriechische Urkundenmaterial, angefertigt, mit Unterstutzung des Thereianosfonds der Konigl. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, von Paul Marc.' To this register, Prof. Sp. Lampros, Athens, has contributed an appendix of bibliographical references to Records published and unpublished.

Prof. Krumbacher reported that the Bavarian Academy had undertaken, as a further preliminary, to photograph the materials existing in Egypt and on Sinai. The work had been entrusted to Dr. Themistocles Bolides, Cairo, a Greek scholar, educated at Munich. In the carrying out of the work generally, part of the cost would be defrayed from the 'Thereianos' fund of the Bavarian Academy. There was a prospect of a small grant from the Vienna Academy, also from the University of Athens, the Archaeological Society of Greece, and from the Greek Government; but help was much to be wished for from other constituent Academies.

As regards the grouping of the material, it was a question whether the geographical arrangement followed in the plan, or the *provenance* of the records should form the basis; probably some compromise would be necessary.

Prof. Diels regretted that the Berlin Academy could not give material assistance to the work.

Prof. Salemann stated that the St. Petersburg Academy had at its disposal a fund for the publication of the Greek Records at Athos.

Prof. Goldziher hoped to be able to gain some support for the project from the Hungarian Academy.

Dr. Gomperz expressed his profound sympathy with the project, and his hope that the Academy of Vienna would give it some material support and effective co-operation.

M. Perrot reported that the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres regarded the programme as set forth in the plan with very great favour.

Count Balzani stated that he had not received any definite instructions from the Accademia dei Lincei, but he was sure that the Academy could not but regard with favour a work of so much interest for the history of Italy, and would always be willing to support it to the best of its power.

The following resolution was carried unanimously:—

'The Section approves of the plan of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences for a Corpus of Greek Records, and expresses the hope that the work may be carried out on the lines indicated.'

'La Section donne son approbation au projet présenté par l'Académie des Sciences de Bavière, et exprime l'espoir que l'œuvre pourra être conduite à bonne fin conformément au plan détaillé qui lui a été soumis.'

'Die Section erklart, dass sie den von der Munchener und Wiener Akademie ausgearbeiteten "Plan eines Corpus der griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit" billigt und die Weiterfuhrung des Werkes auf dieser Grundlage fur wunschenswert halt.'

6. In submitting to the Section the proposition of the British Academy to consider a project for constructing a new Thesaurus of ancient Greek, Sir R. C. Jebb spoke as follows:—

'The material for a Greek Thesaurus has been increased in recent years by an abundance of new documents, both epigraphic and literary. This fact suggests that the time is opportune for considering the position of Greek lexicography. A great Latin Thesaurus is now in process of publication. A like aid to the advancement of Greek philology is not less desirable.

'There is no lexicon or thesaurus of Greek similar in compass or scope to the new Latin Thesaurus. Indeed, for a vast quantity of Greek literature posterior to Aristotle there is no one lexicon adequate even to the ordinary needs of a student.

'Signal progress has been made during the last fifty years in Greek philological research. With a view to further progress, no help could be more important than such as would be afforded by a thesaurus embodying the results already achieved, and conforming to the best modern standard of exactitude and thoroughness.

'With regard to the question of chronological limit, it may be suggested that a natural terminus would be the early part of the seventh century (*circa* 630 A. D.). Up to that date the stream of Greek literature is practically continuous, after it, there is a long interval in which scarcely any literary material occurs. On the other hand, the field of Mediaeval Greek is so wide as to claim separate lexicographical treatment.

'Such a Greek Thesaurus as is here contemplated would evidently demand international co-operation. It could be carried to a successful issue only by the joint labours of very numerous workers, representing the Greek scholarship of Europe and America. Before a commencement could be made, some considerable time would be required for the preliminary work of planning and organizing. That work might be entrusted to an International Committee, with auxiliary committees for the several countries interested. The procedure adopted in respect to the Latin Thesaurus might probably afford valuable guidance.

'Meanwhile the British Academy is desirous of learning whether, in the opinion of the Associated Academies, such a project is deserving of consideration.'

Prof. Diels, on behalf of the Berlin Academy, while expressing the fullest sympathy with the project, spoke of the difficulty of the work as compared even with the stupendous labour of the Latin Thesaurus; it was not merely a matter of dealing with words, the shades of thought and the history of thought would demand the utmost preliminary consideration, and the preliminary preparations for a Greek Thesaurus could not be made too soon. A Committee might well be appointed to consider the necessary preparatory steps. Prof. Diels further referred to the 'Corpus Medicorum Antiquorum,' a project of the Berlin Academy, as a contribution to one particular department of Greek lexicography.

M. Perrot spoke in support of the proposition.

Prof. Leo gave the result of his experience in respect of the Latin Thesaurus. The preparation of textual materials would in the case of a Greek Lexicon be even more necessary than in the case of the Latin Thesaurus. The Academy he represented, though much occupied with the Latin Thesaurus, nevertheless would to the best of its ability advise the present proposal, more especially in the matter of the preliminary work.

Prof. Gomperz suggested as a preliminary the foundation of an international Periodical dealing with Greek lexicography, which would deal with problems of Greek words from the various aspects, etymological, as well as semasiological.

Prof. Krumbacher, in the name of the Bavarian Academy, expressed warm sympathy with the proposal of the British Academy; he was not in favour, however, of the terminus suggested, *circa* 630 A. D., and pointed out that many old Greek words are found for the first time in Byzantine authors; he considered that the question of a Lexicon of old Greek brought into prominence the question of a new middle Greek Lexicon. He approved heartily of Prof. Gomperz's excellent suggestion as to the foundation of an 'Archiv für griechische Lexikographie.'

M. Paul Meyer thought that no better plan could be followed than that of the New English Dictionary.

Mr. Bryce was of opinion that nothing that had been said was inconsistent with Sir R. C. Jebb's proposal.

The following resolutions were carried unanimously:—

'The Section approves of the proposal by the British Academy to consider a project for constructing a new Thesaurus of Ancient Greek. The Section further recommends the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry to consider method, means, and preliminary questions in connexion with the proposal, and nominates the following as Members of the Committee—Sir R. C. Jebb, Professors Diels, Gomperz, Heiberg, Krumbacher, Leo, and M. Perrot, with power to co-opt one or more Members of the respective Academies.'

'La Section exprime sa sympathie pour le projet présenté par l'Académie Britannique. Elle émet l'avis qu'il y aurait lieu de nommer une commission chargée de faire un rapport sur la méthode à suivre et sur les questions préliminaires que soulève la proposition. Elle désigne pour faire partie de cette commission Sir Rich. C. Jebb, et les Professeurs Diels, Gomperz, Heiberg, Krumbacher, Leo et Perrot, qui auraient la faculté de s'adjoindre d'autres membres de leurs académies respectives par cooptation.'

'Die Section aussert ihre Sympathie fur den von der British Academy vorgelegten Plan eines griechischen Thesaurus und halt es fur wunschenswert, eine Kommission zu wahlen, um einen Bericht uber die bei dem Werke zu befolgende Methode und uber die notwendigen Vorarbeiten auszuarbeiten. Die Section ernennt als Mitglieder dieser Kommission Sir Richard Jebb, die Professoren H. Diels, Th. Gomperz, J. L. Heiberg, K. Krumbacher, F. Leo und M. G. Perrot, mit der Befugnis, neue Mitglieder aus den constituierenden Akademien zu kooptieren.'

In the course of the sitting, the Chairman submitted to the Meeting whether the question of the 'International Auxiliary Language' should be considered, although not included in the Agenda. From many quarters applications had been made that the subject might be discussed in some form or other. Professor Goldziher and M. Perrot spoke against the suggested discussion, the former maintaining that the matter was a general question of international intercommunication, and did not specifically affect scientific interests; the latter announced that he had been commissioned by the Académie des Inscriptions to oppose the consideration of this subject. The matter then dropped.

The Section then adjourned till the afternoon.

Thursday, May 26, 1904. Afternoon Sitting.

The Chair was taken by Lord Reay, Vice-President, at 2.30 o'clock.

7. In respect of the Corpus Medicorum Antiquorum (transferred to this Section from the Section of Science), Prof. Diels, on behalf of the Academies of Berlin and Copenhagen, asked that the submitting of the plan might be deferred till the next Meeting of the Association. Accordingly the following resolution was put to the Meeting and carried unanimously.—

'The Section agrees to the proposition of the Academies of Berlin and Copenhagen to defer the submitting of the plan of the work till the next Meeting of the Association.'

'La Section approuve la proposition faite par les Académies de Berlin et de Copenhague de remettre à la prochaine réunion de l'Association l'examen du plan à suivre.'

'Die Section billigt den Vorschlag der Akademien Berlin und Kopenhagen, einen genauen Plan des Werkes der nachsten Generalversammlung vorzulegen.'

8. In the absence of M. Glasson, the writer of the Mémoire, M le Comte de Franqueville presented to the Section the memorandum submitted by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques on the civil condition of foreigners in France —'Mémoire sur la condition civile des étrangers en France, par E. Glasson.'

Sir C. P. Ilbert said that they all regretted M. Glasson's absence, and still more the cause to which it was due He was well known in England through his learned and valuable history of English laws and institutions, and no one would have received a warmer welcome if he had been able to attend. M. Glasson had submitted for the consideration of the Association a Mémoire which abounded in points of interest to the jurist and to the legislator. He had described in it the position of the foreigner under early French law and the causes which had operated to remove his legal disadvantages and disabilities. He had shown how the *droit d'aubaine* was formally abolished by the constituent assembly, how the Code Civil, which based the civil rights of the foreigner on the principle of reciprocity as distinguished from the principle of equality, represented a partial reaction, but how a step forward was again made when the old *droit d'aubaine* was finally and effectively abolished in 1819. M. Glasson had then traced the subsequent condition of French law in *doctrine*, *jurisprudence*, and *legislation* respectively, and had touched on certain recent tendencies of legislation which appeared to him to be of a reactionary character It would be impossible to discuss this aspect of the subject without trespassing on the forbidden ground of politics, but it was satisfactory to find that the present tendency of recent European legislation was to place the civil rights of the foreigner in a position of equality with those of the citizen or subject.
The Mémoire did not raise any specific question for discussion or decision, but was intended rather as a contribution to the scientific study of a subject of unbounded interest and importance. Under these circumstances he proposed a cordial vote of thanks to M. Glasson for his valuable contribution.

M. Leroy-Beaulieu was of opinion that M. Glasson's Mémoire might form a basis of similar studies as regards other countries, though France, owing to the larger proportion of foreigners among its inhabitants, was primarily interested in the subject. It was not merely a question of civil right (*droit civil*), but also from the point of view of work and workmen (*du code de travail ou du code ouvrier*). The Association would probably decline to consider the latter aspect; he thought this would be a mistake, for though the Association was not a legislative body, yet it might prepare material and collect statistics which could not in any way excite the susceptibilities of Governments, and such work the Association might well encourage. He strongly advised that the Association should promote investiga-

tions similar to those of M. Glasson, to be carried out in different countries in respect of the condition of foreigners (*tant pour le droit civil que pour le régime de travail*).

Prof. Diels and Prof. Gomperz took part in the discussion, the former pointed out the danger of the Association assuming anything approaching a legislative or political subject; the latter thought that purely scientific investigation of the kind might carefully be kept from trenching on any dangerous ground, and that too great a fear of touching the susceptibilities of Governments might have the effect of narrowing the scope of the work of the Association.

Mr. Bryce dwelt on the question of private law, and pointed out how it went back into history, and had its roots in the past. He referred to the private law of the United States 'that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal rights.'

The Chairman was of opinion that the subject had been admirably treated by M. Glasson, and he agreed with M. Leroy-Beaulieu that it might form a basis of similar status as regards other countries. It could be dealt with from a purely scientific point of view as a question of comparative legislation He did not see why it should not take into consideration labour laws and the legal condition of workmen. Political susceptibilities need not be roused, and he felt sure that as regards England there need be no fear of such a contingency. He cordially concurred in the vote of thanks moved by Sir Courtenay Ilbert. He trusted that at their next Meeting they would be able to consider reports, similar to that of M. Glasson, from other countries, and one from the United States of America would be of special interest.

The matter was exceedingly important with reference to the status of Orientals in Colonies and Western States.

The following resolution was carried unanimously:—

'The Section expresses its cordial thanks to M. Glasson for his Mémoire on the civil condition of Foreigners in France, and considers it would be desirable that investigations of a like character should be carried out in all countries represented by the constituent Academies of the Association.'

'La Section adresse ses remerciements à M. Glasson pour son mémoire sur la condition civile des étrangers en France, et considère comme désirable que des travaux du même genre soient composés dans les divers pays représentés à l'Association des Académies.'

'Die Section dankt Herrn Glasson für sein Memorandum über die rechtliche Stellung der Fremden in Frankreich und hält es für wünschenswert, dass Arbeiten der gleichen Art in allen in der Assoziation vertretenen Ländern ausgeführt werden.'

9. The proposition of the British Academy in respect of the new Pali Dictionary was submitted to the Section by Prof. Rhys Davids, who made the following statement:—

'The only Pali Dictionary is that of Childers. It was published when only a few texts had been edited, and it is now out of print. Since it was published, nearly the whole of the canonical Pali books and a number of later works have, chiefly through the Pali Text Society, been edited. That Society has now, therefore, organized a scheme for the publication of a new Dictionary, and has secured the co-operation of the following scholars:—

Geheimrath Dr. Ernst Windisch, Professor at the University of Leipzig.
Dr. Richard Pischel, Professor at the University of Berlin.
Dr. Wilhelm Geiger, Professor at the University of Erlangen.
Dr. Edmund Hardy, Emeritus Professor of the University of Freiburg, Sub-Editor.
Dr. W. H. D. Rouse, Head Master of the Perse School, Cambridge, England.
Dr. M. H. Bode, of the University of Bern, Switzerland.
Mr. Charles R. Lanman, Professor of Sanskrit at Harvard College, Cambridge, Mass
Dr. Sten Konow, of the University of Christiania, Norway.
Dr. Dines Andersen, Professor at the University of Copenhagen.
Prof. Rhys Davids, Professor at the London University, Editor.

'The general lines on which the work will be carried out have been settled. The work has been divided out among the collaborators, who are already at work. Estimates have been received from the printers, and the Pali Text Society, which has not the necessary funds in hand, proposes to issue an appeal to raise the money to pay for the work.

'Under these circumstances, as the projected undertaking is important for the study of Indian history and philology, and is a typical instance of organized international effort in the cause of research, it is desirable that the International Association should be afforded an opportunity of expressing its opinion.'

Prof. Pischel, in support of the proposition, pointed out that Childers' Dictionary was long out of print, and that at the time of its publication hardly one of the old canonical books in Pali had appeared in print; it was due to the energy and zeal of Prof. Rhys Davids, who started the Pali Text Society, that now nearly the whole canon of the southern Buddhists and parts of the commentaries were before us; they contained an enormous mass of words which did not occur in Sanskrit, but were of great importance to the history of the Indian languages. He asked the Association to approve of the proposition laid before it.

After some observations from the Chair, the following resolution was adopted unanimously:—

'The Section expresses its satisfaction at the prospect of a new Pali Dictionary being brought out by the Pali Text Society, and hopes that an international undertaking so important for

the study of Indian history and philology will be brought to a successful conclusion.'

'La Section, approuvant la proposition faite par l'Académie Britannique, exprime sa satisfaction au sujet de la publication proposée d'un dictionnaire pali, qui doit être publié par la Pali Text Society, et espère qu'une entreprise d'une aussi grande importance pour l'histoire et la philologie indiennes pourra être conduite à bonne fin.'

'Die Section billigt den Plan eines neuen von der Pali Text Society auszuführenden Palilexicons, und hofft, dass ein für die indische Geschichte und Philologie so erhebliches Werk zum gedeihlichen Abschluss gelangen möge.'

M. le Comte de Franqueville moved a vote of thanks to Lord Reay for the manner in which he had discharged his duties as Chairman. Lord Reay responded.

The Sitting was then concluded.